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Portrait of Sir Charles Trevelyan at the Treasury, c. 1847-50, 
engraved by F. Joubert after a painting by E.U. Eddis. Trevelyan's 
preoccupations with Irish relief and the Commissariat are indicated 
by the titles of blue books and manuals.
Source: British Museum, Department of Prints and Drawings.
The print is incorrectly named as Sir Randolph Routh, probably 
due to his name appearing on the spine of one of the books. However 
Routh would have been over sixty at the time of the sitting, and 
the portrait is recognisably Trevelyan when compared with a later 
wood engraving from a photograph (illustrated London News, XXXIV, 
1859, p.333). The Joubert engraving is also reproduced in C. Woodham 
Smith, The Great Hunger (I962).
(iv)
ABSmCT
Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan, Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, l840-59
Trevelyan brought from his early service in India a strong distrust of 
government intervention in economic matters and a belief in the political and 
administrative significance of popular education. At the Treasury he was 
concerned in more routine matters in the general supervision of a supervisory 
department and in the gradual extension to other departments of Treasury 
control, including improved techniques of estimate and audit. The limitations 
for individual influence in this work made him appreciate the scope for reform 
and innovation in his investigation of government departments that began in 
l848 and culminated in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853» Based on his 
experience of the Treasury his original overall objective had been to ensure 
a separation between "intellectual" and "mechanical" work in the Civil Service, 
but Gladstone gave the question a new twist with his insistence on open 
competition for most first appointments. The Whigs in the Aberdeen coalition 
were not prepared for this proposal, and Trevelyan’s critical and tactless 
comments on the quality of Civil Service personnel ensured maximum opposition 
from his colleagues. The half-hearted compromise of limited competition was 
a disappointment. Other related concerns were the reform of superannuation 
and provision of office buildings. Management of the Commissariat until 
1854 gave Trevelyan scope for executive action, and provided the setting and 
key personnel for his single-handed overall supervision of Irish relief under 
the Russell administration. Here, Trevelyan had the satisfaction of applying 
his theories of economic non-intervention rigorously in a unique situation 
of administrative autonomy. His interest in the Commissariat promotion 
system led him to express critical concern over purchase of commissions in 
the army itself. Trevelyan concluded his public service by two brief 
periods in India between 1859 and I865.
(v)
A NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES
Place of publication is London except where otherwise stated
Add. MS. British Museum, Additional Manuscript
Debates Parliamentary Debates, 3rd. series
Hughenden Disraeli Papers
I.O.R. India Office Records
P.P. British Parliamentary Papers (sessional volume number 
followed by manuscript volume page number)
P.R.O. Public Record Office
T.L.B. Trevelyan Letter Books
(vi)
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
Charles Edward Trevelyan already exists as a substantial 
figure in nineteenth-century British history, and the purpose of 
this study is to attempt an analysis of a number of his activities 
and interests during his period as Assistant Secretary to the 
Treasury from I84O to 1859* This period can only be adequately 
viewed in the context of his whole career, which begins and ends 
in the service of the East India Company# Indeed, without considering 
the place of India in Trevelyan's life it is scarcely possible to 
understand and to appreciate a number of the moral and administrative 
attitudes that he exhibited in his work at the Treasury. For this 
reason, the two periods of Indian service from 1825 to I84O and from 
1859 to I865 are each given a chapter.
Trevelyan's work at the Treasury can be broken down into 
five main inter-related areas for thematic treatments
1 The organization of the Treasury, particularly the role 
of Assistant Secretary within it.
2 The extension of Treasury influence over other departments.
5 The reform of the Civil Service, including reform of the
superannuation system and the improvement of government 
office buildings.
4 Management of the Commissariat Department until 1854*
5 Army reform.
Of these. Civil Service reform is the most significant and three 
chapters are devoted to it. Yet the less obviously important 
aspects of his work, as for example with the Commissariat, shed 
light upon Trevelyan's attitudes to more central issues.
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Furthermore it is in such unspectacular and routine activities that 
Trevelyan gained immense personal and professional satisfaction.
In many respects it is not too difficult to document Trevelyan's 
involvement in Treasury affairs. Despite the anonymity of most of 
the official records, Trevelyan's contribution can often be discerned 
in minutes and endorsements. Furthermore he was quick to offer 
expositions of his views on a wide range of administrative topics.
Yet here veiy often resides the limitation of the subject; Trevelyan 
usually only speaks in a public or semi-public capacity and rarely 
(even in his semi-official Treasury letter books) does he offer 
any direct insight into the way his ideas developed. This is due 
to the absence of personal papers and diaries, and of anything 
approaching personal recollection on the part of his contemporaries. 
Thus the austere facade of the public figure - a facade that 
Trevelyan hardly deserved, but came to cultivate - prevails. 
Nevertheless there are clues to indicate that the picture of 
inflexible moral rigour that Trollope satirised as Sir Gregory 
Hardlines in The Three Clerks was overdrawn.
In order to make good this dearth of personal material, it is 
intended to provide an initial brief outline of Trevelyan's early life 
and a few indications about the nature of his family life and leisure 
activities.
1 Early Life
Charles Edward Trevelyan was born on 2 April 1807* He was the 
fourth son of George Trevelyan, rector of Nettlecombe in Devon, who 
was himself the third son of Sir John Trevelyan, from whom he had
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received the family living. As the younger son of a younger son 
Charles Trevelyan had little prospect of inheritance and thus the 
success or failure of his career was to he determined hy his own 
efforts and to a lesser degree by the effectiveness of his connections.
Trevelyan's education began at Taunton Grammar School and was 
continued at Charterhouse. Whereas the former was obscure and little- 
known, the latter was acquiring distinction in this period as a 
school for the sons of the London merchant class. Under its energetic 
headmaster, John Russell, Charterhouse expanded rapidly - a success 
that was due not only to its popularity, but also to the application 
to the sons of the middle class of the monitorial system that Andrew 
Bell had advocated for the children of the poor. This rather mechanical 
instructional system provided Trevelyan with the rudiments of classical 
education - something that he was at least able to build upon during 
his later service in India. It is more difficult to judge the degree 
to which this rather limited education enabled Trevelyan to think 
of administrative problems in mechanistic terms and to ignore the 
intangible psychological and emotional aspects of administration.
In more immediate terms. Charterhouse more than adequately prepared 
Trevelyan for the intellectually undemanding climate of the East 
India Company's College at Haileybuiy. Consideration of this stage 
of Trevelyan's education will be left to the next chapter.
2 Family Life and Leisure Activities
Trevelyan was twice married. His first wife was Hannah, the 
favoaiite sister of Thomas Babbington Macaulay - a connection which 
was to be decisive in the development of his career since it was 
instrumental in bringing him from India to the Treasury. It was also
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through this connection with Macaulay that most ligbt is shed on 
the Trevelyan household, or rather as a result of Macaulay's 
affection for the children of this marriage, Margaret Jean and 
George Otto. Macaulay's attachment to the family had the result 
of inducing George Otto to devote his literary talents to praise 
of his uncle rather than of his father. On Macaulay's death his 
unpublished papers, letters and journals passed first to his sister 
and then in trust to Margaret and George. The latter became in effect 
his uncle's literary executor, and he published in 18?6 his Life and 
Letters of Lord Macaulay. It is from this oblique source that most 
references to the family are derived. Bearing this in mind, it is 
not surprising that Trevelyan appears as a shadowy figure in his 
domestic setting. It is unfortunate that George Otto never attempted 
to redress the balance in favour of his father by writing a filial 
biography.
The nature of this evidence makes it difficult to assess the 
extent to which Trevelyan's private life had a bearing on his 
public life, but it has been suggested that Hannah exercised a 
restraining influence over Trevelyan's rash and impatient temperament, 
and that when this influence could not be present at the time of 
Trevelyan's return to India as Govenor of Madras there was nothing 
to moderate the conflict that arose between him and the Supreme 
Government. Hannah died in 1875 &nd two years later Trevelyan 
married Eleanor Anne Campbell, the daughter of Walter Campbell 
of Islay.
For most of his life Trevelyan was dependent on his salary.
Only in 1876 did he acquire the status and income of a country
“ 5 -
gentleman through inheritance from his cousin of the Wellington
Estate in Northumberland. Trevelyan devoted much of the remainder
of his life to improving the estate. He died in London in 1886.
There are few insights into Trevelyan's leisure activities
for he neither admitted to carefree pleasures nor rejoiced in
describing them. His interests were certainly serious and it is
probable that he retained that characteristic, noted by Macaulay
in India, of having "no small talk".^ Macaulay himself seems to
have had a considerable softening influcence on the Trevelyan family,
particularly as a result of his great affection for his sister, Hannah,
and his nièce, Margaret. Unlike Trevelyan, Macaulay had time to devote
to the family, frequently visiting his niece and nephew at Clapham
and Westbourne Terrace and when they were older taking them on numerous,
2
sometimes semi-educational,visits of London. George Otto Trevelyan 
describes how Macaulay also used to organize educational visits for 
the whole family:
Regularly every Easter, when the closing of the public offices 
drove my father from the Treasury for a brief holiday, Macaulay 
took our family on a tour among Cathedral-towns, varied by 
an occasional visit to the Universities. We started on the 
Thursday; spent Good Friday in one city and Easter Sunday in 
another, and went back to town on the Monday. This year it 
was Worcester and Gloucester; the next York and Lincoln; 
then Lichfield and Chester, Norwich and Peterborou^, Ely 
and Cambridge, Salisbury and Winchester. Now and then the
1 G.O. Trevelyan, The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay (enlarged ed,
1908), po 279.
2 Ibid., pp.485, 492. G.O. Trevelyan makes a point of describing 
Macaulay's extreme sensibility and modesty. Was this in contrast 
to his experience of his father's manner? (ibid., 490-491»)
routine was interrupted by a trip to Paris, or to the 
great churches on the Loire; but in the course of twenty 
years we had inspected at least once all the Cathedrals 
of England, or indeed of England and Wales, for we carried our 
researches after ecclesiastical architecture as far down in 
the list aà Bangor. "Our party just filled a railway 
carriage", says Lady Trevelyan, "and the journey found his 
flow of spirits unfailing. It was a return to old times; 
a running fire of jokes, rhymes, puns, never ceasing. It
was a peculiarity of his that he never got tired on a journey.
As the day wore on he did not feel the desire to lie back and 
be quiet, and he liked to find his companions ready to be 
entertained to the last." ^
It is dangerous to argue from a book in praise of Macaulay about 
the apparently passive role of Trevelyan. Yet it is clear that 
Macaulay was the dominant figure in the life of the Trevelyans ; not 
for nothing had he attached so much importance to finding Trevelyan 
a post in England in order to remain close to his sister and her 
children. Trevelyan respected Macaulay's intellectual interests 
and conformed with his plans. In 1847 this resulted in his refusing
the offer of a fishing holiday - an activity which, one supposes,
might have been more relaxing after the hectic activity of the 
Irish emergency than the proposed tour of York and Lincoln cathedrals. 
When Trevelyan himself felt the need for relaxation it was often 
for therapeutic reasons. In July 1847 be wrote to Routh that 
he was taking a fortnight's holiday "in order to keep myself in
1 Ibid., II,p495-
2 Trevelyan to Rev. G.O. Trevelyan (his brother), 9 March 1847, 
T.L.B., XIII,p 11.
2
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good working trim."^ In October 1848 he confessed to a Saturday
afternoon train excursion to Hastings, taken only because he had 
2
not felt well. The same attitude appears to have characterised 
his attitude to alcohol: while disapproving of excessive consumption 
of beer and cider, he remarked on one occasion: "I can testify from
my personal experience that a glass of pale ale does me more good 
when I come home tired of an evening than anything else I can eat 
or drink.Trevelyan's total involvement in his work at the 
Treasury left him virtually no energy for other pursuits, even if 
he had felt entitled to engage in them.
One unfortunate consequence of Trevelyan's apparent small 
regard for social entertainment is the difficulty of determining 
with any accuracy his circle of friends. His letter books do not 
contain lists of guests at dinner parties, from which one could build 
up a picture of his connections. Like so much of the evidence about 
Trevelyan's private affairs this is negative, and one is therefore 
reluctant to draw any firm conclusions. Yet one suspects that 
Trevelyan's austere manner and constant over-work precluded the 
development of a large circle of friends that spanned private and 
public life.^
1 Trevelyan to Routh, 26 July 1847, T.L.B., XVI^.92.
2 Trevelyan to Palgrave, 16 October 1848, T.L.B., XXIII,p.54•
5 Trevelyan to Walter Calverly Trevelyan, 27 July I846, T.L.B., VI,pl56.
4 Gladstone's lists of guests at his breakfast and dinner parties 
show Trevelyan attending on seven occasions in 1855 and 1854, but 
these were semi-official parties and often included other Treasury 
officials, e.g. Anderson, Arbuthnot, Stephenson (Add. MS. 44782 
fs. 18-55 passim).
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Chapter II 
INDIAN PRELUDE
Although the tasks of an English and an East Indian Civil 
Servant were usually very different, Trevelyan's education at the 
East India Company's College and his service in India from 1826 to 
1838 were decisive in forming many of his attitudes towards public 
business. The European Covenanted Civil Servants constituted an elite 
numbering between seven and eight hundred among the sub-continents 
population of about 150 million.^ Trevelyan inevitably brought to 
the Treasury some of the sense of moral authority that this isolation 
produced. When applied to English institutions, this attitude deeply 
offended his Civil Service colleagues. Of course it would be quite 
wrong to regard India as mere preface to Trevelyan's work at the 
Treasury. At the outset he must have expected to spend his entire 
working life there; furthermore he retained after his return to 
England an exceptionally strong interest in Indian affairs and a 
deep affection for the country itself. This continuing interest, 
and his subsequent appointment as Governor of Madras and later as 
Indian Finance Minister provide the subject of the final chapter.
1 East India College
Trevelyan's Indian career began with his nomination to a 
writership on 21 January 1824. Trevelyan had been recommended 
by his guardian, ¥, Thompson Hankey (banker. West Indian merchant 
and founder member of the British and Foreign Bible Society), to Neil 
Benjamin Edmonstone (East Indian Civil Servant, whose successful 
career had been rewarded by being made a director). The details
1 P.P., 1852-53, LXIX,p 64.
2 I.O.R., Committee of College References, XXXVII.
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surrounding his appointment are significant in that they illustrate 
the twin strands of evangelical conscience and professional zeal that 
combine to provide the personal motivation for his entire career.
In February 1824 at the age of sixteen and a half, Trevelyan
entered the East India Company's College at Haileybury. He later claimed
that he had been so conscious of his immaturity that he had stayed
at Charterhouse for an extra six months, rather than enter at the
minimum age of sixteen.^ Trevelyan's personal concern was matched
by the controversy that was then raging in East Indian circles over
the nature, and indeed the, continuance, of the education he was to
receive. Occasioned by the decennial renewal of the Company's Charter,
it manifested itself in a debate in the Court of Proprietors which
proceeded intermittently from December 1823 to March 1824» Although
it was on a motion to allow nominees to be educated elsewhere and
merely to take the final examination, if passed it would have resulted
2
in the rapid decline of the small college.
The East India College had been founded in 1806. Since 1813 no
nomination to a writership (the title given to a first appointment
in the Civil Service) could become effective unless the nominee attended 
the College for two years and received a certificate of competence. 
However since patronage in civil appointments.was regarded by the 
directors and stockholders who elected them as a valuable and 
legitimate benefit from holding East India stock as opposed to 
government stocks, this educational requirement was widely regarded 
as an unwarrantable interference. Attempts were made from time to
1 Trevelyan to ¥.B. Baring, 13 March 1843» T.L.B., IIJ)l66.
2 The Asiatic Journal, XVII (1824), P*51*
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time to discredit the college hy claiming that lax discipline increased
the risk of disorder among the students - hence expulsion and the
loss of valuable nomination. Certainly the allegations of violent
disorder and riots were exaggerated, although it is true that some
schoolboy pranks were ineptly handled by the College authorities.^
The actual risk of losing a nomination in this way was not very high,
for it was pointed out in 1824 that only twenty out of 271 entrants
2
had been expelled since the foundation of the College. Even a survival
rate of over ninety percent was not as satisfactory as absolute
certainty and it was generally recognized that misbehaviour or failure
at Haüeybury enabled the reluctant nominee to avoid going to India.
Although the motion to destroy Haileybuiy's preparatory monopoly was
lost by 400 to 272, the debate is of interest in discussing some of
the main moral and intellectual issues underlying the East India
5
Company's Civil Service. For example, it was argued that if England 
could manage without specially trained Civil Servants, so also could 
India.^ Indeed it was suggested that this special education made 
for conceit. "At the Haileybury College they are all alike to be 
Indian statesmen." By contrast the argument in favour of the 
continuance of the College concentrated on the need to establish moral 
as well as intellectual fitness.^ This view had already been expressed 
in a pamphlet by Thomas Maithus, the Professor of Political Economy,
1 Lawrence Lowell, Colonial Civil Service; The Selection and Training 
of Colonial Officials in England. Holland and France (New York, I90O),
pp. 281, 299.
2 Lowell calculated that 88 percent of 1985 students admitted to the 
College between I806 and 1854 entered the Civil Service (p.504)*
5 The Asiatic Journal, XVII (1824), p.522.
4 Ibid., p. 535*
5 Ibid., p.522.
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when in I8I7 he had defended the College against similar criticisms.
Maithus had been anxious that any weakness should be revealed in 
England rather than in India, and he suggested that a salutary 
element of competition could be introduced if the Directors 
nominated one-fifth extra candidates.^ While this formula for 
improving the calibre of students may seem naive, it must be 
recognized that the existing system already brought forward able and 
conscientious students - students of the calibre of Trevelyan.
As a self-aware young man and as a pupil of Malthua^ Trevelyan must have 
been fully aware of the wide issues that underlay his education.
Of course the concept of intellectual and moral excellence attained 
throu^ competition and emulation was not peculiar to the Indian 
Service; it was part of a wider evangelical concern for testing 
human worth which for India manifested itself in these educational 
precautions against any kind of repetition of the corruption and 
opportunism of the nabobs of the previous century.
The course provided by Haileybury appeared much more impressive 
on paper than it did in practice. A great range of subjects was 
taught at a fairly low standard. With European subjects, insistence 
on Classics, Mathematics, Law, Political Economy and History meant 
that there was insufficient time for any specialization. As for the 
classical oriental languages - Sanscrit and Persian - the standard 
attained was usually negligible. Examinations for all subjects 
were broadly assessed^under the headings of "great proficiency",
"proficiency" and "little proficiency". The lowest assessment, 
unless it occurred only once in one of the European subjects.
1 T.R. Maithus. Statements respecting the East India College 
... in refutation of the charges lately brought against it. 
p.13. His arguments were partly based on those propounded by 
Wellesley in 1800 when he had attempted to found a College 
for Civil Servants at Port William.
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resulted in the term being repeated. In addition, numerous and
lavish book prizes and medals were awarded to those who performed
well in each subject, but the sheer quantity and frequency of these
rewards prevented their being a serious spur to exertion.^ Nevertheless,
Haileybury provided an ostensibly systematic education which Trevelyan
continued to regard with nostalgia and affection. Perhaps this was
not surprising, since he was among the best pupils of his year,
2
He gained prizes for Classics, Political Economy and Sanscrit. In 
his final examinations, he was placed first equal in Political 
Economy, while showing "proficiency" in Law and "little proficiency" 
in Mathematics.^ This result placed him in the first class and first 
among those leaving to serve in Bengal.^ Trevelyan was given another, 
and somewhat better, opportunity to prove his academic ability when 
he arrived in India in October 1826. As a Bengal Civilian he was 
obliged to attend the language college at Calcutta. However, he went 
far beyond obligation in passing the courses in the shortest time on
5
record: he passed Hindi in one month and Persian in two.
2 The Colebrooke Scandal
Trevelyan was so eager for his training to be put to a searching 
test, that he arranged to be posted as an assistant to the Commissioner 
at Delhi. In this way, we would be able to serve under Sir Charles 
Metcalfe, who - as an outstandingly successful Civil Servant - had
1 P.C. Danvers, M. Monier Williams and others. Memorials of Old 
Haileybury (I894), pp. 52-54*
2 Ibid., p.574. In all Trevelyan gained eight prizes and two medals 
5 I.O.R., Examinations, 1817-25, II.
4 I.O.R., Copies of Students Certificates, 1824-51» II*
5 The Asiatic Journal, X^XV (1828),p$57*
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become a model to emulate for the young Civil Servants of the decade*
However, he soon discovered that most of his work gave little scope
for emulation. He later recalled that his first task had been to
keep a diary of all correspondence as a means of keeping Calcutta
informed about all decisions. The East India Company's administrative
system demanded that each level of the hierarchy - from smallest
station to presidency - should transmit its decisions in the form
of diaries or general letters. Yet Trevelyan also managed to gain
some active experience, when on two occasions he was placed in charge
of a division of the Delhi agency. He had to assume all the functions
2of judge, magistrate and revenue collector. This was a challenging
situation for an ardent young Civil Servant. The Delhi territory
at that time has been described as "virgin administrative soil,
bereft of centralized authority, but with everywhere the signs of
former systems and rulers, offering a clear field for investigation,
3for speculation and construction." Unexpectedly, Trevelyan was 
to conduct his first investigation into an abuse of the English, not 
of the Indian, administration.
In June 1827, Trevelyan's fortunes underwent a radical change. 
Metcalfe was appointed a member of the Supreme Council. His 
replacement'was Sir Edward Colebrooke, a man at the close of his 
career with forty years' seniority. His attitude towards the ethics 
of administration was totally different from Metcalfe's: rather
1 Select Committee on Indian Territories, evidence of 26 May 1855,
P.P., 1852-55, XXVIII, 154* For a popular account of Trevelyan's
service in India see Humphrey Trevelyan, The India We Left (1972),pp.25-106«
2 Ibid., p.121
3 T.G.P. Spear, Twilight of the Mughuls (Cambridge, 1951), p.158.
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than encourage reform, he wad content to leave the existing system 
alone. All might have been well, if Colebrooke's traditional attitude 
had not led him into some equally traditional corrupt practices. 
Colebrooke's corruption was hardly monstrous, although it was not in 
keeping with the moral climate in the 1820s; he marked down the value 
of presents from Indian princes, so that his wife could buy them on 
advantageous terms; he accepted hospitality from Indian princes, and 
thus compromised his independence. Trevelyan was horrified at such 
iniquities. His first reaction was to ask to be posted away from Delhi, 
in order to avoid witnessing them. However, he was soon recalled to 
Delhi to be confronted by the dilemma between service loyalty and 
public morality. At first, Trevelyan tried to remonstrate with 
Colebrooke. Not surprisingly, Colebrooke declined to take Trevelyan's 
youthful scruples seriously. In a desparate attempt to prove that 
they should be taken seriously, Trevelyan finally preferred charges 
of corruption against Colebrooke's steward.
The methods, adopted by Trevelyan to ensure that his case would be 
successful, revealed his reckless impatience with formality. He 
realized that minor transgressions of protocol were as nothing, compared 
with the ruin of his career if he failed. To obtain information, 
Trevelyan began secret investigation. His most daring act was to 
force the Delhi bankers to open their books for inspection. In a 
letter to Colebrooke in January 1829, Trevelyan described this as 
"an investigation I have made on my own responsibility for whatever 
use it may be proper to make of it". Colebrooke indignantly replied 
that he was not prepared to be made a laughing-stoclq and he counter­
attacked by posting Trevelyan to Kotah, about three hundred miles
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from Delhi. He prosecuted Trevelyan.Ts agent; he suborned witnesses; 
and finally, he planned to prosecute Trevelyan for conspiracy. To 
protect himself, Trevelyan was forced to accuse Colebrooke directly.
As Colebrooke was in control at Delhi, Trevelyan wrote to the chief 
secretary of the government of Bengal, suggesting two special 
investigators should be appointed. Despite the obvious appearance of 
insubordination on Trevelyan's part, the Bengal government decided to 
treat the case seriously. Once the investigators were at work, Trevelyan 
was able to produce a detailed and dramatic annotation of Colebrooke's 
counter-charges. Eventually Colebrooke was found guilty on twelve of 
the thirty charges and was dismissed from the Company's service.
Despite the vindication of the verdict, Trevelyan remained 
acutely aware of the risks he had run at the start of his career. He 
was also rather proud of himself.^ In a letter to Lord William 
Bentinck on 1 May 1850, he described himself as "a boy who had been 
little more than two years in the country, and had never filled any 
situation in which his character and views could be developed". He 
was particularly anxious to avoid appearing an over-strict and 
precocious moralist - one who would seek to eliminate all feelings 
of friendship and gratitude. Nevertheless, he concluded his letter 
with the generalized moral observation that "it may also be questioned 
whether the real mode of raising the character of the civil-service 
would not be to evince to the world that we are prepared to prevent
1 It was claimed by Metcalfe's contemporary biographer that Trevelyan 
was sustained by the knowledge that his exemplar, Metcalfe, had 
incurred similar criticism in eradicating corruption among the 
bankers of Hyderabad. (J.W. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of 
Charles, Lord Metcalfe, 1854, I, p.89.)
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abuses, instead of allowing them to flourish unchecked, in order to
support a pretension to unattainable purity, since all are aware
that some abuses must exist in every service which is composed of
men and not of angels".^ This stereotyped attitude was one way in
which Trevelyan could conceal his extreme sensitivity to the inevitable
criticism by the English community of his conduct. In order to justify
himself, and to guard against any attempt on Colebrooke's part to have
the case reopened, Trevelyan arranged for a collection of documents
2
to be privately printed. Trevelyan was probably being over cautious, 
for the Colebrooke scandal helped to mark him out for a distinguished 
career. In particular, Bentinck held Trevelyan in considerable esteem 
and offered him a reward. Trevelyan refused anything for himself, but 
asked for some preferment for his elder brother who was an officer in 
the Company's army. Accordingly, Lieutenant Trevelyan was granted a 
good diplomatic appointment.^
3 Reports on Customs Duties, 1852-35
Trevelyan did not stay much longer in Delhi. After remaining to 
become the first assistant to the new resident, he was posted in 
I85I to Calcutta. Calcutta as the administrative centre of Bengal 
and the seat of the Governor General, offered the best opportunities 
for conspicuous public service, Trevelyan first served as a deputy
1 C.E. Trevelyan, "Papers Transmitted from India" (I850), n.p. This comp­
ilation of letters and papers provides the main narrative for this episode.
2 Although Trevelyan occasionally distributed copies of his "Papers"
(e.g. Trevelyan to Bromley, 9 August 1852, T.L.B., XXIX, p.217} 
the only copy I have located is at Vallington. Colebrooke also 
produced his collection in an attempt to get the case reopened:
"Papers relative to the Case at Issue between Sir Edward Colebrooke 
Bt. and the Bengal Government" (1855)•
3 G.O. Trevelyan, The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay (enlarged ed.
I9O8), p.278.
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secretary in the General and Financial Department, and then in the Secret and
Political Department.^ While much of this work was routine, the reforming
climate of the 1830s raised many issues of policy. Trevelyan’s
contribution to policy-making was the production of a series of reports
on economic and fiscal topics.
Trevelyan’s first report appeared in October 1832. It was devoted
to a limited and technical topic: the opening of the river Indus
to mercantile traffic. Trevelyan's main proposal was the imposition
2
of an ad valorem duty, as opposed to one based upon weight. On '
6 February 1835, the report was published in The Bengal Hurkaru in
order to sound out mercantile opinion. Trevelyan went on to defend
his opinions in a series of letters to the same newspaper under the
pseudonum of "Indophilus". In the absence of an official journal
or of a system of formal public discussion, it was not unusual for
the Indian governments to encourage Civil Servants to express an
official viewpoint in this way. In this case, Bentinck gave Trevelyan
eveiy encouragement.^  In subsequent "Indophilus" letters, Trevelyan
went far beyond the immediate issue in order to discuss the principles
of fiscal administration. In particular, he was highly critical of
the excessive amount of government energy that was absorbed by the
collection of land revenue. He suggested that the work could be better
4and more cheaply performed by the employment of natives. These 
letters gave him a taste for denouncing inefficiency. Tears later
1 Dodwell and Miles, Bengal Civil Servants, 1780-1858 (1859)*
2 I.O.R., "Bengal Secret Consultations", CCCLXIX, 24 December 1852.
5 Evidence of J.C. Marshman before the Select Committee on Indian 
Territories, P.P., 1852-55, XXVII]^p.60-6l.
4 The Bengal Hurkaru, 26, 27 April 1855*
— 18 —
he still affectionately recalled his "Indophili" in which he had
scourged the iniquities of the up country revenue system.^
Trevelyan’s zeal and ability led to his being invited to consider
the customs of the whole Bengal presidency. The findings of his detailed
investigations were published in two reports: the Report on Bengal
Inland Customs (January I834) and the Town Duties Report (October I855).
The former was a convincing document of 197 pages, in which Trevelyan
propounded the simple theory that, as the duties were unimportant as
a source of revenue, thqy could be abolished in the cause of free-trade.
Trevelyan had sensed that the reaction to his earlier report that
a free-trade proposal would be welcomed by a large part of the
trading community. He had already shown his contempt for the
government’s preoccupation with the unnecessary complexities of fiscal
administration. The result was a whole-hearted tract in favour of
laissez-faire. For example, after an allusion to the impediments to
economic development if Manchester had ever been surrounded by chokeys
or customs posts, his tone became charged with messianic fervour:
"Nature is the only true commercial legislator, and just in proportion
as we interfere to interrupt the system of economy established by
all-wise Providence, the freedom of exchange becomes contracted,
production limited, and mutual intercourse, the appointed means of
2peace, improvement and civilization checked". In more practical 
terms, Trevelyan claimed that the removal of fiscal anomalies would 
yield more revenue, as it would stimulate more trade that would in 
turn be liable to external duties. Another benefit of abolition would
1 Trevelyan to E. Horsman, 7 January 1858, T.L.B., XXXVT,pl55«
2 C.E. Trevelyan, Report on Bengal Inland Customs (Calcutta, 1854)» p.11*
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"be the elimination of a powerful source of official corruption.^ In
his conclusion, Trevelyan indicated his belief in the moral and
religious advantages of free-trade: "England and the United States,
let who will gainsay it, are the favoured instruments of God's
providence in the establishment of his kingdom of peace and love.
These are the two western nations whose religion is purest - where
government is freest - whose fleets command the ocean, and whose
commerce pervades the whole world; and they have at once the greatest
amount of temporal and eternal benefits to communicate, and the most
2extensive and effectual means of communicating them."
Trevelyan also spent some time in this report in developing a 
philosophy of administration. Leaning heavily on his Benthamite faith 
in collecting and disseminating information, he pointed to an essential 
difference between England and India: between the vast quantity of 
material that was readily available in English Parliamentary Papers 
and the tradition of secrecy in Indian affairs that often consigned 
reports to the obscurity of the archives. It need hardly be added 
that Trevelyan was an eager writer of reports, and one who was 
disinclined to leave his work in obscurily. Trevelyan's remedy for the 
Indian situation was ingenious. He suggested that Bengal Civil 
Servants should be encouraged to write reports on eveiy aspect of 
the presidency's economy. Hot only would these reports be printed, 
but prizes would be awarded to give added encouragement to the 
writers' exertions. In this way, knowledge about Bengal's economy 
(including such topics as soil, climate and weights and measures)
1 Ibid., pp.52-55»
2 Ibid., p.196.
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could be conveniently assembled as a basis for future government action.^
The much shorter Town Duties Report indicated Trevelyan’s attitude
towards the proper role of government. His main objection to the
town duties - which he also sought to abolish - was that they encouraged
local dependence upon the central government and discouraged civic
responsibility. Conversely, the abolition of the tax would promote
responsible self help in each town in place of the clumsy wastefulness
2
of central government intervention. Trevelyan retained this attitude 
as an article of faith.
Trevelyan's approach to the Bengal customs was both simple and 
radical, in that he believed that the principle of free-trade could 
cut throu^ a tangle of tradition and technicality. His proposals were 
accepted by the Bengal government because free-trade seemed a logical 
consequence of the ending of the Company's residual trading activities 
in 1855» As a zealous reformer, Trevelyan found himself in an ideal 
position - one in which the opposition of tax collectors appeared as 
the selfish defence of vested interest against the victorious doctrine 
of free-trade. In writing these reports for a sympathetic administration, 
Trevelyan was able to associate what seemed to him sound, prevailing 
economic opinions with a wider moral purpose. In this sence, therefore, 
the work was too easy and too satisfying; it served to confirm those 
traits of character that gave Trevelyan a reputation for cock-sureness 
in formulating his opinions. Furthermore Bentinck did not set him 
an example of official caution in that he implemented Trevelyan's 
recommendations without any reference to London and without prolonged 
discussion.
1 Ibid., pp.190-191.
2 C.E. Trevelyan, Town Duties Eenort (Calcutta, 1835)> p.24«
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The reports certainly demonstrated Trevelyan's ability to master 
a mass of detail to support a convincing, if rather facile, argument. 
Macaulay wrote of the Bengal Customs Report:
I have no hesitation in affirming that it is a perfect 
masterpiece of its kind. Accustomed as I have been to 
public affairs, I have never read an abler State paper; 
and I do not believe that there is, I will not say in 
India, but in England, another man of twenty-seven who 
could have written it. Trevelyan is a most stormy reformer.
Lord William said to me, before anyone had observed Trevelyan's 
attentions to Nancy ^a reference to Trevelyan's courtship 
of Macaulay's sister/: "That man is almost always on the right 
side in every question; and it is well that he is so, for he 
gives a most confounded deal of trouble when he happens to 
take the wrong one." He is quite at the head of that active 
party among the younger servants of the Company who take the 
side of improvement. In particular, he is the soul of every
scheme for diffusing education among the natives of this
country.^
It was fortunate that there were plenty of outlets for Trevelyan's
"correct" opinions. Following the adoption of his customs reports
by the Bengal government, he was appointed a member of committees
which revised customs and Post Office laws in the four presidencies
2
and prison discipline. This work helped to establish Trevelyan's
1 G.O. Trevelyan, op. cit., pp. 278-279*
2 I.O.R., "Personal Records", XX. Reports on the Post Office were
later printed in P.P., I85I, XLI, pp. 789-855*
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view that investigation and policy-making were the proper functions 
of able Civil Servants, while in fact he was still obliged to perform 
much work of an extremely routine nature. His last appointment in 
India was as Additional Secretaiy to the Sudder Board of Revenue, 
where he was occupied in preparing and signing official letters - a 
task very similar to what he was later to find at the Treasury.^
4 Indian Education
While Trevelyan's official interests were fiscal, his main
personal interest was native education. His deep concern for this
was not only inspired by missionary zeal, but by a growing awareness
that the administration of India required an educated native élite.
Trevelyan had been trying to foster this from the time he arrived
in India. On his arrival at Delhi, he had helped to found an
English language College. On the strength of his sli^t experience
of elementary school teaching in England, he even tau^t English and 
2
Geography himself. The success of this venture confirmed his 
belief in the superiority of European culture, and the college at 
Delhi constituted an example for English education as distinct 
from the government oriental colleges elsewhere. Inevitably 
Trevelyan became involved in what came to be known as the Orientalist 
controversy: whether or not the main part of the Company's education 
budget should be devoted to traditional studies in Sanscrit, Persian
1 I.O.R., "Sudder Board of Revenue", Range 8 ,^ 24-27.
2 Lords Select Committee on the Government of Indian Territories, 
Trevelyan's evidence of l6 June 1855, P.P., 1852-55» XXXII, p.146.
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and Arabic for a very small number of students, as opposed to 
the development of more popular education by means of English and 
the vernacular languages. Trevelyan's part in this began with 
two articles (later reprinted as a pamphlet) in The Bengal Hurkaru 
in May I83O. He not only discussed the obvious difficulty of 
translating scientific works into classical oriental languages 
but expressed the view that the spread of English would cause the 
spread of Christianity. In practical terms he envisaged a system 
of preparatory schools and colleges teaching law, mathematics and 
philosophy. Among other advantages these studies would serve 
to strengthen British rule by providing a relevant education for 
potential Indian Civil Servants. Traditional Indian education was 
notorious in producing unemployable students and Trevelyan aimed 
to promote Western education by guaranteeing government employment: 
For instance, the students who take a first class degree may 
be entitled to employment in any department of the service 
they may prefer on the first vacancy that occurs in it, while 
those who take only a second degree, high proficiency in the 
qualifications necessary for any particular department may 
entitle them to be employed in that department. To all, 
however, who will thus enter the service in eveiy department, 
a commission should be given on behalf of the Government, 
pledging it, that they will not be liable to be ousted from 
their situations except for some sufficient offence regularly 
proved against them, on proceedings which have been submitted 
to, and been approved by the superior authorities, else the
1 For background to this question see T.C.P. Spear, "Bentinck and 
Education" Cambridge Historical Journal, VI (1938)» PP* 78-101;
G. & N. Robinson Sirkin, "The Battle of Indian Education: Macaulay's 
Opening Salvo", Victorian Studies, XIV (1971)» PP* 407-428.
— 24 —
education of the young men will prove of little benefit either 
to themselves, or to the Government, or to the bulk of the 
people, but rather the reverse.^
Trevelyan had not made the mechanism of social and educational change 
very clear, for he was simultaneously suggesting that education should 
be a means of advancement in the Civil Service, while the promise of the 
latter should itself be a stimulus to education. His hopes of the 
creation of a politically articulate middle class that would wish to 
share in government was of course extremely premature, but as in other 
colonial countries it was the emergence of this class that provided 
the intellectual basis for independence a centuiy later.
In I83I Trevelyan became more deeply involved in educational 
policy-making through becoming a member of the General Committee of 
Public Instruction. His confidence in the imminence of educational 
reform was encouraged by other contemporary developments: the 
suppression of thuggee and suttee and his own work on abolishing 
customs duties. However, at first Trevelyan and the "Anglicists" 
were in a minority on the Committee and battled to further their 
case, eventually resorting to a press campaign in the Calcutta 
newspapers to turn public opinion in their favour. As he later
2boasted to Bentinck this strategy produced "almost magical results".
On 18 March 1833» following the completion of his reports on internal 
customs duties, Trevelyan outlined his proposals for a comprehensive 
system of education using English and vernacular languages in a 
letter to Bentinck, flattering the Governor General that he would
1 C.E. Trevelyan, A Treatise on the Means of Communicating the 
Learning and Civilization of Europe to India (Calcutta, I83O), p.8.
2 Trevelyan to Bentinck, 3Ü April 1834» Portland MSS, quoted in John 
Clive, Macaulay, the Shaping of the Historian (New York, 1973)»
p.362.
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receive the gratitude of millions if he were able to implement it.^
Such grandiose proposals were beyond ttie normal resources of the
government and in a subsequent letter Trevelyan concentrated his
attack on the privileged position of oriental education: "India
is on the eve of a great moral change. The indications of it are
perceptible in every part of the country. Everywhere the same
decided rejection of antiquated systems prevails - everywhere the
same craving for instruction in a better system is to be perceived,
and the abolition of the exclusive privileges which the Persian
langage has in the courts and offices of government will form the
crowning stroke which will shake Hindooism and Mohammedism to their
centre and firmly establish our language and learning and ultimately
2
our religion in India." In the meantime the conflict between the 
two schools of educationalists had been extended to government 
financed institutions where proposals had been made to introduce English 
as a compulsory language in the Sanscrit College and the Madrassa or 
Muslim College at Calcutta. These proposals finally precipitated the 
crisis. H.T. Prinsep, one of the leading Orientalists, 
claiming that they undermined the protection given to Oriental 
culture by the Charter Act of 1813.^
This minor legal crisis combined with sharp division in the 
General Committee of Public Instruction and continuing controversy 
in the Press clearly called for a clear and authoritative decision. 
Bentinck, despite his sympathy for Trevelyan’s position, did not 
wish to appear prejudiced, and he decided to put the matter in the 
hands of the newly-arrived legal member of the Supreme Council,
1 18 March, Ibid., p.360.
2 Trevelyan to Bentinck, 9 April 1834» Portland MSS., quoted in
G.D. Bearce British Attitudes Towards India, 1784-1858, (I96I) p.l6l.
3 H. Sharp (ed.), Selections from Educational Records, Part 1 
(1781-1839) (Calcutta, 1920), I, p.l05.
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Macaulay. This was not a aurprising choice since Macaulay had 
the advantage of being both a lawyer and a man of letters. Accordingly 
the two parties presented their oases in January 1855 and effectively 
left the decision to Macaulay. In a minute of 2 February 1855 
Macaulay crystallized the arguments in favour of English literature 
and education. He briefly, and quite unfairly, dismissed the arguments 
based on the Charter Act by suggesting that the government had as much 
discretion over the form of education as it had over such matters as the 
level of rewards for killing tigers or the cost of chanting in the 
cathedral. He claimed that Indian education could be taken to mean 
whatever education was felt to be in the best interests of India. His 
interpretation of these interests was adequately revealed by his 
arrogantly exaggerated assertion that "a single shelf of a good 
European libraiy was worth the whole literature of India and Arabia". 
This was a gloss on his argument that the encouragement of English was 
the only policy consistent with current legal and administrative 
reforms. In connection with the projected English legal code that 
was to replace a complexity of Hindu and Muslim laws, he claimed 
that it would be absurd to provide what would increasingly be seen 
as an irrelevant and obsolete form of education.
Bentinck had already been persuaded by Macaulay's arguments 
before the actual submission of the Minute, and he had no hesitation 
in adopting it as the basis of policy. He rejected a plea from the 
Orientalists for the co-existence of Western and Oriental studies
1 Ibid., pp. 107-117'
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in government institutions, and assisted by Macaulay he drafted
the Minute of 7 March 1835» This measure actively discouraged
Oriental education by discontinuing students’ stipends and the
grant of funds for printing Oriental texts.^ The matter was not
referred to the Board of Control or to the Court of Directors for
it was realized that permission for the change would have been
refused. In fact, the authorities in England were incensed by
the new policy and the arbitrary way in which it had been introduced,
but they were not prepared to revive the controversy by attempting
to re-establish the old system. They preferred to appear impartial
2
and they made no decisive public statement. It was in this 
confused situation that Trevelyan decided to restate his views in 
On the Education of the People of India (I838). Quoting extensively 
from Macaulay's Minute he contrasted the obscurantism of the Orientalists 
with the promise offered by the development of English education.
While he was not completely opposed to the academic study of 
Oriental classics, he felt that this was trival compared with larger 
social and educational issues.^ A compromise was provided by 
Bentinck's successor, Lord Auckland, who provided limited resources 
for Oriental studies while continuing to stress the importance of 
English as the official language in place of Persian.^
English as an educational medium was firmly established and has 
remained so ever since. The greatest success was among the Hindus 
of Bengal, and in I836 Trevelyan triumphantly concluded an article 
in The Edinburgh Review on the suppression of thuggee by describing
1 Ibid., p. 129.
2 K.A. Ballhatchet, "The Home Government and Bentinck's Educational
Policy", The Cambridge Historical Journal, X (1951), PP« 224-229.
3 On the Education of the People of India (I838), pp. 182-201.
4 Ballhatchet.
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the overwhelming enthusiasm for English education at the newly-opened
Hooghly College in Calcutta.^ Significantly for the future development
of India the Muslim population was hostile, and there was little
activity in other presidencies. By contrast, development of vernacular
languages was everywhere negligible. Although most money was spent
on English education, Trevelyan was active in efforts to transliterate
vernacular languages into the Roman alphabet. The Orientalists had
described this as "ultra-radical subversion" but Trevelyan countered
with the argument that text books and dictionaries would be easier
and cheaper to print and that Roman letters would help to graft to
the vernaculars such concepts as "virtue".’, "honour", "patriotism",
2
"gratitude" and "public spirit". Trevelyan founded a Roman Letter 
Propogation Society in I836. Since its memorandum book is the only 
personal record of Trevelyan that appears to have survived from this 
period, it is unfortunate that it provides very little information. 
However one detail is characteristic of the optimism of the 
propagandist and zealot for reform: unsold copies of Trevelyan's 
pamphlets were to be sold to create a fund for the publication of 
dictionaries and elementary readers.^
1 /C.E. Trevelyan/, "The Thugs or Secret Murderers of India", The 
Edinburgh Review, LXIV (1837), pp. 357-595* Reprinted in Hinduism 
and Christianity Contrasted (1882), where Trevelyan explained that 
he had adapted an official report for publication with the help
of Macaulay. (W.E. Houghton ed.. The Wellesley Index, I, Toronto
1966, p.485).
2 C.E. Trevelyan, J. Prinsep et.al. The Application of the Roman 
Alphabet to all the Oriental Languages (Serampcre, 1854), PP* 4, 15,
55, 50.
3. Wellington, "Memorandum Book of the Roman Letter Propagation
Society/Committe, dated 19 September 1836. Now among the Trevelyan 
of Wallington papers in the Libraiy of the University of Newcastle.
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5 Return to England, I838
Trevelyan's Indian career was so successful that its early 
termination can only he explained by his personal connection 
with Macaulay. Macaulay came to Calcutta in 1833 as member of the 
Supreme Council accompanied by his sister Hannah, and within a few 
months she had attracted Trevelyan's attention. Macaulay did not 
discourage the match although he depended greatly on the support 
and company of his sister, and within three months Trevelyan and 
Hannah were married. Macaulay received a second blow at this stage 
through the death in England of his favourite sister, Margaret. Now 
as Hannah's company became even more important to him, the Trevelyans 
agreed to live with him as one household. An added advantage was that 
both Trevelyan and Macaulay were able to economize in their household 
expenses - a point of vital importance to Macaulay who had set himself 
the task of saving half his salary, £25,000, during his five year tour 
of duty. Neither had any taste for Calcutta society and they spent 
a great deal of time in each other's company, when Macaulay took the 
opportunity to make good the deficiencies in his brother-in-law's 
classical education. These arrangements appear to have worked 
reasonably well for Macaulay. Although he was mortified at losing 
Hannah to Trevelyan, the combined household provided him with the 
domestic environment he so much needed. Trevelyan accepted the 
situation, particularly as Macaulay's Whig reforming ideas so neatly 
coincided with many of his own. Furthermore, he agreed to postpone 
his furlcu^ unti1 1838 when Macaulay's tour of service came to an 
end.
Macaulay's appraisal of Trevelyan's character and talents have 
a bearing on the development of the letter's career. Trevelyan
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constituted the ideal of the superior young man who combined the
qualities of intellectual and man of action:
As to his person, he always looks like a gentleman,
particularly on horseback. He is very active and athletic, and
is renowned as a great master in the most exciting and perilous
of field sports, the spearing of wild boars. His face has a
most characteristic expression of ardour and impetuousity,
which makes his countenance very interesting to me. Birth is
a thing that I care nothing about; but his family is one of
the oldest and best in England. ... He has no small talk.
His mind is full of moral and political improvement, and his
zeal boils over in his talk. His topics even in courtship,
are steam navigation, the education of the natives, the
equalisation of the sugar duties, the substitution of the
Homan for the Arabic alphabet in the Oriental languages.^
While not disapproving of such highmindedness Macaulay was one who
excelled and delighted in more intimate conversation with members of
his family. He noted that Trevelyan's behaviour was gauche, varying
at times from the extremes of rou^ness and sheepishness, but that
2
it was improving under Hannah's influence.
Macaulay, accompanied by the Trevelyans, returned to England 
in I838. Freed from financial worries by his "modest competence" 
of £25,000, Macaulay entered Parliament in 1839 and became Secretaiy 
at War in Melbourne's cabinet. This political success did not free 
him from the fear that his sister would soon have to return to India 
with Trevelyan. Fortunately for him, this fear remained unrealized;
1 G.O. Trevelyan, on. cit., p.279*
2 Less flattering comments which were not included in Life and Letters,
G.M. Trevelyan, Sir G.O. Trevelyan, A Memoir (1932), p.8.
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Trevelyan was offered the Assistant Secretaryship to the Treasuiy
before the end of the year. The detailed circumstances of this
appointment are obscure. Certainly Sir Francis Baring, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, welcomed the accession to the Treasury
of a man with Trevelyan's proven energy and talents* and Trevelyan
always acknowledged him as the sponsor of his English career. As
for Macaulay, he was so relieved that he was never able to speak
about the matter without emotion.^ It must, indeed, have seemed
providential that the Assistant Secretaryship fell vacant at this
time, through the premature retirement of Sir Alexander Spearman.
With a salary of £^000 (rising after five years to £2,500), it was
one of the few posts in England that could match Trevelyan's position
in India, where his salary in 1837 had been 24,000 rupees or about 
2
£2,200. Whatever influence Macaulay may have used in arranging 
the appointment, he did not need to feel any qualms vhen private and 
public interest coincided so perfectly. His colleague. Baring, was 
pleased at the prospect of Trevelyan extending his missionary zeal 
to the improvement of public departments in England.
Conclusion
One of the most significant aspects of Trevelyan's service 
in India was the opportunity given to him to consider larger issues 
like fiscal reform and the extension of popular education - issues . 
of a kind that were seldom presented to permanent officials in 
England, particularly those in the Treasury.
1 G.O. Trevelyan, op. cit. p.389.
2 I.O.R., "Bengal Civil Servants (Covenanted)", XX (1837). It had 
risen from 3,^00 rupees or £340 in 1826. (Ibid., XIII, 1826.)
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Prompted by his Whig belief in progress and sustained by 
moral fervour, Trevelyan acquired a messianic view of Indian affairs. 
With the support of his Whig superior, Bentinck, he did not shrink 
from publicity and he made extensive use of the Press to sound out 
and prepare opinion for government proposals. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, Trevelyan's career at the Treasury was to be a series 
of attempts to find an outlet for the boundless energy and enthusiasm 
that had been nurtured in India.
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Chapter III 
TREVELYAN AND THE TREASURY
In becoming Assistant Secretary, Trevelyan gained one of the 
best paid positions in the home Civil Service, with a salary of 
£2,000 rising to £2,500 after five years. However, the mere fact 
of being the chief permanent official in the most central 
government department did not in itself indicate power and authority.
On the contrary, Trevelyan's position can be largely expressed in 
terms of over-work, frustration and disappointment. The difficulties 
of his position can, therefore, only be appreciated after an examination 
of the way in which the Treasury worked. Paradoxically, the part 
of Trevelyan's work as Assistant Secretary from which he derived 
most satisfaction was strictly speaking unconnected with the main 
part of Treasury business. This was his responsibility for the 
management of the Commissariat, an activity that will be considered 
separately in a later chapter.
Trevelyan's responsibility for the working of the Treasury 
itself is the most difficult part of his work to define. Although 
the Assistant Secretary was the antecedent of the. Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, his f&le in Trevelyan's time was much 
more limited. This distinction between the post as it then was 
and what it later became is the more important since it is central 
to the problems which Trevelyan himself faced - problems which 
were further confused by his wishful thinking about the powers which 
he felt he ought to possess. Certainly in specific situations 
Trevelyan was most influential. The most notable of these was
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his supervision of relief measures during the Irish famine where 
the authority that he obviously exercised has led to his being given 
a modern Civil Service status; "The official title of Trevelyan was 
Assistant Secretary, but he was in fact the permanent head of the 
Treasury, and owing to his remarkable abilities and the structure of 
British administration, which results in a capable, permanent official 
exercising a h i ^  degree of power, he was able to influence policy 
to a remarkable degree."^ However, his overall control of relief 
operations between 1845 and 1847 was exceptional and this gives added 
poignancy to the way he exercised authority ©n that occasion. Thus 
the paradox emerges that whereas he often appeared powerful to 
outsiders, in the Treasury itself he had far less influence. It could 
be argued that this official impotence in his own domain explains 
his willingness to busy himself in all kinds of ad hoc functions.
Not for nothing did Trevelyan earn the reputation of being an 
incorrigible meddler.
The difficulties of definition also make for difficulties 
of description, as the materials illustrative of the day-to-day work 
of the Treasury consist of the intractable mass of Treasury Board 
papers. The officials of the Treasuiy were daunted by their bulk 
and their miscellaneous and often trivial nature. For this reason 
it has proved impossible to reconstruct Treasury operations in 
great detail, in order to determine whether accusations of inefficiency 
and counter-claims of overwork had any real substance. Bearing in 
mind that these criticisms and vindications were the assertions of 
interested persons, an attempt will be made to illustrate them by
1 Cecil Voodham Smith, The Great Hunger, (1962), p.58.
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more accessible types of evidence. This approach is valid as we 
are more concerned with the development of Trevelyan’s ideas and the 
reactions of his contemporaries, than with an attempt to unravel the 
"facts" about the nineteenth-century Treasury - facts that were 
unknown to the men who worked there.
1 The Working of the Treasury
When Trevelyan came to the Treasury in I84O the structure of 
the department was fundamentally the same as it had been since 1805»
In that year the decision-making part of the business of the Treasury 
had been formally separated from the executive part of routine 
minute-copying and letter-writing. A new permanent official, the 
Assistant Secretary, had been appointed to provide strength and 
continuity at decision-making level. The main part of the department 
had been divided into six' divisions for the execution of routine 
work. This fundamental reorganization had been necessitated by the 
increase in the volume of work brought about by the war. The first 
Assistant Secretary, George Harrison, undertook much of the responsibility 
for war finance and this, together with the participation of the six 
chief clerks in the preparation of mainly formal minutes, relieved 
the two political secretaries from the pressure of work that had led 
to dangerous delays. This assistance at the highest level was of 
fundamental importance in the development of the Treasury in the first 
half of the centuiy, since it helped to develop the concept of a 
small elite of permanent advisers. Although the established clerks 
retained their clerical duties, in a relative sense they progressively 
suffered a decline in administrative importance. This distinction
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between administrative and executive duties has parallels in other 
departments, but its development at the Treasury has a special 
importance in that it had a profound affect on Trevelyan’s attitude 
towards a whole range of administrative problems. Moreover, it is 
possible to interpret Trevelyan’s ambition to reorganize the Treasury 
as a desire to accelerate this process. Trevelyan’s criticisms of the 
Treasury were not fundamental but were the grievance of a rigorous 
person who saw glaring inconsistencies in the operation of the 
existing system. When Trevelyan complained that the senior officers 
of the Treasury were inadequately supported, he meant in effect that 
the arrangements of 1805 had been sound and that more and better 
men would be needed to make it work. This failure to adopt a 
flexible attitude towards the system is the key to his abortive 
attempts to reorganize the Treasury in 1849» it is the background for 
his final failure in both Treasury and Civil Service reform.
The structure of 1805 had been further refined by a Treasury 
Minute of 17 October 1834»^ This minute is specially useful in
giving a fairly clear picture of the way in which the Treasury worked.
*
Some additional clarification of the position ofthe Treasury itself 
will heed to be added.
Theoretically the Treasury was the department of the Lord 
Treasurer, the royal official entrusted with the care of the king’s 
money. However, since I7I4 this and other ancient hi^ offices had 
been in commission and thus the "head" of the department was her 
Majesty’s Lords Commissioners of the Treasury or the Treasury Board. 
The Commissioners consisted of the First Lord, the Chancellor of the
1 Printed as an appendix to the evidence of the Select Committee 
on Miscellaneous Expenditure of I848 (P.P., 1847-48» XVIII ii ,
PP .78-85).
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Exchequer and three junior lords. The title of First Lord was that
assumed by the head of an administration. Not until the present
century was the position of "prime minister" given any official
recognition. However, since the time of Pitt the First Lord had
ceased to attend meetings of the Treasury Board.^ Even the Chancellor
of the Exchequer rarely attended, although important matters were
submitted to him; occasionally he initialled a minute to show that
he approved a decision. Another indication of the Chancellor's
imprecise relationship with his department was the fact that he did not
possess an office in the Treasury Chambers. His separation from the
Treasury was partly remedied by the informal help that could be
gained from the Treasury clerks who were seconded for service as
2
private secretaries. In contrast, the formal business of the 
Treasury was conducted by the comparatively unimportant junior lords. 
Only one was needed to attend the Treasury Board as a quorum for 
validating minutes; two were needed for signing warrants and
5
constitutions. Although th^ may have been "mere signers of papers" 
in the Treasury, they possessed an important political function as 
Parliamentary whips; as Canning had once said their task was "to make 
a House, to keep a House, and to cheer the Ministers".^
The real direction of affairs came from the Secretaries, both 
of whom were members of Parliament. Between them they covered the
1 D. Gray, Spencer Perceval: The Evangelical Prime Minister, 
I767-I8I2 (Manchester, 19^5)» p.508.
2 There was a long tradition of clerks on the general establish­
ment qualifying themselves for Board level appointments in this 
way : G. Arbuthnot, W.H. Stephenson and Leake had all done so.
3 Warrants were for payments made by the Paymaster General; 
Constitutions were the official letters of appointment for posts 
under Treasury control.
4 Quoted in E.I. Barrington (ed.). The Works and Life of Walter 
Bagehot (1915), V, p.312.
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two most important aspects of Treasuiy activity, finance and patronage.
They "assisted" the Board together with the permanent officials.
In this way most of the control of revenue and expenditure was 
carried out. Much of this work was the application of Treasuiy 
precedent to individual cases. Only rarely did it prove necessary 
to obtain the added authority of the initials of the Chancellor 
or of the First Lord. The bulk of the work was transacted by the 
permanent Board level officials. By 1834 there were four of these.
In order of authority they were:
Assistant Secretary (First appointed in I8O5)
Auditor of the Civil List (I8I6)
Principal Clerk for Colonial Business (I832)
Principal Clerk Assistant to the Secretaries (I8I5)
It had originally been intended in 1805 that the Chief Clerks should 
continue to present their minutes to the Board, but gradually they 
had surrendered this function to this new class of superior officers, 
appointed on merit rather than seniority. In practice it proved 
impossible to display appropriate merit in the Treasury and all the 
men appointed to these positions had either been drawn from outside 
the department or had been ministerial private secretaries. This 
development seemed to reflect the need for even greater professionalism 
and concentration of power at Board or Principal Officer level. At the 
same time it appeared to stress the inadequacies of the clerks on the
general establishment - inadequacies, which were the result of dead-
eningly laborious promotion. In running its course, the reorgan­
ization of I8O5 created a self-fulfilling prophecy of an increasingly 
over-burdened élite and an under-employed and increasingly demoralized 
rank-and-file.
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The Minute of 17 October 1834 defined the process so far. It 
prescribed that all the permanent Board Officials, and not only the 
Assistant Secretaiy as formerly, should initial the minutes they 
presented to the Board, unless the minutes had been previously 
initialled by one of the Secretaries. The work of the Assistant 
Secretary was also defined. The Minute observed that with the transfer 
to him of the Commissariat Department, both he and the Auditor of the 
Civil List would increasingly perform analogous duties. It was also 
prescribed that the Auditor of the Civil List should be selected in the 
same way as the Assistant Secretary, and that he should rank next to 
him. Clearly the position of the Assistant Secretary was no longer 
unique as his duties were assimilated to those of the other permanent 
Board officers; for like them he had been given a specific field of 
activity. The following table shows the responsibility for preparing 
minutes and is based on Trevelyan's evidence to the Select Committee 
on Miscellaneous Expenditure in I848:.
Patronage Secretary Patronage; Woods and Forests
Other Parliamentary Secretary Revenue Departments; Civil
Contingencies
Auditor of the Civil List Civil List; Bills likely to inter­
fere with the revenue ; Municipal 
Corporations; Revenue Prisoners
Clerk for Colonial Business Colonial matters generally
Principal Clerk Assistant Less important revenue matters;
to the Secretaries Irish affairs
Law Clerk Legal Establishments; Compensation;
Expenses of criminal prosecutions
Two clerks on the general
establishment with specific
responsibilities:
Crafer Miscellaneous Estimates
Rumsey Fees
Assistant Secretary Commissariat; Expenditure; everything
else not assigned to another officer
1 P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i),pl40.
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There was comparatively little assistance for the Board officers.
Apart from a private secretary for each of the Parliamentary Secretaries 
and the Assistant Secretary, there were only three assistants including 
the Clerk for Parliamentary Returns, none of whom was permitted to 
deputise for their superiors.
In moving to the executive divisions it is easier to give a more 
precise picture of the pattern of work. Inevitably the duller and 
more routine any occupation is, the easier it is to regularize its 
predictable course. The divisions merely executed the decisions of 
the Board. In 1854 the divisions had been reduced in number from six to 
four and the Revenue Department made a fifth division.^ Althou^ it 
was integrated into the career structure of the Treasury, this division 
enjoyed à special status. Whereas the other chief clerks had lost 
their right to present minutes to the Board, the chief clerk of the 
Financial Division retained this distinction. The others had a much 
more limited responsibility to see that letters were prepared in 
accordance with the minutes.
As to the actual conduct of business, this can best be described 
(as it was by contemporaries) as the passage of papers between various 
parts of the department. Althougji the Treasury Board papers shed little
1 Some attempt had been made in 1834 to rationalize the distribution 
of work, rather than merely ensuring that there was a sufficient 
volume of work to keep its clerks employed. From 1834 to 1848 
the distribution was approximately as follows:
First Division Military, naval, foreign and colonial matters,
i.e. with the departments of the Secretaries 
of State
Second Division Revenue departments, including the Post Office
Third Division Bank of England; Indian affars; legal matters;
stationery and printing; the audit of public 
accounts ; the Mint; Scottish affairs, excluding 
revenue
Fourth Division Home affairs; Crown property; Ireland, excluding
revenue ; Civil List; other matters not specifically 
allotted to the other three
Fifth Division Revenue and expenditure accounts; preparation of
warrants for the issue of money
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light on decision-making processes at the highest level, they do 
constitute the basic material processed by the Treasury machine.
Indeed, it is possible to imagine this machine put in operation by 
an external stimulus, such as a letter or other form of document from 
an individual or from another department. On its arrival at the 
Treasury this document would first be sent to the Registry where it 
would be docketed ( a brief endorsement noting the subject) and an 
entry made in a numerical register. This record included a note of 
the subject and the name of the Board officer to whom the document 
had been sent. If it was a comparatively simple matter, a minute would 
be drafted and formally "read" to the Board on one of the Board days, 
Tuesdays or Fridays. In practice minutes were never read but copies 
of them were laid upon the table. Certain specified matters and 
others that could not be readily solved by precedent mi^t be referred 
to one of the Parliamentary Secretaries or the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
In this way the most important decisions concerning revenue and 
patronage could be made at ministerial level. Naturally, significant 
matters were discussed in the process of collecting information and 
preparing minutes, but decisions came to the Board already made; the 
Board was the conclusion of a process, not, as it had once been, the 
time and place for discussion. After the meeting of the Board, when 
the draft became an official minute - an administrative pronouncement 
of the Treasury - the papers were sent to the appropriate division.
There, the necessary warrants and letters were written and a fair 
copy of the minute made on foolscap paper so that it could be bound 
in a serial volume, arranged by division for each date. The whole 
body of papers was then returned to the Registry and the minute given
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a serial number. Probably earlier papers and minutes on the same 
subject had been amassed; if the matter was one requiring the 
examination of precedents, the resulting "bundle" might be very 
large. In any one year the papers - documents of all kinds including 
minutes - would remain grouped in this bundle out of their strict 
numerical sequence. A record was kept in the paper keeper's book, 
or skeleton Register, showing the highest number (i.e. the latest 
one) where all relevant material was assembled. Thus the crudity of 
early nineteenth-century filing and methods of indexing would be 
partially overcome by the physical proximity of related papers.
The volume of business being dealt with and the frequent 
regrouping and transfer of papers inevitably gave ample opportunity 
for delay and error. By the Minute of 17 October 1834 the clerk in 
charge of the Registry had been enjoined to report on all papers which 
had not been returned to him within a week. The Board officers were 
also instructed to draw the attention of the Board to any papers more 
than a wefek old which had not been settled. Some delays would 
inevitably be caused through referring matters to other departments 
and the Registry clerk was also expected to prepare a list of letters 
unanswered for more than a fortnight. To ensure that the minutes 
themselves were acted upon quickly, each chief clerk was to show his 
own Department Book to the Board every week. These regulations imposed 
on the Board officers the ultimate responsibility for seeing that their 
part of work was properly carried out; they did nothing to instil 
initiative and imagination in a routine operation. As a consequence 
of this approach, the improvement of methods was often viewed as a 
refinement of the techniques of registration.
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2 The Assistant Secretaiyship
Although the Assistant Secretary had only a limited responsibility 
for the work performed in the Treasury, he did have a general respons­
ibility for the efficient working of the whole department. The Minute 
of 19 August I8O5 which established the post of Assistant Secretary 
described his duties as follows:
His peculiar duties as Assistant Secretary will be to attend to 
the Board at eveiy sitting; to take the Minutes, to see that 
the same are regularly transcribed and carried into effect with­
out delay, by the chief clerk, or in his absence by the senior 
clerk in each Branch, to revise the Minutes and Drafts of Letters 
and special Warrants prepared in conformity thereto ... and to 
report upon all such matters as may be referred to him by order 
of the Board; and generally to take care that all the Regulations 
for the Conduct of Business are punctually attended to; the 
Assistant Secretary only to give Leave of Absence to the Clerks, 
and to enter the same in a Book stating the Period and cause 
of Absence of each Clerk.^
This overall supervision continued under succeeding Secretaries and was 
exercised by Trevelyan. However, the first Assistant Secretary, George 
Harrison, enhanced the status of the post by proving to be extremely 
valuable to Spencer Perceval, and later Lord Liverpool, in matters 
of patronage and finance. His advice was sou^t when the efficiency 
of other departments was in question and in funding negotiations with 
the City and the Bank of England. He may have been contemptuously 
dismissed as a mere clerk at the time of his appointment, but the increase
1 P.R.O., T.I/45O8.
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of his salary from £2,000 to £3,500 a year was an index of his real 
importance.^ If one or both of Harrison’s special concerns had been 
developed by his successors, the Assistant Secretaryship might have become 
more influential. Harrison's position embryonically revealed what were 
to become two of the main preoccupations of the Treasury: control of 
the Civil Service and management of government finance. Trevelyan 
endeavoured to develop the former side as his own special interest, 
while recognizing that the latter needed strengthening by the appointment 
of financial experts.
Many of Trevelyan's difficulties and frustrations at the Treasury
can be explained in terms of temperament. Whereas his predecessors
accepted the system as they found it, Trevelyan was impatient for
change. With Harrison, for example, his willingness to remain in obscurity
was the main reason for his success, and such an attitude was in keeping
with the unspectacular conservatism of Lord Liverpool's administration.
By contrast, from I83O onwards many of the most notable reforms and
innovations were achieved by men who were not ashamed of appearing
as publicists - men like Edwin Chadwick, Kay Shuttleworth and Sir John
Simon, who were outsiders to the Civil Service and who worked in new,
2
ad hoc departments. He is a "zealot" rather than a "professional" - 
a classification that further distinguishes him from all his predecessors.^
1 J.R. Torrance, "Sir George Harrison and the Growth of Bureaucracy 
in the Early Nineteenth Century", E.H.R., LXXXIII (1968), p.57* 
Harrison held an additional post, that of Law Clerk, and his legal 
background gave him an authority not enjoyed by his successors.
By 1810, Harrison's salary was £5,500, together with a further 
£300 for examining accounts passed at the Treasuiy (P.R.O., T.l/4506, 
"Memorandum on Salaries and Establishment of the Treasury" n.d. /Ï820/.
2 This classification is suggested by Henry Parris, Constitutional 
Bureaucracy (1969), pp. I38-I4O.
3 Sir George Harrison had come from the Land Tax Redemption Office. 
William Hill had been successively an assistant clerk in the Revenue 
Department of the Treasury, Principal Clerk Assistant to the Sec­
retaries and Principal Commissariat Clerk. Col. James Stewart had
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5 The Inquiries of 1848-49
An opportunity for Trevelyan to publicize his views came in I848.
An economic crisis in 1847, combined with proposals for increased
taxation in the following year, produced in the Commons overwhelming
demands for economy. One consequence was the setting up of the Select
Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure which had a responsibility
for examining methods as well as costs of civil departments. Trevelyan
was determined to include in his evidence a detailed criticism of the
organization of the Treasury. On 4 April I848 he argued that the
public was badly served by the lack of support given to the staff at
Treasuiy Board level: "they are barely able to get through the business
they have to do; they are only able to get. through it by the most constant
and intense exertion. In case of their absence, there are no proper
persons to take their place." While this complaint was not likely to
soften the heart of the most ardent economical reformer, Trevelyan had
another and more telling point: "If we had more strength in that
department of the Treasury, a great deal of business, for which Royal
Commissions and Parliamentary Select Committees are not appointed, would
2be done in the ordinary course of business at the Treasury." He
1 For the background to this situation and the wider significance of 
the Select Committee, see Chapter 7 passim.
2 P.P., 1847-48, X7III (ij,pJ.75* The departments he suggested as 
suitable for investigation were the Board of Works and Commissioners 
of Education in Ireland, the Board of Works and Forests, and the 
rate of expenditure on prisons and hulks.
been transferred from the Board of Stamps ( a revenue department). 
Sir Alexander Spearman had held no less than four Treasury posts 
before becoming Assistant Secretary: an assistant clerk in the 
Revenue Department, Clerk of Parliamentary Accounts, Principal 
Clerk Assistant and Auditor of the Civil List. (P.P., 1847-48, 
X7III iip.202.)
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assumed that reform could he placed on a regular and permanent basis; 
that a few men of integrity in the Treasury would be more effective 
than intermittent ad hoc investigation by committees. However, as 
stated by Trevelyan, this would have meant an extension of Treasury 
influence at the expense of Parliament, and it is not surprising that 
this observation found no response in the report of the Select 
Committee.
Trevelyan's eagerness for a stronger Board establishment was 
partly due to his feeling that assistance would enable the Treasury to 
scrutinize its decisions more carefully. Trevelyan did not feel that 
many of these decisions could safely be delegated to other departments, 
giving point to this by the standard of vigilance that he himself 
had exercised at the height of the Irish famine:
Merely to keep down the business which every day falls upon 
me, properly to investigate and dispose of the many general 
and special cases which have to be disposed of by me, my work 
is greatly to interfere with my personal comfort, and to 
deprive me of social enjoyment. That is to say, I begin 
at a veiy early hour in the morning. I have no time for
reading long papers, or series of papers at the Treasuiy, and
so I read all the papers before breakfast. I then go to the 
Treasuiy and work all day, till my strength is completely 
exhausted, and then go home to sleep the greater part of 
the evening. I could not describe my duties better than that. 
Then there came this extraordinary pressure upon me, and ny 
wonder is that I was able to get throu^ it alive. It
exceeded anything in my experience. I went through a great deal
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of wear and tear of that sort in the course of twelve years' 
experience in India, hut I never knew of anything equal to 
that ; ...^
In fairness to Trevelyan one must mention that hid immediate
predecessor, Sir Alexander Spearman, had been forced to retire through
ill-health, aggravated by overwork. Spearman in fact told the
Committee how on that occasion, his absence had resulted in his work
being divided between the Financial Secretary, his own private
2
secretary and other Treasury Board officials.
Trevelyan's zeal only added to the burdens of his office. Much 
of the daily correspondence with officers in charge of operations 
in Ireland, for example, could have been assigned to a competent 
clerk with precise routine instructions, or better still have been 
avoided by effective local delegation. The frantic and partially 
unnecessaiy industry which Trevelyan exhibited on this occasion was 
very satisfying to him as a substitute for the policy-making authority 
which he lacked. His obvious delight in attending to detail was 
either an unconscious act of compensation or a recognition that some 
power was better than no power at all. Indeed, retrospectively he 
was able to boast in his Edinburgh Review article on the famine (later 
published as a book) that never before had three million people been
5
fed under the control of one central authority. Fortunately for 
Trevelyan, no witness thought to question his method of work. He 
was probably spared this embarrassment as his objectives in Ireland
1 Ibid., p.179» Trevelyan went on to say that he and some other 
Treasury officials had been awarded a donation of a year's extra 
salary on account of their exceptional efforts - an act of ministerial 
generosity that was later questioned in the Commons. See infra pp. 286-7.
2 Ibid., p.202.
3 "The Irish Crisis", Edinburgh Review, LXXXVII (January I848) p.90, 
published separately by Longmans later in the year.
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were the same as those of the Select Committee: the strict control 
of government expenditure. In 1848, all efforts in this direction 
acquired a special kind of sanctity.
In his evidence before the Select Committee Trevelyan went on 
from complaint to make a number of practical propositions. Naturally 
these had to lead to economies in order to be relevant to the Committee's
purpose. Trevelyan convenienty claimed that the work of the Treasury
\
could be better done at less cost. No more money - indeed rather less - 
would need to be spent on staff, but it would need to be distributed 
quite differently. He suggested that if the Third and Fourth Divisions 
were consolidated, the established clerks released by this could be 
used to relieve the Board officers of some of their work. The routine 
copying originally performed by established clerks would in turn be 
delegated to copying clerks. Trevelyan's proposals for the recruitment 
of future senior officers were much more far-reaching. He suggested 
that, after allowing for the promotion expectations of existing clerks 
to be realized, a smaller number of appointments would be required at 
a higher level: "instead of taking very young men, whose education is 
not finished, and of whose qualifications we have had no experience, I 
would take young men who had completed their education at the universities 
or elsewhere; and in particular cases I would go beyond that, and take 
young me who have had some experience and success in life; for I 
conceive that no test of fitness for public service is equal to that 
of a person having succeeded in some other line of life". He felt 
that this ^lite should not be bored and deadened by mechanical work 
but should rather "be employed from the first in superior duties; they 
would then acquire an interest in their business, and would enter into 
the spirit of their profession, and they would then become better
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qualified for rendering useful services to the public, either in
the Treasury or anywhere e l s e . T h i s  view was questioned by some of
the other witnesses who represented a more traditional view of
public service. Spearman felt that diudgery : was no bad thing. He
was bitterly opposed to the separation of intellectual and mechanical
labour on the grounds that trustworthiness and reliability was
2
essential even for men who were in effect copyists. This objection
did not refute Trevelyan's claim for better staff at Board level. 
Moreover the pattern of Spearman's own career was a good example of a 
man devoting most of life to superior duties. Another similar 
objector was George Boyd who from the start of his career in 1809 
had served in every division before becoming Chief Clerk of the Second
3
Division. This proponent of steady and relentless progress through 
all the grades of the Office was inevitably hostile towards the notion 
of regarding the greater part of the Treasury's work as mere routine. 
Trevelyan was to find it extremely difficult to prevail against these 
traditional and deep-seated attitudes.
Although the Select Committee did not take Trevelyan's views 
very seriously, the matter did not end there. The Treasury set to 
work to revitalize itself. In November a Treasuiy committee was set 
up, consisting of Trevelyan, W. Gibson Craig (Junior Lord)and J.Parker 
(Parliamentary Secretary). This was an even better opportunity for 
Trevelyan to press and elaborate his views, since the committee 
felt that the Treasuiy had an obligation to set an example to other 
departments. This was a traditional attitude for the Treasury to 
adopt at a time of Parliamentaiy pressure for economy, and it increased
1 P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i), pp. 177-178.
2 Ibid ., pp. 195, 205.
5 Ibid., p.204.
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the possibility of Trevelyan bringing about some c h a n g e s A f t e r
a general observation that the best type of economy would be to
extend the Treasury's powers of financial control, the report, dated
3 November, repeated Trevelyan's complaint that lack of support made
it impossible for the Board officers to attend to "general objects".
An arrangement was proposed that formally recognized the Principal
Officers as a distinct class by providing both for deputies and for
a succession of qualified persons. This proposal was linked with a
2
rationalization of the duties of the Principal Clerks. The Assistant 
Secretary was, however, not given additional assistance since it 
stated that he would be relieved of excessive work if the other 
Principal Clerks had more help. Trevelyan did, of course, not wish 
to be specifically burdened with a personal staff to help him 
perform precise duties. He felt that he had a particular responsibility 
for attending to "general objects". The new arrangements would enable 
him to do this without his being driven to the limits of human 
endurance. To provide the staff required, the Treasury committee 
went beyond what Trevelyan had suggested, by reducing the general 
divisions from four to two.
Most of the committee's proposals were put into force by the 
Minute of 2? March 1849, but an important reservation was made on 
the one point that was central to Trevelyan's view of a reorganized 
Treasury.^ Trevelyan later attributed this to the influence of
1 During the reductions of 1821 the Treasury had made cuts of 
exemplary severity in its own salaries. In 1848 the possible 
inconsistency between improved efficiency and reduced cost had 
been glossed over by Trevelyan's proposals for staff redeployment.
2 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.37» The documents of the inquiry were printed 
in 1854 as part of Reports of Committees of Inquiry into Public 
Offices (P.P., 1854, ^17157, XXVII).
3 The unexceptionable parts of the report dealt, among other things, 
with the consolidation of the divisions; the discontinuance of 
extra allowances for additional work; the prohibition of clerks 
holding directorships. Trevelyan was enthusiastic about these small, 
even if they were not radical, improvements. (Ibid., pp. 51-55»)
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George irbuthnot, the private secretary of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Sir Charles Wood.^ Certainly the reasons given fbr rejecting
the notion of an elite class of clerks were traditional administrative
ones as well as political:
The Report appears to contemplate that in the case of the
absence of the Principal Clerks, their Assistants should
act for them, but my Lords are of the opinion that a general
recognition of the claims of subordinate officers, without
reference to their standing in the Department, to have the
management and direction of any important branch of the business,
2even for a short time, would be open to serious objection •••
The Minute went on to stress that all Treasury clerks should be given 
an opportunity to show whether or not they were fit to occupy superior 
positions. Here, the old theory that the Treasury was still composed 
of a homogeneous body of clerks reasserted itself. In practice, 
usually only those established clerks who had served as private 
secretaries could hope for principal clerkships. Moreover, the Minute 
was careful to reserve the right to make external appointments when 
necessary. Naturally the political heads of the Treasuiy were reluctant 
to relinquish control over the appointment of their immediate sub­
ordinates. From this, Trevelyan realized that the crux of the matter 
lay in the initial recruitment of suitable staff. One result was 
the diversion of his efforts into Civil Service reform; another 
was to be his final attempt to implement his ideas in the Treasury 
in I856.
1 Arbuthnot certainly occupied a special position. In I85O he was 
commended "for his constant and zealous exertion which he /Sir
C. Wood/ had received from him in times of great difficulty and on 
subjects of the greatest moment and importance". He was rewarded 
by being appointed a supernumery senior clerk and later in the year 
succeeded Pennington as Auditor of the Civil List. (H.M.T., 
Departmental Arrangement Book, III, 22 March I85O, 12 November 1850*)
2 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.50.
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The extreme caution of the Minute was also reflected in the 
rejection of a related proposal to make all promotions on merit.
Hitherto seniority had prevailed in promotions below senior clerk.
The framers of the Minute were not anxious to introduce a competitive 
element and they considered that deference, obedience and sufficient 
ability were all the qualities needed to justify promotion.^ In the 
same vein, the Minute went on to warn against the employment of copying 
clerks, to the extent of depriving established clerks of the experience 
of mastering essential business routines. It was abundantly clear to 
Trevelyan that these qualifications substantially diminished the force 
of his proposals. He had been able to expound his plans for improved 
staffing but he had actually achieved very little.
One projected reform was reserved for further discussion. This 
was the form of the official Treasury record, the Fair Minutes. It 
had been suggested by the Treasury committee's report that the bulk of 
the Fair Minutes should be reduced by the omission of matters of secondary 
importance and of those matters that were fully recorded elsewhere.
As these minutes were prepared at an annual cost of £2,000, their 
reduction might produce a painless economy. The Treasury committee 
were asked to investigate the matter further by comparing the Treasury 
system with those in other departments. Ponderous as it was, the 
Treasury's registration system was found to be a sufficiently convenient 
guide to the original papers, for the Fair Minutes to be dispensed with 
in routine cases. In future, each class of business excluded from the 
Fair Minutes was itself to be the subject of a minute, setting out 
rules and precedents. Subsequent modifications of such general rules
1 Ibid., p.56'
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were still to be recorded in the Fair Minutes. The committee felt, , 
that it was in this way that the "consolidation and classification 
of information" contemplated by Sih Francis Baring in I84I could be 
brought about. Since there was a logical connection between indexing 
and selecting minutes for inclusion as Fair Minutes, the Registry was 
to assume responsibility for copying them.^ Althou^ these changes 
were mainly technical, they form a small but practical illustration 
of the need to formalize separate processes for policy and routine 
decisions. Trevelyan was quite satisfied with this part of the 
reorganization of I848.
4 The Reorganization of the Financial Division
After the false promise of I848 Trevelyan's concern for the 
reorganization of the Treasuiy took a new direction. From I85O 
onwards he helped to make the Financial Department a useful instrument 
of fiscal and financial policy; having failed to remodel the Treasuiy, 
he became increasingly interested in what was becoming one of the 
most important parts of it. The prompting for this new development 
was essentially political and arose from the growing complexity of 
financial problems. The abandonment of most protective duties 
combined with the steady rise of the costs of government to make fiscal 
details a central concern. This fiscal reform of the fifties is 
inevitably associated with the name of Gladstone, and it was Trevelyan's 
collaboration with him that resulted in a brief period of decisive 
influence.
1 Ibid., p.55* In I84I, Trevelyan had himself drafted the Minute 
of 26 January that had placed the Principal Clerk Assistant to 
the Secretaries in charge of the Registry, in an attempt to 
improve "consolidation and classification of information" 
(P.R.O., T.1/4558/2045).
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Consideration of these problems was precipitated in I85O
with the death of T.C. Brooksbank, Chief Clerk of the Financial 
1Division, This took the form of a memorandum by G.¥. Brands,
Principal Clerk for Colonial Business, with observations upon it
by Trevelyan. As Brands had at one time been Secretaiy to the
Colonial Audit Board he was one of the best qualified men in the
Treasury to offer detailed advice. In the memorandum, dated March
I85O, Brande contended that the Financial Division should have full
information on eveiy tax and loan. These details, many of them
embedded in the records of the revenue departments, would obviously
be essential to any dynamic Chancellor of the Exchequer. His
suggestions about expenditure were an extension of the improved
methods of accountability that Trevelyan had been helping to apply
to army expenditure. In particular, Brande felt that the Treasuiy
should be able to provide a clear picture of the actual, as opposed
to the theoretical, financial situation; not only the Exchequer grants
but also the expenditure of it within each year. The Treasury should
also serve to indicate expenditure by the revenue departments which
2
was not subject to Parliamentary vote.
Trevelyan's remarks written in April I85O concentrated on the 
undesirable dependence of the Treasury on the revenue departments 
for information about the departments themselves: "The Treasury is,
however, dependent on the Revenue Departments themselves for the
1 Brooksbank's long personal involvement with all aspects of revenue, 
particularly with funding, illustrated the difficulty of finding 
an adequate replacement from within his own division. He had 
devoted a lifetime to the Treasury, entering as an extra clerk
in 1796 and rising to become Chief Clerk of the Revenue Department 
(later Financial Division) in 1829. (J.C. Sainty, Treasury
Officials, 1660 - 1870,1972, p.ll5.)
2 Brande's memorandum and Trevelyan's observations were later included 
by Trevelyan in the second blue book on the Civil Service, Papers 
relating to the Re-organisation of the Civil Service, P.P.,
1854-55, XX, pp. 452-456.
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information required for the extension of this control over them, 
the rule being that every proposal for an alteration of the existing 
status would be supported by a complete examination, ab initio, of the 
facts of the case, as if nothing were known about them at the 
Treasury. In the same way, when any complaint or suggestion is received 
at the Treasury, it is referred to the department concerned for a 
report Trevelyan felt that the Treasury was obliged to defer
judgment to the revenue department concerned and was anxious to 
enable the Treasury to be something more than a rubber stamp.
Trevelyan went on to repeat his view (extremely similar to that of 
Baring) of the need for the Treasury to be able to ensure that the 
fiscal machine was suited to current needs:
What takes place in the absence of this constantly-adjusting 
and regulating power, is that, while everything else is 
changing, the revenue establishments, and the rules and forms 
of proceeding connected with them, remain the same, until 
they become, by their unnecessary expensiveness on some points, 
their insufficiency on others, and their unsuitableness to the 
actual state of business on nearly all, a subject of general 
comÿaint. The Treasury is then forced by Parliament and by 
public opinion to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, upon whose 
recommendation certain remedial steps are taken; after which 
everything relapses into its former state of inaction, until 
a new clamour and pressure from without arise, and a new 
Commission is appointed.
This was a reasonable interpretation of the fitful evolution of 
institutions and methods brought about by commissions, committees
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and inquiries from the time of Lord North onwards. Trevelyan preferred 
to regard this side of government as a machine and he developed a 
topical industrial analogy: "The working of these great establishments 
would be watched by the Treasuiy as a master-manufacturer watches his 
machinery: eveiy redundancy would be reduced, and every defect would 
be supplied as soon as it was brought to lig)it; and the inconvenience, 
waste, and loss of power which at present arise from long periods of 
neglect would be avoided." In the same way as he hoped that the 
Treasury could become the hub of the Civil Service, Trevelyan expected 
the Financial Division to become the pivot of fiscal policy.
Trevelyan believed that "correct" opinions on finance and 
taxation could be formed in much the same way as they could be formed 
on any other aspect of government. All that was needed was an 
impersonal mechanism to establish the truth. He accepted that a 
Chancellor of the Exchequer might have the advice of the revenue 
departments, the Board of Trade, his private secretaries and the 
Chief Clerk of the Financial Division, but only the Treasuiy - he 
believed - could form a detached and comprehensive view. He agreed 
with Brande that the Treasury should be able to prepare for the 
Chancellor a well-digested statement on every aspect - fiscal, political, 
ecomonic and social - of eveiy tax or proposed tax. One presumes 
that by this means the true interests of the nation were to be 
protected, and that crises of the kind brought about in I848 by 
the injudicious increase of income tax at a time of economic depression 
would be avoided.‘ This new kind of expertise would be complementary 
to the more traditional skills in the management of government borrowing. 
Trevelyan proposed, for example, that Brooksbank's accumulated 
experience should be preserved by the careful arrangement of his
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fiscal and financial memoranda.
It is not clear what use was made of Brande's and Trevelyan's 
papers in 1850. Sir Charles Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
had already shown that he was far from keen to remodel the Treasury 
in accordance with Trevelyan’s advice. To Gladstone, however, this 
suggestion that the Treasury might he an instrument of policy had 
much more appeal, and he was later able to put Trevelyan's enthusiasm 
to a number of limited constructive uses.
To turn from the comparative simplicity of a theory of reform 
to the complex reality of the staff structure of the Financial Division 
indicates the practical difficulty of making any substantial change in 
the methods of fiscal supervision. It might be supposed that the 
death of Brooksbank made the reorganization of the Financial Division 
easier, but change was limited by a pattern of promotion which had 
been laid down ten years earlier. While Sir Francis Baring was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1859 and I84I, he had been struck 
by the need to arrange for a successor to Brooksbank. As Treasury 
reorganization had opened promotion to the chief-clerkship of the 
Financial Division to all suitably qualified senior clerks, he had 
appointed C.L. Crafer and George Litchfield as senior clerks, making 
Crafer the senior of the two.^ Accordingly, Crafer became Chief 
Clerk on Brooksbank's death. He accepted the ideas expressed in
2
Brande’s memorandum, while admitting his inexperience for the post. 
Crafer was in fact more eager to become a principal clerk, and he 
was further promoted in February I85I as Principal Clerk for Colonial 
Business in succession to Brande. With its extra £200 salary this
1 T.L.B., XXX?, p.252.
2 P.P., 1854-55, XX, pp. 458-440.
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post was the reward for thirty-nine years’ service. In accordance
with Baring’s scheme he was replaced hy George Litchfield, an even
older man who had entered the Treasury in 1808, and who on grounds
of age alone was clearly incapable of remodelling the Financial
Division. This undistinguished appointment might have conveniently
been regarded as an interim measure, if it had been possible to find
a suitable successor according to the usual rules of Treasury promotion.
A serious effort was made by working down the list of assistant clerks
eligible for promotion until a suitable person could be found. The
two senior assistants in the Financial Division were eliminated: one
of them, Spencer Drummond, refused; the other, Courtney, was pressed by
Trevelyan to waive his claim on the grounds of inadequate qualifications
and ill-health. The post finally devolved upon W.H. Stephenson, a
man of ambition and ability, who was at the time serving as private
1
secretary to Sir Charles Wood. Stephenson was, however, so invaluable
in this latter capacity that he did not return to take up his appointment 
2until August I85I. Furthermore, he did not stay long in his new post, 
for he, like his predecessor, was attracted by the more immediate 
reward of a principal-clerkship, and this led in February 1852 to
3
his succeeding Leake as Principal Clerk Assistant to the Secretaries.
In this post Stephenson became Trevelyan’s main adviser on matters of 
reorganization, but of course was no longer available to improve the 
Financial Division.
The alarming and bewildering frequency of these staff changes 
was mainly due to an unusually large number of retirements at the top 
of the office. But they also revealed the near impossibility of
1 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Book, III, 25 February I85I.
2 Ibid., 7 March, 12 August I85I.
5 Ibid., 20 February 1852.
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finding a qualified Chief Clerk hy minor adjustments to the existing
staff structure. It was clear that impetus for fundamental change
could only emerge from wider political and administrative needs.
Fortunately for Trevelyan he was able to channel these needs through
his close links with two successive Chancellors of the Exchequer,
Disraeli and Gladstone.
With Disraeli, Trevelyan became for the first and last time a
close adviser to a Chancellor. Disraeli knew little about the details
Of finance. He had been encouraged by Lord Derby to accept the post
with the famous remark: "You know as much as Mr. Canning did. They
give you the figures." Unfortunately there is little to show how far
Trevelyan made good the Chancellor's technical deficiencies. He was,
however, accorded the doubtful distinction by Disraeli's biographers
of having helped to prepare the ill-fated "compensatory" budget of
I852 - the desperate bid of the protectionists to find a policy to
replace protection as such by extending income and house tax in order
to pay for tax concessions to the agricultural, shipping and sugar
interests. However this policy failed to reunite the Conservatives
2and offended other interests, and the ministry was defeated. Despite
the fact that Treasury officials usually had little patience with
Chancellors who failed, Trevelyan was touchingly grateful for Disraeli's
5
appreciation of his services on leaving office.
In terms of policy, Gladstone was a Chancellor after Trevelyan's 
heart. With this went the difficulty, that in financial matters 
Gladstone - with his immense professional ability - dwarfed Trevelyan.
1. W.F. Moneypenny and G.E. Buckle, The Life of Disraeli, III (1914)»
p.428.
2 S.H. Northcote, Twenty Years of Financial Policy (I862), p.195*
5 Trevelyan to Disraeli, 29 December 1852, T.L.B., XXX, p.165.
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Trevelyan was eloquent in his praise of Gladstone's budget of 1855 -
a proposal which, among other things, planned the eventual ending of
income tax. Trevelyan was strongly opposed to the tax and felt that
Gladstone's policy was "correct" and he wrote on 21 April: "I sincerely
congratulate you on the success and honour of your Budget. I say
success, because whatever its fate as a Party or Political measure
may be, you have been extremely successful in preparing a scheme by
which the best interests of the Country are provided for to a remarkable
1
and unexpected extent." Trevelyan's respect was reflected in the first
practical suggestion he made about Treasury organization. This was
the essentially traditional proposal that Gladstone should select one
of the best Treasuiy clerks to be his private secretary, but with the
additional object that the clerk would bring back to the Treasury
"the knowledge of the recent proceedings of the Chancellor of the 
2
Exchequer."
From the time he took office Gladstone had been considering a 
reorganization of the accounts of revenue departments. This was a 
completely non-party issue, the need for which had been established 
in Brande's memorandum of March 1850. As the details of this change 
will be dealt with in the next chapter, it is sufficient to say that 
by February 1854 the transfer of the revenue departments to the 
estimates called for a major change in the accounts kept by the 
Financial Division. Fully aware of the difficulties in finding a 
man on the Treasury establishment capable of undertaking this work, 
Trevelyan had suggested that V.G. Anderson, the Assistant Paymaster
3
General, should be added to the Financial Division. By this step the
1 Add. MS., 44555 f.54.
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 3 January 1854, Ibid., f.79«
3 Trevelyan had also been trying to ease the situation in the Treasury
by pressing for the retirement of one possible claimant to head
the Financial Division. This was Courtney, who had insisted in 
February' 1852 on becoming Senior Clerk when Stephenson had been
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embarrassment of making a blatantly external appointment might be 
avoided. There would be the added .administrative advantage of 
formalizing the dependence of the Pay Office on the Treasury. Trevelyan 
was enthusiastic about this grafting on of hew stock without the 
trouble of cutting out of dead wood. In a letter to Gladstone on 
8 February 1854, he expressed his confidence that the proposed 
arrangement, which included two other key appointments, would be able 
to cope with the increased expenditure caused by the outbreak of war 
with Russia: "that with Anderson at the Treasury and the Pay Office, 
Bromley at the Admiralty and Hoffay at the Audit Board I shall have no 
fear of meeting, without waste or confusion or arrear, any amount of 
war pressure upon the Account Departments".^ Quite apart from the 
wider issue of reform, the war demanded a quick and workable solution 
to the uncertainties surrounding the Financial Division. Trevelyan 
was giving the matter considerable thought and he considerably revised 
his opinion about the practicability of this compromise arrangement.
On 9 February he informed Gladstone that after taking Stephenson's 
advice he was convinced that it would be desirable and feasible to 
retire Litchfield prematurely in order to make way for Anderson, and 
thereby to link the Pay Office with the Treasury. Trevelyan then went
1 Add, MS., 44355 f.l50.
further promoted. From March to December he had been Disraeli’s 
private secretary - a post which, it was felt, was consistent with 
his duties in the Financial Division. (H.M.T., Departmental 
Arrangement Book, III, 2 March, 24 December 1852.) Despite this 
assurance, Trevelyan was determined to get rid of him on account 
of his poor record of attendance since I848 (T.L.B., XX,ïp256, 268.) 
In January 1854, he was cunningly persuaded to go on extended sick 
leave with the vague, unwritten promise of being given any other 
senior clerkship that might later fall vacant. (T.L.B., XXXII,
pp. 163, 210.)
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on to point out the need for a salary of £1,500 for the new combined 
post. The existing equality in the salaries of the chief clerks 
was, he felt, a proof of the bad arrangement of the Treasury. He also 
took the opportunity of referring to Arbuthnot’s oppostion and his 
influence with Sir Charles Wood which had prevented reform in 1849.
Finally Trevelyan proceeded from the particular to the general. 
Naturally the salary of the head of the Financial Division had led 
him to consider the status of principal officers. He felt that the 
existing practice of selecting some of these from the offices super­
intended by the Treasury should be extended to make it the usual 
form of recruitment for all the established clerks. He was convinced 
that the £500 - £500 salaries of assistant clerks would serve to 
attract the best men from the Pay Office, the Post Office and revenue 
departments. He planned to convert the exceptional nature of Anderson's 
appointment into a general principle:
This plan properly carried out would make the Treasury really 
a supervising office, possessed of a firm hold of all the 
branches of business which it has to deal with, would introduce 
a powerful principle of unity into the Public Service; and 
would give a very beneficial stimulus to exertion in every 
other Department.^
Inevitably he was tempted to twist the immediate problem to find 
additional supporting arguments in favour of his plans for the Civil 
Service as a whole - plans which had reached a crucial stage of 
development in February 1854*
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 9 February 1854, Add. MS., 44533 f* 182. 
Trevelyan had earlier suggested to James Wilson, the Financial 
Secretary, that the Treasury should confine itself to prescribing 
financial rules for subordinate departments and to supervising 
their execution. (13 September 1853, T.L.B., XXXII, p.54») Clearly 
Treasury staff who were experienced in the procedures of subordinate 
departments might make the best watch dogs.
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However, in order to complete the arrangements for Anderson's 
appointment, Trevelyan was obliged to attend to a number of much more 
mundane details. On 21 February, he reported to Gladstone that Anderson's 
new combined post was being opposed by Lord Monteagle, the Comptroller 
of the Exchequer. Monteagle represented a thoroughly outmoded view 
of financial propriety, but his opposition was "plausible and clever". 
Trevelyan encouraged Gladstone by reminding him of the advantages of 
radical change;
A new financial machinery has to be constructed founded on 
the completion of the symmetrical system of annual Estimates, 
and carried through books of account to be opened for the 
purpose, to a simple comprehensive Balance Sheet of the whole 
of the National income and expenditure and a separate statement 
of the saving or excess on each vote. Much careful manipulation 
will also be required to reduce the present cumbrous and complex 
forms of issue to harmony with this new state of things, and 
3rd the ordinary duties of the Financial Room including the 
highly important function of assisting and advising the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer as Mr. Brooksbank used to do, have 
to be carried on.
These advantages might still be achieved by a simple modification 
of the plan, for since the combined post had originally been conceived 
as an expedient to bring Anderson into the Treasury in the least 
painful manner, Trevelyan was quite prepared to give up the idea that 
he should retain the Assistant Paymastership. Accordingly, he suggested 
that Hoffay (whom it was proving difficult to appoint as Secretary 
to the Board of Audit) should take over Anderson's Paymastership
1 Ibid., f. 198.
- 64 -
The concluding arrangements in the Treasury were equally
time-consuming. Trevelyan was anxious that the Clerk for Parliamentary
Accounts, Shelley, should become the Division's Senior Clerk. This
was another useful piece of consolidation, to which Shelley raised
difficulties by declining to accept promotion, except on special
conditions - conditions which were unspecified in Trevelyan's
explanatoiy letter to Gladstone. Trevelyan suggested that the Chancellor
should formally offer him the post, before offering it in turn to
Edwin Crafer*^ The outcome was unexpected for Trevelyan: Shelley
accepted and was appointed by the same Minute of 24 March that also
appointed Anderson. Possibly as a result of Shelley's initial
reluctance, the Minute arranged for a further clerk to be in charge
of preparing Parliamentary returns. In addition to this consolidation,
another indication of the new status of the Financial Division was
the description of its Chief Clerk as "the confidential adviser of
the Chancellor of the Exchequer". His post was to rank with the
Principal Clerk for Colonial Business and the Principal Clerk Assistant
to the Secretaries, and thus was to carry a salaiy of £1,200. As this
was the amount he was already receiving, Anderson was also to receive
2a personal allowance as a reward for his promotion.
Some of the satisfaction that Trevelyan must have felt in helping 
to implement a small yet vital part of his scheme must have been 
dispelled by a well-informed attack upon him in The Times. Coming 
more than a year after Anderson's appointment, it served to keep alive 
some of the bitterness that had been aroused by disappointed expectations. 
On 18 June 1855, a pseudonymous letter by "Civilis", claiming to be
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 15 March 1854, Add. MS., 44353 f« 266.
2 Treasury Minute of 24 March 1854» H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement
Book, III.
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written by a Civil Servant with a quarter of a century's experience,
scathingly attacked Trevelyan for his ignorance of English official
practices. It claimed that it was Trevelyan's ineptitude that had
made it necessary for him to go outside the Treasury in order to
find a man with Anderson's qualities. It stressed the responsibility
of permanent heads of departments for achieving reforms in the Civil
Service. However, it pointed out that the heads of departments were
usually not selected from the main body of Civil Servants:
Take the instance of Sir Charles Trevelyan ... He is a man of
untiring industry, of energy indomitable, ambitious and public-
spirited. How came he to be Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury?
What are his peculiar qualifications for that position?
Sir Charles Trevelyan came to England on furlough, after ten
or twelve years well spent in the Civil-Service of India, and
when his brother-in-law, Macaulay, had a seat in Lord Melbourne's
Cabinet. He had acquired a reputation for great integrity under
trying circumstances, plodding industry in administrative
details, and a desire to improve by education the status and
prospects of our Indian fellow subjects. He was placed at the
head of department requiring a thorough knowledge of finance,
with the very elements of which he was unacquainted, and which
he has never since shown himself possessed of any aptitude to 
1acquire.
One consequence of his unfamiliarity with finance was, it was alleged, 
the upsetting of Baring's plans for the succession to the Financial 
Division. As we have seen, Trevelyan could hardly be blamed for the
1 The Times, 18 June 1855, P*9 col.e. A similar criticism of Trevelyan's 
professional origins had been made by George Arbuthnot in March 185^, 
see infra, pp. 190-I91.
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failure of this plan to produce the right man at the right time. He, 
therefore, immediately wrote to Gladstone (by now out of office) to 
justify himself. Although he might be over sensitive on the matter 
of Anderson's appointment, he was anxious to preserve his reputation 
and he asked Gladstone's help to prevent Anderson's appointment continuing 
to harm his relations with other members of the Treasury. Gladstone's 
help would be all the more useful, as Trevelyan did not feel that it 
would be either effective or appropriate for him to defend himself in 
the Press. Moreover, he had no wish to apologise for what had been done. 
Indeed his only complaint was that he had not been able to do more:
"it is unfair to hold me responsible for the arrangements relating 
to the Treasury Establishment; for, as you well know, I have no control.
If I "had, many things would be different.' For instance, eveiy appointment 
to the Treasuiy would be made on the same principle as Mr. Anderson's - 
that is, I would have no situation on the Establishment except the 
Supplementary Clerks with a smaller salary than £200 a year, and would 
select to fill the vacancies at the Treasury the best of the Clerks of 
a few years' standing belonging to the Revenue and other subordinate 
Establishments."^ In restating his views yet again for Gladstone's 
benefit, Trevelyan pathetically revealed how little he had so far 
achieved. The next phase of development at the Treasury was to be even 
less satisfactory to him.
5 The Reorganization of 1856
Shortly after the episode of the letter in The Times, Trevelyan 
made his last sustained attempt to remodel the Treasury. On 20 September 
1855, he sent Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Gladstone's successor as
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 18 June 1855, T.L.B., XXX?, p.251.
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Chancellor, a paper on the establishment. Describing it as the "mature
fruit of many years' experience and reflection", he asked for it to
be shown to Palmerston.^ This appeal to the hipest authority was
linked with an attempt to win Arbuthnot over to his point of view.
While on holiday at St. Leonards, Trevelyan wrote a long letter on
7 October, in which he attempted to convince Arbuthnot that the
Trevelyan scheme for the reinforcement of the Treasury already existed
embryonically. The letter recapitulated developments so far. He
stressed that the established clerks should have every opportunity
of qualifying themselves for the highest posts, including that of the
Assistant Secretary, but that this process could not take place until
2
extra clerks relieved them of excessive routine work. This was a belated 
effort to allay the fears that Trevelyan's involvement in Andersorfs 
appointment in Civil Service reform generally had aroused. Trevelyan 
had realized too late that his pronouncements on Treasury organization 
had in the main only served to create resentment.
In attempting to implement his plan Trevelyan was only able to 
make one or two token gestures. For example, he was anxious to exploit 
every opportunity to reduce the number of established clerks. Thus 
when in October 1855 Anderson wanted a well-qualified accountant for 
double-entry book-keeping, Trevelyan suggested to Palmerston throu^
Lewis that the appointment should be as permanent extra clerk.^ When 
he failed to obtain any response from Palmerston, Trevelyan reminded 
Lewis of the paper he had written in September, referring to Anderson's 
book-keeper as an illustration of the practicability of what he had 
proposed.^
1 Trevelyan to Lewis, 20 September 1855, Ibid., p.272.
2 Trevelyan to Arbuthnot, 7 October 1855, T.L.B., XXXV, p.274»
3 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Books, III, 29 October and 22 November 
1855; Trevelyan to Lewis, 22 November 1855, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.12.
4 Trevelyan to Lewis, 1 December 1855, Ibid., p.14»
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The next episode in Trevelyan's campaign is described in a
series of letters to Sir William Hayter, Patronage Secretary, in
February I856. On 7 February Trevelyan sent him an outline of the
existing establishment and his proposals for changing it. Trevelyan's
tone was almost apologetic: "As the primary duty of the situation I
hold is to maintain and improve the efficiency of the Establishment
and long experience and reflection have convinced me that this very
important public object cannot be obtained without making the
appointment with the distinct reference to the nature of the work to be
performed, I feel confident that Lord Palmerston will approve of my
having brought the subject fully under his consideration." Hayter
in reply must have brought home to Trevelyan the strength of opposition
to these pretensions - pretensions which appeared to some of Trevelyan's
colleagues as claims to personal aggrandisement. In a further letter
on 9 February Trevelyan disclaimed any wish to increase his won
powers: "I do not ask for the confidence which has so much to the
public advantage been reposed in Sir Benjamin Hawes and his Chief
Clerk, Mr. Brewry. The, appointments will be made by others, but
I have earnestly submitted to Lord Palmerston that they should be of
a kind suited to the duties to be performed." This was at least
a tactful reply to a Chief V/hip whose assiduity in the manipulation
of patronage became almost legendary.^ Nevertheless, Trevelyan still
felt it appropriate to express his regret that Hayter had opposed the
attempts by Lord John Russell to invigorate the Treasury in 1849 - as
2
necessary then as when they were partially brought about in 1855»
1 A month later Trevelyan clashed with Hayter over the failure to 
find employment for ablebodied men on the redundant list (see p. 235 
infra)•
2 Ibid., pp. 90, 91.
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It is clear from Trevelyan's further correspondence with Hayter, 
that Trevelyan's campaign to reduce the establishment of superior 
clerks prompted Arbuthnot to launch a minor counter-attack. Apparently, 
Arbuthnot wrote direct to Palmerston to protest against Trevelyan's 
criticisms of the bad effects of copying which, he felt, were a slight 
upon the men who had already undergone this kind of training. In 
his reply to Hayter on 11 Februaiy I856, Trevelyan expressed his pain 
at Arbuthnot's method of airing a complaint. While rejecting the 
extreme interpretation that had been placed on his own observations on 
copying, Trevelyan cited the examples of the arrangements to employ 
more supplementaiy clerks, that had been reached with the permanent 
heads of the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade. He also mentioned 
the similar recommendations that had been made in the suppressed report 
on the Foreign Office. Trevelyan particularly resented Arbuthnot's 
assertion that the Treasury had "deteriorated" under his direction.
He claimed that, as regards copying, he had only been attempting to 
put into force the Minute of 1849»^ Yet, regardless of assigning 
personal responsibility, the prolonged state of uncertainty over the 
organization of the Treasury, combined with Trevelyan's own semi­
public pronouncements on administrative reform, demanded an authoritative 
decision.
In attempting to force the pace of change, Trevelyan found
himself placed increasingly on the defensive. Palmerston's scepticism
of Trevelyan's proposals led to his questioning the effectiveness of
Trevelyan as an Assistant Secretary. In a letter to Lewis on I9 May I856,
Trevelyan denied that the Treasury's organization was "chaotic". If
it was unsatisfactory, this was due to the failure to implement the 
2
proposals of I848. Trevelyan made one last plea for this to be done.
1 Ibid., p.94.
2 Ibidi, p.158.
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His desperate persistence was due to his realization that the 
Treasury was about to be remodelled on principles different from 
his own.
The Minute of 4 July I856 was a turning point in Treasury 
organization. While Trevelyan's diagnosis of the need for a proper 
succession to the higher posts was accepted, it was not surprising 
that the remedy was the complete reversal of what he had always 
envisaged. In essence, it was a return to the system that had 
existed before 1805. Instead of a horizontal division between Board 
level and routine work, the Office was to be regarded once more as 
an entity. In addition, the old formality of Board meetings was 
abandoned, and thus with it the cumbersome centralization of authority. 
The work of the Treasury was to be divided between six divisions, 
each headed by a principal officer. In this way all routine work, 
including the conversion of minutes into letters and fair minutes, 
was to be carried out under the direction of the officer responsible 
for making policy decisions. The only mechanical woik that was to be 
separated from the rest was the making of copies of letters and 
other documents in a new department to be attached to the Registry.
By these means the clumsy ritual of excessive written communication 
would be avoided. The whole office was to be regulated according 
to fixed rules under the general supervision of the Assistant Secretary, 
to whom the Principal Officers were to be responsible after reference 
to the Parliamentary secretaries. However, his more particular 
responsibility in being only one of a number of principal officers 
was confirmed and formalized by his being put in charge of one of 
the new divisions. In this way Trevelyan's scope for offering advice 
and for attempting to interfere in the day-to-day management of the
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office was strictly curtailed.^ However, Trevelyan derived some 
immediate satisfaction from the revised office establishment in that 
it increased established senior positions at the expense of junior 
ones. There were to be ten first-class clerks in place of five senior 
clerks (the former nomenclature) and sixteen second-class clerks in 
place of thirteen assistant clerks, while the number of third-class 
clerks (junior clerks) was reduced from thirteen to seven.
The Assistant Secretary was instructed by the Minute to prepare 
new office rules in collaboration with the Auditor of the Civil List 
and the Principal Clerks. In view of the difficulties Trevelyan 
had always encountered in his dealings with Arbuthnot,^ it was clearly 
going to be extremely difficult for Trevelyan to introduce something 
of the substance of his earlier ideas into the detailed implementation 
of the Minute. In a letter to Arbuthnot on 22 September, for example, 
Trevelyan was anxious that the succession to the Principal Clerkships 
should be ensured, by including in the rules a provision that the 
First Class Clerk in each division could authenticate minutes in the 
absence of his Principal. This was one of Trevelyan's suggestions that 
Sir Charles Wood had found so objectionable in 1849* Quite apart 
from the practical value of this in providing for continuity, Trevelyan 
now felt that giving the First Class Clerks more responsibility would
1 Trevelyan's successor, G.A. Hamilton, succeeded in being relieved 
of Divisional responsibilities within a year of his appointment 
(H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Books, IV, Minute of 20 December 
1859).
2 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Books, III, 4 July I856;
J.C. Sainty, Treasury Officials, I66O-I87O (1972), pp. 71-72.
5 It is not easy to assess the extent of friction and conflict 
between two officials. After Anderson's appointment, Arbuthnot 
expressed discontent with his own salary. He produced a 
memorandum on 3 October 1855, in which he contrasted his predecessor's 
promotion to Assistant Secretary with his own failure to obtain 
an increase in salary. (H.M.T., Treasury Establishments, typescript 
copy*) The following day, Trevelyan wrote to Lewis asking that 
Arbuthnot's salary should be equal to that of the Principal Clerk 
and Arbuthnot, like Anderson, was awarded a personal allowance of £300 
in addition to his salary of £1,200. (H.M.T., Departmental
Arrangement Books, III, Minute of 27 Hovember I855.)
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make it impossible for them to be regarded as seniority appointments.^ 
This veiled attempt to extend the number of "administrative" appointments 
failed. In the final version of the rules there 'was only a general 
observation that the First Class Clerks were to be responsible for 
the transaction of business in the absence of their Principals.
Neither Arbuthnot nor the political heads of the Treasury were anxious 
to provide Trevelyan with rules liable to the latter*s highly personal 
interpretation.
Trevelyan had already submitted his draft of the rules to Lewis
on 11 September. He said that he had consulted Arbuthnot, Crafer and
Anderson. He pointed out that everyone had now been put in their
proper relative position. He was particularly at pains to stress that
2the Assistant Secretary was equivalent to a Treasury Under Secretary. 
Lewis was far from enthusiastic. He wrote to James Wilson, the 
Financial Secretary, thanking him for the improvements which he had 
made to the printed draft. He disliked formal regulations as they 
were either inconvenient or were disregarded: "I wish you would try 
when you see Trevelyan to reduce it to what is strictly necessary - 
if any part of it is necessary. I wish it also to be distinctly 
understood that no Minute on any important subject is to be passed 
without the knowledge and consent of one of the political heads of 
the Office. Trevelyan has a most dangerous love of the Press. He 
is unmindful of Mr. Canning's dictum that whoever prints, publishes..
Despite discouragement from permanent and political officers, 
Trevelyan presented a printed draft of the rules in the' form of a 
minute dated 1 October.^ In view of Lewis's strictures on rules.
1 T.L.B., XXXVI,p220.
2 Ibid., p.216
3 Quoted in E.I. Barrington, The Servant of All (1927), I, p.315*
4 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Book, III, 1 October 1856.
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Trevelyan was obliged to defend it in a lengthy letter to Lewis 
on 6 October. His most ardent appeal was for the retention of a 
paragraph on rules for promotion, by which seniority was to be 
finally relegated to cases of equal merit. This was another of the 
reforms that had failed to materialize in 1849. Now, Trevelyan 
proposed that it should be operated by the six principal officers.
In the past, promotion by merit had been vitiated by suspicions of 
favouritism, but this could be avoided by making use of the new 
structure of the Treasury. Unless appointments were made in this 
way, Trevelyan felt that "we should lose the fruit of all the labour 
and pain we have gone through, and the Office would be left worse 
than it was before". • Indeed, to cancel the paragraph would be to 
"re-establish the old state of feeling in renewed strength". While 
he did not wish to limit the discretion of political heads of departments, 
he felt that the improved standards in staff selection - standards 
which could only be achieved by the methods he had proposed - were 
in keeping with the real aims of his political superiors. Finally, 
he argued that the Treasury had a duty to set an example to other 
departments.^- This argument prevailed and the unexceptionable 
paragraph on promotion remained. Trevelyan had i±ie satisfaction of 
seeing that correct principles were established. Yet at the same time, 
definitions and rules only served to define and to limit Trevelyan’s 
functions.
The allocation of Treasury work between the principal officers • 
further emphasized the limits of Trevelyan's influence. He was placed 
in charge of the First Division with a responsibility for departments 
which had been his concern for the past sixteen years: the naval and 
military departments; the Stationery Office; the Public Record 
Office; the Board of Control; the Irish Board of Works; the Enclosure
1 T.L.B., XXXVI, p.230.
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Commissioners; and miscellaneous items. Trevelyan’s influence was 
confined as never before, and to some extent his reforming energy 
was diverted towards improving the efficiency of the army; for 
whereas the reorganization of the Treasury temporarily ended scope 
for discussion and speculation, Trevelyan’s continuing responsibilities 
for examining the expenditure of military departments combined with his 
earlier experience of managing the Commissariat to provide a new 
channel for his zeal during his last two years at the Treasury.
Following the reorganization Trevelyan remained extremely 
sensitive about what he considered to be the inadequate recognition 
of his status. He complained to Sir Benjamin Hawes, recently appointed 
Permanent Under Secretary to the new War Department, about a departmental 
regulation that had prescribed that the Assistant Under Secretary should 
sign letters to the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury and "other 
officers of inferior rank". As a former M.P., Hawes enjoyed a status 
which Trevelyan admitted that he had never possessed - despite the 
comparability of his salary and despite his being the senior permanent 
official in the Treasury. Trevelyan was satisfied that when the 
regulations were revised the offending words were omitted.^
An alternative indication of the value and significance of the post 
of Assistant Secretary is provided by the circumstances in which 
Trevelyan relinquished it. At Disraeli’s instigation he gave it up 
in exchange for the Governorship of Madras, and was succeeded by 
G.A. Hamilton, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, who wanted 
a permanent post. Sir Stafford Northcote in turn took Hamilton’s 
place, thereby providing a place for a Peelite returning to the
1 Trevelyan to Hawes, 21 and 23 April 1857»T.L.B., XXXYII, pp. 34,
36, 37* Even G.A. Hamilton, like Hawes a politician before becoming 
a Civil Servant, could do little to improve the status of the post.
While he soon relinquished divisional responsibility he did not acquire 
the title of Permanent Secretary until I867 (Treasury Minute of 10 May 
I867, quoted in M. Wright, Treasury Control of the Civil Service, 1854-74 
Oxford, 1969, pp. 363-566X
- 75 -
Conservative fold. The whole series of changes smacked of a
political job and it clearly revealed how a man like Hamilton with
limited means and political ambition regarded the Assistant
Secretaryship as a desirable prize.^
Yet despite Trevelyan's failure to improve his own status he
was successful in one important respect. His constant pressure for
a reduced superior establishment left a permanent mark on Treasury
organization, ensuring that the economical tradition of the first
half of the century moulded the administrative pattern of the second.
So much so, that the Treasury was for sixty years hampered by lack
of staff from exercising adequate supervision over expanding
establishments. This situation was not remedied until 1919 when
the Haldane Committee advocated the creation of a special "Establishments
Division" within the Treasury, and a large expansion in the number of
2
senior administrative staff.
6 Personnel Management
While Trevelyan's views did not prevail in the reorganization 
of the Treasury, his influence was a little more successful at a 
lower level in his supervision of entrance examinations and period 
of probation for first appointments.
Of these two duties the most theoretical and the least practical 
was the examination for established clerks. In I84I Peel discontinued 
the practice of limited competition established in 1834 and replaced 
y it by a simple qualifying test to be conducted by the Assistant
Secretary.^ The limited competitions had often been contrived farces,
1 "The New Treasury Appointments - Mr. Disraeli's Shifting Scenes",
The Economist, I5 January 1859, pp. 57-59*
2 H. Roseveare, The Treasury (I969), pp. 245-246.
3 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Books, II, Minute of 3 December I84I.
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but the fixed test was at such a low level that there are no recorded 
instances of a nominee failing it. When the Civil Service Commission 
(established in 1855) asked for information about the examination 
systems prevailing in government, they were not at all impressed by 
the elementary skills demanded at the Treasury.^ By contrast, the 
examinations for extra clerks had not been modified by Peel, and 
here Trevelyan operated a limited competitive system in microcosm.
For each vacancy the Assistant Secretary had the task of inviting 
the heads of the subordinate revenue boards and the Treasury to 
nominate one of their own clerks, Thus there were usually about 
four candidates for each vacancy: a reasonable procedure for ensuring 
the competence of those who had to carry on a great part of the routine 
work. In essence, what Trevelyan came to envisage as the best scheme 
for recruiting men for the higher Treasury appointments, already 
existed in this procedure for selecting the humbler ones. Here both 
limited competition and selection from subordinate departments was 
established in embryonic and workable form.
Trevelyan possessed almost equally little power in the matter
of probation: he did not know of a single instance when an unsatisfactory
2
clerk had been dismissed. On the other hand his love of exhortation 
gave him a nuisance value greater than his real influence. He enjoyed 
playing the headmaster, delighting to tell fathers of their sons' 
misdemeanours. For example, he did not hesitate to complain to his 
predecessor. Sir Alexander Spearman, about his son's work. Spearman 
had been a clerk in the Audit Office but he had been transferred by
1 Civil Service Commission to Trevelyan, 11 January 1856,P.P., 
1856, XXII, p.476.
2 Trevelyan to Major Barcom, 15 April 1854, T.L.B., XXXIII, p.134
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the Patronage Secretary, Sir William Hayter, to a junior clerkship
in the Treasury on the recommendation of Lord John Russell.^ The
following January Trevelyan wrote to Spearman complaining about his
son’s slovenly copying, and concluded by saying that he had issued a
solemn warning: "what we used to call at Haileybury a solemn moneo -
an official reproof intended to mark the offence, and to show that
2
worse consequences will follow a repetition of it". Trevelyan was 
perhaps rather premature in his strictures for after he was transferred 
from the boredom of the Registry Spearman acquitted himself well, 
first as one of Disraeli's and then as one of Gladstone’s private 
secretaries.^ If anything, this incident may have been a further 
illustration of the harmful effect of excessive routine work on 
ambitious and able young men.
Trevelyan could do little except admonish and slackness could 
continue unpunished over a number of years. Sir George Clerk's son 
provides a classic case. Trevelyan first complained to Sir George 
Clerk in July I848 when he informed him that his son had been given 
three warnings for lateness.^ In the following November the Chief 
Clerk of the Fourth Division drew attention to Alexander Clerk's 
unauthorized absences, and as punishment a Treasury Minute was issued 
formally restricting his leave to fifteen days a year.^ Trevelyan 
dutifully informed Sir George of this development.^ Again the measures 
adopted proved to be ineffective and the same sanctions were repeated 
a year later in a further Minute. There was no long term improvement.
1 Treasury Minute of 25 February I85I, P.R.O., T.l, 5659^/4289.
2 Trevelyan to Spearman, 28 January I852, T.L.B., XXVIII,p.I5I•
5 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Books,III, Treasury Minutes
of 2 July, 18 September and 24 December 1852, and 4 March 1855*
4 8 July 1848, T.L.B., XXI, pp. 58-40*
5 H.M.T., Departmental Arrangement Books, III, 10 November 1848.
6 10 November I848, T.L.B.,XXII, p.152.
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and finally in October 1852 Trevelyan prepared a memorandum itemizing
Clerk's offences. His lapses were quite amazing: he had only been
present at the proper time on thirteen days in the previous year,
arriving after 10.50 a.m. on I76 days (Treasury business began
at 10.00 a.m.) and after 12.00 noon on 56 days; he had also taken 86
days leave instead of the regulation 48 days. Trevelyan observed that
Clerk had given no explanation, while other clerks who had offended to
a far lesser degree had promised to mend their ways.^ The resulting
Treasury Minute agreed that dismissal was merited but that for the sake
of Sir George Clerk's service - among them that of being Financial
Secretary to the Treasury from I84I to 1845 - the disgrace was to
be avoided by the forfeiture of three months' pay. Additional weight
2
was given to this decision by a memorandum signed by Lord Derby.
The Clerks took advantage of this comparatively honourable escape and, 
doubtless to the relief of Trevelyan, Alexander Clerk resigned in 
March 1855.^
Although Clerk's case was an extreme one, this and other examples 
of slackness coloured Trevelyan's pronouncements on the Civil Service.
His strictures did not pass unquestioned; Arbuthnot who had contended 
that the Treasury was badly organized rather than badly staffed was 
equally critical of Trevelyan's generalizations about the Civil Service.^ 
However, as the chapter on Civil Service reform will show, Trevelyan 
realized that staffing and organization were inextricably linked.
He also appeared to adopt rigorous attitudes of the kind satirized 
in Trollope's portrayal of Sir Gregory Hardlines in The Three Clerks
1 Memorandum dated 22 October 1852, T.L.B.,.XXIX, p.278.
2 Departmental Arrangement Books, III, 4 December 1852.
5 Ibid., 18 March I855.
4 See infra pp. 188-I92.
- 79 -
(1858),^ One small example serves to illustrate the superficial
plausibility, if not the fairness, of this satire. At the time of
Trevelyan's departure from the Treasury in January 1859» rumours were
rife among the staff that Trevelyan had left a memorandum to the effect
that all offices in the department were overpaid. In a letter to
W.ÏÏ. Stephenson Trevelyan emphatically denied this, particularly that
the post of Assistant Secretary was overpaid, but at the same time
reiterated his view that second class clerks should be drawn from
2
departments subordinate to the Treasury. Even at this late stage he 
was more concerned to reduce the size of the permanent establishment 
than to refute the implicit accusation that he had thoroughly demoralised 
his own department.
Conclusion
The most important consequence of Trevelyan's disappointments 
and frustrations at the Treasury was the diversion after 1848 of his 
energies towards departmental reorganization and later to the consideration 
of Civil Service reform as a whole. Althou^ he was continually 
theorizing about the need for more senior staff to share the burden 
of important decisions, he himself made no serious attempt to delegate, 
particularly at the time of the Irish famine, when it would have been 
perfectly feasible to leave many of the detailed decisions to officials 
in Ireland# Indeed it will be clear when his management of the 
Commissariat Department is considered separately that Trevelyan enjoyed 
attending to executive details, and that the unique relationship of the 
Commissariat to the Treasuiy enabled him to do so. Apart from personal 
predilections, Trevelyan's experience in India had conditioned him to
1 Anthony Trollope, An Autobiography (1885, reprinted in World's 
Classics ed. 1953), p.96. Trollope liked Trevelyan personally 
despite his disapproval of competetive examinations.
2 15 January 1859, T.L.B., XXXVIII, p.58.
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think in terms of rule rather than supervision. In this sense he 
was out of place at the Treasuiy.
The uncongenial nature of Trevelyan's supervisory role 
combined with the inherent weakness of the Assistant Secretaryship 
is further illustrated by his series of attempts to extend the financial 
and administrative supervision of the Treasuiy - an activity in vÆiich, 
as the next chapter will show, he was forced to work within existing 
traditions of reform where he had little opportunity for decisive 
personal action.
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Chapter IV 
THE , EXTENSION OF TEEASUEY INFLUENCE
Trevelyan's work in attempting to extend the influence of the 
Treasury was closely hound up with his conventional laissez-faire 
opinion that government should assume as few burdens as possible. It 
followed from this view that one of the most important tasks of 
government was its strict accountability to Parliament: its need to 
show that public money was being effectively spent on the legitimate 
functions of government. This, of course, had been the main concern of 
those who had pressed for financial and economical reform from the 
1780s onwards. During the early nineteenth century, the Treasuiy 
had sustained this concern on a technical level through encouraging, 
if not always acting upon, the highly technical work of obscure reforming 
book-keepers and accountants. It was Trevelyan's eager involvement in 
their work that gave him, a financial amateur, a small part in three 
important aspects of government accounting: reorganization of estimates; , 
extension of estimates to more departments; and the development of 
techniques of post-appropriation audit. His contribution to each will 
be discussed in a section of this chapter.
The frustrations that Trevelyan encountered in making the Treasury 
a superintending office were also abundantly revealed in his attempts 
to control departmental establishments and departmental expenditure 
generally. He might often be tempted to interfere in departments 
subordinate to the Treasury and to offer advice in others, but these 
verbal excursions were generally an index of his ineffectiveness. A 
few examples will serve to illustrate Trevelyan's position, and to 
explain his enthusiasm for the exceptional opportunities granted him 
in the departmental investigations from I848 to 1855. These
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investigations are reserved for more detailed examination in the 
next chapter.
Finally, something of Trevelyan's personal need to feel that 
he was able to achieve some tangible economies will be shown in his 
collaboration with McCulloch of the Stationery Office - a collaboration 
which, while it did not bring about large economies, pleased Trevelyan 
in that it imposed a measure of centralized discipline over the 
spending departments.
1 Financial Control
A The Reorganization of Estimates
Trevelyan's work on the reorganization of estimates began soon 
1
after his appointment. Strictly speaking, concern for the estimates
in a general sense was no part of his work. Indeed, the Clerk for
Pariiamentazy Accounts was later at pains to point out that the preparation
2of estimates was nothing to do with the Assistant Secretary. However, 
Trevelyan derived a far more valuable insight into the problems of the 
military departments from his management of the Commissariat than he 
would have done from the routine collation of estimates in the Treasury 
proper. Here, as in other aspects of his work, the Commissariat provided 
him with real responsibilities on a small scale - responsibilities that
1 His work on estimates is only intelligible in the context of the 
three-fold financial process of estimate, appropriation and audit.
In part, this process belongs to the history of Parliament, for it 
was Parliament that had demanded to control the appropriation of 
supplies from the Deign of William III onwards. Formal appropriation 
could only be effective, however, if it was known whether the sums 
asked to be voted were adequate for legitimate needs (i.e. an accurate 
estimate), and whether these sums had been spent according to the 
separate votes in the Appropriation Act (i.e. a post-appropriation 
audit that would examine vouchers and bills to check actual 
expenditure). Estimates were being refined in the 1840s and 1850s, 
while - despite some pioneering developments - post-appropriation 
audit lagged behind. As we shall see, this was due to the suDrvival of 
an older system of audit that relied on minute care in the actual 
disbursement of money in accordance with ParliamentaDy appropriation.
2 The evidence of C.L. Crafer before the Select Committee on 
Miscellaneous Expenditure. (P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i), p.66.)
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might prompt him to extend the scope of his duties.
When Trevelyan took over the Commissariat, the main problem 
that confronted him pertained directly to estimates. This was the 
tangle of accounts left after the abolition of the Army Extraordinaries 
in 1855* As its name would suggest, the Army Extraordinaries was a 
multi-purpose vote that had originally been intended to cover 
contingencies, but it had come by the end of the eighteenth century 
to include much routine expenditure. This had resulted in the military 
departments being able to provide a number of services without the 
necessity of preparing an estimate for them. The risks inherent in 
this arrangement had long been appreciated, and in 1855 the Extra­
ordinaries had been broken up and replaced by a number of separate votes, 
The estimates for these votes were to be prepared by the department 
responsible for the service, that is by the War Office, the Ordnance and 
the Treasuiy for Commissariat services. The implementation of this 
dragged on for a decade as it proved difficult to reclassify the 
estimates satisfactorily. When Trevelyan entered this protracted 
discussion, he emphasized that the estimates should be produced by the 
department which actually provided the service. As he remarked to 
Sir Henry Hardinge, the Secretary at War, in 1842, "any other course 
must, I think, be productive of unnecessary repayments, double accounts, 
divided responsibility, and Estimates prepared on imperfect data by 
those who are not familiar with the particular service because it is 
not performed by them".^ The problems inherent in applying this 
system to the army overseas was submitted to a specialist committee 
in May 1843* On 11 July 1843 Trevelyan triumphantly reported to Sir 
William Herries, the Chairman of the Audit, that the recommendation of 
the committee was a "simple, intelligent, concise system equally 
applicable in war as well as peace". Although the Commissariat would
1 Trevelyan to Hardinge, 18 July 1842, T.L.B., II, p.89. R
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provide additional services which were on the estimates of other
departments, the submission of monthly accounts for final classification
by the Board of Audit according to the grants and votes would ensure
departmental responsibility.^
While Trevelyan was tempted to make pronouncements on general
principles, the real work of reforming the accounts of the service
departments was being undertaken by a series of specialist committees.
Each committee consisted of T.C. Brooksbank, the Chief Clerk of the
Financial Division, and W.C. Anderson, the Assistant Paymaster General,
together with a permanent official from the department whose estimates
were being examined. Although these committees were engaged in work
of laborious complexity, they succeeded in establishing principles
of general application. For example, the committee investigating the
classification of the Ordnance Estimates (set up in December I84I and
reporting in March I844) stressed that estimates only had value as a
control if they referred to actual expenditure within the year as opposed
to debts incurred. This was the reiteration of a point made by the
Select Committee on Finance in 1797* The Ordnance Estimates Committee
pointed out that the success of post-appropriation audit depended upon
the adoption of this procedure. Indeed, the failure to apply this
principle in the naval departments vitiated the post-appropriation
audit pioneered there by Sir James Graham. Equally important was the
recommendation that the Ordnance Estimates should be broken down under
nine heads instead of indeterminately showing lump sums for each 
2station. The importance and general applicability of all these 
proposals led over the next two years to a detailed examination of
1 T.L.B., Ill, p.56.
2 Copies of Reports and Treasury Minutes relating to the Audit of Naval 
and Military Accounts, P.P., I856, XXXVIII, pp. 255-265.
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the Army and Navy Estimates. These investigations culminated in
the Treasury Minute of I5 January I846, whereby a common system of
estimate based on actual expenditure within the financial year was
imposed on the Army, Navy and Ordnance.^ This enabled the Treasuiy
to insist that the accounts should be closed and unspent balances
returned to the Exchequer eight months after the end of the financial
year. These new rules were linked with a formal statement of the
"immemorial practice" that only estimates approved by the Treasuiy
were to be laid before Parliament. At the same time, formal
recognition was given to the right to transfer, with the prior
approval of the Treasury, a surplus on one Army, Navy, Ordnance or
2
Commissariat vote to meet a deficiency on another. In effect, 
this was a refinement of the concept of Treasury control: instead of 
a formal prohibition that would frequently be evaded, there was 
flexibility under Treasury superintendence. This superintendence 
was more to satisfy Treasury amour propre than to restrict the service 
departments. Although the Treasury was willing to accede to all 
requests, it at least recorded the extent to which Pariiamentaiy 
votes were modified. Trevelyan, with his overall responsibility 
for the mechanics of military expenditure, operated within the system 
without complaint. Under the new system, the need for Treasury 
permission acted as a brake; in this sense, Trevelyan described it 
in I848 as "a real control, and is felt to be so by all the parties
1 Trevelyan wrote to Baring in I848 explaining to him that the 
work he had initiated had been continued by Goulburn and Wood 
(12 August I846, T.L.B., VII, p.2(J.
2 P.P., I856, XXXVIII,p.506. The power of transfer was explicitly 
provided for in the next Appropriation Act (9 & 10 Vic. c.ll6).
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concerned'*.^ However, his enthusiasm for these technical developments 
was not matched hy results. He failed to notice that the excessive
2recourse to transfer nullified the improved form of the service estimates. 
His touching faith in improved methods of accountancy was, moreover, 
not proof against the pressure of war expenditure from the Crimean 
War onwards.
Trevelyan’s pride in developments in military accounting led
him to make a general suggestion in I848 that the Miscellaneous (later
Civil) Estimates could profitably undergo the same kind of reform.
He felt that it would be a comparatively easy task, since they had
already been reclassified in 1845 by Sir George Clerk, the Financial 
3
Secretary. Although a few refinements were made in 1854 in the 
printed form of the Civil Estimates,^ they were not assimilated to 
the Service Estimates until 1866. As an outsider to these processes, 
Trevelyan had wanted to show that he was eager to take some small share, 
even if it was only as a propagandist, in the Treasury's slow and 
unspectacular progress towards improved accountability to Parliament.
1 Paper on the Office of Paymaster of Civil Services and the 
Exchequer, I848, P.P., I856, XV, p.519* Occasionally Trevelyan 
revealed his opposition to the older, formerly endemic, practice 
of holding balances over from one year to the next. In December 
I84I, he chided Sir Sydney Herbert for this on the grounds that 
it helped to establish a dangerous precedent. (T.L.B., I,pul64.) 
Trevelyan was satisfied when the Admiralty accounts were remodelled 
in order to conform with the Appropriation Act. (P.R.O., T.l/4658.)
2 The Select Committee on Public Accounts in their second report 
in I862 was critical of the indulgence shown by the Treasury 
since I846. The exigencies of war and the increasing level of 
service expenditure had resulted in the following transfers:
Navy (1854-60) £3,000,000; Ordnance (1846/7-55/6) £440,000;
Army (1846/7-55/6) £664,000. The Select Committee felt that the 
scale of transfer indicated that no serious attempt had been made 
to prepare accurate estimates. (P.P., 1862, XI, pp. 207-208.)
3 P.P., 1856, XV, pp. 517-520.
4 From 1854 onwards, contingent expenses were printed in detail 
for the first time. (P.P., 1854, XL, p.361.)
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B. The Extension of Estimates
Since the quality of Trevelyan's intervention was limited to 
generalities in this highly technical field, he was in a stronger 
position when it came to the extension of an administrative principle 
as opposed to its implementation in detail. Thus he was able to 
take a more conspicuous part in the extension of estimates to departments 
that had hitherto not been obliged to prepare them. Two groups of 
departments were involved; the revenue departments and a larger group of 
more recently formed departments. The revenue departments consisted 
of the Customs, Inland Revenue and the Post Office. They all deducted 
their administrative costs from the revenue they collected, before 
rendering a net account to the Exchequer. The other group was composed 
of departments, established by statute from the reign of George III 
onwards, which derived their administrative expenses from specific 
revenues. Since no supply needed to be voted, no estimates were 
presented to Parliament. Thus the Treasury stood in special relation­
ship to these departments, for it alone could exercise any kind of 
economical control.
The revenue departments were particularly important as one 
of the largest employers in the government service and might, therefore, 
be considered as one of the most promising fields for economy. From 
a financial point of view there was also the advantage of being able to 
assess the gross revenue, once these departments were made subject 
to estimate for their own expenses. This step had originally been 
suggested in I83I, but it did not emerge as a serious proposition 
until I852. From Gladstone's notes for a cabinet meeting in December 
I852 it appears that Disraeli had begun to consider the matter.^ As 
Disraeli admitted to leaning heavily on Trevelyan in the preparation
1 Notes for a cabinet meeting, 3 December 1852, Add. MS., 44^36 f.l.
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of his budget, it is possible that the latter had suggested the 
change as a long overdue improvement. Gladstone certainly saw the 
need for it as part of an overall scheme for the reform of national 
finances. He asked Trevelyan and W.G. Anderson to produce a memorandum 
on the feasibility of the proposal in order to counter the objections 
of Lord Monteagle, the Comptroller of the Exchequer, who was likely 
to have considerable influence with Gladstone's VJhig colleagues.
The joint memorandum was a persuasive document which made a point 
of emphasizing the improvements already made in the service estimates.
As the service departments had paid all their receipts into the 
Exchequer since I848, it was felt that it would be relatively easy 
to extend this accounting principle to the revenue departments. This 
emphasis on the ease of making the change led Trevelyan and Anderson to 
scorn the curiously ill-informed objection of Monteagle that large 
sums of money would need to be circulated between departments. They 
ridiculed this archaic concept and pointed out that the revenue 
department employed commercial methods of transferring credits.
On the central ussue of improved estimates, Trevelyan and 
Anderson tactfully concentrated on the improved accountability to 
Parliament that the change would bring. They pointed out the anomaly 
that whereas estimates were required for the smallest items of expenditure 
inmost departments, in the Customs it was possible to'"build expensive 
offices, purchase or erect new buildings and machinery for a distillery, 
establish a revenue police, purchase and equip revenue cruizers, with 
no other limitation of cost than that which their own discretion may 
impose, without going throu^ the formality of an intimation to 
Parliament". Trevelyan felt that it was one of the duties of the 
Treasury to keep Parliament primed with information. Consequently
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he did not bother to answer Monteagle's most valid point that there 
was already insufficient time for Parliament to discuss existing 
estimates business.^
The memorandum served its purpose in showing that Gladstone's
proposal was practicable. An Act was passed, whereby the revenue
departments and the other group of departments financed by the revenue
2
were made supply services, and thus subject to estimate. Of course, 
it had not been difficult for Trevelyan to show that Monteagle's ideas 
were as out-of-date as the remaining powers of the Exchequer that he 
still exercised. Monteagle's powers and his exercise of them were so 
obviously incompatible with attempts to streamline accounting 
procedures that they gave Trevelyan ample scope for polemic.
C The Dispute with Monteagle
Trevelyan's long-standing professional dispute with Lord 
Monteagle contains an element of drama that is usually lacking in the 
arid discussion of financial reform. Instead of slow and laborious 
development in which only cautious advances could be made, there was 
clash of principles - a clash between the principles inherent in the 
old system of the Exchequer and in the newer techniques of accountability 
being developed in the pay offices. Althou^ the old Exchequer had been 
finally abolished in 1834, a new official, the Comptroller of the 
Exchequer, had been created as an additional check on the expenditure 
of Parliamentary grants. He was responsible to Parliament for seeing 
that Treasury orders to the Bank of England were in accordance with 
supply and appropriation. He was, therefore, an auditor in the old
1 P.P., I856, XV, pp. 575-580. The memorandum, dated 1 February 1853,
was printed in the appendix to the report of the Select Committee 
on Public Monies.
2 17 & 18 Vic. c. 94.
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Exchequer tradition of providing a concurrent audit. This form of 
audit was clearly of limited value, and it was in progress of being 
made totally redundant by the improved efficiency of the paymasters 
and the development of post-appropriation audit. From the outset, 
therefore, Trevelyan hoped to undermine what he felt were the vexatious 
and obsolete powers of the Comptroller.
The first round of the conflict occurred in 1848. It was
proposed to amalgamate the offices of the Paymaster General and the
Paymaster of Civil Services. This was to be the culmination of a
long-term process, which had begun with the amalgamation of the military
and naval paymasters in I836 and the consolidation of their accounts 
two years later.^ Originally numerous separate paymasters had been 
regarded as a crude but effective way of ensuring that grants for 
different services were kept distinct. On the other hand, the 
amalgamation of paymasters had the advantage of making it possible to 
work with far lower aggregate balances. Trevelyan grasped the economical 
importance of this development. In I848, he produced a memorandum 
for submission to the Select Committee on Mscellaneous Expenditure on 
the benefits of the proposed amalgamation. Inevitably, the memorandum 
discussed the role of the Comptroller. However, neither was it shown 
to Monteagle at the time nor was it printed with other written evidence 
in the appendix to the Select Committee's report. Trevelyan's failure 
to use the material he had prepared is so out of keeping with his usual 
attitude to publicity that an explanation is needed. Possibly the 
memorandum was regarded by the Committee as an embarrassing and unsolicited 
observation from a permanent official who had no direct responsibilities 
in this field. Alternatively - and this was more likely - Trevelyan 
may have decided not to publicize it, so as to avoid giving Monteagle
1 Appendix to the Report from the Select Committee on Public Monies, 
P.P., I856, XB,pp.5Ul, 515.
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advanced warning of an impending change in his status. Monteagle 
himself later virtually accused Trevelyan of having ante-dated it.^ 
Trevelyan's memorandum contained a thorough discussion of the 
situation. It maintained that the proposed amalgamation would create 
a simple and effective machine for controlling the actual disbursement 
of public funds. The Comptroller was not only unable to augment this 
control, but he was quite powerless to prevent funds voted for one 
service being temporarily transferred to meet a deficiency in another. 
Trevelyan maintained that this flexibility of temporary transfer, 
although technically it was not permitted by the Exchequer Act of 1834, 
was essential for two reasons: the desirability of avoiding large, 
unproductive balances and the impossibity of estimating the precise 
sums needed to meet expenditure on particular votes on particular 
days. Trevelyan pointed out that the Paymaster of Civil Services - 
keeping a separate balance for each vote - had an aggregate balance 
of £295,000, whereas the Paymaster General - with four times as much 
money to issue out of one balance - was able to manage with a balance 
of only £27,000. To reduce all balances to this scale would result 
in an annual saving of about £9,000 in interest. The advantages were 
so obvious that Trevelyan hardly felt it necessaiy to argue in their 
favour. However, he could not resist a comparison between the virtues 
of business and the vices of the Exchequer: "Merchants, manufacturers, 
and railroad companies, however large their concerns may be, do not 
have a separate account at their bankers for every head under which 
their expenditure is conducted, but, as a general rule, they have a 
single banking account for eveiy purpose, which they keep as low as 
possible, and depend upon a proper system of bookkeeping in their 
own office for preserving the distinction and regularity of their
1 Ibid., pp. 517-520.
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various transactions."^ By contrast, Monteagle was insistent on
legalistic precision. When in I856 he eventually saw the memorandum,
Monteagle remarked that Trevelyan "must understand the word control
2
in a totally different sense from mine".
After dealing with the immediate question of paymasters' balances, 
Trevelyan turned to attack Exchequer control. He took a positive 
delight in a gargantuan catalogue of nine procedural stages, necessary 
before an issue of money could be made;
1. the Royal Order countersigned by the Commissioners of the Treasury ;
2. the Treasury warrant based upon it;
3. the monthly estimate of the Paymaster General;
4. the special application for daily amounts from the Paymaster General;
5. a letter from the Assistant Secretaiy to the Treasury to the 
Comptroller of the Exchequer to ask for a credit;
6. a letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Paymaster-General 
advising him of the credit;
7. a letter based on the Assistant Secretary’s letter from the 
Comptroller to the Bank of England;
8. a certificate from the Assistant Secretary to the Paymaster 
informing him of the antual credit;
9. (for civil departments) an order from the Treasury requesting 
that a specific payment should be made; in the case of service 
departments an order from the department concerned.
Trevelyan was convinced that at least the sixth, seventh and eighth 
steps could be dispensed with and replaced by one royal order. This
would effectively bring to an end what was in effect a double Treasury.
As Trevelyan observed, no other country was burdened with such a 
cumbrous arrangement. What was needed was good book-keeping, not
1 Ibid., p.518.
2 Monteagle’s evidence before the Select Committee on Public Monies,
5 June I856, Ibid., p.131*
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the mediaeval type of security of a chest with many keys.^
Initially, this improved arrangement was achieved by a Treasury
Minute of 22 December I848, which amalgamated the paymasters' offices
and authorized the Paymaster General to make any credits that the
2
Treasuiy thought were necessaiy. Monteagle was deeply incensed to 
learn of this development only after the Minute had been drafted, 
and he succeeded in prevailing upon Sir Charles Wood to modify part 
of it. This lack of preliminary discussion in making an administrative 
change was extremely unusual and it is possible that it was intended 
to present Monteagle with a fait accompli. The failure to secure 
Monteagle’s tacit acquiescence was due to his determination to preserve 
the prerogatives of his office and to Sir Charles Wood’s caution in 
avoiding conflict on an issue that could only finally be resolved by 
legislation. In the revised Minute the statutory duties of the 
Comptroller were fully rehearsed. This confirmation of established 
practice was one of the set-backs that Trevelyan suffered in I848 
and 1849•
Sir Charles Wood’s concessions placated Monteagle. However, 
they were more nominal than real, in that the practical rather than 
the legal system prevailed. The situation remained unchanged until 
Gladstone precipitated a reconsideration of the issue. Complaints 
from Monteagle in December 1855 that his authority was being flouted 
prompted Gladstone to seek Trevelyan’s opinion. In a letter to 
Gladstone on 8 December 1855 he pointed out that it had been the * 
influence of Monteagle and Spearman that had led to the modification 
of the Minute of December I848. He quoted the view of the late
1 Ibid., p.520.
2 Ibid., pp. 542-546. The revised Minute ordered the Paymaster 
General to keep balances as low as possible, while adhering to 
the instructions of the Comptroller.
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T.C. Brooksbaak that the Comptroller's office had been "a sham and a cheat
from the commencement". Trevelyan was eager to go onto the offensive
once again, and flushed with the success of some of his recent
departmental investigations, he proposed that a committee should be
set up.^ Gladstone, on the other hand, preferred to put Monteagle
on the defensive by asking him to put his complaints in writing.
In so doing, Gladstone contrived a situation in which he could make
the best use of Civil Service experts. Moreover, Monteagle played
into his opponent's hands by giving his case a distinctly antiquarian
flavour. In his memorandum of 10 Februaiy 1854; he referred to
precedents of misappropriation that went back to the seventeenth
century. Obsessed by the dangers of excessive war expenditure, he
pointed out that in the previous conflict there had been no less than
five separate paymasters to administer military and naval expenditure.
He also appeared to confuse the distinction between a number of
services being included in the same vote (as in the Army Extraordinaries)
and an aggregate balance being maintained by the Paymaster General.
Monteagle's view of the function of the Treasury was equally old-
fashioned, since he felt that its discretionary powers should be
subordinate to Parliament, the Exchequer and the Auditors. This
was quite contrary to the objectives lying behind the power of
transfer that had been granted to the Treasury by the Appropriation
2
Acts from I846 onwards.
Trevelyan was not invited to reply to this. It was a task better 
left to W.G. Anderson, as Trevelyan would almost certainly have 
introduced unnecessary animus that migb^ t have detracted from the
1 T.L.B., XXXII, p.149.
2 p.p., 1856,XV, pp. 546-557.
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soundness of the Treasury's case. Anderson's memorandum of 27 March 1854 
was a masterly survey of the improvements that had been made since the 1850s. 
By listing these developments it was not difficult to dismiss Monteagle*s 
examples as obsolete or irrelevant. He naturally stressed that the 
newer and more effective method of control was the audit of vouchers 
after payment.^
Trevelyan's advice and Anderson's memorandum produced no immediate
result as Gladstone was preoccupied with the Oxford University bill
and Civil Service reform. Furthermore the beginning of the Crimean
War made major financial reorganization unrealistic. For while to
Trevelyan the abolition of the comptrollership seemed a relatively
simple matter, such a change would raise the whole question of
accountability. In the Commons there was little enthusiasm for such
a laborious and dull subject. When on 14 March Baring attempted to
move for a Select Committee he was unsuccessful. On this occasion
it may not have helped his case that he thought fit to quote Trevelyan's
2
opinion oh. the inadequacy of the War Office post appropriation audit. 
Undeterred, Baring made a further attempt a month later on 24 April, 
apologizing to the House for raising once more such a boring subject.
He pressed for the setting up of a Select Committee: the investigation 
that he had in mind was not one that would attempt trivial 
investigations of establishments or book-keeping methods, but one 
that would devote its attention to the wider issue of accountability; 
he felt the main deficiency lay in effective control of appropriation 
and hence insufficient check on the Treasury. Although Cornewall 
Lewis countered with an energetic defence of the integrity of the 
Treasury, the Commons agreed to a Select Committee with Baring as its
1 Ibid., pp. 565-57O'
2 Debates, CXLI, col. 185.
' - 96 -
chairman.^
When the Committee met, Monteagle was the principal witness.
During his evidence in May I856, he was closely and impatiently
questioned by James Wilson and Sir George Cornewall Lewis on the
2
effectiveness of the control that he claimed to exercise. Although 
it was unlikely that Monteagle would be able to impress anyone with 
his case, Trevelyan thought it was desirable that the scholarly Lewis 
had not been unduly swayed by the sanctity of an ancient institution 
like the Exchequer. He therefore wrote him a letter, almost a lecture, 
on the historical and constitutional position of the Exchequer. He 
explained that the fiscal functions of the Exchequer had long been 
transferred to the Treasury and the Pay Office, and its supervisory 
functions to the Board of Audit. Consequently, it merely remained 
to recognize that the Exchequer was redundant and to combine the Pay 
Office with the Treasury (a proposal previously made in 1854 in the 
context of reorganizing the Financial Division of the Treasury) as a 
means of achieving administrative simplification and of forming "a 
Treasury school of practical Financial Officers from which selection 
might be made to recruit the superior Financial Department of the 
Treasury".^ This was clearly an attempt to exploit an impending 
change in the Comptroller's status in order to farther the development 
of the Treasury's supervisory powers.
The report of the Select Committee effectively ended the 
Comptroller's powers as a concurrent auditor. In particular it 
recommended the repeal of those sections of the Act of 1834 which 
prohibited the minor adjustments of balances by the Paymaster General.^
1 Ibid., cols. 1450-66.
2 Monteagle's evidence of 30 May I856, P.P., I856, XV, pp. 70-75*
3 10 July 1856, T.L.B., XXXVI,p.191*
4 Treasury Minute of I5 Februaiy I858, P.P., 1857-58» XXXIV, p.377*
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In this way, the well-established practice of temporary transfer in 
order to reduce the aggregate balance needed by the Paymaster was 
at last legalized. However, the final stage of rationalization was 
not achieved until after the death of Monteagle. By the Act of 1866 
the vestigial powers of the Exchequer were merged with those of the 
Board of Audit to form the new department of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General.^
D Collaboration with the Stationery Office
A special case of financial control is afforded by Trevelyan's 
attempts to reduce the cost of stationery and printing. Vaste and 
misuse of stationery and excessive printing were to Trevelyan 
symptoms of administrative laxity that was to be condemned in almost 
moral terms. He was able to exercise some indirect supervision since 
the Stationery Office was a service department, which was clearly 
subordinate to the Treasury. He was further helped by his close 
collaboration with the Comptroller of the Stationery Office, the
The significance of this development can only be appreciated 
in the context of the development of post-appropriation audit.
The first such audit had been established by Sir James Graham 
by the Naval Audit Act of 1833• The navy audited its own 
detailed accounts, while a simplified post-appropriâtion 
audit was independently conducted by the Board of Audit for 
submission to Parliament. However, the full effectiveness of 
this pioneering development was not realized until after 
improvements in the form of estimates in I846. In the same 
year the naval type of audit was extended to the army. Further 
improvements and the extension of audit were brou^t about by 
Parliamentary pressure: the work of the Select Committee on 
Public Monies and Gladstone's Select Committee on Public Accounts 
(made permanent in 1862) which culminated in the Exchequer and 
Audit Departments Act of 1866. The Comptroller and Auditor 
General was made responsible for auditing the post-appropriation 
accounts of civil and military departments, for approving transfers 
from the Consolidated Fund to the Supply Account of the Paymaster 
General and for reporting to Parliament that all issues initiated 
by the Treasury were in accordance with legislation. A good 
description of these developments is to be found in the papers 
of the Select Committee on National Expenditure (P.P., 1902, VII,
pp. 232-235)
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economist J.R, McCulloch - a man with whom Trevelyan succeeded in 
forming a good working relationship. Yet, while McCulloch was 
grateful for the support he received from the Treasuiy in opposing 
the excessive claims of other departments, he admitted that the 
Treasury was sometimes powerless to implement its own recommendations.
1
Trevelyan himself emphasized a range of economies of varying importance:
2
the reduction of the rates paid to contract printers; the tightening ■ 
of control over the disposal of waste paper (over a period of ten years 
a saving of £2,500 was achieved);^ the reduction in the number of free 
copies of Parliamentary Papers and instead the encouragement of sal© 
to the public.^ Trevelyan derived great personal satisfaction from 
achieving these small but tangible economies, which reduced the 
estimates for Parliamentary printing from £96,000 in 1850/51 to 
£75,000 in 1860/61.
2 Control of Establishments
The Treasury's responsibility for collating estimates and supervising 
the processes of audit naturally implied a concern for the costs of 
government as reflected in the size of departmental establishments. 
While in theory the Treasury had an immemorial right to refuse to 
sanction any increase in expenditure, its authority in fact depended - 
as Trevelyan would have been the first to admit - upon delaying tactics 
and persuasion. By demanding justification for any proposed increase
5
in civil establishments or salaries, the Treasury acted as a brake. 
Indeed, it would have been inconceivable in the mid-nineteenth century
1 Select Committee on Parliamentary Printing, P.P. 1854-55,XI, p.18.
2 Trevelyan to McCulloch, 1 February 1855, T.L.B., XXX, p.249*
3 P.P., 1854-55, XI, p.198.
4 P.P., 1857-58, XXXIV, pp. 347-549.
5 M. Wright, Treasury Control of the Civil Service, 1854 - 1871 
(Oxford, 1969), p.166.
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for the Treasury to attempt to establish policy guide-lines for 
each department's spending; such an attempt would have conflicted 
with the concept of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. This 
then is the context in which Trevelyan's - and later Gladstone's - 
concern for departmental establishments has to be viewed. The Treasury 
might appoint committees to examine methods and to recommend economies, 
but it was always open to the higher level of departments - the 
departments of the Secretaries of State and the Service departments - 
to reject this advice, even to the point of suppressing a Treasury 
report that proved contentious. Althou^ Trevelyan's involvement 
with these investigatory committees forms the subject of the next 
chapter, it is worth remarking that they constituted an attempt to 
find some general principles of economy and efficiency that could 
be readily applied by the Treasury.
Trevelyan's relative powerlessness in negotiations over 
establishments can be illustrated by a few examples of Treasury 
relations with departments of varying degrees of independence.
In dealing with a department that was closely related to the 
Treasury as the Exchequer was, Trevelyan was able to issue detailed 
instructions. In I842, Trevelyan told Monteagle how to reorganize 
his department in accordance with the principle of promotion by 
merit. In so doing, he prescribed detailed promotions and defined 
the responsibilities of the Chief Clerk. He concluded with a brusque 
directive: "I have now explained at a length which may almost appear 
tedious the views which are entertained by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer with regard to the rearrangement of Your Lordship's office 
and it will be gratifying to me to hear that they have Your Lordship's 
approval".^ Trevelyan's bad relations with Monteagle did not help to
1 Trevelyan to Monteagle, 12 July I842, T.L.B., II, p.72.
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achieve a reduction in the Exchequer's establishment, and in 1853
Monteagle defiantly filled a senior clerkship at a time when Trevelyan
was endeavouring to reduce the number of highly paid clerks.^
Even when a department had already been subjected to detailed
investigation, Trevelyan was tempted to make specific suggestions.
The Post Office had been the only revenue department to be investigated
by Northcote and Trevelyan. In 1858 he elaborated to Rowland Hill
his views on making appointments. He assured him that the inconvenience
of promoting able men from the central establishment, to fill positions
in the provinces would be more than compensated by the valuable
incentive created by such prizes. The mechanics of the system would
2
ensure that for every good man lost, another dozen would be found.
In the following year Trevelyan questioned the appropriateness of 
letter carriers' Christmas boxes. He attempted to eradicate the 
practice of soliciting these perquisites before agreeing to a revision 
of salary, but was prudently persuaded not to pursue such a trivial
5
matter.
In the years following his and ITorthcote 's departmental 
investigations, Trevelyan was naturally anxious to sustain the 
general principles that had been established. The most significant 
of these principles from Trevelyan's point of view was the separation, 
and appropriate remuneration, of intellectual and mechanical labour. 
When, for example, modifications in the salary structure of 
supplementary (mechanical) clerks at the Board of Trade proved 
necessary on account of their assumption of increasingly important 
duties, Trevelyan made a grudging exception, expressing his anxiety
1 Same, 5 April 1853, T.L.B., XXXI, p.l06.
2 Trevelyan to Rowland Hill, 9 February 1857, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.288.
3 Same, 13 and 15 November 1858, T.L.B., XXXVII, pp. 295, 297.
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that it might he notices as precedent at the Education Department
next door.^ The same concern to avoid embarrassing precedents
characterized Trevelyan's extension of the same principle to other
departments. In regulating the salaries of the Public Record Department
in 1855 Trevelyan explained to Cornewall Lewis that "prizes" of £500
would be quite adequate for the level of work that was demanded.
Indeed, to grant more would only give rise to discontent at the
2
Registrar General's Office. When Trevelyan did make an exception 
on his own initiative it was to reward what he felt was exceptional 
merit, as when he suggested that William Farr of the Registrar General's 
Office deserved a special allowance on account of his outstanding
3
qualifications as a statistical expert.
As has been shown in the previous chapter, Trevelyan felt that 
the Treasury's influence could be usefully extended by the judicious 
appointment to subordinate departments of clerks and accountants who 
could be counted upon to co-operate with the Treasury. This was 
particularly true of the Secretaries of the Board of Audit, first 
R.M. Bromley and later C.Z. Macaulay. Their department of 150 clerks 
inspecting over a thousand accounts submitted by about 350 auditors 
provided what amounted to a Treasury intelligence service as regards 
public spending. When an irregularity was revealed, Trevelyan delighted 
to pounce upon it. Bromley's discovery in 1853 that members of the 
Board of Health had apparently been charging for attending expensive 
dinners gave Trevelyan an opportunity to press for a full inquiiy.^
1 Trevelyan to Booth, 28 January 1857, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.284.
2 Trevelyan to Cornewall Lewis, 4 and 14 June 1855, T.L.B., XXXV,
. pp. 231, 250.
3 Same, 10 October 1855, Ibid., p.277»
4 Trevelyan to Bromley, 28 Januaiy 1853, T.L.B., XXX, p.241;
Trevelyan to Molesworth, I7 February 1853, T.L.B., XXXI, pp.10, I5.
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While Trevelyan had some success in imposing his ideas on 
subordinate departments, his own ambiguous status in the Treasury 
and his capacity for arousing enmity ensured that he would fall in 
his negotiations with more influential and prestigious departments.
The obvious limitations of his office and his less obvious personal 
limitations did not discourage Trevelyan from making complaints to 
successive Chancellors of the Exchequer.
The Foreign Office was an outstanding ease of a department that
successively resisted Treasuiy pressure over a long period - a success
that was partly due to the urgent nature of its work and the increasing
volume of business. The department had grudgingly submitted to
investigation in I85O but no agreed report was produced. A request
in I852 to increase the establishment by two clerks was countered
by Trevelyan’s reminder that the I85O investigation had revealed
one spare clerk in another part of the office.^ In 1854» Addington,
the Permanent Secretary, submitted a plan to expand the establishment
as means of coping with more work and of satisfying the demand for
more rapid promotion prospects. Essentially this proposed the creation
of a new class of eight assistant clerks below the senior clerks at
2an initial cost of £3,480. Trevelyan opposed this in a Treasury 
minute which argued in favour of more fundamental and economical 
changes like strict adherence to the principle of promotion by merit 
and the adoption of a division of labour through the appointment of 
lower paid copying clerks, particularly in the consular and slave-trade 
departments.^ He appealed to Gladstone against the dangerous precedent
1 See p. 151 infra.
2 Foreign Office to Treasuiy, 9 March 1854, P.P.O., F.O., 366/499, 
cited in R. Jones, The Nineteenth Century Foreign Office: a Study 
in Administrative History (1971), PP« 52-35 • 1 am indebted to
this monograph for its study of relations between the Foreign Office 
and the Treasuiy.
3 Cited in Jones, pp. 35-54»
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of agreeing to the establishment of highly paid clerks performing 
what he felt was routine work.^  Gladstone felt unable to overrule 
the Foreign Office and he referred the matter to Aberdeen for 
adjudication. After consulting Trevelyan, Aberdeen devised a face- 
saving formula whereby the new class of clerks was not created and 
extra allowances were to be paid to those assisting the senior 
clerks.^
Yet the wider issue was only shelved, and a plan to appoint
assistant clerks emerged once more in 1857» Trevelyan again suggested
the appointment of copying clerks and made an indignant appeal to
3
the Chancellor, Cornewall Lewis. . If Gladstone had declined to 
take, a firm line in 1854, it was extremely unlikely that Lewis would 
do so on Trevelyan's advice. On this occasion the Chancellor quietly 
accepted the new establishment, and open conflict between the Treasury 
and the Foreign Office was avoided.^
Trevelyan found his dealings with the War Office almost equally 
frustrating. As the largest spending department, and one with an 
extensive establishment, it was a worthwhile subject for economy. In 
1852 the investigation of the War Office brought Trevelyan into sharp 
conflict with Benjamin Hawes, the Permanent Secretary, who with the
5
support of the Secretary at War, was able to defy the Treasury. Later, 
when the War Department was formed by the amalgamation of the War Office,
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 28 April 1854, T.L.B., XXXIII, p.179»
2 Jones, pp. 36-57»
3 Trevelyan to George Cornewall Lewis, 9 January 1857, T.L.B., 
XXXVI, p.281.
4 Jones, p.39»
5 See infra, pp. l44-l46.
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the Commissariat and the Ordnance, Trevelyan felt he could offer
Hawes some guidance on the running of the rew department. For example,
he suggested that the War Office should establish rules for the whole
War Department. In particular, he was insistent that increments should
not be automatic, but should rather depend on a favourable certificate
from the chief clerk of each division.^ A month later he pointed out
that the Treasury and the War Office were jointly responsible for
the new establishment, and observed that "we must conciliate confidence
by a full and perfectly intelligible exposure of the grounds of our 
2proceeding". His naive optimism in the efficacy of co-operation was 
not rewarded by reduction in the scale of complexity of the War Office 
establishment. Trevelyan was obliged to admit in December 1858 to 
G.A. Hamilton, Financial Secretary and later his successor as Assistant 
Secretary, that he had failed to control this department with its four 
or five hundred clerks. Indeed, he was contenptucus. of its oivn feeble 
efforts "to prune the eccentricities of this monster Establishment".^
Conclusion
It is clear that Trevelyan's work was of greatest administrative 
significance when he was working within a pre-existing tradition, as 
with the reorganization of estimates. Similarly in his duel with 
Monteagle over the vestigial powers of the Exchequer, Trevelyan had the 
satisfaction of being on the winning side while realizing that his 
own views were not going to be decisive. Furthermore his influence 
and that of the Treasury in the modification and reduction of establish-
1 Trevelyan to Hawes, 28 December 1855, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.45»
2 Same, 24 January I856, Ibid., p.74»
3 Trevelyan to Hamilton, 3I December 1858, T.L.B., XXXVIII, p.39
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merits was slight. Hence the significance that Trevelyan attached 
to the departmental investigations that form the subject of the 
next chapter. However, Trevelyan needed to be sustained by the 
satisfaction he derived from personal and tangible achievements, 
and this largely explains his preoccupation with relatively minor 
economies, as in the Stationery Office.
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Chapter 7
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: FROM INVESTIGATION TO THEORY
Trevelyan often described how Sir Francis Baring had suggested 
to him that the improvement of the Civil Service should become his own 
special reforming mission. Trevelyan did indeed make it his mission - 
a mission that was increasingly strengthened and renewed by the 
frustrations that he encountered in attempting to impose his own ideas 
on the Treasury. As far as his own department was concerned the years 
from I848 to 1853 constituted a period of disappointment; Trevelyan 
failed to bring about what he felt were essential changes in organization. 
In the same period, however, some compensation was offered him in the 
consideration of wider and more exciting issues: initially through 
the investigation of other departments; and later through the invitation 
to consider the staffing problems of the Civil Service as a whole. His 
involvement wfent through two stages of development: first an internal 
investigating phase from I848 to 1853, followed by an external 
publicizing phase during which he presented his findings and theoretical 
suggestions for improvement. Each phase will form the subject of a 
separate chapter.
The background to the first phase of Trevelyan's activities 
was the extremely confused political and economic situation in 1847 
and I848. Althou^ Peel had sacrificed his administration and divided 
his party in order to abolish the corn laws in June I846 in the face 
of the Irish potato famine, this measure could not in itself alleviate 
the famine which called for prolonged and expensive government 
intervention from first the Peel and later the Russell administrations.^ 
Furthermore it had become abundantly clear that five years of gradual
1 See p.279 infra.
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tariff reform could not in itself ensure continuous prosperity and
render England immune from the acute European commercial depression
of 1847 and I848, Yet lacking an economic policy of its own, Russell's
administration leant veiy heavily on what it had inherited from the
Peelites, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Charles Wood, consulted
Peel on numerous matters, including the best strategy for the I848
budget. Wood had the problem of obtaining sanction for a loan of
£8 million to meet the cost of Irish relief and of meeting a potential
budget deficit. The only solution that Wood could devise was to
continue income tax at an increased rate. Peel was personally prepared
to support this but he warned Wood that it was imperative to be sure
of sufficient strength in the Commons, since defeat would not only
mean the collapse of the administration but also undermine the principle
of income tax.^ When Russell introduced the budget on 18 February
I848 he proposed to increase income tax from 7d.to a shilling and land
tax from 2^. to 4’i^* Althou^ he gave a full explanation of the need
for the increases, Russell's laborious and confused presentation led
radicals to misinterpret the ministry's overall objectives. Reactions
were highly critical, Joseph Hume, member for Montrose and protagonist
of retrenchment, made great play of relatively minor increased military 
2
expenditure. Richard Cobden, boasting that as member for the West 
Riding he represented more electors and constituents than any other 
M.P., denounced increased expenditure with the claim that the prices 
of many commodities had fallen by 25^ as a consequence of tariff 
reform. Little was said in favour of the budget, and Wood was left 
with the unenviable task of winding up. Rather lamely and lacking 
in conviction, he asserted that the budget had not been seen in
1 Norman Gash, Sir Robert Peel (1972), pp. 622-624.
2 A Benthamite radical who questioned every item of government 
expenditure. He coined the term "retrenchment" which was added 
to "peace" and "reform" in the radical programme (D.N.B.).
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perspective, particularly as regards exaggerated criticisms of military 
expenditure.^ Unlike Peel, and later Gladstone, he clearly lacked 
sufficient confidence in his policies to justify a coherent plan for 
exploiting income tax.
When the debate resumed on 21 February, Wood announced that Hume
had attempted to press for cuts in expenditure by requesting consideration
of ways and means before supply. Since this was procedurally unacceptable,
Wood proposed the establishment of a Select Committee on Army, Navy and
Ordnance expenditure (this included civil establishments). Hume
expressed his dissatisfaction at the matter being relegated to a
select committee. Yet despite his objection he was accused by his
radical colleagues of having made a secret compact with the ministers
2
to remove some of the most contentious issues from the debate. Certainly 
this respite was invaluable to Wood who on the following day moved for 
the two committees.^ From the government's point of view "economical" 
reform by select committee was a relatively harmless, time-honoured 
procedure which would absorb the energies of some of its most vociferous 
critics and produce recommendations that could be quietly ignored. Once 
the committees were safely established. Wood proceeded extremely 
cautiously to preserve his majority. On 28 February he announced that 
income tax would merely be renewed at the old rate of Yd. for a 
further three years.^
This financial crisis encouraged the formation of provincial 
Financial Reform Associations, dedicated to reduction of government
1 Debates, XCVI, cols. 900-981.
2 Ibid., cols. 987-995»
5 Ibid., col. 1063.
4 Ibid., col. 1406.
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expenditure by the abolition of places and cuts in public salaries,
and by the overhaul of taxation in favour of more direct, and less
indirect taxation. By April 1849 thirty-six Associations had been
founded. The Liverpool Association was the most notable of these,
and the arguments expressed in its tracts were frequently echoed by
radicals in the Commons between I848 and 1850.^ These views were
not more widely shared and they found no reflection in articles in 
2
the reviews. While from a fiscal point of view the Select Committees 
constituted a minor byproduct of the budget crisis and did not achieve 
anything approaching the spectacular overall cuts that Hume and Cobden 
had in mind, they form the background to most of Trevelyan's early 
involvement in Civil Service reform. The ineffectiveness of the 
Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure was pointed out by 
one of its members. Dr. Bowring, who explained on 11 August 1848 that 
detailed examination of each vote was quite beyond the capacity of a 
part-time committee of M.P.s.^ Significantly the saving of 
expenditure of £716,000 (£235,500 from Miscellaneous Estimates) 
which Wood announced on 25 August I848 in his resumed budget state­
ment had been achieved independently of the efforts of the Select 
Committees.^ Indeed, the inherent imperfections and incompleteness 
of Select Committee investigation served to keep alive issues of 
economy and efficiency. The reports when they appeared did not
1 A.D. Gidlow-Jackson, "Public Opinion and Administrative Reform 
in Britain between 1848-1854’* (London thesis, 1958), chs. 1 & 2.
2 W.E. Aytoun, staff contributor to Blackwood's and no friend of
free-traders, commented adversely on Cobden's attack on military
expenditure and Wood's incompetence (Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 
LXIII March I848, pp. 261-280). The first article on "economical" 
reform as such, appropriately appeared as a Whig answer to the 
irrelevance of Burkean attacks on civil establishments. Lord 
Monteagle, writing in The Edinburgh Review a year later, suggested 
that the Whigs had done everything possible to cut expenditure between 
1835 and I84I (Edinburgh, LXXXIX April 1849, pp. 518-537)»
3 Debates, Cl, col. 96.
4 Ibid., col. 543»
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satisfy radical critics but rather provided an arsenal of material 
which was extensively employed in continual radical demands for 
reducing expenditure.^ This pressure gave a sense of urgency to 
consideration of administrative efficiency. For Trevelyan it provided 
a legitimate reason for presenting his views to his ministerial 
superiors, who in turn gave him encouragement to develop and refine 
his ideas.
1 The Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure, 1848
Although the origins of the mid-century investigation of the 
Civil Service can be traced back to the economical reforms of the late 
eighteenth century, the immediate cause was the Select Committee on 
Miscellaneous Expenditure. Set up in February 1848 to find ways of 
reducing the cost of civil departments, this Select Committee furthered 
investigation and reform in two ways: directly, by the intensive 
revision of a few departmental establishments; and indirectly, by 
providing ammunition for those members of Parliament who continually 
pressed for extensive economical reforms. Trevelyan shared in both parts 
of this two-fold process. The earliest revision of establishments 
enabled him to widen his experience of their working, but only the 
continued political pressure that followed gave him an opportunity 
to formulate and present more general views - even if they remained 
fairly traditional ones - on the Civil Service as a whole.
The politicians and permanent officials who gave evidence before 
the Select Committee illustrated Civil Service practice and conditions, 
and at the same time indicated the difficulty of making equitable
1 The Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure reported on 
27 July 1848 (P.P., 1847-48, XVIII i & ii). The Select Committee 
on Navy Army and Ordnance Expenditure took three sessions to cover 
naval, ordnance and army expenditure respectively (P.P., 1847-48, 
XXI i & ii; P.P., 1849, IX; PP. 1850, X). Trevelyan gave extensive 
evidence on the Treasuiy (see pp.45-4%upra) and on the Commissariat 
(see ch. VII infra).
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economies where traditions of promotion and methods of work had created
an apparently hopeless tangle for the economical reformer. Only one
radically hew solution was offered - the separation of intellectual
and mechanical work. As a suggestion this was in no sense original,
for as early as I83I it had been formally proposed to the Lords of
the Treasury by Brooksbank, Chief Clerk of the Revenue Department.
In a memorandum on the training of clerks he had emphasized the
importance of a good general education, while casting doubt on the
value of a training that took the form of fifteen years as a copyist.^
An established precedent existed outside the government office, in the
copying system at East India House from I83I onwards. Trevelyan himself
2
later used this example as a vindication of the principle. A more
useful precedent was the copying department set up by James Stephen
at the Colonial Office in 1832. This speeded up business but it did
not do much to free the higher established clerks from routine.^ The
Colonial Office also helped to provide a notable theoretical formulation
of the principle of the division of labour. One of the Senior Clerks,
Henry Taylor, produced the only contemporary book devoted to the
theory of administration. The Statesman (I836). He defined an
administrator as one who worked throu^ others, rather than attempting
to do all the work himself. He also made the point - one that was
many times repeated by Trevelyan - that dull routine work could destroy
the best administrative qualities in an able man, in this connection
4-actually using the terms "intellectual" and "mechanical".
1 P.R.O., T.1/4306.
2 Report from a committee of inquiry on the Colonial Office, 15 December 
1849, P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.86.
3 D.M. Young, The Colonial Office in the Early Nineteenth Century
(1961), p. 25.
4 Henry Taylor, The Statesman (I856, reprinted Cambridge 1957),
pp. 9 - 13, 84 - 94. The work was well known to Gladstone who had
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Despite the growing currency of this idea of the division
of labour, only Trevelyan brought it to the attention of the
Select Committee. However, J.G. Shaw Lefevre, Assistant Secretary
to the Board of Trade stated, as a result of questioning, that able
men were often discouraged by being made to devote the early part of
their career to copying - work that could often be better and more
cheaply performed by law stationers.^
Most of Trevelyan's evidence to the Select Committee was
a criticism of the Treasury's frustratingly inadequate organization.
Although this was a reflection of his own dissatisfaction, it was,
at the same time, tempered by his sense of mission to improve the
quality of all public departments. Essentially, Trevelyan sought
to establish two principles that he himself had come to accept by
March I848: the desirability of separating routine clerical work
from that of a more intellectual kind - each to be performed by a
distinct class of clerks; and as a corollary of this, the need to
2select higher Civil Servants from the best university graduates.
1 Evidence of 2 May I848, PP., 1847-48, XVIII (i), p. 295.
2 Evidence of 26 March I848, P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i),
p. 177.
read the proof. Taylor's own career is interesting as an example of 
how a minor literary figure could find a convenient niche within a 
government department. He entered the Colonial Office in 1824, having 
been offered a clerkship through the influence of Dr. Heniy Holland.
He rose slowly through the salary scales and eventually attained a 
salary of £900 a year. He refused promotion in succession to James 
Stephen as Permanent Secretary, preferring to devote his energies to
poetry and verse drama. When he began to suffer seriously from asthma 
in 1859 he was permitted to work from home, which he continued to do 
until his retirement in 1872 (D.N.B.).
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These twin concepts, originally thought of by Trevelyan in the context 
of the Treasury, gradually acquired over the next few years a much 
more general application. This extension of his proposals was 
accelerated by his eagerness to publicize his views both in evidence 
before Select Committees or in memoranda produced for his political 
superiors.
Trevelyan's outspokenness was not acceptable to the Select
Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure. In their report, they opposed
the separation of intellectual and mechanical clerical duties on the
rather dubious grounds that it "must, if advantageous, be extended
1
to all other Departments of the Public Service". The Committee 
were clearly looking for localized rearrangements calculated to reduce 
the estimates and not for a panacea that would inevitably arouse a 
general protest. Indeed, the report went on to mention specific areas 
where investigation had already begun or where it could prove fruitful 
by the consolidation of functions, or the amalgamation of offices. 
Trevelyan had already been involved in some of this work. He had 
arranged the inquiry into the Lord Privy Seal's Office and the Signet.
He had drafted the report on them in which he had given vent to his 
scorn for wasteful, traditional procedures - the ten elaborate stages, 
for example, through which a document had to pass as a means of 
legalizing certain Treasury appointments. This quasi-legal reform 
was in a well-established tradition and was accepted without controversy. 
On a more constructively practical level Trevelyan had some influence 
in getting these two sub-departments of the Home Office transferred to 
Gwydir House, in order to improve communications with the Treasury
1 Report of 27 July I848, Ibid., p.15*
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Solicitor, On the same day as the Privy Seal inquiry was completed,
Trevelyan initiated the arrangements for an investigation of the
Home Office - an investigation that proved to he the first of a series
1
of inquiries into major departments.
Obviously at the outset Trevelyan was aware of the significance
of these developments and he was more concerned that he mi^t have
gone too far in the sweeping proposals that he had made in his evidence
to the Select Committee. He realized that it was desirable to retain
the support of the tradition of administrative reform as exemplified
by his former political chief. Sir Francis Baring. Trevelyan wrote to
him on 24 May I848 in order to remove an evident misunderstanding that
had arisen from his evidence to the Committee. He reminded him of his
encouragement two years earlier to work for "the improvement of the
character of the public Civil Service". At the same time he claimed
that his own experience had given him an opportunity to form correct
opinions and that this was an opportune moment for a general reform in
2which the Treasury would set the pace. Baring's reaction is not 
known, but it is clear that Trevelyan was already in danger of breaking 
with the Whig administrative tradition that had helped to nurture him.
In its report the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure 
favoured detailed departmental investigations, while recognizing that 
they were largely irrelevant as a means of achieving large savings 
in expenditure. As the Committee pointed out, large savings could 
be made if the central government were relieved of £4000,000 of local 
expenditure, but that this was a political issue completely outside 
their terms of reference. Another general economy mi^t have been 
made by a general reduction of salaries, yet here there was considerable
1 Trevelyan to Lewis, 27 June and 11 July I848, P.R.O., f. 13/2,
pp. 386, 394.
2 T.L.B., XXI, p.154.
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division within the Committee, and the question was left for further 
consideration as "part of a general revision of all salaries, suitable 
to the altered circumstances of expense and condition of the countly since 
they were originally fixed".^
2 The First Phase of Investigations, 1848-52
The Russell administration was quite prepared to initiate departmental 
investigations of the kind favoured by the Select Committee. Trevelyan's 
enthusiasm and his ill-defined functions as Assistant Secretaiy made 
him the obvious choice as the permanent member of the main series of 
committees. His membership of them gave the Treasuoy an overall view 
of the whole operation. This first phase of the.revision of establishments 
continued over the next two years, and covered the Home Office, the 
Treasury, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. The choice of 
starting place was probably determined by the evidence already given 
before the Select Committee and by the need to make exemplary economies 
in the most important departments. Trevelyan and Gibson Craig, a Junior 
Lord of the Treasury, took part in all four inquiries, together with 
another person from the department under review. Another committee 
with a different nucleus was also appointed to inquire into the Customs 
and the Office of Woods and Forests. The-existence of this committee 
conducted on more conventional lines reveals the significance of 
Trevelyan's work in converting what could easily have become a routine 
investigation of establishments into an examination of general principles.
A The Home Office
In the evidence before the Select Committee the Home Office 
had been revealed as a department in lAich promotion was almost 
exclusively by seniority. For example, the chief clerk had risen to
1 P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i),p.9.
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the top of the office in fifty-three years. Apparently his duties 
could have been performed by one of the senior clerks, but to have 
reduced the level of this post would have diminished the promotion 
prospects of the whole body of clerks. There was no possibility of 
clerks ever attaining any of the highest permanent staff appointments.^ 
Trevelyan naturally must have felt that there was ample scope here 
for him to tiy out his new principles of staff rationalization. Although 
the report of the investigation had not survived it is clear that the 
Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, firmly intended to preserve the 
substance of the existing arrangements while effecting a few economies. 
Trevelyan's share in the work is sketchily outlined by his letter book.
Trevelyan started the process of investigation in July I848 
by writing to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, the Parliamentaiy Under­
secretary, asking him to obtain approval from Sir George Grey for
2an inquiry into the duties of Home Office clerks. Further letters
enclosed an offprint of the evidence given before the Select Committee,
outlined the questions to be asked of the clerks and promised the
attendance of a confidential shorthand writer to keep a record of
the verbal evidence. Trevelyan suggested to Lewis two specific
fields of economy. He referred to the excessive contingent expenditure
mentioned in the Select Committee's report and doubted whether anyone
3
had ever taken the trouble to consider reducing it. He also advised 
Lewis to check with the Office of the Commissioners of Woods, Forests, 
Land Revenues, Works and Buildings about the extent of the accommodation 
actually being used by officekeepers and other ancillaiy staff.^ After
1 P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i), pp. 295, 377.
2 Trevelyan to Lewis, 7 Jnly I848, T.L.B., XXII, p.36.
3 18 and 21 July I848, Ibid., pp. 66, 80.
4 2 August I848, Ibid., p.123*
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prompting the production of evidence and attending meetings at the 
Home Office, Trevelyan drafted a report, On 18 September he wrote 
to Lewis enclosing his work and describing his methods; "First 
of all I read the evidence quite through - then I made the rough 
draft of my paper and then I looked over the evidence again to make 
sure that I had not omitted anything of consequence. If any of my 
conclusions do not at once obtain your concurrence, pray suspend 
judgement until we can go over the subject together. This paper is 
entirely bare of explanation and argument, but as I shaped it according 
to what I believed to be your views as well as mine I am in hopes that 
we shall arrive at a satisfactory result." Trevelyan was probably 
aware that Lewis was the last man to be impressed by novel schemes 
and he turned in his letter to the practical problem of implementing 
them. He stressed that if Sir George Grey could make up his mind to 
carry out administrative changes during the Parliamentary recess, 
confusion and the resultant discredit upon the cause of reform would 
be avoided, "whereas if this is carried through as it ou^t to be 
I expect it will be a great help to us in dealing with other offices 
which want a thorough revision as well as the Home Office". The 
preoccupation with secrecy in all this is illustrated by a postscript 
assuring Lewis that Trevelyan's amanuensis could be trusted and that 
no one else had seen the report.^
The Home Office was slow in bringing about changes. Those that 
were eventually made certainly did not go as far as Trevelyan had 
hoped. He even had to press for the simplest kind of economies.
At the end of September he was contesting the appointment of extra 
clerks and demanded that the Secretary of State should address a formal
1 Trevelyan to Lewis, 18 September I848, Ibid., p.244*
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letter to the Treasuiy before increasing them. Such a Iptter, he felt,
1
would be a check upon casual extravagance. A few days later a
formal Treasuiy letter instructed Lewis to remind Grey to make
economies consistent with efficiency, "as timely arrangements will
render reductions more easy, with less hardship to individuals and
with greater facility for making due provision for the public service".
The concluding mention of the "advantage of the active co-operation
of the Secretary of State" shows the strain that existed between the 
2
two departments. When Sir George Grey reformed the Home Office in 
January 1849 a few anomalies were eliminated and promotion was no 
longer to be so strictly governed by seniority. There was no attempt 
to introduce division of labour.^ In fact promotion by seniority 
continued to be the norm. Furthermore, the distinction between 
intellectual and mechanical work was at variance with the traditions 
of the office which accorded the highest status to those working in 
the ancient core of the office (the Chief Clerk's Department). The 
Home Office clerks did not regard routine work as demanding per se 
and they possessed a camaraderie and cohesiveness that was incompatible 
with Trevelyan's simplistic formula.^ However, one important effect
1 Trevelyan to Lewis, 30 September I848, Ibid., p.261.
2 P.R.O., T.13/2, p.416.
3 Grey's reforming minute sent to the Treasury, 22 January 1849,
P.R.O., H.O. 36/29, cited by Donajgrodzki p.84.
4 A.P. Donajgrodzki, "New roles for old: the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report and the clerks of the Home Office 1822-48", pp. 84-85,
102-104, in G. Sutherland d^.)> Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth-
Century Government (1972). Subsequent developments showed immunity
from Treasuiy harassment. The Home Office was investigated again 
in I856 by a committee in which George Arbuthnot was the permanent 
member. (Arbuthnot would be less likely to estrange the Home Office 
as his administrative orthodoxy had already been proved by his 
frequent clashes with Trevelyan.) Arbuthnot's committee made a 
number of detailed recommendations about the Office's establishment 
and organization. Over the next four years and without the prompting, 
or indeed the knowledge, of the Treasury, the Home Office implemented 
those recommendations that laid down rules for probation and promotion 
by merit. On the other hand the new salary scales for established
and supplementary clerks were quietly ignored. (P.R.O., T.I/6258A/13OO6, 
quoted in M.Wright, Treasury Control of the Civil Service 1854-1874 
Oxford 1969 •)
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of this bureaucratic conservatism was the development of more innovatory 
areas, such as the inspectorates of mines and factories and the central 
administration of the Poor Law, outside the Home Office proper.
B The Treasury
The Treasury report was the first to be published, although some
of its recommendations were not accepted and others remained a dead
letter. Even so it was essential for the investigating department
to set its own house in order. For Trevelyan the Treasury investigation
was an opportunity to reiterate his views and to offer constructive
innovations in the context of his own department. The report exists
as a manuscript and is also printed among the Reports from the Committees
of Inquiry into Public Offices, the collection of departmental reports
presented to Parliament in 1854*^ In many respects the scope of this
inquiry is similar to earlier routine examinations of Treasury business,
2
notably that of 18^4* The inquiry was set up by a Treasuiy Minute of 
3 November 1848 which asked for an investigation, "into the present 
state of the establishment of the Treasury, and into the arrangements 
and regulations for the distribution and conduct of the business, in 
order that such changes may be made as may be required to secure the 
highest practicable degree of efficiency, combined with a careful 
attention to economy". Parker, one èf the Parliamentary Secretaries, 
was nominated as the additional member of the committee to serve with 
Trevelyan and Gibson Craig.^
The report was completed in March 1849» Trevelyan repeated 
in more immediate and practical terms his earlier suggestions that
1 P.R.O., T.1/5533/27830! p.p. 1854 /Ï7157 XXTII.
2 The Treasuiy Minute of 1834 that culminated this inquiry was part 
of the written evidence submitted to the Select Committee on 
Miscellanmous Expenditure. P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (ii), p.78.
3 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.35.
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better qualified superior staff were needed and that intellectual and
mechanical work should be separated. His general view that graduates
should be employed in the higher posts was transmuted into the training
of an ^lite to assist the Principal Clerks at Board level, "and the
junior members of the establishment would be gradually trained under
the immediate supervision of the Principal Clerks, for the more
responsible duties which will ultimately devolve upon them".^ Sir
Charles Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, admitted the need for
more assistance at the top of the office but he was suspicious of
creating a class of clerks with the ri^t of succession to higher
posts. One consequence would have been the strengthening of the
position of the permanent officers at the expense of their political
superiors. The implementing Treasury Minute therefore took the
traditional view that all clerks should be given a chance to prove
their fitness for higher work by gaining experience in every branch
2
of Treasury business. However, once Trevelyan’s concept of a 
superintending class was safely disposed of, the Minute went on to 
accept his arguments for a separation of intellectual and mechanical 
work: "that the gentlemen ... should be employed in copying for a 
much shorter period than has hitherto been the practice, that future 
appointments to the superior of the Treasury should be regulated with 
a due reference to the quantity of business which has to be transacted, 
and that merely clerical duties should, as a general rule, be performed 
by persons who make this their profession and are paid at a lower 
rate". The Minute therefore agreed to the appointment of additional
1 Ibid., p.37*
2 Ibid., p.31.
3 Ibid., p.44.
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permanent extra clerks. Although these clerks constituted a step
towards the gradation of clerical duties, their appointment would
not in itself undermine the traditional concept of a homogeneous
body of established clerks.^ Nothing was said, about their number
and in fact the structure of the Treasury remained substantially
2
unaltered until I856. Trevelyan later claimed that it was the 
influence of George Arbuthnot (Wood’s private secretary and later 
Auditor of the Civil List) with Sir Charles Wood that had prevented 
the Treasury from being reorganized as the Board of Trade was to be.
In 1853 Trevelyan told Gladstone about the episode as an illustration 
of the innate conservatism of Civil Servants whose careers had followed 
the older, traditional pattern.^ As one who had risen from post 
to post, Arbuthnot resisted any attempt to introduce a shorter 
route to higher positions.
C The Colonial Office
While the Treasury report was still being deliberated, the 
investigating committee turned to the Colonial Office. It appears 
that Herman Merivale, the Permanent Under Secretary, was anxious 
for the inquiry into his department to begin. Trevelyan explained to 
him that he would have to wait until the final reports and minutes
4
on the Treasury had been completed. Merivale’s eagerness can partly 
be explained by the Office’s pre-existing tradition of organic reform 
and by the revelation of its inadequacies in the evidence given before 
the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure.
The Select Committee had shown that in many respects the Colonial 
Office suffered from defects similar to those of the Treasury: its
1 Ibid., p.57'
2 See supra, pp.70-71.
3 T.L.B., XXXII, p.16.
4 Trevelyan to Merivale, 1 December I848, T.L.B., XXII, p.195»
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senior officer, the Permanent Under Secretary was inadequately
supported and both he and another senior official, the Precis Writer,
had been appointed from outside the department.^ Yet these external
appointments had been constructive. Merivale and his predecessor,
James Stephen, had been practising lawyers and they had brought from
their former profession a critical attention to detail in administration:
Stephen had set up a copying department and Merivale was eager to extend
and refine this development.
The committee, with Merivale as its additional member, made
two main recommendations on the division of labour and the selection of
superior staff. After alluding to the earlier establishment of a
copying department its report observed that too much routine work was
still being done by the established clerks: "The first years of official
employment are those in which the knowledge, the self-confidence, and
the aptitude for business required for proper discharge of difficult
and responsible duties should be obtained; and it is to be regretted
that persons likely to succeed to important situations in the public
service should have the occupations assigned to them at this initial
period of life which are unimproving and unsuited to their education
and prospects, and as such likely to give them a distaste for their
profession". Linked to the need to reduce the amount of deadening
routine was that of providing prizes or incentives in the form of
2
good career prospects. As at the Treasury, lip-service was paid to 
promotion by merit rather than by seniority but every clerk still had 
to work his way through each clerical class in turn. The solution, as 
suggested by the report, was the formation of two distinct classes
1 P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i), p.222.
2 Report on the Colonial Office, 15 December I848, P.P., 1854,
XXVII, p.82.
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of clerks - "intellectual" clerks and copyists. The "intellectual" 
clerks were to assist the senior officers and to he recruited hy 
examination from among young men aged between twenty and twenty-five.
It was expected that these new positions would be suitable for those 
who had received a universiiy education.^ Since there was no 
reluctance on the part of the Colonial Office to accept these proposals, 
Trevelyan had the satisfaction of seeing some of his general ideas 
embodied in the policy of one department. However, in a strict 
sense Trevelyan’s two-tier type of establishment had not been formally 
recognized, in that the copyists were - like earlier "extra" 
appointments - still unestablished.
D The Foreign Office
Trevelyan’s last inquiry under the Russell administration was 
less successful. When Trevelyan had to deal with a department 
possessing the eminence and social prestige of the Foreign Office, 
the weakness of the Treasury committee was revealed. Moreover 
the Treasury had already been weakened in that the Foreign Office 
had been favourably regarded by the Select Committee on Miscellaneous 
Expenditure. The Committee had heard evidence from Conyngham, the 
Chief Clerk, who maintained that the sudden variations in the volume 
of work made it impossible to observe the customary hours of attendance, 
and consequently to determine whether the department was over-staffed.
In many respects the Foreign Office was a self-regulating clerical 
community. It appeared from Conyngham’s evidence that he visited 
his colleagues’ rooms in a social rather than an advisory capacity.
It was the loyalty and chivalry of the gentlemen of the department
1 Ibid.,.p.87.
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and not conventional notions of official dscipline that had
established a high morale and prevented idleness. This aristocratic
homogeneity of the Foreign Office was not likely to be disturbed,
as Conyngham had maintained that the confidential nature of the work
precluded the employment of extra clerks.^ All this evidence was
accepted by the Select Committee which in its report only criticized
2
the excessive sums claimed by Foreign Office messengers.
The Foreign Office was further safeguarded by the strong 
opposition of Palmerston to any kind of Treasury investigation. Only 
with reluctance did he give way.^ Even when this was accepted in 
principle, the Permanent Under Secretary, Addington, was profoundly 
suspicious and slow to co-operate. The Chief Clerk, Lennox Conyngham, 
shared this attitude and deeply resented Treasury intrusion: "I wish 
to God we had the overhauling of the Treasury - there should be 
proper work cut for every man and eveiy man should do his own work 
and not meddle with the work of others".^ In this climate it is 
not surprising that an agreed report was not produced, yet it is
5
not clear what the main disagreements actually were. There is a 
printed draft in the Foreign Office records but since it is undated 
and unsigned its status is uncertain.^ Possibly one of the main 
disputes was over the Treasury’s wish to discontinue Foreign Office
1 Evidence of 7 April 1848, P.P., 1847-48, XVIII (i), pp. 213-220.
2 Ibid., p.13.
3 The Times, 19 January 1849, p.3, col. f.
4 Conyngham to Addington, 16 April I83O, P.R.O., F.O. 366/375, quoted 
in R. Jones,.The Nineteenth Century Foreign Office (1971), p.25.
5 Addington to Malmesbury, I7 July 1852, P.R.O., F.O. 366/449, cited 
in Jones, pp. 25-26.
6 Reprinted in Jones, pp. 148-164*
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agency (a system whereby Foreign Office clerks obtained commission
through acting as diplomatic bankers). More significant from the
point of view of Civil Service reform was the admission in the draft
that the division between intellectual and mechanical work was
inappropriate in the Foreign Office. It seems unlikely that Trevelyan
would readily have conceded this point, particularly as he vainly
urged Addington that agreement would serve as a valuable example to
1
the other Departments of State. To Trevelyan’s annoyance the draft
was completely ignored by the Foreign Office, as instanced by a request
in I852 for two more clerks on the establishment without reference to 
2
the draft. When two years later there was further discussion of
increased establishments, Gladstone asked Trevelyan whether he was
5willing to take part in a completely fresh investigation.
E Other Inquiries; the Customs and the Office of Woods and Forests
The two other inquiries already referred to sought a limited, 
practical improvement in the method of transacting business. The 
report of neither inquiry presumed to formulate a general theory for 
the improvement of staff or for their better deployment. However, in 
terms of composition these investigating committees had something in 
common with those on which Trevelyan served, since they consisted of 
a nucleus of two Treasury nominees - Sir William Hayter (Financial 
and later Patronage Secretary to the Treasury) and Sir Alexander 
Spearman (Chairman of the National Debt Office and a former Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury) - together with a person from the department 
under review. The two permanent members possessed a very different 
outlook from Trevelyan. Spearman had clearly shown that he was opposed
1 Trevelyan to Addington, 23 October I85O, T.L.B., XXVII, p.42.
2 Trevelyan to Gibson Craig (a junior Lord of the Treasury and a member 
of the investigating committee), T.L.B., XXIX, p.212.
3 Seepp 151-2 infra.
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to Trevelyan's theories hy his evidence before the Select Committee 
on Miscellaneous Expenditure. Hayter not only had a practical interest 
in estate management - a good qualification for work on the Woods and 
Forests - but as Patronage Secretary and Chief Whip he came to have 
an interest in not interfering with established patronage. Indeed he 
has been cited as an M.P. whose solicitude to find places for his 
constituents went too far. He was reported to have boasted to his 
constituents that he had provided positions for no less than J>00 of 
them.^
The Customs committee had Lord Granville as its additional member.
It examined the central offices of the Board of Customs - the Long
Room, the Receiver General's Department and the Controller General's
Department. A report appeared in March 1850 which was referred to
the Commissioners of Customs. The final agreed arrangements were
embodied in a Treasury Minute in March I85I* By recommending a
reduction of twenty-eight persons in the Long Room an average annual
saving of £5,900 was made possible. Some wasteful routine work was 
2
also eliminated.
The establishment of the Office of the .Commissioners of Woods, 
Forests, Land Revenue, Works and Public Building had already recently 
been examined in two parts. The general working of the department 
had been the subject of a Select Committee on Woods and Forests which
1 Debates, CXC, col. 45*
2 Report of Customs Inquiry Commissioners, 8 March I85O, P.R.O., 
1.1/5695^/23864. A year later Spearman in his evidence before
the Select Committee on the Customs remarked that the system, which 
had been devised by Lord Liverpool, of confining patronage to first 
appointments had worked extremely well (P.P., 1852, VIII (ii), pp. 123 - 
128). This complacent view was not shared by Gladstone who had already 
gained some insight into the working of the Customs by his membership 
of a committee which had in 1843 investigated a series of frauds.
The scandals that were then revealed led to widespread criticism of 
the whole system (P.P., I843, XXIX, pp. 78-127; P.P., I843, XXX, p.589; 
P.P., 1844, XXXI, p.355)' The evidence led Gladstone to think that 
Customs patronage was more pernicious than that of any other department, 
Not surprisingly. Customs mismanagement was a major grievance of 
financial reform associations (Gidlow-Jackson, op. cit., pp. 115-128).
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had reported ineffectually in I848 and 1849.^ The Office of Works
had been considered by the Select Committee on Miscellaneous
Expenditure in I848.
The committee, with the Hon. Charles Core as its additional
member, was formally appointed by a Treasuiy letter on 11 October I85O
and reported on 25 March I85I. It suggested one immediate economy:
the reduction of the establishment by ten in order to make an annual
saving of £2,870. Only two general principles were mentioned - the
ending of additional payments for extra work and the end of promotion
exclusively by seniority. An attempt was also made to strengthen the
Board by appointing a secretary to the Board itself, as opposed to an
official secretary to the First Commissioner. But this implicit
formalization of professional assistance at decision-making level
did not lead to any consideration of the kind of career structure that
would ensure the emergence of the right kind of administrator. By
contrast, Trevelyan in discussing the Treasury tended to exaggerate
the degree to which the Board officers were unsupported, in order to
strengthen his case for a new class of "intellectual" officers. In
some other respect the framers of this report were veiy cautious; they
dutifully adhered to their terms of reference. When the question
arose of dividing the department into two the committee refrained from
making any comment and remarked that the decision properly belonged 
2
to Parliament. Trevelyan would not have been inhibited from offering 
his opinion. Moreover when he and Northcote later came to examine
the Office of Works as a separate department in 1855, they were able
to apply to it most of the administrative concepts that they had 
developed elsewhere.
1 P.P., 1847-48, XXIV (i) &(ii); P.P., I849, XX.
2 P'.P., I852, LIII, pp. 504-515; J.M. Crook and M.H. Port, The History 
of the King's Works, VI, 1782-1851 (ed. H.M. Colvin 1975), pp.255-257»
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3 Continued Demand for Economy, 1849-50
A The Debates of 1849
The inconspicuous reforms of the Russell administration did 
not help to dispel criticism in the Commons. To many M.P.s the 
cost of the Civil Service was so great that the only effective way 
to bring about a significant economy was by means of a general 
reduction in salaries. This crude method of economizing was a 
constant threat that prompted more subtle efforts in the direction 
of Civil Service reform. It had the effect of making an alliance 
between politicians and permanent officials, since a Commons resolution 
to reduce salaries was as much an attack on the competence of the 
administration as it was on the purses of Civil Servants. The common 
danger enabled Trevelyan to gain the attention of his political 
superiors by developing his arguments for a total reform of the staff 
structure. In the process he brought into the open the ideas that 
had been implicit in the Treasury and Colonial Office reports. Trevelyan 
felt that instead of merely informing Parliament of the net financial 
result of any administrative reform, the political officers of the 
Treasury would have to be able to explain a new concept of efficiency 
that was truly economical. Moreover as Trevelyan's view of staff 
efficiency was - at least as far as most M.P.s were concerned - an 
original one, it would be necessaiy to provide detailed explanations.
A brief narrative of the successive attempts to force economies upon 
the administration will show Trevelyan's contribution.
Towards the end of the decade the pressure for economical reform 
remained fairly constant. The Report of the Select Committee on
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Miscellaneous Expenditure served to strengthen rather, than reduce
this pressure. The Select Committee's two volumes of evidence and
appendices enabled Parliamentary pressure to be amply documented and
to strengthen the demands for drastic retrenchment. A symptom of this
was Cobden's resolution on 22 February 1849 for a return to the level
1
of expenditure of 1855• Of course it is doubtful whether radicals
really believed that this was possible. For Hume in particular, 1855
had the almost mystical virtue of being the post-war year at which
government expenditure had been at its lowest, and consequently the
level of 1855 had become the ideal for economical reformers. It was
not difficult for Cobden - much experienced in hyperbole during the
Anit-Corn Law League's campaigns - to take up this exaggerated demand.
Yet on 1 June 1849 even Cobden was outdone in ruthless zeal by
J.W. Henley, the Conservative member for Oxfordshire. Henley had
served on the Select Committee and he now proposed in a debate on the
Civil Service estimates a reduction of £5,040 in the cost of the
Treasury establishment on the grounds that the cost of living had fallen 
2
by ten percent. Henley went beyond this on 16 July when he suggested 
that this ten percent reduction should be extended to all official 
salaries. Although Cobden appreciated the unfairness of applying this 
cut to lower salaries, he supported the motion as a positive step 
towards economical reform. He also proposed an amendment calling for 
the appointment of a further Select Committee on all public salaries, 
to be independent of the government and with the power of "rigid 
supervision". This proposal was not accepted, for despite its
1 Debates, CII, cols. 1254-55*
2 Debates, CV, cols. 1045-55*
5 Debates, CVII, cols. 4^8-452. Henley claimed that prices had fallen 
by between 20^ and 50% since 1851 (Ibid., C0I.41I-416).
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weakness in the Commons the Russell administration was not sufficiently 
unnerved to surrender authority over civil expenditure to a Committee 
with quasi-executive powers. However pressure on the government at 
this stage provided Trevelyan with occasion to marshal information and 
develop his ideas on a number of aspects of Civil Service organization.
B Trevelyan's Memorandum oh Appointments, 1849
It was in answer to Henley's superficial scheme that Trevelyan
produced his first memorandum on Civil Service appointments. He
prepared this with the help of Macaulay who was asked to check his
paper for style and content.^ When Trevelyan submitted it to Lord
John Russell in August he went out of his way to express his enthusiasm
2
for further investigation of the subject. Entitled "Memorandum on 
the Examination and Probation of Candidates for Public Employment", the 
paper offers a digest of the arguments and influences that formed 
Trevelyan's opinions. The memorandum began with a brief reference to 
the recent over-simplified demands for economy and then turned to what 
Trevelyan felt was the real cause of expense - inefficiency. He claimed 
that it was the lack of an effective system of selection by merit that 
had resulted in the idleness and incompetence of which the Civil 
Service were sometimes accused. He then offered a few practical 
examples of what he believed could be an alternative system. A well- 
established example was the practice of the East India Company of 
eliminating the very worst nominees by putting them throu^ a compulsory 
course at Haileybury. While this negative restriction was in fact of 
questionable value, Trevelyan also brought forward the more recent 
example of the fixed standard examinations that had just been 
introduced for entrance to Sandhurst. It was an imnortant commendation
1 Trevelyan to Macaulay, 17 July 1849, T.L.B., XXV, p.16.
2 Trevelyan to Russell, 7 August 1849, Ibid., p.65.
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that this development had been welcomed by the Secretary at War "as
a great step towards the improvement of the Military Service". It
was even more encouraging that an examining board had been set up to
ensure that potential officers had received a gentleman's education.
(Under the purchase system there was no doubt that an officer was a
gentleman in the current sense of the word; only the appropriateness of
his education was in doubt.) The examining board consisted of a panel
of part-time examiners and a clerk, costing in all £400 a year.
Trevelyan drew the simple conclusion that if an entrance test of
literary skills was necessary for the army, it was equally necessary
for civil appointments.^ Unfortunately he had selected a bad example:
attendance at Sandhurst was purely optional and one contemporary critic
in The Quarterly had suggested that it might be far better to
encourage education elsewhere and to examine applicants for commissions
2
by means of a commission of three examiners. Althou^ Trevelyan 
had failed to see the limitations of what was to him an encouraging 
development, it is clear that examination and selection schemes were 
becoming a topical and much discussed issue.
Trevelyan was equally dissatisfied with the great range of ages
1 The memorandum forms part of Papers, originally printed in 1850, 
respecting the Emoluments of Persons in the Permanent Employment 
of the Government as with those of Joint Stock Companies, Bankers, 
Merchants etc: and Three Papers on the Superannuation Question,
p.87. This octavo pamphlet was printed by Elyre and Spottiswoode 
for the Stationery Office in 1856, probably for circulation among 
Civil Servants at the time of the Select Committee and Royal 
Commission on Superannuation. It is laid out in the form of a 
Parliamentary Paper with a series of twenty-two numbered examples.
It runs to a total of 101 pages and concludes with Trevelyan's 
memorandum of August 1849* I have not succeeded in locating 
manuscript versions, and the copy used is among the Chadwick Tracts 
in the British Library (CT 299). It is subsequently referred to 
as Papers 1850.
2 Two articles attributed to George R. Gleig, Chaplain General,
The Quarterly Review, LXXVII (March I846), pp. 526-565; LXXXIII 
(September I848), pp. 415-450. For two further contrasting 
descriptions of Sandhurst see J. Morton Spearman, Notes on Military 
Education (1855) and Anon., Complete Guide to the Junior and Senior 
Departments of the Royal Military College Sandhurst by an Experienced 
Officer (1849).
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for admission to government departments and the largely nominal probation 
arrangements for first appointments. Not only was there no consistency 
between one department and another, there was a marked reluctance on the 
part of heads of departments to end the careers of men with whom they were 
often intimately acquainted on account of the smallness of each office 
or department. In Trevelyan's own experience at the Treasury he could not 
recall a single instance when a clerk had been refused a certificate of 
competence from his superior, despite the fact that some of these 
probationers had proved to be highly "unsatisfactory. In effect, the 
permanent head of an office was powerless to improve the quality of his 
junior staff. He made an exception, however, for his personal - and to 
a great extent, unfettered - control of Commissariat clerks. He was able 
to claim that since 1859 ten out of 144 clerks had been dismissed after 
an unsatisfactory period of probation as extra clerks. His achievement 
had been due to the use of an indefinite period of probation and annual 
reports on each probationer under no less than five heads. Trevelyan 
made no effort to conceal the relish with which he operated this 
ruthlessly effective system.^
With examinations Trevelyan could find nothing satisfactory within 
the home Civil Service. Earlier attempts to introduce limited 
competitive examinations at the Treasury had resulted in entirely 
bogus competitions. In I84I Peel had replaced these by single nomination 
and a fixed test of literacy. Yet neither had this fixed test proved 
very effective, for the standard had been set too low, and the conduct 
and content of the examinations had been left in the hands of senior 
permanent officials when extended to offices subordinate to the Treasury. 
As in the case of probation these officials had a conflict between duty
1 Pacers 1850, pp. 91-95*
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and personal feelings towards friends and relations, in which the former 
had almost invariably been sacrificed.
Trevelyan hoped to improve matters by means of broader recruitment 
combined with impersonal and objective examination. He hoped, for 
example, that the intellectual level of entrants might be raised by 
recruiting men from college rather than boys from school, but he failed 
to make it clear how this could best be done. He was equally vague in 
his suggestions for a fixed test preliminary examination on which 
might be grafted "the emulation and opportunities for careful selection 
combined with competitive examination". To implement this Trevelyan 
outlined an arrangement which was to be a feature of his later, more 
detailed proposals. Initially a committee would be needed to determine 
the regulations for each type of appointment, the nature of the 
preliminary examination and the form of probation. Once these principles 
had been established, the conduct of examinations ought to be left 
to a permanent board, "composed partly of men of letters and partly 
of experienced public officers, the former of whom would ordinarily 
examine the candidates, and the latter would act as referees in all 
matters requiring a knowledge of official business."^ This system 
was perfectly consistent with patronage, and Trevelyan went on to 
suggest ways in which patronage could still be exercised, but exercised 
impersonally. It seemed quite logical that patronage, like examination 
and probation, could be freed from any trace of corruption. Trevelyan 
proposed that appointments should be made by the government - in other 
words by the Patronage Secretary to the Treasury, as with the Revenue 
Boards :
The appointments are made by the Government as a responsible act
of administration; the public patronage helps, as it ought to
1 Ibid., pp. 95-98*
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do, to strengthen the head of the Government for the time being;
and the appointments to the Public Service, being under the
superintendence of the Prime Minister, through the medium /
of the members who support him in Parliament, are more equally-
diffused through the country, reach on the whole a superior
class of persons, and give more general satisfaction than when
they are in the hands of a single individual at the head of a
department, and are bestowed by him, on the footing of private
patronage, on his family, friends and dependants.
Trevelyan did not entirely exclude provision for sons and relatives
of Civil Servants except that this patronage would indirectly stem
from the Prime Minister.^ Trevelyan claimed that this form of
centralized nomination would be analogous to the practice of the East 
2
India Company. Furthermore there was the advantage of removing the 
popular impression that patronage was being used for purely private 
advantage. Although Trevelyan pointed out that the political importance 
of patronage had diminished, there was some force in his proposal in 
that it would give’ additional influence to the head of an administration 
at a time when party allegiances were weak and confused, and when as a 
consequence the survival of an administration was often dependent upon 
a prime minister's skill in accommodating the interests and ambitions 
of his colleagues and supporters in the Commons. Trevelyan's paper 
acts as a reminder of his Whig politics - an attitude that was 
ingeniously presented to a Whig prime minister as a possible antidote
1 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
2 Although the Directors' exercise of patronage was impersonal as 
far as administrators in India were concerned, there were frequent 
allegations (never in fact proved) of bribery to secure cadetships 
and writerships. Certainly money and connections with the Indian 
service and not political allegiance were the determining factors. 
Accuéations of bribery were later extensively discussed in the debate 
bn the India Bill in 1853 (Debates, CXXIX, cols. 669-772.)
- 135 -
to radical clamourings. Ruseell's reactions to the memorandum are 
not clear. Even if the effect of his proposals had been as predictable 
as Trevelyan had maintained, it was impossible that they could help 
to produce the rapid reduction in costs for which the radicals pressed. 
Trevelyan's ideas were not taken up at this stage but there was soon to 
be a further opportunity to bring them to the notice of the government.
C The Debates of I85O
Fortunately for Trevelyan the question of salaries remained a live issue
in the Commons. On 8 March I85O Cobden spoke in a debate on the
estimates. He was particularly critical of the rise in the Miscellaneous
Estimates from £2,144,000 in 1835 to £3,911,000 in the current year.
He therefore proposed that total civil expenditure, of which
Miscellaneous Estimates covered a part, should be reduced by £650,00
or about ten percent - the first step in a return to the level of
1835* From the example that he gave of the cost of the establishment
of the Master of the Queen's Buckhounds it was obvious that he was
attacking aristocratic privilege embedded in the civil list, and not
the Civil Service. This distinction was ignored by Henley who
proposed a ten percent cut in all government salaries. In answer
to this new threat, or possibly in anticipation since it is dated
8 March, Trevelyan produced another memorandum in which he argued that
Civil Servants did not receive salaries that were at all comparable
with those in the professions, and that a levy of ten percent would
2be an unjustly selective and confiscatory tax. In making the analogy
1 Debates, CIX, cols. 542-563*
2 "Memorandum of Sir Charles Trevelyan on the Proposal to make a 
General Reduction of 10 per Cent in the Salaries of the Permanent 
Civil Servants of the Public", Papers 1850, pp. 5 - 8*
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with a tax, Trevelyan was able to exploit the contemporary argument 
against income tax that it was particularly unfair to men in the 
professions.
After Cobden's motion had been defeated, the Russell administration 
attempted to regain the initiative. Trevelyan helped to strengthen 
the ministers' resolve by assembling all the material he had available 
on the question of salaries, including his memoranda of August 1849 
and March 1850, and addressing it to Wood. In the meantime Russell 
diverted attention from the Civil Service by setting up a Select Committee 
to examiie political, higher judicial and diplomatic salaries. In 
proposing the Committee on 12 April, Russell referred to two amendments, 
put down by Disraeli and Henley respectively, that aimed to achieve 
immediate reductions on the strength of the evidence in the Report of 
the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure and that sought to 
extend the proposed Committee's terms of reference to an examination of 
salaries of every kind. Russell rejected this approach and at the same 
time took the opportunity to mention the economies that had already 
been achieved.^ Although the total saved was nothing approaching 
£650,000, it was an indication of the administration's good faith. 
Moreover, Russell asserted that the accusations of maladministration 
and inefficiency had been grossly exaggerated and that there were no 
Augean stables in need of cleansing. (This was a reference to Carlyle's 
recent tract. Downing Street.) Russell was anxious in the face of 
these criticisms to re-establish Civil Service morale. "Never", he 
claimed, "were public duties performed more zealously and efficiently, 
and yet at a similar cost or with greater energy, than by those\who
1 The Treasury (£5,345), the Irish Board of Works (£I,500); the 
Paymaster General's Office, the Audit Office and the Home Office 
(£23,000).
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hold permanent offices’*. He also maintained that salaries outside
the Civil Service were higher - an observation based on some of
Trevelyan's research - and that inquiries had already been made into
salary rates. In defending these inquiries at the Treasury and the
Home Office, Russell said that they had been made "by efficient persons,
and made minutely, by going through the work of each clerk in those
offices". As a year and a half had already been devoted to inquiries
on this basis, Russell would certainly not consider assessing salaries
with reference to the cost of living. By contrast, Russell viewed
his Select Committee as part of the established tradition of economical
reform and in keeping with the spirit of the inquiries of 1798, 1807 and
1830.^ This approach was more acceptable to the Commons than that
of Disraeli and Henley. After a spirited debate, Disraeli's amendment
2
was defeated by 250 to 159 and Henley's withdrawn. The Committee on 
Russell's terms was appointed on 22 April.^
Russell's manoeuvre to parry attacks on Civil Service salaries 
was only partly successful. Henley made a further attempt to subject 
salaries to Parliamentary scrutiny, when on 30 April he moved for a 
reduction of official salaries. He referred to the unimplemented 
recommendations of the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure, 
and alluded once more to the fall in prices brought about by Free Trade. 
It was at this stage that Trevelyan's papers really proved their worth. 
In his reply Sir Charles Wood adopted a number of Trevelyan's arguments 
and quoted verbatim a number of the examples he had collected.^ In 
fact it turned out that the threat was illusory. Cobden himself opposed
1 Debates,CX, cols. 219-231.
2 Ibid., cols. 279, 290.
3 Ibid., cols. 668 -669.
4 Ibid., cols. 981-1009, particularly IOO3-O4.
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the motion in order that the odium attached to a general reduction
of salaries should not he associated with the beneficent concept of
Free Trade, The motion was resoundingly defeated. Yet this relatively
minor Parliamentary episode helped to enhance Trevelyan's status as an
adviser on Civil Service affairs. It is also interesting that this
debate brou^t from Hume a constructive suggestion similar to one made
by Trevelyan in his 1849 memorandum: the establishment of an examining
board as the best means of eliminating ineffective Civil Servants.^
When the Select Committee on Political, Judicial and Diplomatic
Salaries reported in the following year, Trevelyan gained some
Parliamentary notoriety over the level of his own salary. In the
debate on the report which proposed among other things to reduce the
salaries of the political secretaries to the Treasuiy to £2,000 a year,
Trevelyan's salary of £2,500 was scathingly called in question by
Major Beresford (Conservative M.P. for West Essex): "It seemed that
this Assistant Secretary was a great favourite with the Whig Administration,
because while he received this large salary for the duties of his office,
he had also received a large gratuity for certain extra duties he
was said to have performed in Ireland; though how he could have performed
those extra duties without to some extent sacrificing his regular
duties, he (Major Beresford) could not see". This accusation of Whig
jobbery should not be taken too seriously except as an indication that
Trevelyan was recognized as a conspicuous favourite of Sir Charles Wood.
In the ensuing debate it was only with difficulty that Wood prevented
discussion of Trevelyan's merits, and succeeded in establishing the
principles that in some situations it was appropriate for permanent
heads to receive political .salaries, and that it was quite improper
2
to consider reducing the salaries of men already in post.
1 Ibid., col. 1017.
2 Debates, CXVII, 16 June I85I, cols. 834-842.
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D Trevelyan's Memoranda on Civil Service Reform
While on the one hand Trevelyan used the debates in the Commons
as an excuse to go beyond the older tradition of economical reform,
he was equally anxious in his memorandum of March 1850 to convince
Russell and Wood that his views had respectable, non-radical origins.
Trevelyan's ostensible objective was to defend his colleagues but in
the process of doing this he found that he had an opportunity to make
general criticisms. He first made out a good case for not making
indiscriminate reductions by establishing comparisons with rates of
pay in other public organizations and in commerce. He qualified his
defence of existing salaries by admitting that all staff ought to be
fully and appropriately employed. In conclusion he cited as an example
to the home government the concern displayed by the East India Company
in the welfare of its Civil Servants.^ He was hard pressed to find
an indigenous tradition of rational and equitable payment for Civil
Servants without having recourse to historical examples. The selection
of quotations which he appended started with Macaulay's History of
•pvigl and on the corruption of the reign of Charles II, allegedly
2
caused by derisory salaries and dependence on fees. A further 
example indicated how this situation had been remedied by Pitt by the 
general substitution of salaries in place of fees in 1783. These 
salaries had in turn been reduced in the 1820s, and in 1829 superannuation 
deductions had been imposed on the salaries of those appointed to any 
position in the public service after that date.^ In opposing any 
more general and indiscriminate reductions Trevelyan's most prized
1 Parers 1850, pp. 9-10«
2 Ibid., p.18.
5 Ibid., p.21.
4 Ibid., p.14*
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authority was Burke. Trevelyan referred to a speech in 1780 in which 
Burke himself had opposed a reduction of twenty-five percent. Burke 
took the hypothetical instance of two men receiving £800 and contended 
that the reduction then proposed would leave the sinecurist £600 
overpaid and the conscientious official £200 underpaid. The moral was 
simply drawn that, "no man knows when he cuts off the incitements to 
a virtuous ambition and the just rewards of public service, what 
infinite mischief he may do to his country".^ This was a useful 
indication that in the mainstream of economical reform general 
reductions had no place. Indeed, this kind of argument opened the 
way for a moral and practical reconsideration of every Civil Service 
activity.
While Trevelyan was anxious to show that his views had a
traditional basis that would be readily intelligible to the Russell
administration, he did not conceal that he believed that commercial
methods were superior to those prevailing in the public service in
2
such matters as the division of labour and staff selection. To 
support this view Trevelyan presented in tabular form information 
on salaries in mercantile and insurance companies. Both comparisons 
helped foster the notion of an ^lite, since only very few men could 
ever hope to compete sufficiently successfully in order to rise to a 
salary of £1,000 or more.^ Trevelyan also drew particular attention 
to two recent investigations of the administration of railway companies.
1 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
2 Ibid., p.5.
5 Ibid., pp. 28-31. 63-66. Trevelyan wrote personally for some of 
this information and he had to assemble it very hurriedly. On 
2 April he asked Lord Overstone, an eminent banker, for a comparison 
between mercantile and Civil Service salaries (T.L.B., XXVI, p.l30). 
On 10 April Trevelyan signed his memorandum.
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These investigations, conveniently for Trevelyan's case, laid stress 
on ability and conduct rather than length of service in assessing 
salaries, and on salary scales which were dependent on merit for 
each increment. It also appeared that railway companies, like 
insurance companies, possessed a sharply tapered career hierarchy 
with 298 secretaries and managers compared with 4442 clerks - a ratio 
of one prize for fifteen initial appointments.^  As railway companies 
were never private firms, these figures provided a valid illustration 
of providing incentives for employees. These examples also showed that 
companies could encounter problems of organisation not dissimilar to 
those of the Civil Service, even though these problems were caused by 
rapid expansion rather than adherence to tradition.
Two institutions performing functions analogous to those of the
Civil Service - the London Office of the East India Company and the
Bank of England - supplied even better ammunition for Trevelyan's
argument in favour of a pronounced differential between clerks and
higher officers. The East India Company's system embodied some of the
features that later came to be incorporated in the Civil Service
Commission. The Company controlled admission to their service by
restricting the age of admission to between eighteen and twenty-five,
by insisting upon a certificate of moral character, by an examination
of commercial skills before appointment and by a year's probation. The
Company^s salary scale was modest, ending at £400 except for the few
2
who were promoted to the most senior posts. The Bank of England had 
a basic scale rising to £500.^ From these examples, Trevelyan was
1 Ibid., pp. 56-57, 61. The statistics of employment on railways
from a Commons return (P.P., I85O, LIII, pp. 308-309)*
2 Ibid., pp. 31-34*
3 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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able to argue that in institutions analogous to the Civil Service 
moderate salaries with the prospect of a few better prizes were 
perfectly adequate,
Trevelyan produced one piece of evidence to prove the practicability 
of a complete restructuring- of salaries. Willia, Farr, actuary and 
compiler of abstracts at the General Registry Office, prepared for 
him a paper which demonstrated the actuarial feasibility of contracting 
the top of the salary scale. Farr divided the Civil Service into three 
classes - senior officers, established clerks and non-established clerks. 
He advocated that the established clerks should reach a lower ceiling 
more rapidly. In this way the maximum would be reached during a 
man's fifties, rather than be laboriously attained after half a century's 
service. Farr also maintained that if the age of appointment could 
be restricted to between eighteen and twenty-five, an adequate salary 
would be attained at the probable age of marriage. The absence of a 
high ultimate salary would deter clerks from extravagance and debt.^
This was the germ of those realistic prospects that Trevelyan later 
hoped would prove so attractive to the middle class. However, the 
immediate importance of Farr's paper was to show that the kind of 
changes that Trevelyan wanted could be made without any extra cost.
In producing his memoranda and in assembling a great range of 
precedents and contemporary examples for use, if necessary, by his 
political superiors, Trevelyan had shown that he had a case that could 
not be ignored. He was conscious that the issues had been brought out 
into the open. For the next four years Trevelyan concentrated on 
converting at least some of his theories into practical terms.
1 Ibid., pp. 66-80. This paper was based on one produced in connection 
with superannuation and given to the Statistical Society of London 
in December 1848. Trevelyan also included an outline tabulation of 
an unofficial census of Civil Servants' families and a family budget 
to illustrate the circumstances of a clerk on £150 p.a. Papers No.
18 and 19 by M.J.T. Hammack (April I85O), pp. 81-82. See also 
infra pp. 226-22?.
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4 The Second Phase of Investigation, 1852 - 54
The appointment of the Derby-Disraeli administration in February
1852 led to a second phase in the investigation of offices. Althou^
administrative reform was not a party matter, Trevelyan's new
Chancellor, Disraeli, displayed more obvious interest than his
predecessor. Disraeli had of course already spoken in favour of
economical reform but he pointed out in December 1852 that efficiency
could not be achieved by mere reductions since retrenchment was easy to
demand while difficult to achieve.^ Two departments were investigated -
the War Office and the Admiralty - and one - the Board of Trade - was
on the point of being examined when the administration fell. The
Irish departments were also investigated by a separate committee.
Reports on these latter departments were eventually published, but
2
little is known about the Admiralty inquiry, and information on 
the inquiry into the War Office is confined to a catalogue of the 
difficulties that Trevelyan had to contend with in an obstructive 
department.
The pace of investigation was further increased with the 
formation of the Aberdeen administration in December 1852. Gladstone 
took over Disraeli's projected inquiry into the Board of Trade. From 
this time onwards, however, every investigation was productive in that 
they all led to a published report. It may be argued that the most 
important departments and those best able to defend their interests 
had already been examined under Russell and Derby. Alternatively, 
Gladstone's greater determination may provide the exqjlanation.
1 Debates, CXAiil, col. 894»
2 On 14 October 1852, Trevelyan wrote to Lord Chandos suggesting that 
the Admiralty committee should consist of them both and one other 
official from the Admiralty (T.L.B., XXIX, p.264).
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A The Vax Office
As a major spending department, the War Office was an obvious
subject for economical investigation. However, as Trevelyan later
explained to Disraeli when the completion of the report ran into
difficulties, the immediate occasion of the investigation had been a
request for an increased establishment.^ Although the report never
emerged, more is known about the problems of its production than any of
the others. Trevelyan set the pace. On 7 October 1852 he wrote to
Benjamin Hawes, Parliamentaiy Under Secretary, to arrange the first
meeting of a committee consisting of Lord Chandos, R.M. Bromley and 
2
Hawes himself. Within two months the work had been completed, and 
by December only two points remained at issue - the reorganization of 
the Registry and the proportion of superintending clerks to the total 
number of clerks. Hawes at this stage objected to what he felt had 
been the undue haste in preparing the draft report so far. In reply, 
Trevelyan declined to reopen the investigation. He pointed out that 
he had already invited Hawes to examine the working of the Treasury 
Registry and that Hawes had not complained about the speed of the 
investigation at the time it was being conducted. Trevelyan maintained 
that, as far as he was concerned, the committee's sitting for two hours 
a day for many days and the examination of a great volume of written 
evidence had been quite sufficient to form a correct view of the matter.^ 
A few days later, Trevelyan again pressed Hawes to complete the report. 
The report was then completed to Trevelyan's satisfaction after the
1 15 December 1852, Hu^enden, B/lV/c/14.
2 T.L.B., XXIX, p. 251.
5 Trevelyan to Hawes, 15 December 1852, T.L.B., XXX, p.ll5
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latter had agreed to raise the age of admission for clerks from
between fifteen and twenty to between eighteen and twenty-three.^
This was a compromise that Trevelyan could readily agree to, provided
that it did not imply an upgrading of the entire staff.
Trevelyan's satisfaction was shortlived. His insistence on
completing the report prompted Hawes to produce a counter-report which
2was accepted by Sidn^ Herbert,the Secretary at War. Trevelyan was 
not prepared to accept this flouting of Treasury authority without 
a struggle. He wrote to Lord Chandos and, while admitting that there 
might have been some inaccuracy in their report, maintained that there 
was a need "to speak out". Trevelyan's first reaction was to mobilise 
opposition to the War Office and he arranged to meet the other member 
of the committee, Bromley, at the Treasury.^" However, Trevelyan's 
political superiors realized that this kind of inter-departmental 
feuding would be unproductive. James Wilson, the Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, persuaded Trevelyan that no official notice should 
be taken of the counter-report.^ Presumably the counter-report 
served its purpose in that the main report was suppressed. It was 
never published and no copy survives.
Trevelyan did gain one minor victory. In February 1855 he wrote 
to Chandos, telling him how he had at least managed to place a financial 
restriction upon the pretensions of the War Office: "I have also had 
a hard battle to fight to prevent Sidney Herbert from taking a sum 
on account in the War Office Estimate, to defray the cost of their
1 Ibid., pp. 129, 148.
2 Ibid., p. 190.
5 Ibid., pp. 260, 265.
4 T.L.B., XXX, p.267.
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proposed increase of Establishment, This was intended as a salve 
to the wounded Amour Propre of the War Office, but it would have 
prejudged the case, and would have the worst possible effect on the 
other Public Departments, and on the efficaqy of the future Committees 
of Enquiry."  ^ From these remarks it might appear that even if 
Trevelyan had been given the chance to publish the War Office report 
together with the others in 1854, he would have preferred to leave in 
obscurity an episode that was not a successful example of his reforming 
schemes.
B The Irish Offices
Trevelyan played no part in the investigation of the Irish
Offices, except insofar as it arose from Treasury resistance to increased
salaries. The clerks of the Chief Secretary's Office in Dublin asked
that their salaries should be raised to the level of those in the
Home Office, the corresponding office in England. This request provided
an excellent opportunity for an inquiry, in which E.M. Bromley represented
the Treasury. He must have shared some of Trevelyan's views as he helped
to produce a report that was very pleasing to him. On the same day on
which the report was officially signed, 9 December 1852, Trevelyan
wrote to congratulate Bromley on the way in which career prospects had
2been improved by the report's recommendations. The appointment of 
a stranger to the post of Assistant Under Secretary had been one of 
the grievances that had precipitated the request for a salary increase.
The report's recommendations aimed at removing the need for such an 
appointment in the future. It maintained that promotion by merit 
throughout the office was the key to more efficient senior appointments. 
Two other features of the Iri^ reforms - stricter rules for attendance
1 14 February 1855, T.L.B., XXXI, p.18.
2 T.L.B., XXX, p.109.
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and an improved system for registering papers - were in keeping with
Trevelyan's views. In addition to all these fundamental improvements,
the amalgamation of the Office of the Auditor of Fines and Penalties with
the Commissioners for Auditing Public Accounts achieved an immediate
saving of £5,178 in a total salary bill of £21,758.^ Disraeli singled
out this saving for comment on 16 December 1852, pointing out that
the amalgamation of departments on economical grounds had resulted in
2
greater efficiency.
C The Board of Trade
Until December 1852 the investigating committees had consisted 
of Trevelyan and various other persons drawn either from the Treasury 
or from the Treasury and from the department under review.^ The 
procedure was further professionalized on the formation of the Aberdeen 
coalition in December 1852 when Gladstone added to the team his former 
private secretary. Sir Stafford Northcote. A serious illness had kept 
him out of public life for some time, and on his recovery he approached 
Gladstone for some unpaid and not too vigorous work: "I should much
like", he remarked, "to be employed on odd jobs of any kind".^ Gladstone 
appreciated the ability of his former secretary and appointed him to 
counterbalance Trevelyan, although he was not at the time an M.P.
The first department which Trevelyan and Uorthcote examined 
together was the Board of Trade. Work had been about to begin on it 
when the Conservative administration fell. Northcote had even been
1 PP., 1854, XXVII, pp. 122-125.
2 Debates, CXXIII, col. 1662.
5 The original committee formed by the Derby administration contained
two political figures, Henley and Chandos. Northcote took the place
of both and joined Trevelyan and Booth (Permanent Secretary) in the 
Board of Trade inquiry (Trevelyan to Henley, 10 December 1852, T.L.B., 
XXX, p.154
4 Add. MS., 44216 f. 192.
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aware of this and referred to it in his letter to Gladstone. Towards •
the completion of their joint labours in I855, Trevelyan described
this report as their masterpiece, the Board "having been recast on a
good model, with a considerable pecuniary saving, a great increase of
efficiency, and, so far as we know, to everybody's satisfaction."^
In this report the remodelled Board of Trade bore traces of the ideas
that Trevelyan had been fostering since I848. It is therefore not
surprising that he was eloquent in expressing his satisfaction,
particularly as it demonstrated that both Booth and Northcote
essentially shared his views. That this remodelling was possible was
largely due to the Board of Trade's own tradition of change which had
2gone on since I85O with the continual adding of new business.
The report considered the multifarious business of the Board 
under three headings* the subordination of the whole department to 
the chief authority; the proper division of work; and the need for a 
uniform system of transacting business. All these aspects were 
made relevant to general Civil Service considerations. Starting at 
the top of the office, the recommendation that the three joint 
permanent secretaries in charge of the three regrouped departments - 
General, Mercantile Marine and Railway - should be directly responsible 
to the President of the Board of Trade, presupposed that the assistant 
secretaries would in turn be competent to manage the correspondence 
of each of the three departments. The secretaries in effect 
constituted an administrative élite, forming policy and ensuring 
its consistent execution. This was the strength at Board level 
which Trevelyan had been prevented from achieving at the Treasury
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 15 September 1855, T.L.B., XXXII, p.59*
2 Roger Prouty, The Transformation of the Board of Trade (1957), 
pp. 99-101.
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itself. It was possible here since the Board of Trade was a ministry 
with the President as its sole head, the Board having ceased to meet 
in 1850.1
To ensure that this reorganization would be on a secure foundation, 
great importance was attached to the actual methods of office admin­
istration. Trevelyan himself described routine registration as the 
"lore of the office" and the essential basis for its efficient 
operation. In the report it was recommended that the Registrar, who was 
in future to combine the functions of precis writer and librarian, should 
be in aharge of all clerks in the correspondence departments. One of 
his duties would be to transfer them from one department to another so 
that they would gradually acquire experience of all kinds of work. 
Naturally much of this work would be routine copying and it was therefore 
proposed to establish two distinct classes of clerks. Thus for the first 
time copyists were recognized as part of the establishment; they were 
to pay superannuation deductions, to be granted paid leave, and to 
be paid according to a salary scale (£80 x £5 - £180, with extra 
additions for merit). At the same time it was made quite clear that 
these clerks were to have ^  claim to promotion to senior positions.
The committee was even tempted to extend this arrangement by considering 
the establishment of one large copying pool for the whole of #Litehall. 
Prudently they left this for separate consideration, for Trevelyan was 
on safer ground when he was expounding his views on the correct method 
of selecting the two classes of clerks. He pointed out in the report 
that the feasibility of his examination scheme would have to be the 
subject of a separate study, embracing the whole Civil Service and not 
just one department. He repeated his view that a central body of
1 P.P., 1854, XXVII, pp. 165-167. By contrast, both Baring and Wood
had insisted on preserving the Board structure of the Treasury as 
they felt that Junior Lords exercised a salutary political control 
over much routine business (P.P., 1847-48, XVIII i, pp. 419, 428).
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examinera was needed in order to issue certificates of qualification
before a clerk could take up his duties.^ While it was not difficult
to define what the education of the copyists should be, it was
almost impossible to define the qualities needed in intellectual
clerks. Indexing and registering was included in this category in
that these activities involved an understanding and analysis of day-
to-day business. The report also stressed the need for detailed
supervision of each clerk's career. In future the Registrar was to
keep a record of each man's progress, so that merit would not go
unrewarded. For the intellectual clerks the report offered a new
incentive for official virtue: a new class of six senior clerks to
2
be appointed exclusively by merit.
Apart from improved efficiency, an immediate saving of £5,000 
was achieved to help satisfy demands for economy. The report therefore 
demonstrated that a major department could be economically, and at the 
same time fundamentally, reorganized. Trevelyan's personal satisfaction 
was partly caused by the eagerness with which the President of the
3
Board of Trade had accepted the proposals with one minor exception.
The way in which Trevelyan's and Northcote's first joint venture was
accepted was due to the skillful way in which the committee discovered
some sound features in the department that could be extended throu^out 
the Board of Trade as a whole.
D The Foreign Office and the Treasury
The settling of the final details of the Board of Trade report and 
the drafting of a Treasury Minute to sanction the new establishment
1 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.175.
2 Ibid., pp. 172-178.
5 Ibid., n.l68.
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took until the beginning of May 1855* Before these processes were
completed Trevelyan took a short holiday in Paris. On his return, he
was confronted with the possibility of re-examining the Foreign Office
and the Treasury. Trevelyan certainly did not welcome a protracted,
and almost certainly unproductive, involvement in the affairs of these
two departments. In a letter to Gladstone on 3I March, he agreed that
the Foreign Office should be asked to revise its establishment and
undertook to draft a minute on the subject.^ This was in connection
with plans being produced by Addington, the Permanent Secretary, for
the creation of a new grade of assistant clerks below the senior clerks
as a means of improving the flow of business and of providing improved
promotion prospects for the junior clerks. Trevelyan drafted a Treasury
Minute, in which he argued that the separation of intellectual and
mechanical work was a far more appropriate remedy to problems caused
by an increased volume of work than the mere creation of a new class
2
of superior clerks. îHiis conflict of views continued to be discussed 
and is briefly dealt with in connection with establishments.^ In the 
context of Civil Service reform, however, the Foreign Office could 
not be exploited as an example to other departments. Addington's 
views on the Northcote-Trevelyan proposals were invited and he revealed 
himself as one of the hostile departmental critics.^
As far as the Treasury was concerned Trevelyan was quite opposed 
to engaging in a stale conflict with his colleagues at this stage, 
while there were more promising fields for inquiry elsewhere; "I
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, $1 îlarch 1855, Add. MS. 44535, 1*30.
2 Treasury Minute, 5 April 1854, in F.0.566/499, quoted by R. Jones 
on. cit., pp. 55-54.
5 See pp. 102-103 supra.
4 Addington to Treasury, printed in P.P., 1854-55, XX, pp. 548-56O.
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should be disposed to be content for the present with the degree 
of Improvement which has been obtained, on the ground of the recency 
of that reform, of the dis proportionate expenditure of time and feeling 
necessarily incident to the revision of one's own Office, and of the 
fact that there are several other Offices which stand in more need of 
Enquiry and therefore require our earliest attention".^ Althou^ he 
had been frustrated in I848, Trevelyan realized that any attempt to subject 
the Treasury to the same treatment as the Board of Trade would have 
resulted in a drawn out dispute with men of the stamp of Arbuthnot.
Probably his reference to "feeling" in the letter indicated that he 
was aware of the need for great tact and sensitivity. Trevelyan had 
frequently mentioned that the Civil Service should be regulated in an 
impersonal manner and it might have struck him that his own approach 
as a member of the committees of inquiry disqualified him from an 
examination of the Treasury on the same terms as other departments.
E The Remaining Reports, 1855-54
Five more reports were produced very rapidly during the summer
of 1855 - three of them dated within a few days of each other in August.
Finally two more were produced at the end of 1855 and one in 1854*
All these reports recommended separation of intellectual and mechanical
work; none revealed any new principles. However, in the course of
suggesting economies and making detailed improvements Trevelyan and
Northcote had opportunities to illustrate the validity of the theories
that they had already presented. For this reason only a few of the points
2raised in these ei^t reports are worth mentioning.
1 Add MS., 44533 f. 30.
2 Science and Art Department (25 May 1853); Poor Law Board (20
July 1855)1 Privy Council Office (6 August 1855); Copyhold, Enclosure 
and Tithe Commission (I7 August 1855); Colonial Land Emigration
Board (16 August 1855); Ordnance (17 December 1855); Board of Works 
(14 January I854); Post Office (50 January I854).
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In the Office of the Poor Law Board, for example, the
investigating committee found ample scope for insisting that much
of the routine work should he done by clerks, paid on the same scale
as that laid down for the extra clerks in the Board of Trade.^ In
the education department of the Privy Council, on the other hand,
the report laid greater emphasis on the career structure of the Office
and the way in which this could encourage effort and appropriately 
2
reward talent. The Office of the Copyhold, Enclosure and Tithe 
Commission was singled out for praise on account of the clerks being 
held individually responsible for the accuracy of their work, not 
to mention the annual saving of eighty-two reams of paper each year
5
by the use of half sheets. The Ordnance, as it had already been the 
subject of an inquiry by both a departmental and a select committee, 
appeared to the Treasury dommittee to be admirably regulated - it 
having already achieved an exemplary reduction of £17,500 in its 
estimates between 1850 and 1853, despite a considerable increase in 
the volume of business.^ In the Office of Works the appointment 
of an Assistant Secretary and the payment of higher salaries at the 
top of the department strengthened the principle of the division of
5
labour. The final report, that on the Post Office, only appeared 
in May 1854, six months after the general report. The Organisation 
of the Permanent Civil Service, had been completed. As the Post 
Office was the only "revenue" department reported on by Northcote
1 P.P., 1854, xmi, p.258.
2 Ibid., pp. 256-265.
3 IBid., p.289.
4 Ibid., p.507»
5 Ibid., p.355*
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and Trevelyan, and thus its activities essentially localized with 
extensive employment of semi-skilled non-clerical labour, its problems 
could not so usefully be discussed in the terms that had already been 
developed. Apart from a number of detailed changes, the report 
recommended such traditional economical improvements as the abolition 
of extra payments for additional work and the establishment of a system 
of promotion by merit based on improved staff records.^
Conclusions
Although Trevelyan covered a great deal of ground in his fifteen 
departmental investigations (nine of them in collaboration with 
Northcote), he did little to refine or develop his views. From his 
experience of the Treasury he was convinced that division of labour was 
the key to virtually all problems of departmental organization. Naturally 
he came to examine methods of staff selection, but the problems inherent 
in this remained of secondary importance. The eagerness with which 
Trevelyan wished to impose this preconceived system brought him into 
conflict with the most powerful departments. Yet he remained undismayed, 
content for a time to work in comparative obscurity, improving office 
methods wherever he could by suggesting unexceptionable modifications 
and improvements in office routine.
1 Ibid.. pp. 432-433.
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Chapter VI
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM; FROM THEORY TO COMPROMISE
In the second phase of Civil Service reform, Trevelyan *s 
position was fundamentally different. The Parliamentary pressure 
for economy had abated. But a far more potent and sustained impetus 
came from the interest of Gladstone. Gladstone, by his eagerness 
to strike a blow at patronage through the complete adoption of open 
competition, made Civil Service reform a public issue. Trevelyan, 
therefore, interpreted his new task as one of winning over public 
opinion for a reform of profound moral and educational significance.
1 The Northcote Trevelyan Report, November 1855
The year 1853 was not only the most productive in terms of 
completed departmental reports, it at last saw the formal step of 
proceeding from piecemeal inspection to a general survey and evaluation 
of the Civil Service. This process was formally initiated by a 
Treasury Minute on 12 April. This Minute established the terms 
of reference which had already been applied in the five inquiries that 
had taken place before ; an inquiry into salaries, redundant offices, the 
need for clerical assistance and the general improvement of working 
methods. It also added the question of the feasibility of separating 
intellectual and mechanical work. This in itself was an invitation to 
consider general principles rather than particular instances. Moreover 
the Minute went on to ask the committee to consider features common to 
all departments and to examine the methods of selection. Now, for 
the first time, Trevelyan received an open invitation to do what he 
had been hinting at since I848. The position of the committee itself 
was formalized by the recognition of Northcote*s position at a salary
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of £1,000.^
Trevelyan and Northcote completed their first version of the
general report on 23 November. Despite significant revisions it
retained this date in the published version. Its title, The Organisation
of the Permanent Civil Service, was equally misleading. The contradiction
of the title by the contents probably did not matter initially, since
Gladstone envisaged the report as a confidential one for his own 
2consideration. However, as the subsequent development of Civil Service 
reform took place in the light of the report as a public document, it 
will be necessary to consider, and perhaps explain, the report’s 
shortcomings in its changed context. Moreover some of the confusion 
that ultimately arose from the report’s ambiguity will be seen as the 
results of hurried attempts to make fundamental alterations at the 
insistence of Gladstone.
The report opened with yet another restatement of Trevelyan’s 
views on existing methods of selecting and encouraging staff. Since the 
criticism implicit in this was in general terms and did not refer to 
a single instance or class of instances, it had the appearance of being 
a very unfair condemnation. After stating that the Civil Service failed 
to attract the best talent, Trevelyan and Northcote launched a general 
attack on the quality of Civil Servants*
Admission into the Civil Service is indeed sou^t after, but 
it is for the unambitious, and the indolent or incapable, that 
it is chiefly desired. Those whose abilities do not warrant 
an expectation that they will succeed in the open professions, 
where they must encounter the competition of their contemporaries.
1 Printed in P.P. (Lords), 1854, XLV, p.53. For some reason the Minute 
was not printed with the published collection of reports. It was 
requested as a Lords return in order to satisfy Lord Monteagle’s 
suspicions about the propriety of the inquiries. It eventually appeared 
as a Commons return in the following session (P.P. 1854-55» XXX,
pp. 375-376).
2 Gladstone to Eussell, 20 Januaiy 1854i Add. MS. 44291 f.93«
- 157 -
and those whom indolence of temperament or physical infirmities
unfit for active exertions, are placed in the Civil Service, where
they may obtain an honourable livelihood with little labour, and
with no risk; where their success depends dpon their simply
avoiding any flagrant misconduct, and attending with moderate
regularity to routine duties; and in which they are secured against
the ordinary consequences of old age, or failing health, by an
arrangement which provides them with the means of supporting
1
themselves after they have become incapacitated.
Trevelyan admitted that the system did produce better people than mi^t 
have been expected. He was, however, emphatic that the usually routine 
nature of the work they had to perform, together with the secluded 
environment in which they worked, deprived men of the character-forming 
experience of professional competition. Naturally this moral observation 
was likely to arouse the resentment of those Civil Servants who had 
quietly and faithfully served for a lifetime.
Trevelyan offered a remedy for this lack of character-testing.
He first dismissed, as being too expensive, the notion of recruiting the 
Civil Service from among men who had already proved themselves in other 
fields. Apart from the expense, he realized that maturer men would 
be less amenable to discipline. Trevelyan decided, therefore, that 
the only practicable scheme was to continue to recruit docile young
2men at a low salary, but to take more care over selection and promotion. 
In turn this led to a consideration of the kind of education that 
potential Civil Servants ought to receive, its relevance to intellectual
1 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.4.
2 Ibid., p.8.
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and mechanical work and the form of examination needed to test 
qualifications.
In considering the examination system that was eventually proposed, 
it is necessary to note that at the time of the report's original 
composition, neither Trevelyan nor Northcote envisaged going beyond 
what Trevelyan had suggested in his memorandum of 1849* Under this 
arrangement, patronage was to be centrally exercised by the Patronage 
Secretary to the Treasuiy. Gladstone, by contrast, was anxious to 
destroy Civil Service patronage; he wanted no privileged position for 
his own and succeeding administrations. On 3 December he wrote to 
Northcote, asking that two important changes should be made in the 
reports that competitive examination should be free from any patronage 
restriction, and that it should be extended to a whole additional class 
of departments.^
Although Trevelyan's main concern had been to devise a way 
of selecting men for the highest posts, he had hesitated to remove 
the ultimate right of selection from political hands. It is unlikely 
that he was restrained from going too far by the fear of giving offence 
to his political superiors, for this is the kind of strategic tact 
that Trevelyan never displayed on other occasions. On 28 November 
Trevelyan sent Gladstone some more copies of the report and in his 
letter continued to press his case for the beneficent exercise of 
patronage. As the tone of the letter is consistent with Trevelyan's 
enthusiasm when he finally began to advocate open competition, he 
was probably in the process of changing his positions
I send two spare copies of our General Report on the Civil 
Departments and the same number of my paper on the Superannuation 
question, in which I have made a few amendments. The political
1 Add. MS., 44529 f.ll.
- 159 -
bearing of these proposed changes will, I think, strike you
as extremely important* The Government Patronage is habitually
employed in influencing, or according to a stricter moralily,
corrupting Representatives and Electors at the expense both of
their independence and of the public interests. Even the
establishment at the Board of Trade for protecting our lives and
limbs when travelling by railway is not exempt from the blight
of this system. The defence usually made for it is that it is
doing evil that good may come. However this may have been
heretofore, both means and ends are now equally bad. It is
time that the Government should rest its claim to support upon
simply and directly consulting the public good. The experience
of last Session shows that this is quite practicable. The
Government which began with a narrow majoriiy, acquired, by the
general approbation with which its measures were regarded, a
strength and stability exceeding what had been known for many
years. Following out this principle, we cannot doubt that no
distribution of the Government patronage would benefit the
Government so much as the general confidence that all appointments
to the public service were made solely with a view to the public
good, without any indirect personal or interested motive 
1
whatever.
Whatever Trevelyan's precise position, Gladstone soon precipitated its 
change.
Gladstone's share in extending the scope of the report is made 
clear in his letter to Northcote on 5 December. He admitted that
1 Add. MS., 44335 f. 65. i
2 Add. MS., 44529. f. 11. This is the copy of the letter in Gladstone's I 
letter book (iddesleigh Papers, add. MS., 50015 f. ?6). It is discussed 
by Jenifer Hart, "The Genesis of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report", in
G. Sutherland (ed.) Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth Century 
Government (1972), pp. 73-77.
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he was "keenly anxious to strike a blow at Parliamentary patronage".
He was, therefore, suspicious of a proposal that qualified open 
competition*
You recommend in p. 12 that the clerkships in the higher offices 
should be disposed of by selection among the successful 
candidates and that this selection should rest with the First 
Lord of the Treasury, who would give due weight to the 
recommendation of his colleague and also of his Parliamentary 
supporters. Pray let this disappear. To me it seems at least 
that having slain Patronage in principle by your admirable 
opening statement and your first recommendations, you revive 
it by these words and give it a standing ground from which it 
would wriggle itself once more into possession of all the 
space from which it had been ejected. The recommendations of 
Ministers may be supposed to rest on their knowledges I would 
give to them and not to the Treasury, these appointments ; 
probably with the check you recommend of a list annually 
presented to Parliament. But the recommendations of members 
of Parliament I think can find no place, if the principles of 
your report are to be maintained.
With these words, one of Trevelyan's few pieces of apparent political
realism was dismissed by Gladstone's moral idealism. There was also
the practical point - later expressed in some of the papers on Civil
Service reorganization - that Treasury patronage exercised at a distance 
had often resulted in unsatisfactoiy appointments.^ In the final version 
of the report, therefore, Trevelyan and Northcote made no attempt to 
outline an alternative arrangement. They left the actual distribution 
of appointments undecided and pretended to see no real difficulty
1 Papers of R.M. Bromley and Edward Romilly, P.P., 1854-55, XX, pp. 
57, 277-278,
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in whether they were to he allotted by the examiners or by the 
heads of departments.
In the first draft of the report, Trevelyan had wisely decided 
not to attempt detailed suggestions for the Customs and the Inland 
Revenue. Neither he nor Northcote had any experience of these and 
other departments that employed large numbers of non-clerical, and often 
unskilled, staff at local level. Therefore, they decided to leave the 
existing system of patronage untouched, except for the addition of a 
qualifying examination. It was Gladstone vdio insisted in his letter 
of 3 December that these departments should be subject to open 
competition like the central departments. He realized that it would be 
a considerable task to work out a detailed scheme for them, but he
felt confident that Northcote and Trevelyan would undertake it. Gladstone
never suspected that the superficial alteration that was in fact made 
would create serious ambiguities and raise additional issues that proved 
to be prejudicial to the success of the whole scheme. It is possible 
to see how this came about by comparing the two versions. Fortunately 
a copy of the earlier one exists among the Gladstone papers. The 
paragraph referring to revenue appointments reads*
There are many situations in which character is more important 
than ability, and in such it will generally be prudent to rely
more upon the testimony of those by whom the candidate is
recommended, or to whom his merits are well known than upon the 
results of an examination by those who are strangers to him.
Persons recommended for such appointments as these ou^t indeed 
to undergo an examination calculated to prove whether they are 
capable of discharging the duties which are assigned to them; 
but it will be far below what we think should be required of those 
who offer themselves as candidates for admission into offices where
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they may he expected to rise in due time to very arduous 
positions.^
This was replaced in the final version by a very general requirement:
We are of the opinion that this examination should be in all
cases a competing literary examination. This ought not to
exclude careful previous inquiry into the age, health, and
moral fitness of the candidates, where character and bodily
activity are chiefly required, more, comparatively, will depend
upon the testimony of those to whom the candidate is well known;
but the selection from among the candidates who have satisfied
these preliminary inquiries should still be made by competing
examination. This may be conducted as to test the intelligence,
as well as the mere attainments of the candidates. We see no
other mode by which (in the case of inferior no less of superior
offices) the double object can be attained of selecting the
2fittest person, and of avoiding the evils of patronage.
The extension of open competition in place of patronage to virtually 
the whole Civil Service satisfied Gladstone. There now could be no 
suspicion that the scheme was designed to strengthen Treasury patronage. 
However, in extending the social range of candidates for the new kind 
of examination, it became possible to consider the relevance of every 
type of education to the needs of the Civil Service. As a consequence 
the arguments of educationists became an additional complicating factor. 
At the same time the vagueness of iiie modified proposals invited 
misinterpretation, particularly from hostile critics. Although 
Gladstone had prevented patronage from wriggling its way back into a
1 Add. MS., 44579 f. 142.
2 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.11.
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reformed Civil Service, he had helped to create a series of immediate 
tactical problems that Trevelyan and Northcote were slow to solve. 
Trevelyan lost sight of these problems because from this time onwards 
he became an ardent propagandist against patronage and in favour of 
open competition.^ Never before had he received so much encouragement 
to extend his ideas. Never before had he been so confident that a 
fundamental reform of the Civil Service was imminent.
The other recommendations of the report did not require modification.
Most of them were consistent with the general principle of open 
competition, even if they had originally been conceived in a different 
context. One such recommendation was for the establishment of a new 
central examination system. Essentially what was outlined was the 
same as the arrangement proposed in Trevelyan's memorandum of 1849.
In future, entrance to the Civil Service was to be superintended by 
a specially created impartial and independent board. This board was to 
be headed by a Privy Councillor and was to be composed of, or at least 
able to obtain the assistance of, men who had experience in organizing 
upper-class and middle-class education. To these were to be added men 
with experience of the management of public affairs. This body of 
examiners was to set a competitive literary examination and to assess 
the character and physical fitness of candidates before issuing a 
certificate of competence to serve. These examinations were to be 
conducted on at least two levels. For the higher level of intellectual 
posts, candidates aged between nineteen and twenty-five were to engage 
in a competitive literary examination. It was intended that this hi^  
upper age limit should enable graduates to compete with boys straight 
from school. This was perfectly consistent with Trevelyan's long-
1 Trevelyan had been rather cynical about patronage for some time.
In January 1853 he speculated with E.M. Bromley whether the increased 
demand for clerkships "was owing to the Great Country Party coming 
into office with all their large families and numerous dependants" 
(T.L.B., XXX, p.131).
2 P.P., 1854, XXVII, pp. 11, 16-17.
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standing interest in establishing an administrative élite. However, 
he had never shown so much concern for and interest in the lower 
levels of work. Partly perhaps as a result of the modifications already 
described, the report was less clear in outlining the appropriate 
examination for those aged between seventeen and twenty-one who were 
to fill posts in the executive and account departments, and for those 
who were to perform mechanical work generally. As Trevelyan had no 
experience of examinations on a large scale, the report was only able 
to make the vague suggestion that for the numerous appointments in the 
Customs, examinations should be organized on lines similar to those 
already adopted by the Education Department. This lack of precision 
gave rise to several misunderstandings that Trevelyan and Northcote
7
spent the next three months endeavouring to eradicate.
The most serious misunderstanding as far as serving Civil Servants
were concerned was the impression that the new examination would have
the effect of depriving the middle class of appointments for the benefit
of those with an upper class, university education. The first draft
of the report had drawn a sharp distinction between the levels of
examination for intellectual and mechanical work.^ However, this
disappeared in the final version, when consideration of the examination
needs of the revenue departments obscured the original proposal for
two main grades of clerks in central departments. Trevelyan endeavoured
to correct this impression in a memorandum of 28 February 1854 in which
he stressed the importance of elementary skills like good handwriting,
2
arithmetic and book-keeping for clerks engaged in mechanical work. 
Trevelyan elaborated his expectations to Gladstone a few weeks later, 
when he pointed out that the majority of posts would be open to those
1 Add. MS., 44759 f. 142b.
2 Printed in Papers on the Reorpranization of the Civil Service,
P.P., 1854-55, XX, pp. 427-431.
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who had received an improved "commercial” education. Trevelyan hoped 
that these opportunities would prevent jealousy of "our Oxford and 
Cambridge men"^ - a jealousy that had partly been fostered by Trevelyan's 
preoccupation with a new class of university-trained intellectual 
clerks.
Another of the report's main proposals was for a new method 
of making promotions on the basis of merit. This was as difficult to 
describe in effective concrete terms as a comprehensive examination 
system. Quite apart from the obvious practical difficulties, it was 
most important in the context of the ending of patronage that any new 
system should be seen to be scrupulously impartial. It would clearly 
be dangerous for it to appear that the principle of strict seniority 
was being replaced by the favouritism of heads of departments.
Suspicions of jobbery would be confirmed if it seemed that the patronage 
in first appointments was being taken away, only to be restored in the 
guise of unlimited departmental discretion in making promotions. It 
was fortunate for Trevelyan that he could claim experience of selecting 
men according to merit as a result of his management of the Commissariat.
The report therefore recommended that the Commissariat system should 
be followed. Each clerk's record was to be kept by his head of department 
in a departmental record book, together with details of each clerk's 
probationary service. In his 1849 memorandum, Trevelyan had envisaged 
that this would be done by the central examining board. Now he felt 
that probation would be better left to the departments, as he 
realized that departments themselves ought to be made more responsible 
for properly regulating their affairs. The record book system had, 
in Trevelyan's view, one great disciplinary advantage over any other method
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 10 March 1854# Add. MS., 44333 I* 255*
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of making promotions. It provided heads of departments with a less 
severe and therefore more credible sanction than dismissal. Particularly 
as it was proposed that even incremental additions to salary were to 
depend upon a satisfactory certificate of conduct from one's immediate 
official superior.^
2 Educational Aspects of Civil Service Reform
Trevelyan and Northcote increasingly spoke of the educational 
implications of their proposals and these require explanation. The 
crude distinction between intellectual and mechanical work was reflected 
in an equally crude distinction between university and elementary 
school education as the two levels appropriate for consideration in 
the context of the Civil Service. Each level was represented by a 
prominent educationist: Benjamin JOwett, Fellow of Balliol, and 
Richard Dawes, Dean of Hereford. Both men had been introduced to 
Trevelyan and Macaulay by R.W.W. Lingen, Secretaiy to the Education
Department of the Privy Council and a former pupil of Jewett at
2
Balliol. From his experience in India Trevelyan was able to appreciate 
the interconnections that were possible between education and social, 
political and administrative policies, ahd he was fundamentally 
sympathetic to educational arguments. In a less explicitly utilitarian 
fashion, Gladstone provided a link between educational and administrative 
reform in his concern to eliminate "restriction and private favour" at 
Oxford in addition to ending patronage in Civil Service appointments.^ 
This desire to open institutions to freely competing talent constitutes
1 P.P., 1854, XXVII, pp. 19-21.
2 E.A. Abbott and L. Campbell (eds.) The Life and Letters of Benjamin 
Jowett (1897), II, pp. 185, 197*
3 Gladstone to Graham, 3 January 1854, Add. MS., 44163 f* 109*
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a powerful conunon ideology, and makes it difficult to accept Edward 
Hugheës stricture that Civil Service reform was given an "irrelevant 
educational twist".^ At the same time it can be argued that it 
was a tactical blunder to give unnecessary prominence to the educational 
aspects at a stage when it was important to convince Civil Servants 
and politicians, notably the Whigs, of both the wisdom and necessity 
of the proposed changes.
Benjamin Jowett epitomised the movement for reform of the 
2
University of Oxford. As fellow of Balliol he had helped to create 
an enviable intellectual reputation for his college by efficient and 
stimulating teaching for the honour school. Jewett's success at 
Balliol caused him to appreciate the wasted educational potential of 
the colleges with their large incomes and obsolete and restrictive 
practices, and to consider ways in which the University could once 
more become a truly national institution. In his evidence to the 
Royal Commission on the University (established by Russell in 1850 and
1 Edward Hughes, "Sir Charles Trevelyan and Civil Service Reform", 
E.H.R.. LXIV (1949), p.62.
2 The teaching system had not kept pace with the honours degree 
system set up in the first quarter of the century* Professional 
lectures were usually perfunctory and largely ignored. Fellows were 
in most colleges (Balliol and Oriel being notable exceptions) elected 
without reference to academic ability and with no obligation to 
teach. As a consequence undergraduates depended on coaching (sons 
said cramming) by private tutors. The colleges as mediaeval 
corporations were mainly concerned to preserve their ancient 
privileges and their extensive revenues by literal interpretation
of their statutes. Furthermore as the heads of colleges collectively 
controlled the University through the Hebdomadal Board it was 
impossible to effect reform by any kind of internal pressure alone. 
The university was seveiEi^ criticised by radicals and dissenters, 
who claimed that the State had an obligation to intervene to free 
a national institution from the obscurantist domination of the 
colleges, and also to abolish the religious tests that kept it a 
preserve of the Church of England. See J. Sparrow, Mark Pattison 
and the Idea of a University (Cambridge, 1967), pp* 69-70; W.R.
Ward, Victorian Oxford (1965^. Chs. V-X.
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reporting in 1852) he proposed to break the monopoly of heads of
colleges' in the government of the University, to free undergraduate
education from religious tests and to open fellowships to competition.
He suggested that surplus college revenue should be devoted to
providing a rational teaching structure of properly paid professors,
supported by college lecturers. He also hoped to reduce the expense
of university education and thereby to open "to the lower and middle
classes an honourable way of advancement in life and a means of entering
the professions".^
The report of the Oxford University Commission, while not
accepting all of Jowett's views, was emphatic in recommending major
reforms. So strong were its arguments and the evidence brought forward
in support of them that Gladstone, vdio had originally been opposed to
investigation of the university, devoted himself in 1855 to collaboration
with Jowett in formulating a bill. During its passage through Parliament
under the guidance of Russell and Gladstone between May and August 1854,
the measure was extensively mutilated. The main provision that
survived was the opening of the B.A. degree to dissenters, while other
more fundamental reforms were to be achieved gradually through a new
government structure for the university and a permanent supervisory 
2
commission. While Jowett*s hopes for the extension of university 
education to a wider range of classes were not significantly realized, 
the principle of state intervention had been established. Although 
Gladstone had failed to establish open academic competition for 
fellowships, he had at least devoted three months of Parliamentary
1 Jowett's written evidence, Oxford Universiiy Commission. P.P.,
1852, XII, evidence pp. 5O-4O.
2 J.B. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition. 1852-1855 (Cambridge, I968),
pp. 532-554.
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effort to the attempt» As we shall see he was unable as a consequence
to find any time for legislation on the Civil Service»
In the sphere of elementary education Dawes was a leading
propogandist• As vicar of King's Sombome in Hampshire he had
established a flourishing parish school» His work had been praised
in The Edinburgh Review as a good example of self-financing elementary
education* His school became a show place for progressive educationists
including Jawett» His services to education were rewarded by Lord John
Bussell by appointment of Dean of Hereford in 1850»^
Dawes's ideas and interests are extensively documented in his
pamphlets. He was convinced that elementary schools could be self-
financing from fees,^ and he also favoured support from local t a x a t i o n . ^
Of greater social significance was his concern to educate working
and middle class children together (e.g. at King's Sombome the children
of labourers and farmers) and to charge crudely differentiated rates
5
according to means» He saw the need for non-sectarian general 
education, including some natural science, and contrasted this approach 
with the preoccupation of the National Society of teaching Church of 
England doctrine to the poor.^ Dawes was not only an enthusiastic 
supporter of the pupil-teacher system as an outlet for more able pupils 
and an inexpensive means of developing a teaching profession, but he 
also argued that if merit were to be encouraged in schools it ought 
to be formally rewarded by the award of public appointments. He had
1 feenry Moseley H.M.lJ, "Church and State Education", The Edinburgh 
Review, XCII (I850), pp. 94-136»
2 Trevelyan to Bussell with enclosures from John Wood and Dawes,
2 February 1854, Add» MS., 44555 f. 12?.
5 B» Dawes, Hints on an Improved and Self-Paying System of National 
Education (4th ed» I850).
4 B. Dawes, Observations on the Working of the Government Scheme of 
Education and on School Inspection (184-9)» n.52.
5 B. Dawes, Remarks occasioned by the -present Cruséde against the 
Educational Plans of the Committee of Council on Education (1850^. pp. 7-8»
6 E. Dawes, Suggestive Hints towards Improved Secular Instruction 
making it bear upon Practical Life (1349),
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been involved in a single token project that had pointed in this 
direction: John Wood, Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, had 
arranged with him that an exciseman's position should be available 
annually for competition among his pupils.^ Rather naively, Dawes 
supposed that this example would be followed by others in the Civil 
Service.
While official patronage of the products of publicly financed 
education remained an unrealized dream, central government involvement 
in elementaiy education continued to increase. In 1855 Russell 
introduced a bill to empower corporate towns to levy an education 
rate. After it became evident that this would lead to bitter dis­
agreement in some towns over the principle of financing sectarian
2
education, the measure was quietly dropped in April. At the other 
extreme, the National Society was deeply suspicious of any move, whether 
local or central, that might increase secular control of its schools. 
Despite this failure to extend urban education, the corresponding 
measure for rural schools went ahead, since it did not require legislation 
to increase the Privy Council grant - in this instance by 50^* Yet 
enthusiasts like Jowett and Dawes still felt the need of a comprehensive 
bill as means of indicating central government commitment to a national 
system of elementary education. The failure of the Aberdeen administration 
tc 'produce any kind of bill in 1854 led them to view proposals for 
Civil Service appointments as a surrogate educational' reform.
The production of the Northcote-Trevelyan report was the occasion 
to link education with public service in general terms. Trevelyan 
welcommed Jowett's offer to produce an open letter on the feasibility
1 Remarks, pp. 6O-6I
2 Conacher, op. cit., pp. 110-115»
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of large-scale examinations and he arranged for it to be appended 
to the published version of the report. While Jowett was mainly 
concerned to discuss the merits of a broadly based examination that 
would favour the honours graduate and tend to exclude the crammed 
candidate, he also mentioned the desirability of competitive examinations 
on literary subjects for posts of the level of exciseman and tidewaiter.^ 
Dawes was sent an advance copy of the report and the letter by John 
Wood, and he enthusiastically acclaimed them as doing more for the
2cause of education than any other single measure could have achieved. 
Jowett felt that more weight would be given to the proposals if they 
had backing from Dawes, and he suggested that he should write to Lord 
John Russell on the bearing of Civil Service examinations on the 
education of the lower classes. Jowett also optimistically hinted 
that the lack of an education bill for that session might lead the 
administration to stress the educational aspects of Civil Service 
reform.^ While Trevelyan welcomed support from Dawes he was aware of 
Russell's opposition and tactfully advised that an open letter to 
Aberdeen might be more effective Dawes accordingly summarised his 
views and made the additional point that Parliament was inconsistent 
in voting money for education while disregarding educational merit 
in making public appointments. He also hoped that corporate towns
5
would accept the same principle in making their appointments.
1 Jowett to Trevelyan, Januaiy 1854* P.P., 1854, XXVII, pp. 24-51.
2 Dawes to Wood, 50 January, 1 February 1854, Add. MS., 44435
fs. 127, 129.
5 Jowett to Dawes, 5 February 1854, Ibid., f. 142.
4 Trevelyan to Dawes, 6 February 1854, Ybid., f. 143»
5 R. Dawes, Remarks on the Re-organization of the Civil Service and
its bearing on Educational Progress (20 February 1854).
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Such educational arguments and pressures, however valid in the 
long term, could do nothing to prompt the Aberdeen coalition to take 
resolute action in 1854» The educationists were more concerned with 
future developments while politicians were more involved in the solution 
of immediate practical problems. There was no immediate problem of 
a surplus of educated talent at either university of elementary school 
level - if anything the educationists were proposing to create a 
"problem" by further stimulating academic endeavour with the promise of 
public appointments.^ To pragmatists like Palmerston and Russell these 
were absurdly visionary schemes, which throu^ their association with 
clergymen and academics were vulnerable to cruel but effective ridicule.
5 The Indian Precedent, 1855 - 1854
While Trevelyan and Northcote were preparing and revising their 
report, a parallel development had been taking place in connection with 
the East India Company's Civil Service. The success of the proposals 
to replace Indian patronage by open competition, and the committee that 
was subsequently set up to work out the details of an examination system 
contributed to the optimistic mood for reform which Trevelyan sensed 
in the beginning of 1854* This encouraging development was due to the 
renewal of the Company's charter in 1855. As on the previous occasion 
in 1855, Parliamentary discussion had included consideration of the 
Civil Service and. the qualifications necessary for serving in it. 
Furthermore the Select Committee on the renewal bill provided Trevelyan 
with opportunity to express his views on this and other aspects of 
Indian affairs.
1 It has been pointed out that unlike continental countries, England 
did not have a surplus of educated men vainly seeking entiy to 
the professions. English parents were more likely to match the 
level of education with realistic vocational possibilities (Leonore 
0 'Boyle, "The Problem of an Excess of Educated Men in Western Europe, 
1800-1850", The Journal of Modern History, XLII, 1970, pp. 471-495)•
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Essentially Trevelyan was in favour of preserving control by
the directors over the East India Company. In his evidence on 26 May
1855 he argued that the directorate was the best independent governing
body for India: "They include a fair representation of the important
middle classes of bankers, merchants and persons in business generally;
they belong neither to the political aristocracy nor to the class of
Parliamentary politicians; they have the English element without
any objectionable admixture of English party spirit. It is not the
practice for them to take office under the Queen's Government. It
is eminently a government of the middle classes, and of the best 
1
portion of them." Moreover Trevelyan felt that any blemishes of
corruption could be removed and the merits of the system further
strengthened by an improved system of appointments to writerships and
cadetships. He also spoke of society appearing "to be putting forth
a remedial power" and of measures "being taken to cut up this
corruption by the roots". This process of purification would
eventually make it safe for Indian affairs to be entrusted to other
2hands - at least by the time the proprietors' stock was redeemed.
When this decision was officially announced to the Commons 
by Sir Charles Wood on 5 June, it led three days later to a debate 
in which Sir Charles Wood elaborated the advantages that the change 
would bring for the upper classes. He expected that it would lead 
to a more distinguished and widely recruited Civil Service for India, 
in which the aristocracy would be able to participate on the basis 
of merit rather than privilege and patronage as in England. Wood 
claimed that this innovation would be in the nature of an experiment, 
asserting that if it failed, little would have been lost as the old
1 P.P., 1852-55, XXVIII, p.158.
2 Ibid., p.159.
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system could be restored with little disruption.^ For this reason 
he did not find it difficult to reconcile the ending of the directors' 
patronage with his later opposition in the cabinet to extending the 
same principle to the home Civil Service. As the distribution of 
patronage was confined to a small part of the middle-class, the
2political repercussions of the proposed change were negligible.
The distinction between the Indian and English situation was also 
stressed by Macaulay but in different terms when the debate on the 
East India Bill was resumed on 24 June. Althou^ he admired the Indian 
Civil Service, he admitted that directors* patronage and the form of 
education provided at Haileybury had allowed a few inccmipetent men to 
enter the Service. In this he drew a distinction between England and 
India: "Now you can do very well with this in this country. You don't 
want all your clerks in the War Office or the Treasury to be superior 
young men. There is plenty of routine business to be done in those 
offices which a man of no great ability can transact. The men of small 
ability do that routine business, the men of great ability rise in 
position. But the case is different in the Indian service. You have 
there 800 men charged with the happiness of 120,000,000 of people".^ 
Macaulay described how previous attempts to introduce open 
competition in 1813 and limited competition in 1833 had been frustrated.
A further advantage of open competition was that it provided a legitimate
1 Debates, CXXVII, cols. 1155-58*
2 B.S. Cohn, /'Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in 
India, I6OO-I85O" in R. Braibanti et al., Asian Bureaucratic Systems 
Emergent from the British Imiierial Tradition (Duke University, Durham 
N.C., 1966), pp. 109-111* It is suggested tiiat the directorate 
consisted of an upper middle-class group of fifty or sixty inter­
connected and extended families, some with evangelical affinities, 
all centred on London and the home counties. This banking and 
commercial middle class was distinct from both the landed aristocracy 
and the newer manufacturing middle-class.
5 Debates, CXXVIII, cols. 755-756.
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way in which Indians could he introduced to the higher ranks of the 
Civil Service: "... he would in the most honourable manner, by conquest, 
as a matter of ri^t, and not as a mere eleemosynary donation, obtain 
access to the service".^ These ahd other arguments prevailed and the 
government's proposals were adopted. An amendment by Joseph Hume to 
reserve a third of appointments for directorial patronage on the grounds 
that the change was an untried experiment was conclusively defeated 
ty 95 to 59.^
Trevelyan played an important part in putting the Indian scheme 
5into practice. He was asked by Wood to find out whether Macaulay 
would be prepared to serve on a commission to work out the practical 
details for the new examinations.^  Trevelyan hoped for a Royal 
Commission to do this, both to guard against a change of heart that 
might result from a change of administration and to enhance the status 
of the proposed reform. Nevertheless he was satisfied with the 
commission appointed in Februaiy 1854 by the President of the Board
1 Ibid., cols. 758-760.
CXXIX,
2 Debates/ 21 and 22 July 1853, cols. 582, 668.
3 In some ways the pace was set by the educationists. For example, 
Trevelyan and Wood originally intended to preserve the system 
whereby all East Indian Civil Servants spent two years at Haileybury 
(p.p., 1852-53» XXXII, p.223). When Jowett and Dr. Vaughan, Headmaster 
of Harrow, got wind of this, they objected to the preservation of 
Haileybury'8 privileged position, and stressed the resultant 
difficulties in obtaining a high standard in examinations unless 
competition were really open. Both Trevelyan and Wood were persuaded 
to change their minds and the India Bill was amended to allow men
not educated at Haileybury to take the final examination. This in 
turn meant that the second examination could no longer be 
professionally specialized; a further consequence was the inevitable 
eventual closing of Haileybury (R.J. Moore, Sir Charles Wood's 
Indian Policy, Manchester 1966, pp. 88-90; R.J, Moore, "The 
Abolition of Patronage in the Indian Civil Service and the Closure 
of Haileybury College", The Historical Journal, VII, I964, pp. 246-
257).
4 Trevelyan to Wood, 11 November 1853» T.L.B., XXXII, p.104.
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of Control. It contained three men of whom he approved: Jowett,
Shaw Lefevre and Macaulay. If Jowett represented Oxford and Shaw
Lefevre Cambridge, Macaulay, he thought, as "a universal genius
will represent all the w o r i d M a c a u l a y  was appointed chairman
and it was he who wrote the report. In it he recommended the kind
of competitive literary examination that Jowett had earlier suggested
to Trevelyan. Although the age of entry was set between eighteen and
twenty-five, the marks in the examination were to be weighted in
favour of those who had studied classics or mathematics. In this way
graduates from Oxford, Cambridge and the Scottish universities were
2
given a pronounced advantage. On 9 July Macaulay read the draft 
of this to Trevelyan who was naturally pleased to hear a cogent 
restatement of his own and Jowett*s views on examinations for 
intellectual Civil Servants.^ To this extent the movements for the 
reform of the two Civil Services were intertwined. However, as the 
report was not officially completed and signed until November 1854» 
it could not advance the cause of reform at home. This was a campaign 
that Trevelyan had to conduct himself, using his own methods for 
getting publicity and securing support.
1 Trevelyan to Wood, 2 Februaiy 1854» Ibid., p.273.
2 An analysis of the reports of the Civil Service Commissioners (they 
took over the management of the examinations in 1858) shows that 
until I860 the system worked rou^ly as its inventors had intended. 
After the Mutiny, India became obviously less attractive to those 
with an "intellectual" education, and the service became increasingly 
filled with men from "crammers" and public schools. Later attempts
by Wood to secure a preponderance of "gentlemen" only resulted in weight­
ing the examinations even further in favour of public school men who 
were "gentlemen" without being "intellectuals" (J.M. Crompton, "Open 
Competition and the Indian Civil Service", E.H.H., LXXXIII, 1968, 
pp. 278-279).
3 G.O. Trevelyan, Life and Letters of Lord Maoaulay (enlarged ed. 1908), 
p. 609* G.O. Trevelyan served as his father's private secretary in 
India from 1862 to I865 and wrote an amusing and perceptive account 
of the style and attitudes of the new Civil Servants in The 
Competition Wallah (I864)*
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4 Publicity and Controversy, January to May 1854
Even if the Northcote-Trevelyan report had not required so much 
elucidation Trevelyan would have been disinclined to allow the reform 
of the Civil Service to take its own course. Initially his opportunities 
to exert pressure were limited by the confidential nature of the report 
but from Gladstone's interest in its revision Trevelyan inferred that 
it would eventually have a wider circulation and that he was to be 
responsible for achieving this. Althou^ Gladstone' eagerness to go 
further than Trevelyan and Northcote spurred the former on, there was 
no guarantee that the whole report might not still be shelved as a 
result of opposition in the cabinet. Trevelyan hoped that he could 
reduce the risk of this happening if he devoted himself to amplifying and 
spreading the ideas contained in the report at two levels: at a political 
level in his correspondence with Gladstone; and at a public level in his 
dealings with Delane, the editor of The Times. At the political level 
Trevelyan did his best to sustain Gladstone's enthusiasm by writing to 
him almost daily between January and March 1854" At the same time he was 
hoping to prime public opinion by keeping The Times well informed.
The revised report, in making the eradication of patronage one 
of its main recommendations, had made itself far less politically 
acceptable than before. Trevelyan was aware of this for althou^ he 
had Whig sympathies, he was at the same time scornful of the "Great 
Country Party" when they were concerned to find posts for their political 
dependants. He hoped, however, that he could persuade Gladstone to 
share his optimism in an improved national moral climate which would 
prefer politicians to offer sound measures instead of public appointments. 
Trevelyan had no sound political evidence for forming this view. Like 
most judgements about public opinion it was highly intuitive. He was
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naturally anxious to share his views with Gladstone who, he sensed, would 
he veiy sympathetic towards them. On 17 January he summarized his 
views in a memorandum entitled "Thoughts on Patronage". He particularly 
deplored the way in which the making of appointments was sometimes used 
to secure the allegience of M.P.s and constituencies, as well as the 
deleterious effect of this on the quality of public service. The 
Patronage Secretary was singled out for blame in this connection - a 
change of position from 1849 when Trevelyan had recommended that this 
official should control all patronage. Khon listing a few of the 
categories of what he considered to be incompetent public servants,
Trevelyan inexplicably mentioned the colonial service, generals and 
admirals (areas in which he had no experience whatever) as well as 
"the idle, useless young man who is provided for in a Public Office 
because he is unfit to earn a livelihood in any of the open professions...". 
Trevelyan was optimistic that the improved state of public morality would 
put an end to patronage, particularly as many M.P.s "never cross the 
threshold of the Patronage Room and many others would gladly be released 
of asking for places for them and their Dependants." Trevelyan used 
the example of the ending of East India patronage to support this 
argument and ended with an exhortation to England to display her 
superior morality and intelligence.^ Althou^ only a month or so 
earlier he had suggested incorporating some aspects of patronage in 
his examination scheme, he now denounced patronage with the combined 
fervour of a convert and a missionary. It was clearly a satisfying 
document for him to write but it had little practical purpose. Gladstone 
did not need pious comments that he could equally well compose himself. 
Something more than generalized moral arguments would be needed to
1 Add. MS., 44553 f. 91.
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convince the Whigs in the cabinet.
From the time of this memorandum Trevelyan wrote a continuous 
stream of letters to Gladstone. One the following day, 18 January, 
he presented him with twenty copies of Jowett*s letter on the 
practicability of competitive literary examinations.^ As a publicist 
he expected that Gladstone would like to circulate this document.
He failed to appreciate that such a letter was but a dubious 
recommendation in the eyes of professional Civil Servants and of most 
of Gladstone's colleagues. Trevelyan was almost unaware of the strength 
of the opposition. His rash and over-simple attitude was revealed in 
a letter of 20 January which accompanied his replies to a series of 
objections made by Sir James Graham's private secretary, Capt.
H.H. O'Brien:
We have now worked up to the standard prescribed by Parliament 
last session for India; and the selection for the Home and Indian 
Services may be made by the same Examiners from the same Body 
of young men - such additional arrangements being made in respect 
to the Indian service as the peculiar circumstances may require.
I do not know that anything more can be done at present except
to draw up a short Act of Parliament authorizing the formation
of an Establishment for the purpose of testing the qualifications
of Candidates for Civil Employment and directing that the rules
under which it is to act shall be sanctioned by Order in Council
2and be submitted to Parliament.
1 Ibid., f. 95.
2 Add MS., 44333 f. 103.
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In pressing for a bill Trevelyan was forcing the issue into the open
and simultaneously making it more difficult to arrive at a less formal,
yet practicable resolution of the patronage question.
Trevelyan did at least display greater realism in his answers
to O'Brien's objections and two of them are worth mentioning. When
O'Brien stressed the value of the great sense of honour to be found
among the upper classes, Trevelyan countered with the assertion that
the proposed examinations were "decidedly aristocratic" in that they
would eliminate "those of our inferior rank of society" who until then
had been brou^t forward by patronage.^ It could at least be argued
from this that Trevelyan's aims were consonant with kliig philosophy.
O'Brien also suggested that patronage and competition should be combined.
A little earlier Trevelyan mi^t have accepted this but now his
opposition was vehement. He pointed out that something like this
had been introduced in the Treasury by Melbourne, found to be ineffective
and discontinued by Peel who reverted to patronage alone. As evidence
he produced for Gladstone's perusal a letter from Stephenson, the
Principal Clerk Assistant to the Secretaries, who described how such
2
limited competitions had been rigged. Although Trevelyan was being 
a little more down to earth, his overconfidence led him to commit "Wie 
impropriety of circulating O'Brien's memorandum in order to obtain 
further comments. Like many of the documents connected with Civil 
Service reform, Trevelyan had it printed for limited circulation.)
1 The notion that aristocracy of birth and talent coincided was a 
current one. It had for example been mooted in Fraser's Magazine
a few years earlier in answer to middle class attacks on aristocratic 
privilege ("The Aristocracy of Rank; Is it the Aristocracy of Talent?", 
XXXIV, August I846, pp. 159-166 ). In the first half of the century, 
success in university honour schools and greater involvement than 
before in philanthropy and the details of local government were given 
as instances of the way in vhich the aristocracy held its own in 
competition with the middle class (David Spring, "Aristocracy, Social 
Structure and Religion in the Early Victorian Period", Victorian 
Studies, VI, March 1965* PP« 265-280).
2 Confidential blueprint including Stephenson's letter of 18 January 
1854, Add. MS., 44580 f. IO5.
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When reproved by Gladstone he was most indignant, claiming that he
had been unaware of the confidential nature of the document. HoweVer,
he did assure Gladstone that he would recover all the copies that he
had distributed.^
At this stage Trevelyan was more successful in creating a
sense of urgency in his correspondence with Gladstone, keeping him
primed with additional arguments in favour of open competition. In
breathless haste he sent a short letter on 24 January enclosing a note
from Jowett and two scraps from Northcote and Lingen which described
their conversion to open competition. "Every scrap on this subject
from Persons whose opinions we value," wrote Trevelyan, "is of importance
2
at the present time." Lingen's autograph comment had been cut from the 
copy of O'Brien's memorandum which, one presumes, Trevelyan had seen 
when he had asked for the copies of this document to be returned. This 
enthusiasm concluded the dense body of correspondence that formed a 
prelude to the discission of the reform proposals in the cabinet. In 
his final brief note on 25 January, "ttie day before the cabinet meeting, 
Trevelyan promised to print no more on the subject nor to ask for any 
more opinions. He agreed to this restriction on his activities since 
he felt that he had sufficient evidence to establish the case for
5
reform. Furthermore Trevelyan had probably been reproved for the 
embarrassment he had caused Gladstone in his relations with Russell.
In an exchange of correspondence on 20 January, Russell had protested 
about the premature discussion of the ministry’s plans in the newspapers 
and announced his intention to oppose any change in making appointments.^
1 Ibid., f. 107.
2 Add. MS., 44353 fs. II5, 115, 117, 118.
5 Ibid., f. 119.
4 Russell to Gladstone, 20 Januaiy 1854, Add. MB., 44291 f* 91*
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Gladstone, while defending the policy, apologised for premature
disclosure of the contents of the Northcote report and attributed
the error directly to Trevelyan; "I understand from Sir C. Trevelyan's
account of the matter that this plainness of allusion arose from
inadvertence."^ While such an excuse might be presented it is doubtful
whether it restored harmony between cabinet colleagues.
When the cabinet met on 26 January to consider Civil Service
reform, the Peelites supported and the Whigs (among them Sir Charles
Wood) opposed the proposals. Gladstone's deep interest in the decision
2is indicated by a note which he kept of how the members voted. On the 
following day Trevelyan wrote to congratulate him, prefacing his 
letter with the words; "I thank God for this decision." He immediately 
undertook to frame a bill in collaboration with Northcote and Jowett.^
A copy of Trevelyan's draft probably exists among the Chadwick Tracts, 
for while there is no direct evidence for associating it with Trevelyan, 
the bill dates from about this time, follows the correct format and 
is printed on blue paper. Entitled "A Bill for Regulating the 
Appointment of Clerks in the Civil Service", its proposals are rou^ly 
in line with Trevelyan's views. Three examiners were to operate a two- 
stage examination of an elementary fixed-test followed by competition 
in general subjects and those specific to particular departments.
Whenever there was a vacancy to be filled, the post was to be offered 
to the man with the highest number of marks on the panel of competitors.
1 Gladstone to Russell, 20 Januaiy 1854, Ibid., f. 94b.
2 Add MS., 44778 f. 157* Of the Whigs, only Palmerston had not 
revealed his attitude since he had been at Windsor at the time of
the meeting.
5 Add. MS., 44333 f« 121. A fortni^t later Trevelyan sent Gladstone
two copies of a draft and offered to discuss it (Add. MS., 44333 f» I64)
On 4 March Northcote wanted to know whether he should get on with the 
bill or complete the report on the Post Office (Add. MS., 44216 f. 250). 
The indecision indicates that the bill was no longer being seriously 
considered.
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The bill made no attempt to differentiate between levels of first 
appointment except insofar as heads of departments would specify the 
qualifications for particular posts.^ There was clearly much more 
work to be #one on this copy of the draft if this bill was to be a 
comprehensive measure.
Leaving aside the draft bill it is difficult to determine the 
extent of legislation agreed to by the cabinet. Only two reliable 
sources survive : a letter from Trevelyan to Northcote written after 
the cabinet meeting and Gladstone's memorandum written for the benefit 
of the Queen. Trevelyan was extremely optimistic and described how 
the recommendations of their report were to be applied without dilution 
to all first appointments. An additional feature was to be the submission 
of promotion records to the examiners. At Gladstone's suggestion the 
proposal to reserve some places for the sons of Civil Servants was 
abandoned, "before we have weakened our cause by the odium it. would 
bring upon us." Trevelyan was immensely gratified at the rapid and 
deserved success of the scheme. He began to envisage the extension of 
open competition to military appointments so as to form one 
superintending or examining body for the whole public service. He 
had of course already linked in his own mind the examination arrangements 
for the Indian and English Civil Services. By contrast, Gladstone's 
version for the Queen was far more cautious. Although the essential 
principles were the same, Gladstone was anxious to stress the limits 
of their application. He pointed out that the heads of departments 
would retain the ri^t to appoint anyone who was approved by the 
examiners. They would also continue to regulate promotion themselves.
1 British Library, Chadwick Tracts, CT 227 (4&). Since the bill 
was not introduced into the Commons no copy exists among the 
Parliamentary Papers. See appendix for full text.
2 Trevelyan to Northcote, 28 January 1854, T.L.B., XXXII, p.265.
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Another restriction was that posts requiring specialist qualifications 
were to he excluded from the scope of the hill. The hill was also not 
to apply to the lowest posts, candidates for which were either not 
to he examined or were only to take a qualifying examination.^
Gladstone wanted to limit controversy by destroying the basis of some 
practical objections. He also did not want to touch upon any aspect of 
departmental administration that mi^t even remotely impinge on the 
royal prerogative, particularly as he did not have the support of the 
whole cabinet.
As soon as it was decided to mention the bill in the Queen's 
speech, Trevelyan was able to busy himself with preparations for the 
publication of the Northcote-Trevelyan report together with Jowett's 
explanatoiy letter and the departmental reports. In a letter to 
Gladstone on 31 January Trevelyan outlined the strategy that he felt 
ou^t to be pursued. He agreed to remove the privileges for the sons 
of Civil Servants from the report in order to prevent suspicion of 
bureaucracy. He justified the inclusion of Jowett's letter on the 
grounds that it made good a deficiency in üie report. Naturally he 
did not say that the report's limitations had already become apparent 
but delicately suggested that the letter was important in "solving by 
anticipation numerous difficulties idiich arise in people's minds 
and showing that the revision of the first appointments to the Public 
Service may be extended with appropriate modifications, to the large 
subordinate classes of Letter Carriers, Lockyers, Weighers, Messengers, 
etc., and that in its annlication to the lower ranks of society it is 
likely to be productive of veiy beneficial effects by promoting 
education, and impressing the rising generation with the value of 
character." Trevelyan even went so far as to suggest to Gladstone what
1 Draft of memorandum for the Queen, Januaiy 1854, Add. MS., 44743 f. 132.
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he ought to say when he laid the reports on the table of the House.
He proposed that the scope of Civil Service reform should be further 
widened by raising another issue that affected efficiency: the question 
of superannuation deductions. Trevelyan felt that if Gladstone decided 
to abolish them, it would be a good opportunity to introduce compulsoiy 
retirement at sixty-five. His concluding remarks were at least more 
immediately relevant vdien he pressed for the reports to be printed 
as a command paper rather than have them "moved for and ordered to be 
printed". This procedure would save the costs of double printing.
It would also have the effect of confirming the policy of the 
administration.^
Trevelyan had not been content to allow Gladstone to develop his 
Civil Service policy at a gradual pace. He was anxious to accelerate this 
process by using the Press to inform and, as he hoped, to mobilize 
public opinion. In this, he was fortunate in being able to exploit the
close liaison that existed between the Aberdeen axiministration and
2
The Times. This liaison lasted until the outbreak of war with Russia 
in March 1854» long enough for Trevelyan to publicize the report before 
and after its presentation to Parliament. Furthermore with a daily 
circulation of about 40,000 copies - at least ten times greater than 
that of any other newspaper - The Times was undoubtedly the best medium 
for spreading ideas.^
The first reference to Civil Service reform appeared in a leader
1 Add ]yS., 44353 f. 125. Two command papers were presented:
Report on the Or^^anisation of the Permanent Civil Service ^713/ 
and Reports of Committees of Inquiry into Public Offices and Papers 
connected therewith /I7157. The second paper also included the 
first at the end.
2 The History of the Times (1939), II, PP* 109, 117*
3 In 1853 The Times paid stamp duty on 13,909,670 copies as compared, 
for example, with The Homing Post's 829,125, giving an approximate 
daily average of 40,000 and 3,000 respectively.
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1
on 12 January. After alluding to the introduction of open competition 
in the Indian Civil Service, it went on to characterize the English 
Civil Servant "as one whose unambitious youth preferred a small certainty 
and the routine duties of an office to the enterprise and perseverance 
which have led his school fellows and acquaintances to prosperity".
It was clear from the remedies proposed - the seperation of intellectual 
and mechanical labour and the establishment of a central examining body - 
that the paper possessed a copy of the report, particularly as 
the article referred obliquely to an "inquiry". A further conclusive 
clue was mention of the educational implications. This last point was 
enthusiastically taken up a few days later in a letter signed "Oxoniensis".' 
When other newspapers made use of the same material and it was evident 
that a confidential government report was better known to the Press 
than to the cabinet, Gladstone was embarrassed in his relations with 
his colleagues.^ On 17 Januaiy Gladstone urged Trevelyan to prevent 
further Press discussion.^
Once the matter had been discussed in the cabinet and alluded to 
in the Queen's speech on 31 Januaiy, Trevelyan was able to renew his 
efforts. On 6 February he wrote to Delane returning a printed series
5
of letters on Civil Service reform. As a copy of this letter exists
1 The Times, 12 Januaiy 1854, p.6, col.c. Ironically this issue 
contained an advertisement offering a third, of the first three 
years' salary in return for post under government (p.3, col.d).
2 Ibid., 16 January, p.9, col.d.
3 Gladstone to Graham, I4 January 1854, Add. MS., 44163 fs. 120-123; 
Gladstone to Eussell, 20 and 26 Januaiy 1854, Add. MS.,44291 fs. 
91-98, 117.
4 Add MS., 44529 f. 37b.
5 These were presumably letters on Civil Service reform which had 
been printed or were about to be printed in The Times. .
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in Gladstone's correspondence, it seems that from this stage Trevelyan 
was keeping him informed about the publicity he was arranging. Trevelyan's 
letter contained comments which readers of The Times would like to 
hear: that opposition to reform would come from aristocratic families 
who used the Civil Service as a form of indoor relief and also from 
the managers of small Parliamentary boroughs who regarded a few 
appointments as a cheap and effective form of patronage. Althou^
Trevelyan was, as he claimed, concerned to spare personal feelings, 
he mentioned one conveniently scandalous set appointment : the long­
standing provision made for the illegitimate sons of the Dukes of 
Norfolk, one of whom - an epileptic - had been placed in the Treasury.
Trevelyan could only see political advantage in the abolition of 
patronage for as a result M.P.s would become more disinterested and 
vote according to their opinions. This in turn would improve the 
quality of government, since administrations would no longer be able 
to buy support but would have to depend entirely upon the effectiveness 
and popularity of their measures. None of these points was closely 
argued for Trevelyan was merely suggesting the kind of ideas that he 
felt would be appropriate in The Times. He also mântained that the 
quality of political life mi^t be improved by a totally new concept: 
the use of the reformed Civil Service as a training ground for politicians. 
As he observed to Delane: "The want of a preliminary training of this 
sort is at present very perceptible in political official men. The 
virtue of the new regime would, therefore, come back throu^ Parliament 
to our administrative system; and while two of the parts of Government 
would be alike raised to a higher standard, they would be reduced to 
harmony with each o t h e r A s  with educational hopes it was tactless
1 Add. MS., 44333 f. 138.
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to give utterence to such naive, if legitimate, and far-fetched 
possibilities* It was fortunate that The Times made no use of the 
idea for it would have been difficult for politicians to enthuse over 
this by-product of reform as educationists had done over theirs.
While The Times did not echo all Trevelyan's opinions it presented 
sympathetically the proposals of the Northcote-Trevelyan report. Trevelyan 
remained grateful to Delane for this support.^
An immediate effect of Delane's support was to provoke reaction 
from Civil Servants. A leader on 9 February concentrated on the abolition 
and the resultant incentive to education, particularly university 
studies. It pointed out that as the defects of the Civil Service were 
not spectacular, a complete breakdown could be beneficial if it led 
to an improved system.^ (A week earlier this same argument that 
disaster might provide the road to reform had been used in connection 
with inefficiency and anomalies in the armed services.^) George 
Arbuthnot, Auditor of the Civil List and a Civil Servant of thirty- 
four years standing, immediately complained to The Times about the 
attributes of "incapacity, indifference and idleness" being generally 
applied, only to be told that the words were those of Trevelyan.
Arbuthnot then protested to Gladstone that even if Trevelyan had not
wished to give such an adverse impression, he had been guilty of
impropriety. Trevelyan's prime responsibility, he claimed, was to 
protect his subordinates. By contrast, to malign them as part of 
an agitation for reform was to imperil harmonious relations between 
colleagues.^ As a result of this letter Gladstone interviewed Arbuthnot
1 Trevelyan to Robert Lowe, 19 December 1855, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.36.
2 The Times, 9 February 1854, p.6 col.c.
3 Ibid., 2 February 1854, P»8 col.e.
4 Arbuthnot to Gladstone, 10 February 1854, Add. MS., 44096 f. 24*
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on 11 February, when he gave the impression that he disapproved of
Trevelyan's Press publicity and that it would not be repeated.^
Trevelyan himself was far from disturbed by his colleague's attitude,
rather welcoming the opportunity it provided to extend discussion. On
15 February he informed Gladstone that he had invited Arbuthnot to
2
amplify his views in a further letter.
Arbuthnot accepted Trevelyan's suggestions and produced the
first of two lengthy letters addressed to the Lords of the Treasury.
In the first of these, dated 22 Februaiy, he pointed out that the faults
of the Civil Service were faults of organization, rather than faults
of personnel. He also stressed that in the Customs, a department into
which Northcote and Trevelyan had not enquired. Lord Liverpool had
ended political patronage for senior appointments and had arranged that
these promotions should be made from among clerical staff. This was
the kind of organic reform that Arbuthnot wished to see and not a major
change in the methods of initial selection by Ihe use of a competitive
literaiy examination. Arbuthnot cited the Foreign Office under
Palmerston's reorganization as a good example, whereas Trevelyan's
own department» the Treasury, had remained very inefficiently 
3organized.
Gladstone took great exception to ïbhis letter as it concerned 
ministerial policy already outlined in the Queen's speech. In his 
letter of rebuke he wanted to know what precedent there was for a
1 Ibid., f. 144.
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, I5 Februaiy 1854, T.L.B., XXXII.» p.16.
3 Arbuthnot to Gladstone (printed as a confidential paper).
Add. MS., 44581 f. 102.
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Civil Servant addressing the Lords of the Treasuiy in such a manner.
If Trevelyan had indeed committed a grave impropriety in communicating
with the Press, his main opponent from within the Civil Service had
been equally at fault in choosing his method of criticism.^ Nevertheless,
although policy was immune from comment by Civil Servants, it was
desirable that Arbuthnot should be given some legitimate scope to
express his indignation. He was therefore invited to write a further
letter which was to avoid discussion of the proposed method of selection
and to concentrate instead on the qualities of the existing system. It
was this letter that Trevelyan and Northcote later used as a basis for
their replies. When Arbuthnot had completed his letter he was more
circumspect in presenting it to Gladstone, writing in advance to his
private secretary to inform him that he expressed himself "in as strong
language as civility would permit". Having shown the letter in advance
2to Northcote, he had toned down the language at his suggestion.
Arbuthnot opened his second letter, dated 6 March, with the 
observation that now the report had been presented to Parliament it 
was at last properly open to public comment. As a senior Treasury 
official he felt that it was his duty to express his colleagues * 
indignation at the slur cast upon them by the report. He pointed out 
that it had been composed in haste, despite the long interval between 
its official signing and its appearance as a command paper at the end 
of Februaiy. One indication of its hasty composition was the intemperate 
language of condemnation which appeared to ignore the good qualities 
of the Civil Service. Part of this implicit contradiction could be 
illustrated from Trevelyan's own career, by the way in which he had
1 Gladstone to Arbuthnot, 27 Februaiy 1854» Add. MS., 44529
f. 117.
2 Arbuthnot to Lawley, 8 March 1854, Add. MS., 44096 f. 28.
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himself, as a stranger to the Civil Service, depended on the qualities 
of his subordinates. Clearly the language of the report had served 
little purpose except to cause deep offence at the Treasury - an act 
made worse by the ingratitude of an arrogant outsider.^
Arbuthnot felt that the existing system could be made to work
more efficiently. He cited himself as an example of one who had
survived the rigours of long routine, clerical training in order to
become a senior official. While accepting that stricter probation and
better rewards for exertion would be beneficial, he strongly opposed
any separation of intellectual and mechanical work, utterly rejecting
the idea that departmental specialization created a narrow outlook.
Arbuthnot suspected that this separation of function was part of a
plan to introduce something like the Indian system of administration -
a system more appropriate to "subjected provinces" than to England,
where the Civil Service had to work in liaison with ministers responsible 
2
to Parliament.
Most of Arbuthnot's letter was thinly veiled commentary on 
Trevelyan's ambitions - ambitions which had proved so disconcerting 
to traditionalists like Arbuthnot. Trevelyan ignored most of this and 
thought, as he pointed out in a letter to Spring Rice, that only one 
criticism was of any importance: Arbuthnot's misunderstanding of 
the kind of examinations proposed for the lower grades of the Customs.^ 
Trevelyan and Northcote had already been prompted by Arbuthnot's 
earlier letter to correct this by means of their explanatory memoranda
1 For criticism of Trevelyan's management of the Treasury, see 
pp.64-65 supra.
2 Printed, together with Trevelyan's and Northcote's replies in Papers 
relating to the Re-organisation of the Civil Service. P.P., 1854-55,
XX, pp. 405-415.
5 Trevelyan to Stephen Spring Rice, 10 March 1854, Add. MS.,
44333 f. 262.
- 192 -
dated 28 February. This very limited range of official discussion 
had been partly determined by Gladstone's refusal to allow open 
competition - by now an essential feature of the proposed reform - 
to be criticized by Civil Servants. In turn, the resulting ineffect­
iveness of Arbuthnot's emasculated letter helped to confirm Trevelyan's 
belief in the inherent strength of his own arguments.
Arbuthnot further weakened his position by complaining once more 
to Gladstone about Trevelyan's methods; he protested that Trevelyan had 
circulated to the Press and to the heads of departments a pamphlet 
printed by the confidential Foreign Office printer, contraiy to the 
undertaking that Gladstone had given on 11 Februaiy that Trevelyan's 
Press campaign would be ended. However, by this time Gladstone was 
fully aware of Trevelyan's activities in obtaining a range of opinions 
on the reform proposals. He was therefore extremely indignant at what 
seemed to him to be yet a further attack on government policy.^ 
Trevelyan was for once in the exceptionally advantageous position of 
being on the side of a minister against the pretensions of a Civil 
Servant; it was more usual for him to be stretching official propriety 
to its limits in pressing his own views on his political superiors.
Trevelyan was opposed to any form of apology for the tone of the
report. He insisted that the honour,of the Civil Service depended, as
in India, upon revealing abuses rather than glossing them over, but he
was prevailed upon by Northcote and Stephenson to accept some form of 
2
apology. When Northcote and Trevelyan finally completed their reply
1 Arbuthnot wrote Gladstone no less than three brief letters of complaint 
on 1, 5 and 4 April (Add. MS., 44096 fs. 44, 50, 54)* One was 
testily endorsed by Gladstone: "Does Mr. Arbuthnot know that this 
letter was printed by the Govt, printer at the cost of the public
as part of his Govt, business?"
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 2 March 1854, Add. MS., 44555 f# 241.
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on 10 April, they began with a qualified apology for the false 
impression that their report could have created among those unacquainted 
with the Civil Service. Their regret that they had not mentioned the 
merits of the Service was qualified by the assertion that it had been 
the defective system of appointments and the means of remedying it 
that had formed their terms of reference. Even this grudging apology 
was a tacit admission that it had been a mistake to use what had 
originally been intended as a private document as the material for wide 
publicity. Not surprisingly, Trevelyan made a point of denying any 
personal responsibility for articles in The Times by referring to the 
wide circulation of the report before presentation to Parliament.
One purpose of the letter was to reassure Civil Service opinion 
that the Northcote-Trevelyan proposals were not opposed to the best 
traditions. Earlier improvements, like those made in the Customs by 
Lord Liverpool, were cited. Arbuthnot*s own career was tactfully 
used to illustrate the advantages of promotion by merit from one office 
to another.
No serious attempt was made to substantiate the case that the 
Civil Service was a haven for invalids. While examples could have been 
found in the Treasury itself, the letter merely referred to correspondence 
with the Master of the Rolls about absenteeism in the Record Office.
Finally Northcote and Trevelyan made an attempt to rid the 
scheme of some of the secondary issues that had caused so much 
indignation. They stressed that the essentials were an improved 
examination system on entry and subsequently promotion by merit, not 
purely seniority. Interdepartmental transfers and the separation of 
intellectual and mechanical labour would be a consequence, not a 
precondition of these reforms.^
1 Later printed in Paners on the Reorganisation of the Civil Service. 
P.P., 1854-55, XX, pp. 415-427.
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These explanations were far too late to avert politically-motivated
misinterpretation of the proposals as a counter-attack to publicity
in The Times. The most violent criticism appeared in The Morning
Post in February and March in articles which have been attributed to
Palmerston's inspiration.^ The first appeared on 11 February* After
teasing The Times for setting itself up as the expositor of government
policy, it perversely exploited confusion over the nature and scope
of examinations to include political appointments : "Professor
Faraday and Mr. Babbage are very eminent for their scientific
attainments, yet it would hardly be satisfactory to the Sovereign, or
to the country, that they should select and appoint the Prime Minister
or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, both of whom must be among the
sixteen thousand." The expectation that able men would compete for
2a Civil Service career was scorned as Trevelyan's naive optimism. 
Following discussion in the Lords a further article on 4 March argued 
that the onus was on the reformers to prove that the existing system 
was harmful and that examinations offered any remedy for the alleged 
defects.^ Finally on 20 March the most splenetic piece defended 
political patronage in appointments and scorned the alternative:
1 These and other hostile pieces from The Daily News. The Morning 
Chronicle and The Morning Herald were reprinted in a pamphlet. 
Civil Service Eeform: Observations upon the Eenort by Sir G. 
Trevelyan ... and Sir S.H. Northcote ... by a Civil Subaltern
' (April, 1854)* Hughes (p*65’) quotes from üiis source an article
which is a conflation of the articles of 11 February and 20 March.
2 The Morning Post, 11 February 1854» P* 5 col. c.
5 Ibid.. 4 March 1854» p* 4 col. f.
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"Sir Charles Trevelyan and his brother commissioner think otherwise,
and propose that the Crown should be divested of the patronage which
it has thus administered, and that it dnuld be transferred to a
junta of fifth-rate Privy Councillors, and a mixture of academical
pedants and theoretical educationists." It concluded by whipping up
prejudice against what it described as Jewett's meddling attempt
to establish ateliers nationaux for the benefit of boys educated at
normal schools and who were dissatisfied with their lot as schoolmasters.^
In exaggerating the educational aspects Palmerston had evaded consideration
of the immediately practical issues. Althou^ Trevelyan was partly to
blame, Palmerston's behaviour was reckless. He was publicly attacking
the policy of the cabinet which had been agreed by a majorily of ministers
despite Whig opposition. One correspondent to The Times pertinently
asked why Civil Service reform should be proposed by the government
and attacked by its Press organs. His survey of the situation was
pessimistic I "As we might expect, the scheme has been assailed with
various merit and uniform hostility. It is threatened by official
2
contempt, by ministerial timidity, and by public apathy."
The virulence of Whig opposition to the proposals was acutely 
sensed by Macaulay through his political connections. He had first 
enthusiastically discussed the report with Trevelyan in January 1854 
when his only reservation was the fear that highly paid examiner ships 
might become political jobs. However by 4th March he was in no doubt 
about the virulence of Whig hostility* "I went to Brooks's ... and 
found everybody open-mouthed, I am sorry to say, against Trevelyan's 
plans about the Civil Service. He has been too sanguine. The pear
1 Ibid., 20 March 1854» P* 4 col. b.
2 The Times, 20 April 1854» P* 12 col. d.
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is not ripe. I always thought so. The time will come, but it 
is not come yet. I am afraid he will be much mortified." Macaulay 
also expressed fears about dangers to Trevelyan's career but was 
confident that he would survive, noting that he appeared remarkably 
impervious to the opposition he had aroused.^
At the level of lower paid Civil Servants, the recently founded 
Civil Service Gazette voiced suspicion of the proposals. In its first issue 
on 1 January 1853 it had announced its policy of encouraging developments 
towards merit appointments as opposed to venal patronage. After the 
Northcote-Trevelyan report appeared, the issues of 25 February and 4 
March reprinted the text in full together with Jowett's letter. An 
editorial article drew attention to the opposition that was mounting 
in the Civil Service, and gave currency to a rumour that Trevelyan was 
about to retire as a result. It was particularly critical of the 
report's failure to discuss the great variety of posts in the Customs, 
pointing out that the bottom two-thirds of the total of 16,000 Civil 
Servants enjoyed an average salary of £86.^ To these lowest paid men, 
among whom the journal sought its readership, the notion of competitive 
examination was a mockery. The following week, Jowett was criticised 
for failing to appreciate distinctions between excisemen and tidewaiters. 
However, in the same issue Trevelyan allayed some fears in a letter under 
the pseudonym of "Civil Servant", At last ,he made clear to rank-and-file 
Civil Servants that he had from the outset envisaged three classes of
1 Trevelyan, The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay (enlarged
ed. I9O8), pp. 6II-6I2.
2 Despite these h i ^  motives the Gazette was prepared to accept 
advertisements offering bribes for nominations (e.g. 7 October I854, 
II, p. 64O; 17 February 1855» III, p. 112) - a failing criticised 
by The Times (12 March 1855, P* 6 col. e).
3 The Civil Service Gazette. II, p. 139»
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appointments for the central offices, the executive .and account
offices and for the dispersed personnel employed by the revenue
departments. He confidently stressed the wealth of opportunities
that would thereby become available to all who had enjoyed a middle-
class or an elementary education.^ Such opportunities, if they really
existed, were certainly consistent with the avowed policy of The Civil
Service Gazette.
As to The Times which had been first to publicize what might
have languished as an obscure internal report, its support of the
Aberdeen administration effectively ended with the outbreak of war.
Apart from a few pseudonymous letters during the remainder of 1854
2and 1855 it remained silent. It made no comment on future developments 
and merely noted the appearance of the Reorganization of the Civil Service 
in February 1855 and the Order in Council of the following May.^
By this time it was to be involved in reporting the conduct of thé 
war and the activities of Administrative Reform Association - two 
sustained news features idiich had the effect of keeping the possibility 
of administrative reform before the public without giving any support 
to the government.
5 Parliamentary Discussion, March 1854 - June 1855
The bill for which Trevelyan had been campaigning hever 
materialized. It was obvious from the controversy aroused in government 
departments and among politicians that a bill would have a difficult
1 Ibid.. pp. 155, 156-157.
2 Apart from letters cited elsewhere, the most important contributions 
were made on 17 March 1854 (p. 9 col. c), 24 March 1854 (p. 1^ col. e), 
14 March 1855 (p. 12 col. e), 2 June 1855 (p. 9 col. f).
3 5 February 1855, p. 6 col. f; 23 May 1855, P* 10 col. b.
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passage and consume a considerable amount of Parliamentary time.
Aberdeen's wish to avoid cabinet discussion and the risk of a defeat
in the Commons was illustrated by his attitude over Russell's
Parliamentary Reform Bill, vAiich was first postponed and then in
April 1854 abandoned.^ Furthermore the administration had to contend
with another controversial measure, the Oxford University Bill, which
Gladstone and Russell were concerned to steer through its committee
sta^ in May and June. It was not suprising, therefore, that Gladstone
announced on 5 May 1854 that there would be insufficient time to give
2a Civil Service bill the attention it deserved. Whig members 
of the cabinet were relieved that a largely unnecessary, and possibly 
embarrassing, Peelite measure had been dropped.
With the abandonment of legislation, no significant discussion 
of Civil Service reform took place in the Commons until the following 
year. The Lords, however, had taken notice of the Northcote-Trevelyan 
report. On 13 March they had debated an allegation of Lord Derby that 
diplomatic secrets had been betrayed and that as a result details of 
Anglo-Russian negotiations had been published in The Journal of St. 
Petersburg and later in The Times.^  In an extremely vague reply. Lord 
Aberdeen referred to a rumour that a former clerk in the Foreign Office 
had been responsible, but he knew neither the clerk's name nor whether 
he had been dismissed for this breach of faith. Lord Derby immediately 
remarked that if the man had not been dismissed the head of 
department had been neglecting his duties. Lord Malmesbury who had
1 J.B. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition, 1852-1855 (Cambridge, 1968), 
pp. 298 - 302, 308 - 311.
2 Debates, CXXXII, cols. 1305-07*
3 The Times, 11 Mrch, p. 8 col. f.
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been named as the Foreign Secretary in Derby's administration and 
responsible for appointing the alleged delinquent, asserted that such 
junior personnel should not have the responsibility of copying 
confidential documents. Thus two of the central issues of Civil 
Service reform were brought into the open obliquely* the method of 
appointment and the division of clerical duties.^
Lord Monteagle took the opportunity offered by this discussion
of the probity of Civil Servants, to introduce a motion on the Northcote-
Trevelyan report and the separate departmental reports which had been
presented to Parliament on 24 Februaiy. Monteagle pointed out that the
special commissioners had themselves been at fault where leakages of
official information to the Press were concerned. His main positive
criticism was that five years had been devoted to inquiries that covered
only eleven public offices. He wanted to know whether other reports had
been suppressed or withheld. He was even more interested to see the
evidence upon which criticism of the Civil Service had been based,
particularly as he felt that he could cite a number of contrary examples.
Accordingly, he asked for the production of the instructions given to
2
the commissioners and a copy of the evidence they had collected. . Apart 
from the return in answer to Monteagle's inquiries, nothing more came 
of discussion in the Lords.
In the second half of 1854 Trevelyan hoped to retain Parliamentary 
and public interest by having a series of comments made by public men
1 Debates, CXXXI, 62I-64O. When the former clerk denied the 
allegation, Derby accepted this and then went on to attack the 
gentlemen of Whitehall who were in the habit of communicating with 
the Press, (ibid., cols. 882-883.)
2 Ibid., 640-645. P.P. (Lords), 1854, XLY, p. 53 contains the 
Trevelyan Minute setting out the terms of reference, and Trevelyan's 
explanation of the lack of recorded evidence* that in the early 
inquiries it had been found that the keeping of a shorthand copy
had discouraged free communication and had therefore been discontinued.
- 200 -
presented as a command paper. He felt that the strength of informed
opinion could indicate to Parliament a new public awareness of the
importance of Civil Service reform. Since January 1854 Trevelyan had. been
soliciting opinions, but largely from those with an interest in education
or who were in some sense sympathetic with the scheme. In July he
invited more views, and in the following month urged Gladstone to have
them presented to Parliament as a command paper.^ At about the same
time, he wrote to Lord Granville asking him to present the paper in the
Lords. He claimed that it contained papers written at Gladstone's
2request, and which provided a range of opinion on the scheme. Publication 
was, however, deferred until the beginning of the next session, and 
Trevelyan used the interval to obtain at least six more papers. 
Significantly some of the later ones are the least favourable to the 
Northcote-Trevelyan report. When the second blue book, Papers Relating 
to the Reorganisation of the Civil Service, eventually appeared in January 
1855» there was no immediate Parliamentary reaction of the kind that 
had greeted the appearance of the first blue book a year earlier.
This was doubtless due to the lack of advance Press publicity and the fact 
that the subject had become a little stale at a time when the choicest 
epithets could be used to describe the misfortunes of the army wintering 
in the Crimea.
The Reorganisation of the Civil Service presents the views of 39 
persons and fills a substantial volume.^ Eleven of them were educationists
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 8 July and 4 August 1854, Add. MS., 44534 
fs. 61, 71.
2 Trpvelyan to Granville, 5 August 1854, T.L.B., XXXIY, p. 152.
3 P.P., 1854-55 XX, /Î8707.
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of one kind or another, including four headmasters, four dons, one H.M.I#
and the principal of a normal school (training school for teachers).
All of them were in favour of the proposals for open competition,
particularly as regards its educational implications.^ The æmaining
views were contributed by Civil Servants, if J.S. Mill and ¥. Spottiswoode
may be loosely included in this category. Of the Civil Servants, twelve
were favourable. J.S. Mill undoubtedly saw the widest implications in
the proposals when he asserted* "A man may not be a much better postman
for being able to draw, or being acquainted with natural histoiyj but
he who in that rank possessed those acquirements had given evidence of
qualities which is important for the general cultivation of the mass
that the State should take every fair opportunity to stamp with its 
2
approbation." On a more down-to-earth level were some of the men with 
whom Trevelyan had worked most harmoniously, John Wood (inland Revenue), 
W.G. Anderson (Treasury) and Shaw Lefevre (Clerk to the Lords).^ Eight 
contributors revealed mixed opinions.^ Among them was Edwin Chadwick 
who produced a very confusing 95 page paper in which he accepted the 
principle of open competition, while stressing the importance of practical 
as opposed to academic tests. He claimed that such tests had already 
been put to good effect in making appointments in the General Hoard of
1 Rev. W.H. Thompson (Regius Professor of Greek, Cambridge); Rev.
H.G. Liddell (Headmaster of Westminster); Rev. C. Graves (Professor 
of Maths, T.C.D.); Rev. P. Temple (Principal of Kneller Hall Training 
School); Rev. Canon Moseley (H.M.I.); Rev. A.C. Tait (Dean of 
Carlisle)* Rev. E.H. Gifford (Headmaster of King Edward School, 
Birmingham); Rev. Dr. Jeune (Master of Pembroke College, Oxford);
Rev. G.E.L. Cotton (Master of Marlborough College); Rev. Dr. Jelf
(Principàl of King's College, London); Rev. Dr. Vaughan (Headmaster 
of Harrow).
2 P.P., 1854-55, XX, p.100.
5 In addition Lt. Col. Larcom, Alfred Power, R. Griffith (Irish officials); 
Major Graham (Registrar General); Rowland Hill (Post Office); Henry 
Cole, lyon Playfair (Science and Art Department).
4 R.R. Lingen (Committee of Council on Education); Sir Geirge Cornewall 
Lewis (former Poor Law Commissioner); James Booth (Board of Trade);
Edward Romilly (Board of Audit); Sir Thomas Freemantle (Board of 
Customs); Rt. Hon. H.H. Addington (formerly Under Secretary of State 
at the Foreign Office); Edwin Chadwick.
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Health. The remaining seven papers were written by opponents of open
competition.^ The most authoritative came from Sir James Stephen,
2
upon whose support Trevelyan had originally counted. From his 
experience as permanent secretary at the Colonial Office, Stephen 
doubted whether the Civil Service could ever provide a satisfactory 
career for talented university graduates. He went so far as to hint 
at an inherent constitutional risk in such a proposal: "You stand 
in need not of statesmen in disguise, but of intelligent, steady,
3
methodical men of business." He skilfully presented open competition 
as an eccentric notion by emphasizing that other professions did not 
apply educational tests. The criticisms proved harmful to the cause 
of Civil Service reform, since Stephen's views were often singled out 
for comment in later review articles.
The weighty arguments contained in the second blue book were not 
discussed in Parliament, and the next mention of Civil Service reform 
in the Commons on 25 March 1855 was largely incidental. Northcote who 
had just entered Parliament as member for Dudley contrived to make 
a brief mention of the separation of intellectual and mechanical work 
in a debate on the army's transport services - a bitterly contentious 
issue in view of lack of transport in the Crimea. It was possible for 
Northcote in a maiden speech to air any topic of his choice, but it 
was extremely unlikely that this would be followed up by other speakers.^
Yet this speech was significant in that it was the first to link the conduct
1 Sir T. Redington (Board of Control); T.W. Murdoch (Emigration Board); 
Herman Merivale (Colonial Office); B. Hawes (War Office); H. Waddington 
(Home Office); Sir Alexander Spearman (National Debt Office and 
Trevelyan's predecessor at the Treasury); Sir James Stephen (Professor 
of History at Cambridge and former Permanent Secretary to the Colonial 
Office).
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 10 March 1855, Add. MS., 44555 f. 264.
5 P.P., 1854-55, XX, p.78.
4 Debates, CXXXVII, cols. 1055-55.
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of the war with some of the principles of administrative reform.
It was pressure from outside Parliament that brought the Civil 
Service once more under active discussion. The mismanagement of the war 
led some radicals to. question every aspect of government. The.most 
notable symptom of this disquiet was the foundation of the Administrative 
Reform Association at a public meeting on 5 May 1855. The Association 
was formed on the initiative of radicals like Samuel Morley, Henry 
bayard and William Tite, the architect, and later M.P. for Bath following 
a by-election in June. Its object was the reform of government 
generally and did not draw a distinction between political and strictly 
administrative functions. During 1855 the Association held public 
meetings in London and published a series of ten official papers on 
aspects of public administration.^ The Association professed to deplore 
exclusiveness - whether patronage in Civil Service appointments, purchase 
of military commissions or the restricted franchise - and assumed that 
as regards the Civil Service, the introduction of open competition for 
first appointments would help bring in more able men and lead to a 
more businesslike approach to public affairs. Encouraged by the mounting 
indignation at the Crimean campaign which followed the endless disasters 
detailed by the Press, the Association believed that its radical 
programme could be realized through educating public opinion and securing 
the election of sympathetic M.P.s.
In the meantime, the compromise Order in Council of 21 May 1853
1 The Administrative Reform Association: Official Papers. Nos. 1-10: 
Nos. 2, 3f 4 and 6 concentrate on Civil Service matters, Nos. 7 and 
10 on voting behaviour and the electoral system. For a recent 
discussion of the Association's work, see Olive Anderson, "The 
Janus Face of Mid-Nineteenth Century Radicalism: the Administrative 
Reform Association of 1855“, Victorian Studies (March, I965), 
pp. 231-242.
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was promulgated. Far from establishing open competition, the Civil
Service Commissioners were only empowered to issue certificates stating
that men appointed by patronage met the requirements of their
departments in respect of age, health, character and education. This
new and untried machinery did not satisfy the Association, particularly
as it was unfairly interpreted as a sop to placate them.^ Yet this
seemed a relatively minor issue compared with spectacular mismanagement
in the Crimea, and the Association preferred to concentrate on this
as an interesting and topical subject as opposed to the duller
technicalities of Civil Service appointments. The matter was never
raised at the Association's public meetings, Layard devoting the meeting
2
on 13 June to the War. However, when Layard raised the matter in the 
Commons two days later he linked the two aspects. His resolution 
expressed concern at the "state of the nation" and attributed its ills 
to the "manner in which merit and efficiency have been sacrificed in 
public appointments, to party and family influences."^ Although 
the resolution was heavily defeated, it served to give immediacy to 
a subject that was in danger of dropping out of sight. Moreover in
1 W.S. Lindsay, Confirmation of Admiralty Mismanagement (1855)* A large 
part of this pamphlet was taken up with Lindsay's grievance that
the Admiralty had failed to take up an offer to freight supplies to 
the Crimea at highly competitive rates - an interesting example of 
the convergence of commercial and public interests that underlay 
some of the thinking of the Association.
2 The second meeting on 2? June had Charles Dickens as its main speaker. 
He diverted his audience with a completely irrelevant instance of 
administrative incompetence - the burning down of the Palace of 
Westminster in the process of detroying obsolete Exchequer tallies 
(The Times, 28 June 1855» p.12 col. d). His most scathing satire
of bureaucratic nepotism and incompetence appeared as the Tite 
Barnacles and the Circumlocution Office in Little Dorrit (introduction 
and Ch. x) published in instalments later in the year.
3 Debates, CXXXTIII, cols. 2040-2133, 2154-2222.
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linking the spectacular ineptitude of the War with Trevelyan’s 
blue books, Trevelyan was himself brought into the fringe of political 
controversy. At the same time, Layard's extremism discredited the 
Association. For example, the Tory Fraser’s Magazine veered from 
sympathy to hostility in June and July issues.^ Furthermore there 
was no likelihood of any effective collaboration between the Association 
and Northcote and Gladstone, both of whom disapproved of the tone 
of its criticism.
Northcote was one of the speakers in the debate on 15 June.
He emphasized that reform of the Civil Service could not be achieved 
in a piecemeal way by the political heads, as changes of administration 
would prevent the formulation of a consistent departmental policy. 
Indeed, if the heads of departments possessed this power, it might 
lead to the American system of ejecting the defeated party’s nominees.
It was equally undesirable to establish a bureaucratic system by giving 
this power to the permanent heads. He admitted that at one stage in the 
preparation of the report on the Civil Service both he and Trevelyan had 
contemplated giving control over all appointments to the Patronage 
Secretary to the Treasury because his patronage in the Customs and 
Excise had appeared to them so beneficial: "In no other department was 
there a more perfect system for division of labour, or a better system 
of promotion by merit, or so good a system of appointments." The 
Patronage Secretary nominated candidates for vacant first appointments
1 ^D. MassonJ "The Administrative Reform Movement - An Attempt to
put in on Wheels", Fraser’s Magazine. LI (June 1855), pp. 605-627,
LII (July 1855), pp. 115-122. The first article was favourable to 
open competition for Civil Service appointments and regretted that 
this had been confined to India. It even envisaged a national 
index of talent illustrated with daguerrotypes. The second deplored 
Layard*s tactics and spoke of the need for men of authority, experience 
and good sense to implement any reforms.
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and the department concerned examined them, Northcote had realized 
that to extend this kind of arrangement to the whole Civil Service 
would have aroused immense jealousy, Northcote also recognized the 
important difference between these and higher appointments, in that 
those in the Customs were filled by persons of low social rank.^
Gladstone, who in February had resigned from the newly-formed 
Palmerston administration in opposition to setting up a Select Committee 
on the conduct of the War, also spoke. Not only did he oppose the 
motion’s pessimism but what he rightly discerned as an attack on 
aristocracy and privilege. Like Trevelyan, he valued aristocracy and 
the need for continual recruitment from the "veiy best of the people".
He felt that revitalization rather than complete condemnation was 
needed. He dismissed 'a supplementary motion by Sir Bulwer Lytton for 
a full investigation of the Civil Service, on the grounds that this had 
already been done and the results published in the Blue Books of February 
1854* Moreover he did not feel that an amendment of the Order in Council 
would be significant as "it leaves it perfectly open to any government 
that mi^t be disposed to surrender that ri^t to initiate any system 
of admission that might be desired." Obviously he believed, as indeed 
was shown in 1870, that the next stage in Civil Service reform could 
be achieved by administrative action without legislation and with 
minimum Parliamentary controversy. Gladstone was now eager for the new 
situation to be staULized, and he was anxious to take any possible 
political heat out of the debate by pointing out that the origins of 
the Civil Service reform lay equally in Derby’s administration. In 
addition he was able to claim that Aberdeen’s aristocratic cabinet had
1 Debates, CXXXVIII, cols. 2087 - 88.
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originally accepted a far more far reaching scheme of reform than
the Commons was prepared to do. Gladstone concluded with other
arguments that were equally Trevelyan’s. He stressed the importance
of first appointments, otherwise promotion by merit would be regarded as
jobbery. In turn the education received by potential Civil Servants
would become increasingly significant. Finally, he dismissed as
illusory the notion - firmly believed by -ttie Administrative Eeform
Association - that the pationage that remained was an important source
of political strength.^
Vincent Scully, M.P. for Cork, accepting the Order in Council,
provided that it could be extended to provide for open competition.
This proposal was rejected by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Gladstone’s
successor as Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the grounds that a bill
would be necessary* Northcote joined the debate to introduce a note
of moral indignation by citing a current example of corruption: a
newspaper advertisement offering £500 for a situation. The most telling
speech was one that was very hostile to Trevelyan. Sir Francis Baring,
who had not before made any public comment on Trevelyan’s plans, made
it clear that he was totally out of sympathy with his approach. He
expressed "surprise and, pain" at the way in which Trevelyan had described
the Civil Service. Moreover he implicitly attacked Trevelyan’s management
of the Treasury in suggesting that the lack of suitable men for the
higher posts had been due not to lack of talent but to bad promotion 
2arrangements. After favouring the traditional way of rewarding 
deserving officers by giving places to their sons, he made a personal
1 Debates. CXXXVIII, cols. 2098-2114.
2 As Chancellor, Baring had made arrangements for succession to 
the chief clerkship of the Financial Divison. These had not 
worked out very satisfactorily. (See pp. 57-59 supra.)
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thrust at Trevelyan: "He had a high respect for the ability and integrity 
of Sir Charles Trevelyan, with whose appointment he had something to do, 
but he should be very sorry to have a whole office of Sir Charles 
Trevelyans. Sir Charles was now the right man in the right place; 
but he was sure that no office would work in vÆiich all the clerks possessed 
Sir Charles’s ability and anxiety to do work."^ This must have been 
veay annoying to Trevelyan as he had always claimed that Sir Francis 
had exhorted him to improve the standard of public offices. However 
it seemed that Baring would have preferred to concentrate on a procedure 
for dismissing unwanted staff rather than concerning himself overmuch 
with selecting the best qualified. For this reason he approved of sup­
ernumerary staff who were readily subject to dismissal. This commercial 
approach whereby staff were viewed as expendable was the reverse of 
Trevelyan’s ambition to make the Civil Service a profession.
Finally Gladstone re-entered the debate to defend Trevelyan.
He considered that the need to appoint outsiders was an indication 
of the inefficiency of the whole career structure. Nevertheless, 
outstanding men had been appointed in this way, and he instanced John 
Wood, Herman Merivale and Trevelyan himself. Palmerston, on the other 
hand, naturally defended the Order in Council as it stood, and said that 
he wished to experiment with closed competition before attempting any­
thing more ambitious. The House took the same cautious view and by
2
a majority of fifteen Scully’s motion was defeated. It was, however, 
appropriate that both Gladstone and Northcote voted in favour of the
5motion.
Comment from the Reviews
As we have seen Civil Service reform became at once narrowed
1 This criticism may have made Trevelyan more than usually cautious
in avoiding any new embarrassments. On 11 July, he refused to comment 
on the draft bill of the Administrative Reform Association,(T.L.B. 
XXXV, p. 267.)
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to a consideration of first appointments and dangerously widened 
and confused with schemes for extending education and with general 
criticism of government mismanagement. As additional issues accumulated 
it had become increasingly obvious that Trevelyan’s more modest, original 
ambitions could not be realized in the short term. Yet these confusions 
in their turn brought the longer term advantage of intelligent comment 
from the reviews. The complexity and problems of the Civil Service 
were brought into the open, not merely the consideration of particular 
points of view. This is in marked contrast to the period before 1853, 
when Civil Service affairs received virtually no public notice.
During 1854 Press comment had been mainly hostile ^ art from The Times, 
but from 1855 onwards constructive criticism created a climate of 
public opinion in which the Civil Service Commission began to work.
One of the first reactions came from the utilitarian Westminster 
Review in June 1854* In an article, the authorship of which has not 
been subsequently identified, it welcomed the Northcote-Trevelyan report 
while sensing that the government appeared to be ahead of public opinion 
in its wish to end patronage. It was suspicious that competitive 
examinations might fill the Civil Service with clever rather than really 
able men, and lead to the formation of a bureaucratic caste of men of
2 James Acland, "Parliamentary Incongruities and Election Anomalies", 
The Administrative Reform Association: Official Papers. No. 10,
p.13. Those in favour of the motion represented 60,000 more voters 
and 1,350,000 more population than the government majority. Liberals 
who voted with the government and those who were absent are listed.
3 Debates, CXXXIX, cols. 675-745*
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"small and crippled original power and strong conservative tendencies - 
conservative we mean, in the genuine and not the party sense of the 
word." The article went on to suggest that the most novel and 
creative ventures were best left to private individuals, echoing the 
fear of government coercion for one's material good which had been 
expressed in The Westminster Review a year earlier. A really useful 
development, it was felt, would be a Benthamite analysis of the functions 
of existing departments.^ While this was not a surprising utilitarian 
reaction, it does indicate a fear that government mi^t become too 
efficient and that cleverness (particularly that kind of cleverness of 
an élite as indicated by the examination systems of the time) mi^t be 
employed to establish an administrative tyranny.
A year later Blackwood *s Tory political commentator offered a more 
down-to-earth appraisal of Civil Service reform as seen in the confused 
political situation following the debate of 15 June 1855* While not 
prepared to accept sweeping attacks on the quality of the Civil Service, 
the writer was broadly in favour of open competition for men with 
adequate testimonials, although he felt that examinations ou^t to be on 
a departmental basis. He suggested that the Berby-Bisraeli administration 
had been keener on this than Aberdeen, who had been hampered by the 
"hereditary Whig" attitude of Palmerston. He concluded by pointing to 
the irony of the debate in which many liberals had voted against open
1 "The Civil Service", The Westminster Review New Series, 71 (July 1854), 
pp. 68-95Î /Herbert Spencer/, "Over-Legislation", Westminster, 17 
(July 1853), PP* 54-84# The Benthamite model of investigation which 
was recommended is in Arthur Symonds, Papers relative to the Obstruction 
of Public Business and the Organization of the Civil Service (1853).
This reprints a letter to Gladstone of 23 February 1853 which the 
writer pointed out the need for a proper survey of the Civil Service.
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competition or had been absents "We appeal again to all the honest 
men of the Liberal party, whether they contemplated such a state of 
things when they made their great effort to get rid of what was called 
Tory corruption."^
In May 1855» another Scottish review, the liberal North British, 
welcomed the Northcote-Trevelyan report and accepted its strictures on 
the Civil Service. The writer, David Masson, rejected patronage and 
agreed with ¥.B. Greg's One Thing Needful (which was being reviewed 
together with the second blue book and regulations for open competition 
in India) that the country's salvation depended on mobilization of 
the country’s talent. Education as a form of intellectual husbandry 
has now become so commonplace that it is difficult to grasp the 
relative originality of this suggestion. Masson welcomed the idea that 
the government should vie with commerce in picking the fittest men for its 
purposes, rather than at random. Once given an objective of this kind, 
education would itself be encouraged. The only limitation to comp­
etitive examinations would be staff appointments where clearly
2
previous merit ou^t to be the determining factor. This enthusiasm 
also extended to one of the toiy reviews, Fraser’s, when in June 
Masson spoke of the possibility of a national index of talent 
illustrated by daguerrotypes.^
A further indication that attitudes to Civil Service reform
1 /W.E. Aytoun/» "Administrative Reform - The Civil Service", 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. LXXVIII (July 1855), pp. 116-134#
2 /David Masson/, "Reform of the Civil Service", The North British 
Review. XXIIÎ (May 1855), pp. 137-192.
3 See note 2 p.205 supra.
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could not be predicted on normal political lines is provided by
a series of articles in The Economist from l^ larch to August 1855. Although
dedicated to Free Trade it was opposed to open competition. The tone
of its rejection was perhaps due to the editor, James Wilson, who
accepted that the plan for examinations was understandable from a
headmaster or a Balliol tutor but incredible from men with any
experience of the realities of official life. He took the pragmatic
view that it was sufficient to eliminate the least able from public
service, and merely to ensure an appropriate standard of dull competence.
Competitive examinations were an alien idea borrowed from Berlin and
Peking, and what was required were sensible and steady men, not
"learned, clever and crammed men".^ One of the few original suggestions
brought forward was for three levels of appointment, the highest
devised to attract men of the calibre of staff appointments with a
2
starting salary of £500 a year. This was equivalent to an Oxford 
or Cambridge fellowship and a logical development of the separation 
of intellectual and mechanical labour, but one which Trevelyan could 
not have attempted to explore in the "economical" reform context that 
surrounded his own efforts. Yet The Economist in the final article 
of the series remained convinced of the harmful effects of excessive 
competition and instanced the continual raising of standards for 
honour degrees \diich, it suggested, frequently overtaxed the physical 
and mental constitution of candidates. This may have been an over­
statement, but the state of university education and examinations 
at that time rightly provoked a number of doubts about the educational
1 The Economist. 3 March 1855, pp. 221-222; 1? March 1855, PP- 
278-279; 14 July 1855, p.755#
2 Ibid.. 21 July 1855, pp. 755-756.
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panacea that Trevelyan and Jowett were offering. After inconclusively 
discussing the problem of promotion which was at one and the same time 
more important and more difficult than making first appointments, the 
article concluded that ministerial nomination, objective certification 
and promotion in the hands of permanent heads of department was the most 
realistic combination of practical alternatives - the first two elements 
were in effect provided by the Order in Council of July 1855*^
Conclusion
The sudden change of fortune in 1855 and 1854 was a mixed blessing 
for Trevelyan. At last he could feel that what he had to offer as a 
reformer was considered to be of real value at ministerial level.
At the same time, enthusiasm prevailed over common-sense, since the 
Northcote-Trevelyan report was quite unsatisfactory as a document for 
publication# If its language had been more moderate, and if political 
reaction had been awaited before leaking the report to the Press, much 
pain and embarrassment might have been avoided. Little was gained 
by Trevelyan's haste, except the adherence of The Times, a few head­
masters and Civil Servants - allies, who did not possess the power to 
bring about an administrative change which had political repercussions. 
For Gladstone, who had only just managed to get the tentative support 
of the cabinet a M  who had to contend with the irascible 
Trevelyan's maladroit manoeuvres created an impossible situation. 
Although Gladstone remained convinced of the value of open competition, 
the distraction of the Crimean War, the innate inertia of the Aberdeen 
coalition, and finally his resignation spared him the political and 
administrative difficulties of attempting to achieve open ccxnpetition 
in the glare of publicity that Trevelyan had created.
1 Ibid., 4 August 1855, pp. 839-84I.
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Chapter VII
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: EXAMINERS, PENSIONS, BUILDINGS
After receiving so much encouragement from Gladstone, Trevelyan 
was at first bitterly disappointed at the failure to implement the 
main proposals of the Northcote-Trevelyan report. Macaulay succinctly 
summed up the situation in March 1853: "He had been too sanguine. The 
pear is not ripe. I always thought so. The time will come, but it 
is not come yet. I am afraid that he will be much mortified."^
Fortunately Trevelyan was able to continue his efforts in more immediately 
practicable directions: in the development of the Civil Service Commission; 
in the reform of the superannuation system; and in the improvement of 
office buildings. The Civil Service Commission was an extension of his 
earlier interests, while superannuation and office buildings were aspects 
of Civil Service reform that became prominent once the question of 
first appointments was temporarily settled.
1 The Establishment of the Civil Service Commission
The collection of expert opinions that Trevelyan assembled to
support the Northcote-Trevelyan report served to point the way to
a working compromise. Trevelyan assured Gladstone in October 1854 that
he had taken pains to consult evexy worthwhile authority and the resulting
replies were published in the blue book. Papers Relating to th'ë
2
Reorganization of the Civil Service. Even where the writers were 
hostile to Trevelyan's censorious attitude there was an acceptance of 
the need for some kind of independent body of examiners. This was one
1 G.O. Trevelyan, op. cit., p.612.
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 24 October 1854, Add. I^ÎS., 44354 f» H?*
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of Trevelyan's earliest suggestions, and it was the only one that 
could be implemented at this stage without raising a storm of controversy. 
Trevelyan was quick to collaborate actively with Gladstone on this, for 
the adoption of part of his proposals was certainly not inconsistent with 
their eventual adoption in their entirety. Trevelyan's main practical 
contribution was to ensure that the men appointed to operate the 
examination system were dedicated to its success. Although the Order 
in Council setting up the Commission had not been promulgated before 
Gladstone left office in Februaiy 1855» Trevelyan had already succeeded 
in determining the principal appointments.
Initially Trevelyan was anxious to appoint educationists as 
Commissioners. He approached Jowett and the Rev. Frederick Temple, 
Principal of Kneller Hall, but both refused.^ He was however satisfied 
with his second choices; Sir Edward Ryan, Assistant Comptroller of the 
Exchequer and formerly Chief Justice of Bengal; and Sir John George 
Shaw Lefevre, Clerk of the Parliaments, - one who since the time of the 
Select Committee on Miscellaneous Estimates had been sympathetic towards 
Trevelyan's views on administration and who also served on Macaulay's 
committee on Indian Civil Service examinations. Sir Edward Romilly, 
Chairman of the Audit Board, was the third member of the Commission.
It was probably fortunate for the success of the Civil Service Commission 
that these senior Civil Servants, rather than clergymen or academics, 
were appointed. In making the appointment of the two permanent 
examiners, Trevelyan persuaded Jowett to recommend to Shaw Lefevre
2
Theodore Walrond, Fellow of Balliol, "as the best man for the job".
Valrond was to make the Civil Service Commission his career, becoming
1 Trevelyan to Temple, 21 February 1855» T.L.B., XXXV, p. 110.
In his eagerness to secure the services of an active educationist 
Trevelyan assured him that he could remain Principal of Kneller Hall.
2 Trevelyan to Walrond, 27 February 1855, Ibid., p. 115.
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Secretary and finally a Commissioner. The other examiner, Edward 
Headlam, Fellow of St. John's College Cambridge, was chosen to 
complete the representation of the two ancient universities.
The selection of the Commissioners was an essential preliminary 
to the setting up of the Commission. It was a task that was left 
to Gladstone's successor as Chancellor, Sir George Cornewall Lewis.
He had accepted Gladstone's plans for the Commission as they stood 
but he insisted on presenting the Order in Council to Parliament 
himself.^ The Order in Council of 21 May 1855 established a Commission 
roughly on the lines that Trevelyan had suggested. Essentially the 
new body was intended to allay fears about the competence of the 
Civil Service, without at the same time arousing political and 
professional jealousies. The Commission was limited to setting a 
test examination appropriate to the posts being filled in each depart­
ment, and to ensuring that candidates were within the prescribed age 
limits for the department and that they were able to produce satisfactory 
references as to their age and character. It remained open to heads 
of departments to appoint those who had not received the Commission's
certificate of competence, although after 1859 any person appointed
2
in this way would be ineligible for a pension. Furthermore, patrons 
were still able to nominate only one person for each vacancy and thus
to rule out the possibility of competition.
1 Trevelyan to Granville, 28 February 1855, Ibid., p. 119#
2 Superannuation Act 1859, see infra p. 240.
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Despite these limitations, Trevelyan was soon impressed by Ryan's
tact and persuasion in getting heads of departments to co-operate.^
By asking for details of existing examinations and by undertaking to
set and administer them the Civil Service Commission rapidly began
to acquire the respect and confidence of departments. Additionally the
Commission prepared the way for further changes by means of its first
few annual reports, in which it assessed the educational attainments
of entrants to the Civil Service and thereby pointed out the inadequacies
2
of the system it had to operate. The first report of the Commission 
had the effect of briefly reviving the discussion of open competition 
in the Commons. Lord Goderich, in praising the first report, moved 
on 24 April I856 a humble address to the Crown for the extension of 
open competition. This was an unusual procedure which was opposed 
by the Palmerston government on the grounds that it was either devoid 
of real meaning or intended to force their hand. The motion was 
supported by Northcote and Gladstone - the latter asserting that he 
would not be opposed to any increased administrative expenses that 
might arise from running open competitions - and carried by 108 to 87.^  
Although the government was not obliged to take any action, it 
could not flagrantly ignore the feelings of the House. Gladstone
1 Trevelyan to Lewis, I3 October 1855, T.L.B., XXXV, p. 277*
2 Edwin Chadwick brought the work of the Civil Service Commission to 
the notice of British Association in papers delivered in 1857
and 1858. Althou^ he had earlier been lukewarm about the 
Northcote-Trevelyan report, he mentioned Trevelyan as among 
those Civil Servants with the best understanding of the situation 
(The Journal of the Statistical Society, XXI, I858, pp. I8-5O;
XXII, 1859, pp. 44-75)* A decade later, Horace Mann, Registrar 
of the Commission, gave a further report which showed how little 
progress had even been made in extending limited competition 
(Ibid., XXXI, 1868, pp. 407-414; XXXII, I869, pp. 58-60).
5 Debates, CXLI, cols. 1401-1444*
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attached importance to the motion, since he alluded to it in his article,
"The Declining Efficiency of Parliament", in the September issue of
The Quarterly, as an example of effective Commons action in compelling
"a sluggish functionary of state /Palmerston/ to move onwards, even
when he had mustered all his vis inertias for somnolent resistance."^
The Civil Service Commission mi^t as a consequence be safe from direct
interference, but Palmerston did not feel inhibited from insisting on
his own ri^ts of nomination in the Treasury, as Trevelyan discovered
in the following year. Furthermore no help at ministerial level
was given to the Commission, and consequently open competition was
extremely rare until it was formally established by Gladstone in 1870.
Naturally Trevelyan was anxious to give the Civil Service
Commission as much help as possible, but he found this most difficult
2
in his own department. When he attempted to reduce the number of 
separate competitions for supplementary clerks (numerous competitions 
for each vacancy or group of vacancies were producing an unsettling 
effect in the revenue departments that put forward the candidates) 
he encountered the resistance of Palmerston, who insisted upon his
1 The Quarterly Review, XCIX (September 1856), p. 555*
2 He also hoped to give some encouragement to recruitment from 
elementary schools for low level posts by publishing a 
letter to Dawes in The Times (19 December 1855, P« 9 co. b).
It was accompanied by one from John Wood which much more 
specifically thanked Dawes for finding deserving Excise
candidates, and undertook to provide a place annually. Dawes 
was active and wrote the preface to the Manual of Educational 
Requirements necessary for the Civil Service (1856), giving 
details of departmental tests and reprinting the first report 
of the C.S.G.
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right to nominate candidates for each post.^ IVhile there was no
question as far as the Treasury was concerned of the Commission not
administering examinations for these competitions, they could only
become effective in establishing a consistent standard if they were
conducted on a larger scale. However, when he was free from the
surveillance of political superiors Trevelyan was more effective.
For example, in 1856 he pressed Monsell, Clerk of the Ordnance, to
2dismiss some clerks who had been employed without a certificate.
In 1858 he resisted an attempt by Sir Edward Romilly, Chairman of 
the Audit Board, to select permanent clerks from among the temporary 
clerks without any reference to the Civil Service Commission,^
While Trevelyan did not have an opportunity to mould the future 
course of Civil Service reform, the principles which he established 
eventually became the ideal of Civil Service management. In I860, 
even George Arbuthnot, one of Trevelyan's sternest critics on Civil 
Service matters, was forced to admit that the standard of clerks 
recently appointed had greatly improved, yet insisting that many 
supplementary clerks were too well qualified for the posts that were 
in fact open to them,^ This provides a clue to what proved to be 
a perennial problem of drawing effective and equitable boundaries
1 Trevelyan to Byan, 29 July 1857, T,L,B,, XXXV, p. 99» He asked
him to grant a certificate to a clerk who although unsuccessful
in an earlier competition, had gained higher marks than successful 
candidates in other competitions. Palmerston reacted to this in
a Minute of 10 November 1857 that insisted on the full procedure 
of revenue department nominations that had been established in I84O 
and administered by the C,S,C, since 1855 (P.R.O,, T4/6092/1796O)•
2 Trevelyan to Monsell, 9 and 10 January I856, T,L,B,, XXXVI, p.53*
5 Trevelyan to Romilly, 27 June 1858, T,L.B,, XXXVII, p. 244*
4 Select Committee on Civil Service Appointments, Arbuthnot*s 
evidence of 22 March I860, P,P,, I860, IX, pp, 101-105*
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between the various classes of clerks. It remained a problem after 
the Order in Council in 1870 had introduced open competition to most 
departments. Indeed Trevelyan's last contribution to Civil Service 
reform was his evidence before the Playfair Commission of 1875 - 
a Commission that had as its main objective the expression in practical 
terms of Trevelyan's over-simple theory of the division of labour.^
Until the end of the First World War many problems of Civil Service 
management were the result of desperate shifts to make the theory 
fit labyrinthine complexities of departmental staffing. In this sense, 
therefore, Trevelyan's influence survived until the Fulton Report 
of 1968 re-unified the career structure of the Civil Service.
2 Superannuation
The controversy in the 1850s over superannuation differed from 
other aspects of Civil Service reform in one very important respect: 
it would almost certainly be in their favour, as opposed to the very 
problematical advantages to be derived from the reform of the procedure 
for making first appointments. Trevelyan, although he was preoccupied 
with the problems surrounding the latter, appreciated the importance 
of an efficient termination of Civil Service careers. In developing 
his views in this field, he found himself in partial agreement with 
a large body of Civil Service opinion. For Trevelyan this was a 
unique position - a position brought about by the confusion and unfairness 
of the existing system of awarding pensions. It will be necessary to 
explain the background to these existing arrangements, before examining 
Civil Service grievances and Trevelyan's attempts to put the granting 
of pensions on a totally new basis.
1 Second Report of the Civil Service Enquiiy Commissioners,
Trevelyan's evidence of 19 March 1875, P*P*, 1875, XXII, pp. 556-567*
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A . Background
The origins of Civil Service pensions lie in the eighteenth
century? from the informal arrangements made by office-holders to
provide for their predecessors there developed particularly in the
Customs, the notion of collective responsibility as exemplified by
the payment of contributions to superannuation funds.^ The first
comprehensive non-contributory scheme, however, was the result of
government action. A Treasury Minute and later an Act of 1810 made the
provision of pensions a public responsibility. The Act provided that
pensions, like salaries, should be met from the Civil List whenever
2
departmental fee funds proved insufficient. Six year later, a 
further Act ordered that this charge should be spefically voted, so 
making the cost of pensions, for the first time, the subject of
5
Parliamentary scrutiny, and thus vulnerable to pressures for economy.
This inevitably resulted, during the economical drive of the early 1820s, 
in pensions being made contributory once again. By a Treasury Minute 
of 1821, confirmed by an Act in the following year, salaries of less 
than £100 were exempt from deductions, those between £100 and £200 were 
subject to a deduction of 2^, and those above £200 to a deduction of 
5^. Half the cost of pensions was to be paid from the fund produced 
by these deductions, and half from the Consolidated Fund. This was 
the first attempt to impose deductions on the salaries of all existing 
Civil Servants and it aroused a storm of protest. The government
1 The origins are described in M. Raphael, Pensions and Public Servants:
A Study of the Origins of the British System (Paris, 1964)«
2 50 Geo. Ill c. 117.
3 56 Geo. Ill c. 46.
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was accused of breach of faith towards Civil Servants, because 
they had entered public service on the assumption that they would 
receive their full salaries, and with the expectation of an eventual 
pension* Parliament accepted the force of these arguments ; the Act 
was repealed in 1824 and the deductions ordered to be repaid.
The perennial pressure for economy could not allow the matter to 
rest. In 1828, the Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure 
recommended that deductions should be reimposed. Earlier embarrassments 
were avoided by the careful framing of the Treasury Minute of 1829, 
which excluded existing Civil Servants from its provisions. Only those 
persons appointed after August 1829 were liable to pay. In its turn, 
this new system was embodied in an Act in 1854* The Act repeated the 
detailed scale of deductions, but it did not provide for them to form 
a fund. Since 1829 the Treasuiy had kept the deductions distinct from 
other funds by investing them in Exchequer Bills, with the intention 
that Parliament should eventually decide what should be done with the 
money. The Act of 1834 regarded the deductions as normal revenue, and 
it directed that the amount already collected and all future sums should 
be paid into the Consolidated Fund.^ This arrangement, with: its 
attempt to harmonize vested interests with the need for economy, was 
to be a major source of misunderstanding and grievance over the next 
thirty years.
B Service Grievances
As a result of the confused situation between 1829 and 1834, many 
Civil Servants appointed after 4 August 1829 believed that a fund 
actually existed. In common parlance men continued to speak of
1 Trevelyan's evidence of 4 March 1856, Select Committee on 
Superannuation, P.P., I856, IX, pp. 17-29.
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deductions for the Superannuation Fund; even a financial expert like
W.G. Anderson did so, although he had no doubts about the real situation.^
If many Civil Servants believed that a fund existed, they naturally
came to feel that they had some claim upon it. This impression that
the government owed something to contributors was confirmed by the
generous provision for pre-1829 Civil Servants, who continued to be
eligible for pensions under the provisions of the 1810 Minute. It
was possible for these men to retire on full pay after fifty years,
whereas men appointed later could expect at the most forty-sixtieths after
a minimum service of forty years. An even greater anomaly was that,
provided service was continuous, employment in any position at any
salary before 1829 could secure exemption from deductions. Thus an
extra clerk with £100 a year might eventually secure a permanent
position with a large salary and still not pay deductions. It often
happened that of two men in the same office on comparable salaries,
2one paig deductions and the other not. It was felt to be particularly 
unfair that premature retirement or death resulted in the loss of 
deductions paid; widows often felt that they had a claim, and 
consequently addressed pathetically futile appeals to the Treasury.^
In "üiis connection it was often claimed that the lower paid clerks paid 
in deductions the money that they should have used in insuring their 
lives. The overall sense of grievance was increased by a conviction 
that the system operated at a profit to the government. While the 
proponents of economical reform often maintained that Civil Servants 
were overpaid, the Superannuation Question presented them as the
1 Ibid., p.30.
2 Ibid., pp. 17-22.
3 Ibid., p.30.
- 224 -
victims of parsimony, rather than as the beneficiaries of administrative
inefficiency.^ As the proportion of post-1829 Civil Servants
progressively increased the Superannuation Question became more acute.
Mounting discontent resulted in I846 in the foundation of an association
under the chairmanship of R.M. Bromley, Secretary of the Board of
Audit and later Accountant General of the Navy. The association was
managed by a committee of deputies representing thirty departments -
all the main departments except the Customs. Its main objectives were
the collection of data on the Superannuation Question and the preparation
of papers in support of claims for an increased scale of pensions and
the application of abatements to form a widows* and orphans* fund. A
petition was presented to Lord John Russell in March I848, but the
budget crisis and the ensuing economical investigations ruled out its
2serious consideration.
It was not until 1852 that the matter was brought before the
public. A series of sympathetic letters was printed in The Times
3in October and November. These were supported by an outspoken leader
of 16 October which described existing superannuation arrangements as
"a gigantic swindle perpetrated by the State upon a body of defenceless
men"#^ Interest within the Civil Service was further stimulated '
by the first issue in January 1853 of the Civil Service Gazette (a
weekly newspaper aimed at the lower-paid) which understandably devoted
5an article to the injustice of deductions. There was a further spate
1 Ibid., p.33.
2 William Farr, Remarks on a proposed scheme for the conversion of the 
assessment laid on public salaries ... into a "Provident Fund" for 
the support of the widows and orphans of civil servants (1849).
3 The Times, 2 October 1852, p. 6 col. b; 5 October, p. 5 col. f;
8 October, p. 6 col. dj 2 November, p. 4 col. e.
4 Ibid., 16 October I852, p. 4 col. c.
5 The Civil Service Gazette, I (1853), P* 10#
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of correspondence in The Times in November 1853 which served to
illustrate a wide division of opinion over the desirability of
a dependants' fund.^ Yet the association felt sufficiently confident
to present the Abérdeen ministry in December 1855 with a petition
containing between three and four thousand signatures. Thereafter,
superannuation became enmeshed in wider consideration of Civil Service
affairs and the consequent publicity ensured that the matter was kept
under consideration until the appointment of the Select Committee in
1856. At this stage the association tactfully decided to disband,
trusting that its overwhelming case would be recognized by the 
2
Committee.
The professional way in which the committee of the association 
undertook its work indicates the increasing capacity for analysis 
of organizational problems. This was largely due to the work of 
William Farr and the actuarial resources of the Registrar General's 
Office. In order to make out an effective case for dependants' benefits, 
it was decided to quantify the family responsibilities of Civil Servants. 
This was done by means of a voluntary census requesting information 
on the number and age of dependants. No less than 7962 returns were 
made and the findings tabulated. On 18 December 1854 Farr presented 
his conclusions in a' paper to the Statistical Society of London. He 
pointed out, for example, that the average salary of Civil Servants 
who paid income tax (i.e. those with salaries of £150 p.a. or more) 
was £346 as compared with the average professional salary of £496. This 
disparity was in itself a compelling reason why deductions should be
1 The Times, I9 Ncvembec 1855, P* 10, col. c; 22 November, p. 8,col. d; 
23 November, p. 12^col. d; 24 November p. 10, col. b.
2 Bromley's evidence of 7 March I856, Select Committee on Super­
annuation, P.P., IX, pp. 94-93*
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ended, and for the government to set an example of fair treatment of 
its employees by acting as guarantor of a dependants' fund. Even on 
incomplete information this was shown to be feasible, and with full 
data available it would be perfectly straightforward. Farr had little 
enthusiasm for alternative systems of private life assurance since the 
rates were likely to be 25^ higher than those calculated from the 
life-table.^
This preoccupation with a dependants * fund was part of wider
concern at this time with the improvement and extension at this time
of life assurance. A Select Committee on the subject reported in June
1853 and recommended a more effective system of registration, together
2
with the security of more detailed accounts. Farr gave evidence of 
how life assurance had developed from speculative ventures into providing 
security for families. He suggested that there was considerable scope 
for growth in business, particularly with the reduction of stamp duty 
to one shilling percent and the income tax allowance on premiums 
granted by Gladstone's 1853 budget. Parr was anxious that more effort 
should be made to provide cover for those with income of less than 
£200 p.a. Furthermore, if policy contributions were started at the 
average age of 25 instead of 35 the volume of business could be doubled.^
1 "Statistics of the Civil Service of England, with Observations on the 
Contribution of Funds to provide for Fatherless Children and Widows", 
Journal of the Statistical Society of London. XII (1849), PP* 103- 
150. Trevelyan included an abstract of these tabulations in his 
collection of material about salaries, see supra p. 142.
Farr was a pioneer of statistical analysis. He prepared the vital 
statistics for J.R. McCulloch's Statistical Account of the British 
Empire (1837) and wrote the Reports of the I85I, I86I and I87I censuses. 
See Victor L. Hilts, "William Farr (I8O3-I883) and the 'Human Unit'", 
Victorian Studies, XIV (1970^, PP* 143-150*
2 P.P., 1852-53, XXi, p.7* The report and evidence was sympathetically 
discussed in Blackwood's (W.E. Aytoun attr., "A Chapter on Life 
Assurance", LXXIV, July 1853, PP* 105-116).
3 P.P., 1852-53, XXI, pp. 317-332.
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This evidence was consistent with the view that Parr had expressed in 
1848, that it was desirable to give Civil Servants a realistic salary 
at the probable age of marriage in order that they should be able to 
make adequate provision for their families. As part of this provision 
it was argued that Civil Servants should be put in a position to 
buy their own life assurance - a view that was to be strongly expressed 
by Trevelyan.
C Trevelyan's Attitude
Trevelyan had gained some insight into the procedure for granting
pensions by his attendance at the Treasury superannuation committee.
This committee consisting of two junior lords had been set up in I83I
to revise proposed superannuation allowances, but its function was
mainly one of granting formal approval. As with many of Trevelyan's
other duties, this experience only served to reveal the impotence of the
Treasuiy and of Trevelyan's own position. Apart from the ward of
premature pensions or of extra allowances for specially meritorious services,
the discretion of the committee was severely limited. Trevelyan was
appalled at vhat he suspected was the jobbery in arranging many premature
retirements. He was particularly incensed by the Foreign Office; with
pensions, as with establishments, this department felt free to do as it
pleased. When the Treasury stood firm, he was clearly delighted. In
a letter of 1 October 1847, he approved the refusal of a maximum
pension to Adolphus Turner - a man who, he said, had been a mere
1
subordinate and who had never shown any real merit. Piecemeal control 
of this kind could not be really effective. Nine years later, in 
Januaiy I856, Trevelyan complained to James Wilson of what he felt was 
an improper grant of a pension: £500 a year at the age of thirty-one
1 Trevelyan to H. Rich, T.L.B., XVII, p. 51*
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after only twelve years* service. As the Foreign Office had made 
no mention in its letters of the prospect of re-employment, Trevelyan 
suggested that it was a matter that ought to he laid before Parliament*^ 
From incidents like these, Trevelyan was forced to the view that if 
men were incompetent or chronic invalids, they ou^t never to have 
been appointed; if, on the other hand, they were still useful, they 
ought to be re-employed. Unfortunately the Treasury superannuation 
committee was unable to take consistent notice of these two related 
aspects of its work.
Even more harmful than the wastefulness of jobbery was the damage 
done to Civil Service morale by the lack of a eompulsoiy retiring age.
The only escape for the senile was the provision in the Act of 1834 
that permitted retirement for anyone under the age of 65, provided that 
he could obtain a medical certificate stating that he was "incapacitated 
throu^ age or infirmity" from carrying on his work. The lack of 
compulsion, combined with the impossibility of granting a full-rate 
pension - only pre-1829 Civil Servants aged at least 66 could ever 
expect this - ensured that the highest posts on many office establishments 
were filled with elderly men. This lack of mobility was- frustrating 
to junior clerks, who had to perform much of the work of their seniors 
without a measurable prospect of their own eventual promotion. Trevelyan 
so often talked of "prizes", or departmental promotions, as a spur to 
exertion, that he obviously recognized that the Superannuation Question 
was not only concerned with justice for Civil Servants, but was an 
issue that could effect the "future efficiency and spirit" of the
1 T.L.B., XXXVI, p.280.
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whole Service.^ When he expressed this view to Sir Francis Baring 
in November 1852, Trevelyan was not aware that he was on the threshold 
of a major investigation of the Civil Service. Most of his efforts 
were to be concentrated on the improvement of first appointments, 
but he also was to begin to clarify and elaborate his views on 
superannuati on.
The Northcote-Trevelyan report made only a passing reference to
superannuation. It observed that effective control over pensions
was handicapped by lack of proper records of staff performance, and
suggested that the proposed examiners might also collect this
information. However the wider aspects of superannuation were not
properly within the committee's terms of reference and the report
2mentioned that it was receiving separate consideration. Trevelyan 
had devoted himself to this task on his own, and on 8 November 1853 - 
a fortnight before the completion of the first printed draft of the 
Northcote-Trevelyan report - he completed a "Memorandum on the
5
Superannuation Question". This was the first of four papers on the 
subject which he wrote over the next two years. Like the Northcote- 
Trevelyan report, it made no attempt to provide an impartial analysis ; 
it was obviously Trevelyan's first opportunity to offer his opinions. 
He immediately sent copies of the Memorandum to Gladstone and to 
James Wilson.^
After explaining the cause of Civil Servants' discontent with
1 Trevelyan to Sir Francis Baring, 10 November 1852, T.L.B., XXX, 
p.48.
2 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p.21.
3 Papers, originally printed in 1850 #. and Three Papers on the 
Superannuation Question, pp. 126-138.
4 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 18 November 1853, T.L.B., XXXII, p^ 114* 
A printed copy on blue paper is among the Gladstone Papers 
(Add. MS., 44579 f. 155).
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the system of deductions, Trevelyan was mainly concerned to dismiss 
as irrelevant Bromley's arguments in favour of a widows' benefit fund.
He suggested that the only criterion was the efficiency of the Civil 
Service. This could best be achieved by making pensions the explicit 
reward for satisfactory service. He felt that the prospect of a pension 
would be veiy encouraging to men in their fifties - men who were some 
of the most valuable because they had the benefit of experience without 
being worn out.^ With a fixed retiring age, it would be possible for 
them to remain fully active until the end of their careers, before 
enjoying the deserved benefits of a reasonable span of retirement.
It was, therefore, necessary to establish a fixed age for retirement, 
and to end deductions in order to give unfettered discretion in 
awarding pensions. The idea of a retiring age is now commonplace, 
but - probably fortunately - the award of pensions on a professional 
judgement-day has never materialized. If pensions could be regarded in 
this way, provision for widows would be impossible. It mi^t appear 
legitimate to reward or punish - the latter by means of a reduced 
pension - the Civil Servant himself, but it would have been intolerable 
to punish his family as well. Trevelyan often commented on the 
influence of ordinary humane feelings which made heads of departments 
reluctant to dismiss incompetent men. These feelings would have been 
even more powerful if widows' pensions were at stake. Although this 
consideration was in his mind, Trevelyan argued that it was morally 
desirable that the individual, not the State, should be responsible 
for the welfare and security of his own family. He was hostile to 
the State's assumption of any more administrative burdens, when widows
1 William Farr had worked out the details, see supra p.lA2.
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and families could be provided for by means of life insurance#
Trevelyan, who had hitherto been guarded in his response to Bromley's
overtures for support for the widows' fund, now openly refused to help.^
Trevelyan went on to clarify for Gladstone's benefit some of the points
raised by his Memorandum, He suggested sixty-five as a compulsory retiring
age, with an option at sixty# However, he stressed that he wanted this
to be flexibly interpreted, in order that the services of men like
Brooksbank and Archer, Chief Commissariat Clerk, could be retained#
Compulsory retirement would, he felt, speed up promotion and rid the
Service of disappointed men. He reiterated his opposition to a new
version of the proposed widows ' pension fund suggested by Sir James
Graham, whereby part of the deductions should be devoted to this 
2purpose.
In the early months of 1854 both Trevelyan and Gladstone were 
more immediately concerned with the implementation of the Northcote- 
Trevelyan report. Yet as Gladstone remarked to Russell, he regarded 
superannuation as being closely linked with wider issues of efficiency.
He was convinced that an improved superannuation system required an 
improved Civil Service, since he saw no other way of solving the 
problems caused by incompetent and worn-out men clinging to their 
posts in order to become entitled to a pension.^ Only when it became 
apparent that no progress was likely with a general Civil Service measure, 
did Gladstone decide to deal separately with superannuation, announcing 
in the Commons on 5 May that there was the possibility of a bill to 
reform the system.^ The bill which he began to prepare left the 
basis of the 1834 system intact, and merely aimed to facilitate the
1 Trevelyan to Bromley, 26 November 1853, T.L.B., XXXII, p.133*
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 18 December 1853, ILid., p. 173*
3 Gladstone to Russell, 20 January 1854, Add. MS., 44291 f.95t>.
4 Debates, CXXXII, col. I3O5*
- 232 -
retirement of aged or incompetent men. Trevelyan was not discouraged,
for he knew that such a bill would do nothing to relieve the pressure
of Civil Service discontent, and could therefore be little more than
a temporary arrangement. In January 1855» he emphasized that the
financial consideration of retaining the revenue from deductions was
unimportant when compared with the remedial effect that could be
produced by a properly revised system. Gladstone took no notice, for
he was anxious not to abandon revenue of £60,000.
When Gladstone resigned in February 1855» the bill was taken over
hy his successor, Sir George Cornewall Lewis. Since the latter was
temperamentally disinclined to do more than what was immediately
necessary, Trevelyan had to repeat all his arguments in favour of
ending deductions as a preliminary to total reform. In June he produced
three further memoranda including one entitled, "Age of Retirement of 
1
Civil Servants". He proposed that forty years service ou^t to be
thé norm, with retirement between sixty and sixty-five. He was convinced
2
that the better sort of Civil Servant would welcome longer retirement. 
This could only be proved in the long-term; a more immediate advantage 
would be the end of the unreal, token investigation of superannuation 
claims by the Treasury. As Trevelyan observed; "A plausible case can
1 Papers 1850, pp. I26-I46.
2 Trevelyan best revealed his faith in the almost mechanical efficacy 
of this arrangement in a letter to Viscount Monck, a junior
lord, on 4 July I856: "I am strongly as ever in favour of a self-acting
Regulation that every body should be obliged to retire at sixty-five
unless he was asked to remain, but the permission to retire at 
sixty would get rid of the worst class of cases, and would prepare 
the way for dealing hereafter with the remainder. The elderly men 
who are tired of the Service, and wish to retire keep those who 
ou^t to retire but wish to remain in countenance; and if the first
class were cleared off by permitting them to retire at sixty, the
impaired men of sixty-five would stand out in full relief, and 
public opinion would turn so much against them that there would be 
no difficulty in applying a suitable remedy." (T.L.B., XXXVI, p.l85.)
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be easily got up to be laid before the Treasury, which has neither 
such exact information, nor such strength of will, nor such keen, 
uncompromising sense of public duty as to make it safe that the 
fluctuating body of functionaries of whom the office is composed, 
should be entrusted with a large discretion in a matter in which the 
powerful influences belonging to this state of society are more than 
usually active. Trevelyan's more mechanical system, avoiding the 
snares of personal feeling and political patronage, presupposed that the 
rules for retirement would be reasonable and explicit, and that the 
merits of Civil Servants would be evaluated either by the heads of 
departments or by some other agency. The Civil Service Commission 
was about to be established, and Trevelyan looked forward to the 
extension of that body's supervisory functions.
D The Select Committee of I856 and the Royal Commission of 1856-57
Trevelyan appears to have exerted no appreciable influence, for
when the bill was finally introduced on I5 February I856 it embodied
none of the radical changes which he felt were necessary: deductions
were retained; no retiring age was fixed. The only concession to
efficiency was the reduction to sixty of the age below which a medical
certificate was needed to obtain a pension. Another encouragement to
earlier retirement was the award of the maximum pension of two-thirds
2
salary after thirty-four years, instead of after forty years.
In all, the bill was an unsatisfactory measure that did nothing to
satisfy the demand for the ending or modification of deductions. Its
1 Papers 1850. pp. 142-144*
2 p.p., 1856, I, p. 523.
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effectiveness as a means of facilitating retirement was also doubtful.
Cornewall Lewis was so conscious of the bill's defects and omissions
that he proposed that it should be submitted to a Select Committee
after its second reading. Aware of so many aspects of superannuation
that were not covered by the bill, he went further and suggested that
the Select Committee should examine every aspect of it. Although
Cornewall Lewis appealed for no discussion until after the Select
Committee had reported, Disraeli was quick to remark that the bill was
a poor substitute for a measure that ought to tackle the real issues
underlying administrative reform. Northcote, now M.P. for Dudley,
felt that the first step should be the removal of the real or supposed
grievance of deductions.^ The eventual outcome was uncertain; the
administration had no clear policy and, therefore, little faith in its
own measures; the only firm and consistent pressure was from the
opponents of deductions.
The Select Committee that was set up was under the chairmanship
2
of Cornewall Lewis and contained, among others. Baring, Gladstone,
Roebuck and Henley - Roebuck was fresh from his triumphant investigation 
of the Crimean War, and Henley had acquired a reputation in the late 
1840s for his demands for drastic economies. Among the witnesses 
called before them were Trevelyan and Bromley.
Trevelyan gave his evidence first on 4 March I856, as he was the 
main official witness. He presented a detailed historical survey 
of the origins of the superannuation system. He followed this by an 
exposition of the views expressed in his memoranda. He claimed that,
1 Debates, CXL, cols. 870-897*
2 Gladstone attended only one meeting of the Select Committee. However, 
Trevelyan felt it worthwhile to arg« for the end of deductions.
In May he adduced the Burkean argument that "Englishmen are generally 
content when they are fairly treated", in the hope of countering 
Gladstone's growing irritation with Civil Service malcontents 
(T.L.B., XXXVI, p. 149)*
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after six years* study of the system of making deductions from salaries, 
he had come to the conclusion that they could not be modified satis­
factorily*^ He also explicitly linked the question of ending deductions 
with the general improvement of Civil Service personnel, by a reference 
to the Order in Council of 21 May 1855» which was designed to prevent 
men who were unequal to their work from ever being appointed. He 
cited W.G. Anderson as saying that with well-chosen staff only two- 
thirds of the Civil Service establishment would be needed, and that 
the pension list would be correspondingly smaller. Once again he made 
a plea for a comprehensive and powerful supervisory machine; the 
Civil Service Commission, as already constituted, was only part of 
what was necessary to ensure that redundant staff were re-employed
in other departments wherever possible, instead of being granted 
2
pensions. Trevelyan made a point of stressing the conflict between 
the need for service economy and efficiency to re-employ men on the 
redundant list, and the pressure from political patrons to be able to 
make new appointments. This conflict was strenuously denied by W.G.
Hayter. Patronage Secretary, when he came to give his evidence; moreover 
he argued that except in a few departments the Treasuiy had no power to 
make appointments in the way Trevelyan had recommended.^ Hay ter*s 
objection to the impression that Trevelyan had given led to the latter*s 
recall for clarification of his evidence. Trevelyan, while denying 
that he had intended an attack on any individual, reiterated his view 
that the Treasuiy needed increased powers to enforce the re-employment 
of able-bodied men.^
1 P.P., 1856, IX, p.35.
2 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
3 Hayter's evidence of 11 March I856, Ibid., p. 139*
4 Trevelyan's evidence of I4 March I856, Ibid., pp. I52-I6O.
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On the more immediate issue of ending deductions, Trevelyan's 
evidence was strictly examined hy Sir Francis Baring, a member of the 
Select Committee, when he questioned Trevelyan's contention that the 
loss of revenue in ending deductions would only amount to £100,000.
Since Trevelyan had himself admitted that the figure was based on 
guesswork. Baring was able to observe that "the value of your opinion 
depends upon the data upon which you have founded your opinion".^
The question of establishing a widows' fund was faised once
again by R.M. Bromley, who proposed in his evidence that deductions 
should be replaced by a 2ÿo levy for this purpose.^ He even went so
far as to produce his own version of the bill - a suggestion that was
turned down by a Select Committee that was not concerned with additional 
complexities unrelated to the efficiency of the Civil Service.
Bearing in mind the divergence of evidence it is not surprising 
that the Committee did not attempt to produce a general report; instead 
it considered a number of general resolutions, the most significant 
of which linked the abolition of deductions with an immediate revision 
of the level of salaries. The Committee generally felt that it would 
be unjust to give most of those who paid deductions an indiscriminate 
increase of a little over 3^. Rather, they intended that the ending of 
deductions should mean a redistribution of income among Civil Servants, 
not an additional burden on the State. On 25 June, the Committee 
voted in favour of this resolution by nine votes to two. Earing being
5
one of the opposers. The bill was accordingly amended to bring about 
the end of deductions, and the government was instructed to take 
immediate steps to revise salaries.^ Even if this section of the bill
1 Baring's evidence of 4 March I856, Ibid., p. 50#
2 Bromley's evidence of 11 Iferch I856, Ibid., pp. 126-12?.
3 Proceedings of the Select Committee, Ibid., p. 11.
4 P.P., 1856, I, p. 536.
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had been operable, it would only have constituted a crude economical
approach. Trevelyan had opposed any form of general reduction in I848,
and now he resisted what mi^t prove to be the same thing in disguise.
In July, Trevelyan recommended to Cornewall Lewis that the bill
should be dropped, because of its clumsy amendments and its disregard
for the efficiency of the Civil Service.^
Cornewall Lewis was very pleased to rid himself of such an
embarrassing measure. He now attempted to solve the problem by means
of a Royal Commission. This was set up in November I856, and it
reported in the following I/Iay. One of the members of the Commission
was Sir Edward Ryan, one of the recently appointed Civil Service
Commissioners, who ensured that the report was more concerned with
efficiency than with economy. Trevelyan's arguments were completely
upheld, for the Commission claimed that the cost of ending deductions
could be met by increased efficiency, rather than by reduced salaries.
The Commission recommended that all Civil Servants should be entitled
to a net salary, together with the expectation of a pension after
satisfactory service. Deductions ou^t, therefore, to be abolished
without qualification. Retirement ought to be permissive at sixty and
obligatory at sixty-five, except in special circumstances. Forty years'
2
service was to qualify for the maximum pension of two-thirds salary. 
For the first time, superannuation was accepted as an integral part 
of the rewards of public service: the confusing legacy of half a 
century was discarded.
1 T.L.B., XXXVI, p. 199.
2 Report of I5 May 1857, P.P., 1857, sess. 2, XXIV, pp. 229-257.
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E The Acts of 185? and 1859
The recommendations of the Royal Commission, despite their
cogency, were still far from being implemented. However, Trevelyan
was extremely satisfied by the outcome so far, and he realized that
care would be needed to consolidate the position, by winning Parliamentary
support. The General Conmiitte of Civil Servants for the Amendment
of the Superannuation Act of 1854 was also encouraged by the Commission’s
report to continue its pressure against deductions. Trevelyan asked
Bromley on 19 May 1857 to use his influence to stop continued criticism.
Since Parliament was possibly going to confer a "boon" on the Civil
Service, it would be fatal for the beneficiaries to continue to be
critical.^ Yet the Committee's petitions to Parliament and its
lobbying of back-bench M.P.s bore fruit. On 50 June, Lord Naas
introduced a private member's bill in the Commons to repeal section
twenty-seven of the 1854 Superannuation Act. This would merely
abolish deductions, and it would be left to the government to supplement
the measure, by revising the rules concerning retirement, and by
extending pensions to those departments and classes of Civil Servants
that did not pay deductions. The measure was strongly opposed by
the government, although Cornewall Lewis was prepared to offer some
relief for lower paid Civil Servants, upon whom the burden of deductions
2
pressed most heavily. In the debate on the second reading on 29 July, 
James Wilson stressed that most of the anomalies would remain, while the 
public would lose revenue of £100,000.^ This debate led to Trevelyan's 
name being involved. When it was argued that the ending of deductions
1 T.L.B., XXXVII, p.55.
2 Debates, CXLVI, cols. 690-701. 
5 Debates, CXLVII, col. 246.
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would result in many men being overpaid, Lord Naas cited Trevelyan's
observation before the Select Committee, that when he had been
investigating departments and assessing salaries, the only consideration
had been the market value of the work, and that no allowance had
been made for a post being subject to deductions. Gladstone was
furious that Trevelyan's evidence was regarded as authoritative; he
resented what he felt was an implicit usurpation of ministerial
responsibility and flatly contradicted Trevelyan's evidence on this
point.^ Trevelyan was in fact right, and he lost no time in writing
2
to Cornewall Lewis in order to tell him so.
Ministerial opposition proved less effective than the General 
Committee's lobbying and the Commons put an end to the interminable 
discussion of deductions by passing Lord Naas's Bill. This was so 
obviously an incomplete measure designed to force the government's 
hand, that Trevelyan devoted his attention to advise his colleagues 
that their proper course was to show gratitude by increased devotion 
to work and by spending the money formerly deducted on making their 
own provision for their families; not by continuing to press for a 
provident fund.''^
Pressure for the establishment of a provident fund became less 
effective when it was revealed in March 1858 that the government 
had not been profiting from deductions. A supplementaiy report of the 
Royal Commission reported the findings of an actuary's report, which 
demonstrated that even if the deductions had been funded they would 
have been insufficient to meet all the claims that would have eventually 
been made by those who paid deductions. However, the Royal Commission
1 Ibid., pp. 650-658.
2 Trevelyan to Lewis, 50 July 1857, T.L.B., XXXVTI, p. 84.
5 Trevelyan to J.R. Lowry, 4 March 1858, Ibid., p. 189*
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regarded this aspect of deductions as less important than efficiency;
the supplementary report reiterated recommendations for a fixed retiring
age and for the extension of deductions to all departments.^ In July,
Cornewall Lewis brought in a bill to fix a retiring age. However,
notice of an amendment to extend its provisions to dockyard workers
2was sufficient for it to be withdrawn. The following February,
Disraeli, supported by Northcote, introduced a bill which would have
met all the main recommendations of the Royal Commission. No premature
retirement, except on the grounds of ill-health was to be permitted;
retirement at sixty-five was to be compulsory, except where an individual
had been invited to remain: pensions were to be paid to dockyard
workers and similar classes of Civil Servants.^ In the debate at
the committee stage, the section relating to compulsory retirement
proved to be a major obstacle. Amendments were introduced to raise
the age of eompulsoiy retirement to seventy, and to delay its operation
for three years. Rather than allow the bill to be wrecked by the
failure to agree bn one section, Cornewall Lewis persuaded Northcote
to agree to the section being negatived without a division.^ Although
the retiring age - a matter that Trevelyan felt was crucial - was
deleted, the Act contained one provision that was a positive aid to
the continuing process of Civil Service reform: after April 1859
all new entrants to the Civil Service would need a certificate of competence
from, the Civil Service Commissioners, before becoming eligible for a 
5
pension.
1 Supplementary Report of 25- March 1857, P.P., 1857-88, XXF., pp. 
655-636.
2 Debates, CLI, col* 1181; CLII, col. I5I 
5 P.P., 1859 sess. 1, II, p. 791#
4 Debates* CLIII cols. 1387-95*
5 22 Vic c. 26, sec. 17*
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5 The Rebuilding of Government Offices
Trevelyan's interest in the location and planning of office
buildings for the Civil Service arose from his wider interest in
administrative reform. Although he lacked technical knowledge, he
felt able to offer advice on the basis of his general philosophy of
administration and economical reform. Thus, his views are interesting,
whether or not they can be shown to have had a direct influence on the
rebuilding that took place in the late 'fifties and early sixties^
Trevelyan's views on the need for more efficient office buildings
had been maturing for some time, but he produced his first systematic
presentation of them in February 1855* connection with what eventually
proved to be an abortive scheme to rehouse the Admiralty opposite the
Treasury, Trevelyan established the principles that he felt ought to
apply: the new building ought to be large enough to house the entire
department, including those parts of the Admiralty's work that were
then housed at Somerset House; there ought to be room for expansion,
particularly in wartime; large office rooms together with a central
store for records ought to be provided; no official residences ou^t
to be included; the size of the new building ou^t solely to be
determined by the size of the staff and the bulk of the records; and,
2finally, the design ought to be obtained by means of public competition.
A little later Trevelyan suggested that the Registrar General's Office 
could conveniently remain at Somerset House after the Admiralty had 
moved out, since the large rooms in that building were ideally 
suited for clerks making entries on records in a uniform process.^
1 For background to the problem see J.M. Crook and M.H. Port, 
op. cit., pp. 537-571*
2 Trevelyan to Molesworth, First Commissioner of Works, 9 February 
1855, T.L.B., XXX, p. 281.
5 Trevelyan to Phillips, Secretary to the Board of Works, 17 February 
1855, T.L.B., XXXI, p. 15*
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Towards the end of March, Trevelyan expatiated to Molesworth, First
Commissioner of Works, on the urgent need for rehousing the Colonial
Office and the Foreign Office - a fact that had been well-known in
official circles for over a decade - but concluded nevertheless that
1
the Admiralty building should be given priority. For the remainder of
the year, Trevelyan's increasing involvement in departmental investigations
precluded much consideration of office rebuilding.
It was only a year later, when it became clear from Gladstone's
statement to the Commons on 5 May 1854 that there was no likelihood of
a bill to introduce open competition, that Trevelyan began to devote
himself more fully to the problems of office rebuilding. In a number
of letters, Trevelyan revealed that he was opposed to any piecemeal
solution of departmental accommodation problems as he was to any kind of
piecemeal solution of departmental organization and establishments. In
a letter to Gladstone on 22 June 1854, Trevelyan reminded him of his
remarks in his report on the Board of Works on the use of ordinary
dwelling-houses as office buildings. He stressed the wastefulness of
using houses which generally only provided two useable floors (attics
and basements being of little use), and of the consequent large number
of ancillary staff that were needed for a large number of small units.
He asserted that, if instead of renting properties individually, the
government could obtain contract rates appropriate to the scale of
2
its requirements a great saving could be achieved. Two days later 
a further letter dealt with a more immediately practicable, but related, 
matter; the regrouping of offices in Whitehall. Trevelyan apparently 
agreed with a proposal of Molesworth's that the Enclosure Commission 
could conveniently be moved to St. James's Square, so that the Poor
1 Trevelyan to Molesworth, 26 February 1855, Ibid., p. 121.
2 Add. MS., 44534 f# 57.
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Law Board could in turn move into its vacated premises near the
Home Office, in this way improving communication between the two
departments and facilitating Parliamentaiy business.
In every problem relating to accommodation Trevelyan realized
that there was an important parallel in the Treasury's attempts to
regulate the scale of establishments and departmental expenditure
generally; temporaiy expedients that were justified during an emergency
often tended to be made permanent, and to lead to excessively wasteful
and inefficient half-measures. For example, the continued failure to
solve the Foreign Office's lack of accommodation culminated in 1854
in the decision to build a temporary wooden structure in Downing Street
to house books and papers. Trevelyan strenuously opposed this expedient
on the grounds that it "would lead to an indefinite postponement of
2this really important and pressing question. This view seems to have 
been shared by the government, who turned to consider an extensive 
rebuilding scheme in the area of Downing Street, The need to acquire 
additional land necessitated a bill, and this brought before Parliament 
a preliminary outline of the scheme. In introducing the Downing Street 
Extension Bill on 26 April Molesworth bowed to potential economical
5
criticism by undertaking to submit the Bill to a Select Committee.
On 10 July the Select Committee confined itself to examining only one 
witness, James Pennethome, the architect of the scheme. He proposed to 
construct a large quadrangle behind the Home Office, so demolishing 
all the houses in Downing Street but not extending as far as Whitehall.
1 Ibid., f. 59.
2 Trevelyan to Molesworth, 6 July 1854, T.L.B., XXXIV, p. 92, 
5 26 April 1855, Debates, CXXXVII, col. I83O.
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In this way it would be possible to construct an impressive main 
thoroughfare at a later stage. Molesworth made it plain that he was 
determined to get rid of the ill-adapted houses that contained the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices. His position was supported by a 
surveyor*s report on the perilous condition of the buildings.^
Although the Bill was passed, the large and extensive reconstruction 
that it made way for could not be satisfactorily planned without 
consideration of the wider question of office rebuilding in the area 
of Whitehall. Accordingly, this question constituted the terms of 
reference of a further Select Committee that was set up on 28 April 
1856. Trevelyan was invited to give evidence before it, and in so 
doing was able to expand his limited experience of particular instances 
into a general plan of administrative centralization.
Trevelyan prefaced his evidence with the observation that "next 
to the appointment of proper officers, the thing most conducive to 
the public service will be to have proper offices". He based his 
argument on the economical aspects of this, by quoting from his report 
on the Board of Works that the £15 >000 spent on rent could pay the 
interest on a capital sum of £500,000. For a smaller sum it would be 
possible to build offices which were conducive to efficient work: "One 
clerk in a well-arranged office, with ready access to all its papers, 
and in constant communication with his superiors, can do nearly as 
much work in a day, as two who are placed in distinct buildings, 
separated from each other, from their chiefs, and from the records 
of the office."^
Apart from practical considerations, Trevelyan sought to
1 P.P., 1854-55, VII, pp. 205-209.
2 Report of the Select Committee on Public Offices, Trevelyan's 
evidence of 16 June I856, P.P., I856, XIV, p. 553*
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illustrate the economical merits of his proposals by instancing 
the multiplicity of wasteful domestic arrangements that had once 
provided for the needs of the Board of Trade: at one time there 
had been no less than four households of ancillary staff occupying 
the upper floors and basements of a terrace of houses. This situation 
had been detected by Treasury vigilance as a result of an appeal for 
more accommodation. Trevelyan felt that the Board of Works, as a 
service department, ou^t to assume supervisory control over domestic 
arrangements. As with the Stationery Office, he assumed that the 
centralization of supplies and services would be a sure way of obtaining 
uniformity of practice and economy. There was, however, no indication 
that the Board of Works was prepared to act as a trusted agent of the 
Treasury, and Trevelyan merely preferred to stress the inherent 
economical merits of consolidation by citing his favourite example 
of the amalgamation of the Paymasters* Offices.^
Trevelyanfe most novel and ambitious proposal was for the grouping 
of major government departments. Trevelyan envisaged that their 
proximity would result in a great simplification of business, by reducing 
the volume of correspondence both between and within departments. His 
outline plan for grouping the main departments in three large new blocks 
reflected a three-fold division of administration: one block was to 
house financial and supervisory departments such as the Treasury, the 
Paymaster General's Office, the Audit Board, the Civil Service Commission 
and the Board of Trade; another was to contain the Departments of State, 
the Home Office, the Foreign Office and the India Office; and a third 
was to be occupied by the service departments, the Admiralty and the
1 Ibid., pp. 554-555.
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War Department.^ Improved communication could, he felt, improve
financial control, particularly that of the Treasury over the revenue
departments. To support his argument he cited the French precedent
of assembling all financial departments under one roof in order to
2
form a Ministry of Finance.
This kind of consolidation could be extended to other departments. 
The formation of the War Department provided, for example, an admirable 
opportunity to group together its component parts - the War Office, 
the Ordnance and the Commissariat. Equally important, the Admiralty 
ou^t to be close by so that all the functions of the service 
departments could "be brought under the immediate view and control of 
the financial and civil administration". Obviously Trevelyan could 
produce no examples to illustrate this entirely hypothetical development, 
so he concentrated on the immediate and practical results that new 
buildings mi^t have in furthering the cause of the separation of 
intellectual and mechanical work by facilitating the exchange of good 
administrative practices and by breaking down inter-departmental 
barriers. From Trevelyan's point of view a specially designed 
building had the advantage of revealing and confirming the real 
distinction between intellectual and mechanical work. When questioned 
about the work done by the clerks of the Treasuiy he stressed that 
only about twelve or so needed a room of their own, the remainder 
could more profitably work in larger rooms: "for the intellectual work
1 Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects, 3rd. series,
XLI (1933) P» 33 reproduces Trevelyan's plan^ It was certainly 
realizable and it gained the serious consideration of Molesworth's 
successor as First Commissioner of Works, Benjamin Hall (T.L.B., 
XXXVI, p. 195)» Trevelyan's proposals were indeed modest compared 
with those later |ut forward by R.M. Bromley. The latter's tabula 
rasa approach involved the total rebuilding of the whole of Whitehall 
XpTp., 1861, 3QOT, pp. 227-255).
2 P.P., 1856, XIV, pp. 556-559.
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separate rooms are necessaiy, so that a person who works with his
head may not he interrupted; but for the more mechanical work, the
working in concert of a number of clerks in the same room under proper
superintendence is the proper mode of meeting it."^
Finally Trevelyan expatiated on the wider political and imperial
implications of his proposals. While the Palace of Westminster
symbolized the traditions of monarchy stretching back to Saxon times,
the Palace of Whitehall symbolized the revolution from which English
liberties had been derived:
I consider that we have a veiy important national duty to
perform in this respect; this city is something more than
the mother of arts and eloquence; she is a mother of nations;
we are peopling two continents, the Western and Southern
Continent, and we are organising, christianising and civilising
large portions of two ancient continents, Africa and Asia; and
it is not right that when the inhabitants of those countries
come to the metropolis, they should see nothing of its ancient
renown. Now I conceive that a plan of the kind I have sketched
(by no means saying that it is.the best plan), would answer the
purpose, and more especially as it would give the honour due '
to the focus of all our liberties, of that regulated freedom
2
which we hope will overspread the world.
The Select Committee refrained in its report from commenting upon such 
problematical advantages but it virtually endorsed the financial 
arguments in favour of comprehensive redevelopment. It proposed that
1 Ibid., p. 559.
2 Ibid., p. 562.
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an open competition should he held for the design of a block plan for 
the Downing Street area and for new Foreign Office and War Office 
buildings.^
Trevelyan’s contribution was to help the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and Benjamin Ball, the First Commissioner of Works, draft 
the advertisement for the competition of 4 August I856. Unfortunately 
an architectural competition did not prove to be the best method of 
achieving a sound practical design. Amidst the controversy that arose 
from Sir George Gilbert Scott’s winning gothic design being set aside 
by Palmerston in favour of an earlier classical design by Pennethome, 
Trevelyan despairingly wrote that he would be satisfied with "plain 
factory fronts".^ The dispute was eventually resolved by Gilbert 
Scott remodelling his design in a classical form in order to meet 
Palmerston’s objections,^ but preoccupation with aesthetic considerations 
precluded fuller consideration of the practical aspects that were of 
greater interest to Trevelyan, not least of which was the delay of 
nearly a decade. However, when Gilbert Scott's government offices 
to house the India and Foreign Offices (the War Office scheme having 
been abandoned) were constructed between 1868 and 1873» they clearly 
represented a large-scale, centralized alternative to the multitude 
of small houses that had housed many departments. The new buildings 
were symbolic of continuing attempts to impose some measure of 
professional uniformity upon a diversity of government departments.
1 Ibid., pp. 535-336" Gladstone, who was not a member of the government 
acidly commented in The Quarterly (CI, April 1857» PP* 578-9) on the 
prodigal civil expenditure of Palmerston's administration and singled 
out for special mention: "the foolish and almost incredible scheme for 
exterminating the whole population between St. James's Park, the river 
and the Houses of Parliament, in order to erect in the solitude thus
to be created, a great 'Palace of Administration'".
2 B. Hall to the Treasury, 5 December I856, P.P., 1857-58, XLVIII,
pp. 334-537" This letter was written in explanation of the sequence 
of events leading up to the competition.
3 Trevelyan to Cardwell, 3 August 1857» T.L.B., XXXVII, p. 87.
4 G.G. Scott, Personal and Professional Recollections (1879)» pp. 177-201,
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Conclusion
Trevelyan's concern for a more efficient and equitable form of 
superannuation and for improved office accommodation indicate the width 
of his view of administrative reform that his position as Assistant 
Secretary had led him to acquire. His significance here, as well as 
in the early development of the Civil Service Commission, is not the 
degree to which he had a decisive influence, but rather the way in which 
his position in the Treasury enabled him to adopt a general overview 
of the inter-related elements of a number of patterns of government 
development. Curiously enough, Trevelyan did not find this general 
aspect of Treasury activity particularly satisfying, since he almost 
invariably preferred to be involved directly in the details of 
administration. The next chapter oil the Commissariat shows Trevelyan 
in such a personally congenial situation.
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Chapter VIII 
CONTROL OF THE COMMISSARIAT
One of the most personally rewarding parts of Trevelyan's work was 
his control of the Commissariat, As the Commissariat was a distinct 
department under the direct control of the Assistant Secretary, it 
was extremely important in the development of Trevelyan's ideas, 
illustrating for him in microcosm many of the problems of Treasury 
control and Civil Service reform.
1 The Work of the Commissariat
Between I84O and 1654 the Commissariat possessed two distinct / 
functions: it provided food, pay and transport for the army overseas; 
and it acted as a government banking service in the colonies.
The first of these functions had its origin in the arrangements, 
made in the time of Marlborough's campaigns, for the appointment of a 
special civilian staff to organize the provision of non-warlike stores. 
For many years, the staff for this purpose - a Commissary-in-Chief and 
his subordinates - had been appointed on an ad hoc basis whenever the 
need arose. However, in I8O9 a Commissary-in-Chief had been appointed 
to supervise the purchase of provisions and the hiring of transport in 
the Peninsula. From this time onwards there had been continuity in 
Commissariat personnel and procedure. Indeed, until the time of the 
Crimean War, the experience of the Peninsular campaigns constituted 
the basis of all thinking on Commissariat organization.
The reduction in the strength of the army after I8I5 resulted 
in the dispersal of Commissariat officers among garrisons in the 
colonies, the placing of many others on half-pay, and the substitution
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of an Agent for Commissariat Supplies for the Commissary-in-Chief*
To ensure economy this new official had his office in the Treasury*
For some years the post of Agent was held by the Assistant Secretary, 
until in I834 this personal connection was confirmed by placing the 
Commissariat under the direct control of the Treasury, with the 
Assistant Secretary specifically in charge of a distinct Commissariat 
department.^
While control of the Commissariat was concentrated in England 
after 1816, Commissariat personnel were deprived of the possibility 
of a home tour of duty. The only exceptions were one or two senior 
officers who were employed in preparing treatises or revising accounts; 
also a few officers were attached to the army in I848 when a Chartist 
rising was feared. In England the Commissariat's work was performed 
by the Ordnance - a department vdiich in wartime only concerned itself 
with warlike stores (guns and ammunition). The nearest thing to a 
home tour of duty was the intermittent periods when the Commissariat 
saw service in Ireland.
The purely financial part of the Commissariat's work arose from 
its administration of an annual Parliamentary vote called the Army 
Extraordinaries. It had first been voted in I686 to provide for 
contingencies, but it had gradually come to include the cost of a 
number of permanent services, such as hospitals and even the salaries 
of clergy in North America. By 1?82, the Extraordinaries had become 
larger than the ordinary militaiy votes, and as a result many details 
of military expenditure evaded sanction by Parliament. This state of 
affairs was revealed by the Commissioners for Examining Public Accounts.
1 Trevelyan himself provides the best short account of the Commissariat's 
work in the first half of the centuiy in his evidence to a 
departmental committee in I848, P.P., 1859, XV, p. 197* A more 
general contemporaiy account is in C.M. Clode, The Military Forces 
of the Crown (I869). A recent description is provided by J. Sweetman, 
"The effect of the Crimean War upon the administration of the British 
A m y  (1852-1856) " (London thesis, 1972), pp. 127-131,
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They reoonmiended that the actual spending of this vote should be
conducted by a civil officer responsible to the Treasury* The vote
was continued as it provided a useful banking balance*^ Commissariat
officers had from the outset managed these funds at local level, and
this they continued to do,, obtaining money by means of bills drawn
upon the Treasury and by cash remittances. From these sources they were
able to make advances towards services contained in other votes. In
1835 the vote for Army Extraordinaries was finally brought to an end,
and the services it provided were included in the votes and estimates
of a number of other departments. However, the so-called Army
Extraordinaries continued to provide a banking service in the colonies.
Yet as it was now made explicit that it could never make final payments,
2the Treasury acquired additional supervision over expenditure.
All this military and financial work was carried out by a staff 
of about 200 officers and clerks. They were deployed at between 
twenty and twenty-four overseas stations, which in turn controlled about 
118 subordinate stations and sixty-five Commissariat Chests at stations 
where cash balances were kept. The officers of the Commissariat 
were half civil, half military; they were granted a constitution by 
the Treasury and a commission by the War Office, so making them subject 
both to Treasury discipline and to military law. One indication of their 
military status was the blue uniform prescribed in Commissariat 
Regulations. The ranks ranged from Commissariat Clerk - with pay at 
7/6 a day, equivalent to an ensign - to Commissary General - with pay
1 C.M. Clode, OP. cit.. I, pp. 111-159*
2 Trevelyan's evidence to the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance 
Expenditure on 10 May 1850, P.P., 1850, X, pp. 451-455, 470*
5 Appendix to Report, Ibid., pp. 1109, 1115*
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at 94/11, equivalent to a major general*^ Little prestige was 
attached to this service and few men of social standing entered it*
It was less glamorous than the army; and less convenient than a 
post in civil departments at home*
2 Staff Reorganization
A Promotion
From the time he first came to the Treasury Trevelyan was concerned
with the reform of the Commissariat. He was, therefore, conscious of
a rather special relationship with his subordinates, particularly as
regards promotion. In I858, he recalled his first steps* "Soon after
my appointment to the charge of the department in January I84O, Sir
Francis Baring ... called my attention to the report of the commission
upon naval and military promotion, of which the Duke of Wellington was
chairman, and desired me to consider idiat changes in this respect
2
were required in the Commissariat. " This was a realistic task in that
the report had pointed out that the Treasury possessed "full power to 
redress any grievances that may be found to affect the officers of this 
Departments". Trevelyan immediately discovered that promotion was 
extremely slow, owing to the large number of officers of middle rank 
who had started their careers during the Napoleonic wars, and also 
because of the return of many half-pay officers to full-pay service.
With Baring's support, the regulations concerning half-pay were 
ti^tened up; in future the half-pay list was to be a refuge only for
1 Trevelyan's evidence of 30 June 1858, War Office Committee on the 
Reorganization of the Commissariat, P.P., 1859, XV, p.198.
2 Ibid.. p. 199.
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senile and hopelessly incompetent officers, for whom a return to 
full-pay would he completely impossible. Some of the older officers 
vho still retained their faculties were transferred from ordinary 
service to work on rearranging accounts and on preparing treatises 
on Commissariat practice. These changes, together with greater 
attention to the overall distribution of ranks when making new 
appointments and promotions, enabled Trevelyan to offer more immediate 
prospects to those who had waited a decade for a deserved promotion.
For example, in a Treasuiy Minute of 11 August I84O, Trevelyan referred 
to some officers who had been twenty-five years in the same rank,
A programme of mass promotion in the lower ranks was initiated* twenty- 
four men who had been first appointed before I8I6 were promoted from 
Deputy Assistant Commissary General to Assistant Commissary General; 
sixteen Clerks were promoted to Depuiy Assistant Commissary General,
In this minute. Baring also established principles - later embodied 
in Commissariat Regulations - for future promotions* there was to be 
an annual investigation of promotion claims, in which the criterion 
was not to be seniority but "recorded merits and services",^ In 
I858 Trevelyan proudly recalled the procedure that was adopted at the 
times
What actually took place was, that towards the close of each 
year, the state of the department was carefully reviewed, the 
casualties that had occurred in the past year were noted ••• 
and the promotions were made on the principle of putting up, 
out of their turn, those who had proved themselves possessed 
of superior qualifications; of passing over those who had 
misconducted themselves, and of promoting the rest according
1 Commissariat Promotion Memorandum Book, P.R.O., W.O., 6I/5 pp. 1-4*
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to senior! Mistakes of course may have been made but the 
promotions were always awarded on strictly public grounds, and 
all idea of interest or of favour was excluded.^
Trevelyan believed that to confine promotions exclusively to seniority 
would have a "deadening effect". At the same time he was convineed 
that, under his direction, there had been a judicious balance of the 
justice of seniority and the efficiency of promotion by merit. Trevelyan's 
promotion memoranda gives ample evidence that he rigorously acted upon these 
principles. The first draft of these memoranda were usually written 
by Thomas Archer, Chief Clerk for Commissariat Business, but they were 
substantially rewritten by Trevelyan. His method of making promotions
later served as a model for proposals in the Northcote-Trevelyan
2report. Trevelyan was rapidly convinced of the effectiveness and 
the justice of what he was doing. In his promotion memorandum dated 
9 December 1342, he recapitulated his achievements# very extensive 
promotion had been made (since I84O, two promotions to Commissary 
General, three to Deputy-C.G., thirty-four to Assistant-C.G. and twenty- 
seven to Deputy-Assistant-C.G. ), yet because of some transfers to half­
pay and a reduction of the number of full-pay officers from 202 to 194» 
the salary bill had only been increased from £46,326 to £47,731*
Fortunately the half-pay list had been reduced from 193 to 184 as a result 
of numerous deaths among the older officers. This reduction saved about 
£2,000. Trevelyan felt that he had defended the interests of Commissariat 
officers, while protecting the public purse. His triumphant mood was 
indicated by his remark towards the close of the memorandum that "no 
grievances remain".^ His perfected system of promotion was now fully 
operational•
1 P.P., 1859, X7, p. 200.
2 P.P., 1854, XXVII, p. 20.
3 P.EÛ., W.O. 6I/3, pp. 15-15.
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Once the machinery was set up, Trevelyan had unbounded faith in
its continued efficiency. Even when the Treasury was about to lose
control of the Commissariat, Trevelyan wrote to C.G. Filder, asking
him for reports on his subordinates in order to consider the Christmas
promotions. Althou^ the Commissariat was beset by the problems of
provisioning the amny during an uneofcpected winter siege, Trevelyan
expected Filder to list the officers in each grade in order of merit.
Characteristically Trevelyan concluded by saying that this task would
not take very long, as Filder must have become ware of their relative
merits.^ When the Commissariat was handed over to the War Office
a month later, in December 1854» Trevelyan wrote to Henry Roberts,
the Permanent Under Secretary, begging him to take care of the
Promotion Memorandum Book as it was "the key to the administration
2
of the Department during the last fifteen years."
B Appointments
Trevelyan had less control over first appointments to the 
Commissariat than he had over promotion. Some Commissariat officers 
started their careers as unestablished extra clerks, but both permanent 
and extra clerks were appointed by patronage. One common practice 
was for some of these appointments to be given to the relatives 
of senior Commissariat officers. Trevelyan entered into the spirit 
of this’, and his memoranda indicate that he selected such officers as 
were entitled to this favour. Although he wrote in 1845 of its 
beneficial effects,^ approval of this practice was belied ten years
1 Trevelyan to Filder, 3 November 1854» T.L.B., XXXIV, p. 285.
2 Trevelyan to Roberts, 26 December 1854, T.L.B., XXXV, p. 54* A few
months later Trevelyan borrowed it back to have a copy made
(Trevelyan to Petrie, 11 May 1855, Ibid.. p. 203)*
3 P.R.O., W.O. 61/3 p* 54*
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later when he had to remind one officer that his nephew had behaved 
so badly since his appointment that he had had to be suspended.^
When ei^t new appointments were made in 1855, Trevelyan was anxious 
that four of them should be regarded as "departmental". Of these, 
one was given to the nephew of C.G. Pine-Coffin (even if the officer 
did not have a son \dio wanted the post, it was legitimate for a distant 
relative to benefit) and the other three to unestablished clerks.^ 
Trevelyan clearly enjoyed the exercise of this additional power over 
his subordinates. On a number of occasions he refused this "boon"
(as he liked to call it), either because the importunate officer had 
not conducted himself well, or because he had the effrontery to ask 
for more than one appointment. For example, D.C.G. Bowers at the Cape 
was reproached for ingratitude for the appointment he had already 
received, when Trevelyan discovered that he provided another son with 
a local temporary appointment. Trevelyan insisted that this appointment 
should be cancelled.^ Trevelyan was fairly satisfied with these 
arrangements, althou^ he later became more guarded about them. When 
he was being questioned in 1854 by the Select Committee on the A m y  
before Sebastopol, he was not being perfectly truthful \dien he denied 
that he would only employ gentlemen connected with the Treasury or 
the Commissariat.^ Althou^ he bad no reason to be ashamed, Trevelyan 
had come by this time to commit himself to the merits of open 
competition and he naturally had no wish to draw attention to the
1 Trevelyan to MoClean, 15 December 1855, T.L.B., XXX, p.124.
2 Monorandum of 12 JanuEŒy 1855, P.R.O., W.O. 61/3 p. 201.
5 Trevelyan to Bowers, 3 Februaiy 1854, T.L.B., XXXII, pp. 275-275*
For other examples of Trevelyan's small-scale patronage, see 
T.L.B., III, p. 2; VI, pp. 84, 207*
4 Evidence of 20 April 1855, P.P., 1854-55, IX (ii), p. 92. He
emphasized that the employment of centrally recruited staff gave the 
Treasury greater control over commercial operations, since - unlike 
locally recruited personnel - they were entirely dependent on the 
Treasury for their future prospects.
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close patronage he had once hdped to exercise.
Trevelyan did have misgivings about the educational attainments of 
the young men who were appointed. His misgivings were tempered by the 
satisfaction he felt in making the system work as well as it could.
With the benefit of fourteen years* experience he described in 1855 
to the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol how he had 
succeeded in eliminating the worst candidates nominated by the Patronage 
Secretaiy. He felt that public money would have been saved if instead 
he had been in a position to select the best. The methods that Trevelyan 
actually used were quite simple % he "screwed up" the qualifying 
examination as much as he could, and he insisted that the period of 
probation should be really meaningful. Trevelyan went on to report 
that a considerable number had been "weeded out" for lack of application 
or ability* "Whether it was their fault or not, we removed them from 
the department, sometimes allowing them a few months* pay." This 
is shown in more detail in the sparse record of clerks' progress that 
Trevelyan kept at the end of the Promotion Memorandum Book. The list 
starts in I84O and ends in June 1854 - it appears not to have been 
continued after its transfer to the War Office - and contains about 
200 names. Most clerks were appointed D.A.C.G. after three years, 
and against their names Trevelyan sometimes wrote "bene" or "optime".
A few took much longer, and against one clerk who was six years in this 
rank he wrote; "Will become a good officer in time if put under a 
strict officer". Against another who took seven years, he put: "Will 
never make a good officer - devoted to his pleasures - has received a 
very limited education - orthography bad". During this fourteen year
1 Evidence of 18 April 1855, Ibid., p. 74*
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period, there were tea dismissals (one the result of a sentence of
transportation after a conviction for fraud), compared with IO4
promotions and nine deaths or resignations*^ Compared with the
purely nominal system of probation for Treasuiy clerks, this was an
impressive record.
Despite his dissatisfaction with the quality of some new entrant^,
Trevelyan appeared so pleased with his own achievements in organizing
the department, that it was inevitable that the Select Committee on the
Army before Sebastopol should question him as to why the Commissariat
had not been more successful in the Crimea. Trevelyan stoutly
denied that the Commissariat had failed, but here he hinged his
explanation upon the need for better selection: "the quality of a
manufactured article depends mainly upon the raw material, and unless you
have a h i ^  standard of raw material you cannot have a first-rate 
2
article." Trevelyan's experience of controlling the Commissariat 
increasingly made him regard personnel management as a comparatively 
simple mechanical process.
C Personnel Management
Although Trevelyan had immense faith in administrative systems, 
he took delight in personally supervising the work of Commissariat officers. 
In this, as in all other business connected with the Commissariat, he
X
relied heavily upon Archer, Chief Clerk of the Commissariat Department.
1 P.R.O., W.O. 61/3, unpaginated at end.
2 p.p., 1854-55, IX (ii), p.75.
3 Archer was equally concerned with improving the Commissariat department 
of the Treasuiy. In his memorandum of 10 December 1847» he pointed 
out that the volume of business had expanded from 5880 letters in
I845 to 7600 letters in 1847* He also hoped that.Trevelyan would 
do something to improve the status and prospects of the clerks (P.R.O., 
W.O. 61/3, pp. 126-127). This plea was partially answered by the 
reorganization of I848 - one which paralleled the changes in the 
rest of the Treasury in that it freed senior officers from routine work 
and improved salaries (Treasury Minute of 29 June 1854» P.F*, 1854» 
xxni, pp. 47-49).
— 2Ô0 —
Both men were in agreement over the principles to he adopted in order 
to exclude the grossly incompetent and the chronically sick. In 
his memorandum for I848, for example, Archer suggested that four men 
who had served between thirty-four and thirty-eight years should be 
promoted to A.C.G., and then prematurely retired on half-pay. He 
justified the expense "by the superior efficiency and the benefit to 
be derived from the intelligence and activity of the rising officers". 
Trevelyan readily accepted this involved manoeuvre, which alone made 
possible the retirement of old officers by ensuring them an adequate 
income *
Trevelyan was convinced of the need for positive incentives. With
the new method of making promotions, he was in a good position to
balance the principles of hope and fear* "Evezy young ccxnmissary looks
to become à commissary general, and he knows that all his prospects in
life depend on his merit, and that on every occasion of a promotion his
conduct will be severely scrutinized, and he is, therefore, exceedingly
anxious to keep well with the Treasuiy. You do not have that advantage
in the Ordnance Civil Service, or in the case of the regimental pay- 
2
masters." In his day-to-day letters to Commissariat officers, Trevelyan 
made sure that this situation would never be long forgotten. He sometimes 
adopted an intimate tone, so as to be better able to chide and exhort 
in the same breath. In I64I for example, in appointing an officer to 
be in charge of a station he observed that Baring was satisfied that he 
had selected an officer of "unimpeached honour and integrity, animated 
by a genuine zeal for the public interest and possessed of an extensive 
knowledge of the profession", vdiile at the same time reminding that only 
highly successful service had eradicated an earlier unfavourable impression
1 Commissariat Promotion Memorandum Book, P.R.O., W.O. 61/5, pp. 57» 77.
2 Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure, Trevelyan's evidence 
of 10 May I85O, P.P., I850, X, pp. 457-459* ,
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of his "temper and discretion". Trevelyan concluded with the hope
that the recipient would never have to forfeit his post, together with
his personal congratulations.^
This tone was most common in letters written in the early 1840s
when Trevelyan had fewer other tasks to distract him from the management
of the Commissariat, and vhen he doubtless felt that many officers ,
needed guidance in the ways of the revitalized Commissariat. When an
A.C.G.'6 allowance was doubled, Trevelyan was not above suggesting that
this should not be the occasion for extravagance, but rather that the
officer should adopt "such a moderate and economical style of living as
will furnish a guarantee for the prudent and independent discharge of his
public trust - to which object and not to that of vying with persons whose
main ground of distinction consists in their wealth, his ambition ou^t 
2
to be directed." On another occasion, he replied to a request for more 
pay on account of an increased volume of work, by suggesting that the 
officer ought to feel glad that he had an opportunity to reveal his merits 
as a claim for future promotion.^ To an officer being transferred from 
the Ionian Islands to China in 1843, be remarked that he would be doing 
him an injustice if he stressed that it was his duty to accept without 
question a less favourable station.^ To another who complained of 
feeling unwell during the Irish emergency, Trevelyan said nothing beyond
5
assuring him that his personal sacrifice was in a good cause. Sometimes
1 Trevelyan to Knowles, 21 January I84I, T.L.B., I, p.l9*
2 Trevelyan to A.C.G. Stickney, I3 May I84I, Ibid., p.51.
3 Trevelyan to A.C.G. Bowers, I4 July I84I, Ibid., p.61.
4 Trevelyan to Foote, 22 March 1843, T.L.B., II, p.l?l.
5 Trevelyan to Hewetson, 27 January 1847, P.P., 1847, LII, p.371*
— 262 —
Trevelyan's rather paternalistic interest was more constructive. One
instance of this was the efforts he made in I842 to ensure that the
son of A.C.G. Maclean should he able to go to Sandhurst on the same
favourable terms that were available to the sons of militaiy officers.
Of course, he was equally concerned to secure implicit recognition of
the improved status he was seeking for the Commissariat.^
Whatever Commissariat officers thought about Trevelyan's advice
and encouragement, they had little chance to express their feelings.
Separated from each other by the distance of their stations and with
no prospect of home service, the Treasury as personified by Trevelyan
was their only link. Certainly Trevelyan appreciated their efforts,
even if he usually presented an austere front to them. When he
finally surrendered control of the Commissariat, Trevelyan wrote to
one junior officer, thanking the officers as a whole for the support
they had given him over the years. For his part, he felt that he was
leaving "the system in a more advanced state and the position and the
2general estimation of the officers better than I found them". This was 
borne out by the testimony of two Commissariat officers before a 
departmental committee in 1858. They admitted that the Assistant 
Secretary's methods were fairer and more intelligible than the lack of 
method that characterized administration by the War Office. Fishing 
for compliments, Trevelyan asked one A.C.G. at this inquiry whether 
Commissariat officers had ever had to appeal to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. The reply was extremely gratifying ; "No, we never found it
necessary to appeal, because the Assistant Secretary had sufficient power, 
and invariably investigated personally every complaint. The officers of 
the department had such confidence in his justice and sympathy that they 
never wished to appeal after his decisions*"^
1 Trevelyan to A.C.G. Maclean, 8 October I842, T.L.B., II, p.116.
2 Trevelyan to A.D.C.G. Smith, 8 December 1854, T.L.B., XXXV, p. 253.
3 Evidence of A.C.G. Watt on 6 July 1858 in answer to a question by
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D Training and Professionalism
Practical involvement in the details of promotion, appointment 
and day-to-day management led Trevelyan to consider such general issues 
as training and professional status. He elaborated his views in the 
memoranda he prepared in 1850 for submission to the Select Committee on 
Army Expenditure* In his memorandum on training he was anxious that 
the Commissariat should be placed on a sound permanent footing, rather 
than wait until a war emergency forced the Treasury to appoint 
temporary staff. Wartime waste and profusion could only be prevented 
by sound professional habits - habits which in turn could only be 
acquired by prolonged training. Indeed, this training, linked with 
experience, was the only effective safeguard for the public against 
the unscrupulousness of businessmen. Proof of the need for this 
degree of professionalism was, he felt, to be found in the inefficiency 
of the Indian Commissariat caused by the secondment of officers from 
the army* Furthermore Commissariat officers needed to possess "the 
highest mental and morsd qualities" - qualities of the kind that Trevelyan 
later prescribed for "intellectual" Civil Servants.^ Both for the 
Commissariat and for the Civil Service as a whole Trevelygin advocated
1 "Memorandum by Sir C.E. Trevelyan on. the Training of Commissariat 
Officers for Active Service", 1 May 1850, P.P., I85O, pp. IO57-58.
Trevelyan, War Office Committee on the Commissariat, P.P., 1859, 
XV, p.255. This view was shared by A.C.G. Fonblanque (Ibid..
p. 247).
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a special kind of professionalism that could not safely be imported, 
but could only be produced by training in the service.
Trevelyan realized that the Commissariat needed a home tour of duty
to help make it more truly professional. Service in England with the
army could obviously accustom military and Commissariat to co-operate -
something that would otherwise have to be leamt during a campaign.
Home service would also remove the grievance that arose from officers
being destined to a lifetime overseas.^ In September I848, Trevelyan
suggested to Bussell, that the Commissariat's proven usefulness in
Ireland should lead to a permanent establishment in England and, indeed,
2
to an extension of the Commissariat's functions. Although Bussell 
ignored Trevelyan's immediate proposal for a special committee to 
explore these possibilities, the ecomonical crisis of February I848 
(the same crisis that sparked off the investigation of the Civil Service) 
led to a detailed examination of the Commissariat. Trevelyan found 
himself in a strong position as the main witness for the Commissariat 
before the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure. For 
the benefit of this Committee, Trevelyan produced a further memorandum, 
in which he pointed out that the morale of the Commissariat had been 
undermined by uncertainty about the various schemes for dismembering 
the department which had been considered at one time or another. Between 
1838 and I846 there had been no home tour of duty, except during 
emergencies, and the Commissariat's work had been performed by the 
Ordnance. In this respect Trevelyan claimed that the Commissariat had
1 Trevelyan vigorously defended the few perquisites open to Commissariat 
officers. One of these was an extra step in rank as a reward for 
those who had served in the notoriously unhealthy West African stations. 
On the grounds of justice and necessary incentive, he resisted an 
attempt by W.G. Hayter to interfere with this arrangement (Trevelyan
to Hayter, October I85I, T.L.B., XXVII, p. 266).
2 Trevelyan to Bussell, 23 September I848, T.L.B., XXII, p. 259*
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been used as a mere convenience, without any regard for the feelings
and just claims of the officers. He described with enthusiasm the
efficient way in which the Commissariat had provided for the forces
assembled at Manchester and Liverpool at the time of the Chartist
crisis, but concluded* "Yet, as soon as the restoration of tranquillity
rendered it possible for these duties to be performed by other
departments, it was proposed that the Commissariat, which had borne
the burthen and heat of the day, should be laid aside and sent back
to their work in the colonies, in favour of those departments."^
Apart from the justice of providing a home tour, Trevelyan was
convinced that the Commissariat could extend its duties to public
advantage, particularly in the supervision of contracts. In another
memoremdum produced at this time, he asserted that: "With the help
of railroads, a deputy commissary-general acting under the eye of
the Treasuiy, with one or two officers of inferior rank, would be able
to form and superintend the execution of all the commissariat contracts
in Great Britaini, and might give much valuable assistance in regard
to the prison and police contracts; and these with the commissariat
officers serving in Ireland, would if war broke out, furnish a
disposable body of experienced officers whose agency mi^t be of the
2
highest national use." A Commissariat establishment in England could, 
therefore, begin to form part of a machine for financial supervision.
Trevelyan's view of professionalism was a paradoxical one; his 
desire to improve the status of Commissariat officers was partly
1 "Memorandum .... on the claims of the Commissariat Department to a 
Tour of Home Service", 16 May I85O, P.P., I85O, X, p.1059.
2 "Commissariat Duties in Great Britain", submitted to the Committee 
on 14 May I85O, Ibid.. p. 505*
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contradicted by his faith in the regulations that were to guide all 
their actions. This faith was shared by most Commissariat officers, 
and it was constantly renewed by Trevelyan's references to "regularity**# 
Moreover, Trevelyan felt that it was one of his main tasks to improve 
these regulations by making them more ccmiprehensive and consistent.
He made use of the most senior serving officer, C.G. Randolph South, 
on his return from Canada in I843. Routh was first employed on 
rearranging accounts, and then on the simplification and clarification 
of Commissariat regulations.^ Both Trevelyan and Routh believed that 
if rules were made consistent and readily intelligible, it would be 
possible to command absolute obedience to them. The editions of the 
Commissariat Code which appeared under Trevelyan's signature in 1843,
I83I and I832 replaced an obsolete book of regulations and a great 
number of circulars. This compilation was comprehensive; it ranged 
from rules governing first appointments to the provisioning of an 
army in the field. Seventeen numbered forms at the back were designed 
to ensure uniformity in accounting. With Trevelyan's encouragement,
I
Sir John Bissett, a retired officer with experience in the Napoleonic
2wars, produced a more general and practical guide. His manual. 
Commissariat Field Service, was intended to instruct young Commissariat 
officers and it dealt with most practical matters from the purchase of a 
personal outfit to the layout of stores and depots. Trevelyan was
I
confident of the improved system that these manuals betokened, and he 
was impatient with those who were unacquainted with it. For example, 
when he was questioned by the Sebastopol Committee on whether a requisition 
had been delayed because a signature was an inch too low on the form.
1 Ibid.. p. 1078.
2 Trevelyan to Bissett, 4 June I846, T.L.B., 711, p. 24.
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he replied that the Coimnissariat officer concerned frequently had 
reason to complain of the irregularity with which the ration returns 
had been made out, but denied the truth of this specific incident,^ 
However, he realized that the outcry in The Times against bureaucratic 
methods in the Crimea could not be lightly dismissed. In answer to 
criticisms that urgent medical supplies had been refused for want 
of a requisition, he suggested in a latter to Lord Panmure, Secretaiy 
for War in Palmerston's cabinet, that there ought to be special 
regulations for such emergencies. He admitted that the best security 
against serious irregularity was "a correct state of feeling" rather 
than "positive regulation". However good the rules devised under his 
own aegis, Trevelyan could not safely deny the exercise of professional 
discretion. Indeed, he stressed in his later evidence that the 
Treasury's regulations combined "a provision for departing from our 
system, and making an exception from it but still preserving the 
responsibility and check.
3 Staff Reductions
While Trevelyan was concerned to organize the Commissariat as a 
career service, he had a more immediate and pressing responsibility 
to ensure economy, by keeping the establishment as small as possible.
This applied to locally recruited subordinate staff as well as to the 
officers appointed by the Treasuiy. It was obviously difficult to 
reconcile staff reductions with Ihe variable demand for men to serve 
in stations where military action was taking place. For example, in 
March 1844 Trevelyan wrote a circular letter to all Commissariat officers 
in charge of stations, informing them that he was awaiting with anxiety
1 Evidence of 17 April I855, P.P., I854-55, IX, (ii), p.29.
2 February 1855, JUÜ.V, p« 96.
3 P.P., 1854-55, IX (ii), p. 109.
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news of the reductions that they were to make, and ordering them to take
extra care in preparing their estimates and in explaining any increases.^
However, in the following year Trevelyan was hard pressed to find
sufficient officers for additional responsibilities in the Gold Coast,
South Australia, New Zealand and China. At this stage he recognized
the difficulties and potential dangers inherent in such slender staff
margins. Tet his main fears were of wastefulness rather than
inefficient organization, should it at some stage become necessary to
provide Commissariat services on the scale of the Peninsular campaigns.
He never envisaged that the Commissariat could ever fail to provision
an army, but he felt that a large scale war would lead to hurriedly
appointed staff, and consequently to slack contracting of the kind that
2had characterized the early stages of the Peninsular War. This 
essentially traditional view of military requirements was typical of 
this period. But Trevelyan at least felt that the new Commissariat 
officers who were being appointed had acquired significance in 
constituting a nucleus of leadership in such an eventuality. This 
idea of a comparatively small elite finds its parallel in later 
consideration of the division of labour in the Civil Service.
In I846, such a nucleus had to be hurriedly gathered together 
to supervise famine relief in Ireland. One of the special functions 
of the permanent staff involved was to imbue their temporarily recruited 
colleagues with an appropriate sense of economy. In this operation, 
Trevelyan had in Sir Randolph Routh someone who was acutely conscious 
of the Treasury's concern for economy. The whole of the relief
1 T.L.B., III, p.193.
2 Commissariat Memorandum, I5 December 1845, P.R.O., W.O. 61/3 p.57*
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operation was conceived within the traditional framework of contract 
and carefully accounted-for distribution* In his endeavour that all 
government interference, whatever its form, should be kept within the 
"narrowest possible limits", Trevelyan wore himself out in controlling 
matters of minute detail from London* Here the efficient working of 
the Commissariat was confused with Trevelyan*s zeal to extend and to 
develop the Treasury*s supervision; a confusion that arose from the 
Commissariat being both an executive and supervisory department within 
the Treasury*
By I848, however, reduced military commitments in China,
Australia and Africa and the end of Irish relief operations led 
Trevelyan to feel that at last his staff was large enough* For the 
next five years no new appointments needed to be made* This was most 
convenient, since the economical Select Committee of I848 resulted in 
pressure for reductions in the Commissariat, as it did in the whole 
Civil Service* In October 1849# Trevelyan sent a Treasury circular 
letter to officers in charge of stations asking them to describe in 
detail the duties of their staff. In particular, economies were expected 
to be achieved by the reduction of temporary staff and by the curtailment 
of every aspect of Commissariat business, including the volume of 
correspondence*^ It was soon apparent from the replies that spectacular 
reductions would be impossible. At Gibraltar, for example, it was 
reported that the subordinate staff of ten persons were constantly
2
employed and yet were barely able to complete the wodc of the station.
In Canada, one of the largest and most important stations, C.G. Filder 
agreed to reduce his staff from thirty-eight to thirty-five, but 
observed that if the troops were ever ordered to move from their depots.
1 Appendix to the Report and Proceedings from the Select Committee 
on Army and Ordnance Expenditure, P.P., I85O, X, p.1080.
2 Ibid** p*1087.
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he would not have an officer to spare for field service.^ Even in 
Canada, with the perennial risk of insurrection, the Commissariat was 
placed on a static basis.
By I85O Trevelyan was able to report in his annual memorandum a
saving of £9#000, while claiming that the Commissariat was still equal
2
to its existing tasks. When he gave an overall picture of Commissariat 
costa to the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure, Trevelyan 
produced a memorandum to show that although the volume of business had 
increased since I84O and that there were twenty-seven more full-pay 
officers, a reduction of forty-two in the half-pay list had resulted in 
a proportionate saving of £5,040. In effecting these small-scale 
economies Trevelyan was faithfully performing an assignment set him by 
his political superiors; he was not expected by them to take the 
initiative in suggesting constructive improvements. Consequently 
Trevelyan never pressed strongly for a reserve of staff to meet 
emergencies*
Even during the Crimean War, when the Commissariat was about to be 
taken from his control, Trevelyan was planning staff reductions* He 
was mistakenly convinced that Sebastopol would fall before the end of 
1854 and that consequently the war would soon be over* He wrote to
C.G. Filder on 2 September 1854 to tell him that his Commissariat 
establishment had seldom been equalled for its extent, efficiency and 
ccttidition. However, he went on to ask him to prepare his half-yearly 
statement of the establishment with special care# and to begin to reduce 
the establishment by sending less efficient officers home.^
1 Filder to Trevelyan, 4 May I849, Ibid., p.1080*
2 P.R*0*, W*0* 61/3 pp* 158-144
3 Appendix, Commissariat Promotions, 1 May I85O, P.P., I85O, X, pp* 
1106-10.
4 T.L*B., XXXIT, p*208.
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4 The Commissariat in Action
Trevelyan *s perennial concern for econony makes a good starting 
point for examining the way that the Commissariat actually worked. To
a greater or lesser degree, considerations of economy permeate all
the aspects that are to he considered* the operation of ihe Commissariat 
Chests; African campaigns; the Irish emergency; the transfer of the 
Commissariat to the War Office; and the Crimean campaign.
A The Commissariat Chests
Just before Trevelyan came to the Treasury, the Army Extraordinaries
fund was subjected to a much needed and urgent review. The next eight
years were devoted to keeping the balances in order. Prom his evidence
to the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure, it seems that
in 1859 the fund had been about two million pounds in debt to the army
grants. But when the accounts were eventually made up, it became
apparent that large sums raised by the sale of Treasury bills abroad
had never been repaid from the army grants. In fact there was a favourable
balance of £1,260#000. Trevelyan was pround of this discovery as it
demonstrated the honesty of the Treasury* "And it is due to the Treasury
to say that this result has been worked out by -the Executive Government
without any pressure from Parliament, and without its being even known
that there was such a balance at the disposal of Parliament."^ To prevent
this situation from arising again, the fund was renamed in I84O the
Commissariat Chest Account, and formally established as a rigorously 
2managed fund.
1 Evidence of 10 May I85O, X, p.450.
2 Treasury Minute of I84O quoted by Trevelyan, Ibid, pp. 471-472.
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What had started as an accountant's problem, Trevelyan turned into a 
scheme of immediately practicable Treasury control. He realized that the 
accounts had become confused and overdrawn in the past because Commissariat 
officers had not been strictly enough controlled in these operations.
He ordered that in future the balances held in each Commissariat Chest 
should be limited by regulation.^ Trevelyan pestered Commissariat 
officers to keep their accounts up-to-date and insisted that smaller 
balances should be kept in the Chests in order to have more funds 
available in England for the redemption of bills drawn against the 
Treasury. Trevelyan's letter books indicate his persistence in reducing 
balances at each station to an ave;rage of two months' expenditure. He 
reminded one officer that if everyone wanted a larger balance, heavier 
taxation would be needed.^ This kind of pressure seems to have worked, 
in that balances in the Chests were reduced from £1,550,000 in I84O to 
£470,000 in I85O. This was in part due to the improved system of 
estimates, according to idiioh the department that provided a given 
service had to account for its own expenditure. Under this new system 
from I845 onwards, the Commissariat prepared estimates for the services 
it provided - provisions, forage, fuel and li^t. Thus, the Treasury 
had influence as an executive department as well as through its super­
visory function in keeping expenditure within accustomed limits. By 
I85O Trevelyan realized that further reductions would be impossible, 
when he showed in a written statement that by his careful management 
total Commissariat balances were £29,715 within the limit of an average 
of two months' expenditure.^
1 Ibid., pp. 451-452.
2 Circular letter to Commissaries, 8 December I84O, T.L.B., I, p.15; 
Trevelyan to Knowles, 5 Hovember I84I, Ibid., p.74* By 1849 the average 
Chest balance was 2IÔ/24 months' expenditure (Appendix to the Report of 
the Select Committee on Ariqy and Ordnance Expenditure, P.P., I85O, X# 
p.ll50>
5 Trevelyan to D.C.G. Palmer, 18 March I84I, T.L.B.# I, p.52.
4 Appendix, I4 May I85O, P.P., 1850, X# pp. 1128-51.
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Trevelyan's attitudes were partly formed and also mirrored by those 
of an experienced officer like C.G. Randolph Routh. He was one of those 
officers whose experience was embodied in the revision of Commissariat 
regulations. He also produced a manual which described double-entry 
book-keeping as "a copious index of our affairs". Like Trevelyan, he 
put the financial responsibilities of the Commissariat first* "The 
Commissariat is essentially a Financial Department, and its other duties 
grow out of the position in which the former are exercised; the first is 
the principal operation and the second consequent on it, to meet the 
convenience and necessities of the service that require them to be 
united. The Public have an interest in this liaison, because the whole 
expenditure passes undividedly under the review of the Board of Audit, 
and secures an impartial examination and report."^ The Commissariat was, 
therefore, an outpost of Treasury influence - an outpost that Trevelyan 
was very reluctant to abandon, even where it could be shown that its 
maintenance was veiy costly. For example, it was suggested by the 
Select Committee on Arny and Ordnance E^enditure that the annual cost 
of the Commissariat establishment in the Bahamas was £900 as compared 
with an average Chest balance of £400, it would be better to close 
the establishment and allow the governor to manage the funds in the Chest, 
Normally Trevelyan would have welcomed any small saving, but here he 
reacted strongly against the proposal* "The first objection would be that 
he is not an officer of the Treasury, and would not be under our control; 
and I conceive that for the safe custody and due and economical 
management of the public monies abroad, it is absolutely necessary that 
we should have our own officers.*^ His particular objection to such an
1 R.I. Routh, Observations on Commissariat Field Service and Home 
Defences (2nd. ed. I852)# p. 127.
2 Evidence of 10 May I85O, P.P., I85O, X, p. 453*
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arrangement was that governors would be unable to resist colonial
pressure for unauthorized expenditure, and that this would in turn
lesid to the inflation of balances. Trevelyan's solution to the problem
of small Commissariat establishments was to suggest additional duties
for them. In a memorandum he proposed that the Commissariat should
undertake the work of the Navy Victualling Agents in small stations
like the Bahamas. This arrangement had been shown to work where naval
vessels called infrequently# as at Bermuda, St. Helena, Sierra Leone
and Sydney; it would save salaries, ensure larger and more economical
contracts, and spare the Admiralty the task of attempting to find men
of sufficient integrity and ability to act as its agents.^ This logical
development of extending Commissariat, and implicitly Treasury, influence
never materialized.
The actual management of the Commissariat Chests was simple yet
effective. Depending on the monetary resources of the station, funds
were either raised locally by bills drawn on the Treasury or by the
proceeds of Crown receipts, or by imports of specie. This specie was
shipped from England, except in the case of stations in the Americas which
2were kept supplied by a special establishment in Mexico. These funds, 
forming the working cash balances, were stored in the Chests or 
strongboxes, for colonial banks were as suspect as colonial governors. 
Quite apart from the possibility of failure, Trevelyan felt that there 
would be pressure on the Commissariat to preserve the banks' solvency 
at those times of crisis vhen funds would be required for military 
preparations.^ The actual physical control of the money by the officer 
in charge (he had one key to the Chest and his subordinate another) put 
the Treasuzy in a strong position. In his evidence in I85O, Trevelyan
1 Memorandum dated 19 June 1850, Ibid.. pp. 1144-45*
2 Ibid., p. 472.
5 Ibid., p. 453*
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described how the banking and supply sides had come to be inextricably 
intertwined in the persons of the Commissariat officers, and how this 
development reinforced Treasuzy influence at local level - in that 
Commissariat officers could only depart fz?om established financial 
regulations with the permission of the Tzreasuiy. In effect the Commissariat 
was "the executive of the Treasury in reference to the greater part of 
the military and colonial expenditure"©^ Trevelyan's elaboration and 
defence of this watchdog role was a sound strategy to adopt before an 
economical Select Committee. The Committee's report never for a moment 
questioned the rightness of the Treasury's control of the Commissariat.
B Field Service in Africa, 1846-47 and 1851
Bearing in mind Trevelyan's claims about the flexibility of 
financial contzrol, it is interesting to consider how the Commissariat 
actually worked during a small-scale war. Between the Peninsukdr and 
Crimean Wars virtually all Commissariat field-sezrvioe took place in 
stations whezre the officers were reasonably familiar with the country 
and were accustomed to supplying the troops of their station. Only 
in Canada and in Cape Colony did the scale of military operations call 
for the rapid recruitment of extra staff and for the solution of 
unprecedented problems. At the Cape the Commissariat's methods showed 
dangerous signs of weakness.
Even Trevelyan had to admit in 1850 that the Kaffir War of I846-7 
showed that the accountancy-orientated Commissariat was inadequate in 
an unconventional and hi^ly dispersed campaign*
1 Ibid.. p© 509.
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It was not equal to the exigency of a levy en masse over the
whole colony. The pressure upon the department at the frontier
was extreme ; perhaps a 100 posts and detachments had to be
provided with money and provisions and the ordinary establishment
of the commissariat was quite insufficient for the purpose; it
was only by appointing a number of people who were not thorou^ly
competent, and had not been trained, but vh.o were the best to be
had, that the establishment was made sufficient for the service
on the frontier, and it necessarily follows that it could not be
equal to the arrangements for carrying on the equipment of the
1
burgher force in every village of the colony.
These emergency arrangements even led to accusations by the governor of
the Cape, Sir Henry Pottinger, of serious financial laxity. When he
contrasted this with the stricter methods employed in the Indian Civil
Service, Trevelyan found himself defending flexibility against regularity
in a situation where the dispersed nature of operations called for
2speedy local decisions about pay and rations.
The Select Committee remained critical of the Commissariat's 
handling of the campaign. The Commissariat's attention to the wants 
of an army in the field was rewarded by a reproach that the Board of 
Audit had complained of slowness in the submission of authorities for 
most of this extraordinary expenditure. Trevelyan himself was criticised 
for having recommended the promotion of the officer with overall 
responsibility, C.G. Palmer. Trevelyan defended himself by saying that 
only after all the accounts had been completed would it be possible 
to question the competence of Palmer.
1 Evidence of 10 May 1850# P.P., I85O, X, p.478.
2 Ibid.. p.479.
3 Ibid.# P.48O.
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Practical as well as financial difficulties were experienced in
the Kaffir war# Most of these were concerned with transport* the
provision of transport animals in drought conditions and the replacement
of losses caused by native depredations. It was only as a result of
hard experience that Commissariat officers took to using mules fed on
c o m  in place of oxen. In his evidence in 1850 one of the officers
involved, D.C.G. Watt, denied the feasibility of prior experiment
on the grounds that this would have been even more wasteful. Such a
lack of detailed guidance and planning was symptomatic of the professional
Commissariat attitude. This attitude was also illustrated by the same
officer's observation that despite the peculiar local difficulties of
the Kaffir wars, the experience of a commissary in Canada in peace-time
would be relevant and useful in such a situation. After all, he would
be conversant with the regulations, and he would also be able to apply
his skills in accountancy.^
Criticism of Commissariat vigilance made Trevelyan even more
concerned than usual with economy in the Kaffir campaign of 1851.
Not only did he enjoin economy in general terras to the officer in
charge, but he even suggested that a substantial saving of 12/- per
2
100 lb. could be made if biscuit were purchased in London. Concern for 
detail of this kind could do nothing to perfect the Commissariat as 
part of a military machine. At no stage did anyone suggest that 
Trevelyan should do anything more than provide an acceptable service 
at the lowest possible cost. Indeed despite its preoccupation with 
accounts, the Commissariat was not criticised by military officers. 
According to Pox Maule, Secretary at War in 1850, the Commissariat in
1 Evidence of 18 June I85O, Ibid.. p.706.
2 Treasury Minute, 7 March I85I, P.R.O., T.I/564IB/5052.
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its existing form was accepted as an essential part of emny organization.^
Only Trevelyan's hints indicated that the permanent staff was set at a
dangerous minimum; and these hints were not seriously regarded, since
Trevelyan had at the same time to substantiate his claim to sustained
Treasury vigilance. Although it is difficult to imagine any administration
in the 1840s and 1850s devoting mon^ to military refinements, Trevelyan's
concern for accountability produced an impression that the Commissariat
would always be adequate for performing its supervisoiy functions,
whatever the scale of military operations. This was an impression
that Trevelyan helped to confirm when he boasted to Lord Hardinge in
December 1852 that the Commissariat was, as a result of the fair
treatment that it had received at the hands of the Treasury, "never
2
in a more efficient state".
C Operations in Ireland, 1845-47
The Irish potato famine gave the Commissariat a chance to under­
take a much larger supply operation than anything attempted since the 
Peninsular War. As a government department that possessed experience 
of buying and distributing food in bulk, only the Commissariat was 
able to implement Peel's initial decision to buy Indian C o m  and to 
keep it in reserve as a price control.^ Through his overall 
responsibility for the Commissariat, Trevelyan became involved in what 
started as a limited, almost commercial, operation, and which progressively
1 Evidence of 22 February 1850, P.P., I85O, X, p.18.
I Trevelyan to Hardinge, 12 December 1852, T.L.B., XXX, p.105*
5 There had been numerous Irish potato famines from the eighteenth century 
onwards. On these occasions, the resulting distress had been mainly 
relieved by charitable efforts, although with some government 
assistance. Peel's relief plan was in part original. As he did 
not wish to interfere with the principle of free trade in cereals.
Peel had decided to spend £100,000 on Indian c o m  - a cereal that 
was both extremely cheap and also unknown on the English market.
Peel hoped, therefore, that his action would not compete with any 
established trade, while at the same time serving to deter any 
excessive rise in c o m  prices. (C. Voodham Smith, The Great Hunger.
1962, pp. 58, 55.)
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became extended to include supervision of the Irish Board of Works and the 
Irish Poor Law* Since the Commissariat provided the nucleus of Trevelyan's 
supervisory personnel for much of the emergency, it is appropriate to 
consider his involvement in Irish affairs as an aspect of his work with 
the Commissariat *
Aware of the disastrous consequences of the bli^t of the potato
crop in the autumn of 1845, Peel ordered the establishment of a Relief
Commission in Dublin, Set up in November, its objects were fourfold*
the encouragement of local relief committees to buy food and to provide
work; the organization by the Irish Board of Works of road-building
works; the establishment of fever hospitals; and the sale of Indian
c o m  whenever it proved necessary to force down prices,^ Trevelyan
immediately became concerned with the last operation through the
appointment of C.G. Sir Randolph Routh, a senior and distinguished
Commissariat officer, to be in charge of it. Trevelyan was convinced -
that Routh, with his extensive experience in the Peninsula and in Canada,
was the best man to be put in charge of an extensive emergency feeding 
2operation.
Although the greatest relismce had originally been placed on those 
parts of the plan that called for local initiative and for the effect­
iveness of public works in providing employment, it soon became apparent 
that the actual provision of food was going to be the most important 
factor in actually averting famine. Thus, the Commissariat's supervision 
of Indian com supplies became a central feature of relief operations.
The Commissariat, and therefore Trevelyan, became preoccupied with the 
multifarious problems of milling the grain, establishing depots and 
distributing meal by selling it to local relief committees. Trevelyan,
1 Ibid., pp. 61-62. The main narrative throughout this section is 
derived from this source.
2 Trevelyan to Freemantle, 28 November 1845» T.L.B., V, quoted in 
Ibid., p.57*
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always suspicious of any extension of government interference, was 
not at all sympathetic to this development* throu^out the emergency 
he preferred to improve the Commissariat's financial control, rather 
than exploit the opportunity for large-scale operations to develop 
the Commissariat's supply organization. However, the change of 
emphasis in the relief operations did bring Trevelyan one advantage* 
the Relief Commission was remodelled in February I846 with Routh as 
its chairman. Consequently, Trevelyan became the leading official 
in England concerned with relief. Trevelyan was, moreover, certain 
that his views on the need for close control of Commissariat operations 
coincided with those of the government. In January, he had remarked 
to Routh * "I have formed decided opinions as to the course which ou^t 
to be pursued in reference to the Relief of Distress in Ireland, and 
have no reason to suppose that my opinions on this subject differ from 
those which are entertained by the Government."^ Routh's deference to 
Treasury opinion was never in question, but Trevelyan was not loth 
to emphasize his exceptionally favourable standing in the matter. Not 
content to establish principles, Trevelyan endeavoured to prescribe 
many of the details in setting up Commissariat dep'bts, and Routh had
2to insist quite forcefully that he should be allowed some discretion.
With Routh as the Treasury's representative in Dublin, depots 
were established at Cork and Limerick, each under the command of a
D.C.G. At Cork, supplies of Indian com were received and processed.
1 Trevelyan to Routh, 22 January I846, P.R.O., ¥.0. 63/152. In fact.
Peel had a low opinion of Trevelyan's judgment in Irish matters.
In 1845* following a private visit to Ireland, Trevelyan had made
a personal and confidential report 6b the state of the country to Peel 
end Graham,, but had then proceeded to publish the substance of this 
pseudoiQmwusly. Since he suggested that rebellion was imminent, this 
was not merely discourteous but politically dangerous. Furthermore, it 
was evident from the far-fetched details which he repeated that 
Trevelyan lacked both discrimination and a sense of humour (Voodham 
Smith, pp. 60-61; letter by "Philalethes", The Morning Chronicle. I4 
October I843, p. 3 and col. c, contd. I6 October I843, p. 3 ool* o)*
2 Routh to Trevelyan, 22 February I846, P.R.Q, V.O. 63/132.
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Limerick was intended to be a centre that was more accessible to the 
most distressed areas in the South and West. Sub-depots, eventually 
numbering seventeen, were also established under the command of 
Commissariat officers or clerks.^  Trevelyan's involvement was in large 
measure possible because of the copious written explanations expected 
from Routh, as indeed they were expected from most Commissariat officers. 
Even when heavily burdened with work, as in April I846, Routh deferent­
ially apologised for the brevity of some of his letters; "You will see
that I am not idle, and if I am not always so full in my explanations as
2
you wish, you must remind me of my omissions." Trevelyan, furnished 
with these explanations and safely insulated from the realities of the 
situation in Ireland, busied himself with the minutiae that arose from 
the difficulties in preparing and gaining acceptance for a totally new 
kind of food. For example, Trevelyan's deeply implanted faith in 
printed instructions extended to the Irish peasantry* he suggested to 
Routh that a printed half sheet of paper was all that was needed as a 
guide to cooking corn meal.^ The extent of Trevelyan's own involvement 
was to conduct experiments on himself and his family in eating com meal 
bread. However, he doubted the need for experiment if its findings were 
likely to lead to increased expenditure. Thus, when the digestibility 
of Indian c o m  meal was discussed, he settled the matter a priori*
"I cannot believe that it will be necessary to grind the Indian corn 
twice - we must not aim at giving more than wholesome food. It would 
do oermanent harm to make dependence on public charity an agreeable mode
1 P.P., 1847, LI, p.24; Trevelyan to Routh, 18 March I846, T.L.B.,
VI, p.115.
2 Routh to Trevelyan, 4 April I846, P.R.O., W.O. 63/132.
3 Trevelyan to Routh, 7 February I846, T.L.B., VI, p. 13*
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of life." Insteed self help was the keynote of Trevelyan’s efforts
to encourage the manufacture and use of hand mills as a means of 
increasing Ireland’s inadequate milling capacity.
It was starvation, rather than Trevelyan’s and Routh’s efforts 
at popularizing Indian com meal, that was the cause of the tremendous 
demand for meal when Trevelyan ordered the depots to start selling it 
to relief committees on 15 May I846. Both Peel and Trevelyan were 
taken unawares, since they had expected that only limited supplies would 
be needed in order to keep down prices until the next potato harvest.
The run on the meal made Trevelyan even more determined that c o m  meal 
sales should constitute a single finite operation. When the facts 
reported from Ireland appeared to demand a totally different approach, 
Trevelyan refused to modify his original policy. He attributed the 
excessive demand for meal to the impossibility of distinguishing between 
ordinary endemic destitution and the exceptional hardship resulting from 
the potato failure. Since it was impossible to make this dinstinction, 
Trevelyan was anxious that the depots should be closed as soon as
X
possible. Routh clearly understood Trevelyan’s motives; he remarked 
in July: "Mr. Trevelyan appears to be more alarmed, than I think the 
event will justify# but he looks less to our wants and local complaints 
than to the effect which he thinks our purchases will produce on the 
provision trade ..."^
The formation of Russell's administration in July I846, following 
Peel’s resignation over the C o m  Laws, redoubled Trevelyan's determination 
to end Commissariat operations, for Sir Charles Wood, the new Chancellor
1 Trevelyan to Routh, 20 February I846, Ibid., p.46.
2 Trevelyan to Capt. Mann, 28 October and 9 November I846, T.L.B.,
IX, pp. 50, 139.
3 Trevelyan to Routh, 25 June I846, T.L.B., VII, quoted in Woodham 
Smith, p. 86.
4 Routh to D.C.G. Hewetson, 7 July I846, P.R.O., W.O. 63/132.
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of the Exchequer, completely shared Trevelyan's views on the need to
limit government interference. Predictions, including Routh*s, that the
potato crop of I846 would also be blighted were only further incentives
for Trevelyan to disengage the government. Accordihgly, Trevelyan
ordered Routh to close the dep&ts on I5 August.^
Trevelyan was placed in overall charge of relief operations. To
prevent excessive dependence on government funds a new relief plan was
set up. Under the new plan public works were to be met entirely from
rates, and the provision of food was to be left to private enterprise,
except in the most remote areas, where dépôts were to be reopened as a last
resort. To ensure that there was no departure from the new plan, Trevelyan
personally attended to all Commissariat and Board of Works correspondence.
In January 1847 Cardwell relayed to Peel Palmerston's acid description
of the situation* "If you were to come over to the Treasury you would not
know yourself. Trevelyan is First Lord, and Chancellor of the Exchequer*-
has a new room with 4 private secretaries etnd 3 Commissariat clerks:-
2
and the whole had been left to him." Diligent attention to voluminous 
correspondence could not in itself ensure success. The confident 
predictions upon which the plan had been founded proved incorrect: there 
was an increase, not a reduction in applications for public works; 
demands for food did not decrease and were dramatized by heart-rending 
descriptions of distress.^ Nonetheless, Trevelyan remained confident 
that a free market would alone bring forward sufficient food at a price 
appropriately deterrent to prodigality. Moreover as the dépôts were 
understocked even for limited emergency distribution, Trevelyan was
1 Routh to Trevelyan, I7 July I846, P.R.O., W.O. 63/132; Trevelyan to 
Routh, 17 July I846, T.L.B., 711, quoted in Woodham Smith, p.89.
2 Cardwell to Peel, I5 January I847, Peel Papers, Add. MS., 40598
f. 34* quoted in C.S. Parker (ed.). Sir Robert Peel from his Private 
Papers (I899), II, p.481.
3 Woodham Smith, pp. II6-II7.
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anxious that all dépôts should finally close in October I846 - an
unworkable decision that brought a furious reaction from Commissariat
officers struggling to sustain a starving population in Co. Galway and
Co* Mayo*^ The evils of starvation had been exacerbated by the chaotic
management of public works. Not only did it prove impossible to exact
a reasonable day's work from men who were on the point of starvation,
but the attraction of earning cash wages was sufficient to attract men
away from cultivating their land for the following yeaf*s crops. An
intelligent initiative of the Board of Works to counter this development,
by enabling men to obtain relief pay as well as to work their own
2holdings, was promptly vetoed by Trevelyan. As a classical political 
economist, Trevelyan believed that the ruin of small farmers would 
pave the way for larger, better-capitalized entrepreneurs.
The tacit admission that the public works policy had failed to 
cope with starvation was the establishment of a third relief commission. 
This time it was not under Eouth's chairmanship, since the object was 
to transfer the burden of relief to the Irish Poor Law boards, and to 
provide outdoor relief in ihe form of free soup. Public works were 
progressively reduced under Trevelyan's detailed and embarrassingly 
pedantic direction.^ When the Act that permitted the provision of soup 
expired in August I847, Trevelyan was confident that the Commissariat 
dépôts could be finally closed. Yet once again the failure of the 
potato crop - about two-thirds in 1847 - called for the retention of 
an emergency food supply service. Routh, despite his misgivings about
1 Ibid.. pp. 138-159.
2 Ibid., p. 148.
3 Trevelyan to Col. Jones, I4 January 1847, T.L.B., XI, p. 12$.
4 Jones complained to Trevelyan that he felt that he ought to be allowed 
some discretion in making minor appointments. (8 May 1847, P.R.O., 
T.64/366B.)
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Trevelyan *s over-simple approach, nevertheless promised to keep
remaining Commissariat operations "within the narrowest possible
limits"*^ The Commissariat continued to distribute food in the most
remote areas until August 1848.
During this final period of Commissariat involvement, Trevelyan's
main efforts were devoted to imposing upon the Irish Poor Law a
doctrinaire scheme of mandatory indoor relief, despite its impracticability.
To one of the severest critics of this policy. Lord Clarendon, the Lord
Lieutenant, Trevelyan felt it was only necessary to cite the example
of English practice; "the landowners and farmers of England have no
difficulty in combining and setting to work their unemployed poor and
that if Irish landowners, agents and farmers would make the trial they
2would find it equally easy to act in concert." Trevelyan showed no 
more sympathy towards the intractable problems of the Poor Law Commission 
and of the Unions than he had shown earlier towards the equally 
difficult practical problems of the Board of Works ani the Commissariat.
This lack of sympathy was reinforced by Trevelyan's conviction that 
famine conditions were part of a necessary, if painful, economic remedy 
for Ireland's overpopulation. Trevelyan's harsh attitude was further 
confirmed by his and Sir Charles Wood's indignation at Irish ingratitude,
3
as evidenced by minor outrages and insurrections.
Religious sentiments served to justify Trevelyan's economic views 
in moral terms. For example, in a letter to D.C.G. Hewetson in January 
1847 he defended the prevalence of high food prices; "Dearness is 
synonymous with scarcity, and is the check which God and nature have
1 Routh to Trevelyan, 27 November 1847, P.R.O., T.64/5690/2.
2 15 October 1847, T.L.B., XVII, p.76.
5 Woodham Smith, op. cit. p.375*
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imposed upon a too rapid consumption of an insufficient supply of 
any article# ••• it is hard upon the poor people that they should he 
deprived of the consolation of knowing that they are suffering from an 
infliction of God's Providence to mitigate which much has been done 
by the Government and by the upper classes, while nothing, as far as I 
am aware had been done to aggravate it, with the exception of the 
outrages which have been committed on the works and on the stores of 
food in progress on the high r o a d s , T h i s  confidence that everything
that could properly be done had been done pervaded Trevelyan's apologia,
2
The Irish Crisis. In this article in The Ediiburgh Review, later 
republished as a book, Trevelyan unselfconsciously revealed his pride 
in his own administrative rôle: "neither ancient nor modern history 
can furnish a parallel to the fact that upwards of three millions of 
persons were fed every day in the neighbourhood of their own houses by 
administrative arrangements emanating from and controlled by one central 
office."^
Trevelyan had worked exceptionally hard, although, insofar as 
he had controlled so many details from London, unnecessarily so. His 
reward was a Z.B. and a donation of a year's salary. While no one 
questioned the kni^thood, the donation caused Trevelyan acute embarrassment
Parliament was in recess at the time the donation was made, and 
approval was sought for it and other donations in connection with the 
Irish famine as a total sum of £4,055 for civil contingencies. When 
this was questioned by R.B. Osborne, M.P. for Middlesex, in a debate 
on 14 August I848, it became clear that £2,500 of this had been awarded 
to Trevelyan. To Osborne, this appeared to be a manoeuvre calculated 
to deprive the Commons of its right to determine public rewards.
1 6 January 1847, P.P., 1847, LI, p. 4&2.
2 The Edinburgh Review, LXXKVII (January I848) pp. 229-320. 
5 C.E. Trevelyan, The Irish Crisis (I848) p. 90.
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Disraeli went further and attacked the donation in more personal
terms; "The vote of £2,500 was surely conceived in rather had taste;
ard. a preux chevalier, like Sir Charles Trevelyan, bearing his
blushing honours, might well be supposed to recoil from receiving an
extra year's salary." There was a measure of disquiet expressed by
Goulbum and Gladstone about the procedure that had been adopted, and
it was left to Russell to attempt to spare Trevelyan's embarrassment
by hoping that the government's technical error "would not be visited
upon one of the most intelligent and laborious officers that he had
ever known. For Trevelyan this questioning of the propriety and
regularity of the donation was obviously intolerable; for one who
attached so much importance to regularity it was impossible that he
should keep the money. On the day following the debate, Trevelyan
wrote to Russell announcing that he intended to repay the money within 
2four days•
As Trevelyan's previous experience of Commissariat operations had 
been confined to comparatively short and limited campaigns, he was 
unable to look upon the department's involvement in relief operations 
as anything other than another brief campaign. This attitude, combined 
with distrust of the government in economic and social matters, constantly 
led Trevelyan to press for a premature end to Commissariat operations.
Even while the Commissariat was at work, neither the traditions of 
the department nor Trevelyan's laissez-faire philosophy allowed the 
department any administrative initiative. What little there might 
have been was effectively frustrated by Trevelyan's centralized control
1 Debates# Cl, col. 158.
2 Trevelyan to Russell, 15 August I848, T.L.B., XXII, p.170.
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from London. The experience of Irish affairs instead of making the
Commissariat more flexible when confronted with unusual problems,
only confirmed Trevelyan's mechanistic interpretation of administration.
As far as Trevelyan was concerned, the Commissariat provided a service
that would have been adequate if only the more remote and primitive
areas of Ireland had been regulated by the "correct" principles of
political economy. Consequently Trevelyan was able to assert that any
failure to provide an adequate relief service could be attributed to
Irish waywardness and lack of co-operation.^ He was later to adopt
the same attitude, when he was criticised for the Commissariat's reaction
to the confused and almost equally unpredictable problems that arose
during the Crimean War.
In terms of Commissariat organization the only advantageous, but
indirect, result of the Irish emergency was the re-establishment of a
regular Commissariat service for the troops in Ireland. The disturbed
state of the countiy called for increased garrisons, and in June 1847
the Commissariat was established on a permanent footing. Ironically,
therefore, the failure of Trevelyan's simple solutions for Ireland's
complex economic and social problems did at least make necessary the
continuance of a garrison and in this indirect way ensured something
2
approaching a home tour of duty.
In this connection, Trevelyan was particularly appreciative of the 
difference of attitude between Scottish and Irish proprietors, when 
confronted by rou^ly comparable distress. When D.C.G. Pine Coffin 
was transferred from Limerick to Oban to organize emergency food 
supplies, he was instructed to work closely and respectfully with 
Scottish proprietors. To one of these, Trevelyan wrote that it was 
a pleasure to work for a change with'people \dao can help themselves". 
(Trevelyan to Pine Coffin, Trevelyan to H.G. Craig, 2 October I846, 
T.L.B., VII, p.147*) As a rule the Scottish proprietors of the most 
remote and backward areas applied the same drastic economic 
remedies recommended for Ireland; depopulation and better capital­
ized farming, usually sheep raising.
Trevelyan's evidence of 26 February I85O before the Select Committee 
on Army and Ordnance Expenditure, P.P., I85O, X, p. 519* Charact­
eristically, Trevelyan was extremely cautious in setting the scale of 
the new establishment as low as possible in order to avoid public 
criticism. (Trevelyan to Routh, I4 July 1847, T.L.B., XVI, p.44»)
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D Transfer of the Commissetriat to the War Office, 1854
Before considering the Commissariat's involvement in the Crimean
War it is necessary to note that control of the department was transferred
to the War Office in 1854* Trevelyan had always resolutely opposed such
a change, and he had written memoranda on the subject in I84O and 1850,^
As soon as the change was mooted in March 1854# Trevelyan wrote to the
Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies,
2
reiterating his earlier objections* However, it was not Newcastle 
who was pressing for administrative changes, but out-of-office Whigs 
like Lord Ellenborou^ and Lord Grey who prompted Lord John Russell to 
propose a scheme for the amalgamation of military departments under the 
Secretary for War, and for the establishment of a separate Secretary 
for the Colonies* After protracted discussion from April to June I 854, 
the administrative reorganization was accepted in principle by the 
Cabinet* Although the main reason for change at this time was to improve 
the efficiency of the military machine in preparation for a major conflict, 
the absorption of the Commissariat into the War Office did not take 
place for a further six months* Newcastle, who had been reasonably happy 
with the original division of responsibilities, refused to take over the 
Commissariat until he was given adequate office accommodation*^
During this interval Trevelyan continued to run the department 
according to established routine, and without any ministerial guidance*
1 One of the arguments he adduced in a memorandum in I85O was extremely
ingenious: "If a superintending department has no executive business,
it can have no practical experience, and is liable to be continually 
met by objections on practical grounds, which it cannot answer# The 
executive experience possessed by the Treasury through the Commissariat, 
has therefore been in many ways productive of «idvantage to the public 
service*" ("System adopted by the Treasury for controlling the 
Expenditure abroad", I4 May I85O, P.P., I85O, X, p.487#)
2 Trevelyan to Newcastle, 1 March 1854, T.L.B., XXXIII, p.57#
5 J.B. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition, 1852-1855 (Cambridge, I968),
pp. 599-409, 490.
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As he later remarked to the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol,
it was the duty of the Commissary General, under the direction of the
Commander in Chief, to take any necessary initiatives* Trevelyan
for his part, devoted his efforts towards resisting the impending
change* He wrote to Aberdeen and Newcastle, complaining about the
financial risks inherent in the proposals, while admitting the need
for improved liaison between the Treasury and the War Office.^ Trevelyan
regretted that Gladstone's temporary absence prevented him from springing
to the defence of "the integrity and efficiency of the Financial 
2
Department#" Quite unexpectedly for Trevelyan, Gladstone only inter­
vened to suggest to Trevelyan that his view of Treasury control was 
completely mistaken: "One thing is clear to me, that if it is ri^t to 
have the Commissariat expenditure under the Treasury, the nroner function 
of the Treasury in regard to all expenditure is placed so far as regards 
that Department of it in abeyance, for the Treasury cannot be a controlling 
department to itself."^ Trevelyan was also sensitive at losing control
I
of the department, lest the change should be interpreted as a criticism 
of his management* Gladstone reassured him on this point, while 
stressing that Treasury control would be stronger if the Commissariat 
were supervised as a separate department. However, he did agree with 
Trevelyan that the specifically banking functions of the Commissariat 
should be restored to the Treasury.^ This division of functions was 
too subtle a task to be attempted in the middle of a war, end when
1 Trevelyan to Aberdeen, 8 July 1854» T.L.B., XXXIV, p.98; Trevelyan
to Newcastle, 15 July 1854» Ibid., p.l05.
2 Trevelyan to Aberdeen, 12 June 1854» Ibid.. p.99*
5 Gladstone to Trevelyan, 14 August 1854» Add.MS., 44529 f* 150.
4 Gladstone to Trevelyan, 50 October 1854» Ibid., f. I64.
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Newcastle took over the Commissariat in its entirety, Trevelyan accepted
the situation emd querulously remarked: "I am ready to do my best under
all circumstances but I wish to be certain that I am doing what is
expected from me."^ A few days later he made one last attempt to
retain financial control by citing what he described as the impartial
2
opinion of W.G. Anderson. Although this view did not immediately 
prevail, Trevelyan remained confident that he would eventually resume 
control of the Commissariat's financial business.
E The Crimean Campaign, 1854
The disasters of the Crimean campaigns brought to an end a period 
of public indifference about the quality of the armed forces. Public 
outrage at the spectacular mismanagement of so much of the war caused 
all branches of militaiy administration to be closely scrutinized. In 
particular the need to find scapegoats for the blunders of the winter 
siege of Sebastopol transformed the Commissariat from an obscure 
department into the principal object of radical vituperation.^ After 
Russell left Aberdeen's cabinet, the administration was so vulnerable that 
John Arthur Roebuck's motion in January 1855 to set up a select committee 
was carried by 505 to I48. After the collapse of the Aberdeen 
administration and the formation of Palmerston's, the Select Committee 
on the Army before Sebastopol was set up with Roebuck as its chairman.
The Select Committee was concerned not to find detailed explanations, 
but to demonstrate that corruption and incompetence were the cause of 
the nation's disgrace in the Crimea, and in this way to reveal the 
evils of aristocratic government and consequent obvious need 
for radical reform.
1 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 8 November 1854# T.L.B., XXXIV, p.292.
2 Trevelyan to Gladstone, 12 November 1854» T.L.B., XXXV, p.2.
5 For a fuller recent account, see Sweetman, op. cit., pp. 127-l80.
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Since the misfortunes at Sebastopol were in large measure attributable 
to failure in transport and supplies, Trevelyan was the main witness called 
to e^lain the Commissariat's activities. Although the Commissariat was 
often accused of having failed, Trevelyan was convinced - as he observed 
to C.G. Filder on 23 April 1855 - that the Englishman's sense of justice 
would vindicate the reputation of the department.^ Although Trevelyan 
no longer controlled the Commissariat, he was the only readily accessible 
witness and the only person able to speak about the department's work 
as a whole.
Trevelyan gave an outline of the whole Commissariat operation in 
order to define his own and the Treasury's responsibility. As soon as the 
expedition to the Black Sea was planned, C.G. Filder, a sixty-four year 
old veteran of the Peninsular War, was placed in charge of the practical 
arrangements. There was no semblance of intelligence work to discover 
the special needs and possible difficulties of the campaign. Filder's 
only guidance was the treatises written by Routh and Bissett, other 
Peninsular officers like himself. Trevelyan insisted that, fortified 
by this collective wisdom, Filder needed no specific guidance from the 
Treasury. This would not have mattered overmuch if Lord Raglan, like 
Wellington in the Peninsula, had had a firm idea of the scope and 
objectives of the expedition. Yet even allowing for the lack of direction 
provided by Raglan, it was apparent from Trevelyan's own evidence that the 
staff, hurriedly scraped together, was completely inadequate. Forty 
officers and clerks had been found for the original expedition of 
10,000 men; but when this was expanded to 25,000, only nine more were 
available. Althou^ this deficiency amply proved Trevelyan's case for 
a Commissariat home establishment, he maintained that the nucleus of staff 
actually provided has been adequate to ensure regularity in accounting.
1 T.L.B., XXXV, p.171.
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As a result, the wastefulness which had marked the early stages of the 
Peninsular War had not been repeated. This was little help in defending 
the Commissariat# since criticism did not centre upon any lack of the 
Treasury's financial vigilance.
It was much more difficult to explain of defend practical 
inadequacies. He had always maintained that hired transport was 
preferable to government transport on account of its relative cheap­
ness. Unfortunately what might have applied in a free market with ample 
carts and horses waiting to be hired did not apply in Malta, the 
springboard of the expedition, or on the coast of Bulgaria, where 
the first landings were made. A.C.G. Smith's preliminary expedition 
only resulted in a few carts being sent from Malta, and of the 12,000 
baggage animals prescribed by Bissett's manual for an expedition of that 
size, only half were ever obtained. Even Trevelyan had to admit that at 
the Gallipoli landings* "Our Commissariat, when the French troops landed, 
saw the French mule carts loaded and trotting off with the supplies, 
vhereas they had to labour after our troops with the heavy arabas of the 
country. This arises out of the superior organisation of the civil 
department of the French army# and their constant readiness for war."^ 
Trevelyan was nevertheless absolutely determined to exonerate himself; 
when asked whether Filder had actually told him of the inadequate 
transport arrangements, he replied very cautiously that "he never stated 
in so many words, but he never stated anything to the contrary." In this 
way he limited the responsibility of the Treasury to supporting the 
Commissariat. Clearly it would not have been in keeping with Treasury
notions to invite mention of inadequacies and difficulties that might
2
require heavy corrective expenditure.
1 Trevelyan's evidence of 17 April 1855, P.P., 1854-55, IX (ii), p.21.
2 Ibid., p.24.
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The Select Committee, ever anxious to expose the culpable,
appreciated that Trevelyan’s rigid attitude might make it easy to trap
him into making injudicious admissions* If, for example, he denied
responsibility for the detailed working out of the army’s requirements,
he could be accused of a culpable lack of foresight. Although Trevelyan
claimed to be seme thing of an expert on Turkish geography,^ he does
not appear to have realized that the army would require far more logistical
support than a comparable expedition in a more highly developed part
of Europe. In his evidence he had asserted that ”in a proper sense, it
2
is only as wants are found out that they are provided for," When on 
26 April the Duke of Newcastle was asked whether he thought Trevelyan’s 
answer constituted a sound principle upon which to conduct Commissariat 
operations, his reply was an emphatic negative.^ Trevelyan felt that 
this question had been contrived as a personal slight. He rashly 
decided to defend his reputation by submitting to the Committee a 
written explanation of his earlier evidence, simultaneously sending a 
copy of this explanation to The Times.^  Apparently he had meant to 
say that the Treasury was dependent on information sent by the Commissariat? 
he had never meant to justify hand-to-mouth methods. The Committee was 
incensed by this breach of privilege; their anger possibly increased 
by an awareness of Trevelyan’s characteristic use of Press leaks as a 
means of presenting his own point of view. Trevelyan was not allowed to 
escape as easily as he had done over Civil Service reform; he was 
ordered to appear before the Select Committee on )0 April when he was
1 Evidence of 20 April 1855> Ibid.> p.108.
2 Ibid., p.100.
5 Ibid.. p.215.
4 The Times, 28 April 1855* p#ll col. e. Trevelyan’s explanation was 
printed at the end of the report of evidence to the Committee.
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forced to admit that in his first evidence he had not really meant ■ 
what he had said# Nonetheless, he was not prepared to repent publicly 
for his haste in communicating with a newspaper:
May I be allowed to say in ny defence that I felt very keenly 
the imputation implied in the question put by the Honourable 
Member for Aylesbury to the Duke of Newcastle, because it went 
directly to impugn my fitness for the duties on which I have 
been employed for 15 years, for 15 long years I have laboured 
incessantly at those duties, and devoted myself entirely to 
them; and I certainly felt it as a great grievance that my 
management should be impugned on the most vital point of all, 
vdiich is the exercise of reasonable foresight; and I also 
supposed, that, as the evidence given before the Select Committe
was published in all the papers, from day to day, there could be
no objection to my sending a copy of this statement to the "Times", 
having already given the original to Lord Seymour to be submitted 
to the Committee,
Trevelyan had to admit that even if Layard’s question to Newcastle had 
been a veiled attack upon himself, the Press had not exploited it. He 
confessed that it had been some of his friends who had pointed out to 
him the slight upon his reputation,^ Trevelyan’s extreme sensitivity 
was a handicap, but he was quite unable to conceal the intensity of
his enthusiasm for his work with the Commissariat,
The Select Committee itself made considerable capital out of
1 P,P,, 1854-55, IX (ii),pp, 318-519* Lord Seymour, a Whig member of
the Committee and moderate in comparison with Roebuck, was Trevelyan’s 
main personal link, Trevelyan wrote him a number of letters, 
suggesting the topics on which he would like to be questioned; he 
also sent him copies of much of the correspondence with Pilder, 
(T.L.B., XXXV, pp, 135» 151, 194*) Simultaneously, Trevelyan hoped 
to prevent The Times from forming any misconceptions, as when he 
defended Filder’s exercise of foresight in a letter to Delane on 
23 April 1855* (T.L.B., XXXV, p*l67*)
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Trevelyan’s regard for precedent, particularly when it appeared that
virtually all the practical precedents derived from the time of the
Peninsular War* One instance was the Committee’s criticism of the
Treasury’s failure to exploit new techniques for preserving potatoes.
Trevelyan’s answer was that he had been aware of this invention, but
that he did not feel that it was necessary.^ As far as Trevelyan was
concerned, the Commissariat’s main task was to provide the ration of
bread and meat for which a stoppage was made from the soldiers’ pay.
These staple items could readily be provided in bulk, while those required
in variable quantities were - Trevelyan thought - better left to private
enterprise. This was the basis of his explanation why many of the
vegetables shipped from Constantinople were allowed to rot on shipboard:
the troops did not need them, since they had been buying potatoes and
2onions from speculative merchants. This was consistent with his 
general philosophy of keeping government activity "within the narrowest 
possible limits", and in the short-term it was successful in that it 
produced economies. Originally Trevelyan had been veiy confident about 
the campaign. On 8 November 1854; he had informed Gladstone that veiy 
little money had been spent so far. He pointed out that the cost of pay 
and army agency were fixed costs, while happily the cost of provisions 
in Turkey was cheaper than in England. This letter had been intended 
to help convince Gladstone that Trevelyan should retain control of the 
Commissariat* Trevelyan could have argued ihat in the early stages of 
the war with Russia the Commissariat had been reasonably effective in
1 p.p., 1854-55, DC (ii), p.108.
2 Ibid., p.71. Trevelyan was impatient with criticisms of supply 
arrangements, assuring Aberdeen that the Commissariat worked in 
exactly the same way as it had done at the Cape, and that the troops 
had received rations "of the best kind that was to be had" (12 July 
1854, T.L.B., XDCIT, p.99).
5 T.L.B., XXXIT, p.292.
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satisfying basic supply requirements, and had been completely effective 
in the strictly traditional sense of preventing the kind of waste that 
had characterized the early Peninsular campaigns.
The most bizarre episode which illustrated concern for precedent
was his order that coffee beans should be sent out green and unroasted
as they had been during the Kaffir wars.^ Trevelyan was particularly
concerned at the possibility that roasted beans mi^t deteriorate in
transit, but did not take into account the difficulty of finding fuel. )
Apparently no one had ever told the Commissariat officers - at least
Trevelyan was completely ignorant of the fact - that using lids of
cooking pots for roasting resulted in the rims coming unsoldered.
"When this happened the lids would no longer fit their pots, and
2
ordinary cooking became impossible. While it was a minor blunder 
and one that was soon remedied, it was one that the report of the Select 
Committee attributed to the pedantic approach of the Treasury "The more 
immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been overlooked, whilst 
ingenious exchanges on the volatile aroma of the beriy, and in the 
Turkish mode of packing coffee, were passing between Commissary-General 
Pilder and the Treasury*"
Some of the evidence about Commissariat management caused much 
bitterness between Trevelyan and Pilder. Trevelyan was not responsible 
for this as he was always at pains to prevent any of his statements being 
used to attribute blame to the Commissary General. Indeed, during 1854
1 Trevelyan’s evidence of 17 April 1855, P.P., 1854-55» IX (ii), pp*
33-34* As Trevelyan admitted to Lord Seymour, it was an episode that 
had taken a "grip" on the public mind (8 May 1855* T.L.B., XX7, p.194)*
2 Sergt. Dawson’s evidence of 13 March 1855, P*P*, 1854-55, IX (i), p*259*
3 Pifth Report from the Select Committee, 18 June 1855* P*P*, 1854-55,
IX (iii), p.380.
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Trevelyan had always been extremely satisfied with Filder’s work,^
and initially the attack on Filder came from a report produced by Sir
John M ’Neill and Col* Tulloch, a two-man commission appointed by Lord
Panmure to investigate in the Crimea itself a number of allegations of
mismanagement# This report was in turn reported upon by a Board of
General Officers who obtained the views of men who had served in the
Crimea, Pilder was criticized for providing insufficient transport
during the winter siege of Sebastopol, and he in his turn attributed
this to an insufficient supply of fodder. As soon as Trevelyan
became aware of this criticism, he was eager to vindicate himself.
He produced a paper to demonstrate that he had sent out all the pressed
hay that Pilder had asked for. In it he quoted from one of Pilder’s
letters, running two paragraphs together and italicising the words "I
believe them to be ample**, \dilch clearly applied to Commissariat provisions
2and not to hay at all. In his evidence to the Board of General Officers, 
Pilder corrected this impression and succeeded in having the last word.
The report endorsed his view by quoting his words in full; **I proceed 
to state, if the authorities in England are to judge of the expediency of 
complying with the requisitions of a commissary general in charge of an 
army in the field, founded on his personal knowledge derived on the spot 
of his wants and resources, it seems clear that the personal responsibility 
of that officer must be at an end. It is the first time in my experience 
I have ever known demands made under such circumstances to be disregarded, 
whatever future investigation they might be supposed to call for.*’
However, the report did goto remark that a more resourceful commissary 
would have realized that the usual procedure of tender and contract
1 Trevelyan to Pilder, 18 September 1854» T.L.B., XXXIV, p. 240;
25 October 1854* Ibid.. p. 266.
2 "Statement in Explanation of the Arrangements made by the Treasury 
... ", P.P., 1856, XXI, pp. 582-589.
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was impossible in Turkey, and that he would have pressed his case more 
strongly with the Treasury.^  Yet even this failing was an indirect indict­
ment of the Treasury, since Pilder's lact of initiative was a product of 
traditional Treasury caution.
The man on the spot took the blame and Trevelyan was fortunate 
that the Press and the reviews made no attempt to single him out for 
serious criticism. Fraser’s was critical of his unguarded remark that 
the cavalry should have been prepared to forage in the Crimea. The 
Edinburgh Review, while it felt that the Commissariat was not to blame 
over failure to provide adequate transport, felt that Trevelyan had 
overstated his case in favour of the Commissariat in explaining 
inadequacies in the provision of fodder and shelter for transport animals.^
Conclusion
The Commissariat, in presenting a number of administrative problems 
in microcosm, revealed Trevelyan’s limitations. Although he often 
maintained that Treasury rules were flexible, his own mechanistic 
attitude to administrative procedures and his strictness towards 
Commissariat officers effectively inhibited local initiatives of the kind 
that would have made Commissariat organization responsive to the needs of 
unexpected and unprecedented situations. Trevelyan’s overbearing manner 
can be partially justified by the quality of the Commissariat officers 
themselves (as he observed in 1855 he had no opportunity to pick men 
whom he thought would make the best officers) and by the constant 
Treasury preoccupation with immediate economies. Thus no one person 
but rather the system must be held responsible. If Trevelyan were
1 P.P., 1856, XX, p.406.
2 Fraser’s Magazine, LI (May 1855)» PP* 600-601*
5 The Edinburgh Review, CII (July 1855)* PP* 289-290.
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culpable it was because he worked so happily within this system 
that he sought to preserve it. Indeed, he remained convinced that the 
Commissariat had worked quite well in the Crimea and that it was other 
departments that had broken down»^ Such an assertion by Trevelyan 
in 1855 was only an attempt to save his own reputation, for by this 
time the decision to transfer the Commissariat to the War Office had 
already been taken. This decision marked the end of a period of 
direct Treasuiy control of part of the military machine in favour of 
the more customary dualism of spending and supervising departments.
One indication of Trevelyan’s "old-fashioned" outlook was his attach­
ment, as we have seen, to the traditional concept of Treasury control 
of the Commissariat - an attachment that had offered him seme of the 
most satisfying work of his career.
1 Trevelyan’s evidence of 20 April 1855* Sebastopol Committee, P.P., 
1854-55. IX (il), p.lO.
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Chapter IX 
AEMT REPOM
Trevelyan’s deep interest in and enthusiasm for military matters 
can only he partially explained by his connection with the Commissariat. 
As he himself claimed, this interest arose from his service in India and 
from the experience of some members of his family. Moreover his ideas 
only came to be developed and presented systematically after he had 
given up control of the Commissariat - the spate of committees that 
resulted from the disasters of the Crimea providing him with a welcome 
outlet for his ideas. As Ar as Trevelyan was concerned, the period after 
1855 coincided with the partial rejection of his ideas on Civil Service 
reform and Treasuiy reorganization. Being able to offer generalized 
advice to committees on the reorganization of the Commissariat and the 
sale of commissions was, therefore, a compensatory activity.
1 Commissariat Reorganization, 1855-58
The Commissariat always remained central to Trevelyan’s military 
thinking! the events of the Crimean War strengthened his resolve that 
it should be properly managed as a professional entity. The relative 
efficiency of the French army’s intendance militaire provided him with 
a convenient practical model. Thus when Trevelyan was questioned by 
the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol about the merits 
of the French system, he asserted that it embodied some of the 
characteristics like a single financial authority, division of labour 
and careful staff selection that he had been endeavouring to introduce 
into the Civil Service.^ Trevelyan’s admiration for the fact that the 
French had actually achieved in the military administration those 
qualities which in England only existed in embryonic form led him to
1 Trevelyan’s evidence of 18 April 1855, P.P., 1850, X, p.75*
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produce in May 1855 a memorandum in which he vigorously attacked the 
critics of both formal regulation and Treasury control, claiming that 
the disasters of the Crimea had been caused "not by too much routine, but 
by too little system". He stressed that the civilian rather than the mili­
tary nature of the intendance in order to draw attention to the continued 
control by the War Office of all financial operations, particularly that 
of drawing bills of credit. By this time he recognized that the best 
he could hope for was the return of the Chests to Treasury management. 
Trevelyan was gratified when the Commissariat’s exclusively financial 
business - the management of the Chests - was restored to the Treasury in 
December 1855* He took a large part in preparing instructions for this 
change and in formulating regulations for the re-named Treasury Chests.
As he remarked to Sir George Comewall Lewis, it was a difficult task but
one that was possible as a result of fifteen years’ experience and the
2
support of his political superiors. He also came to be very satisfied 
with the new relationship between the Commissariat and the Treasuiy, 
remarking to Hawes on the subject in March 1857* "Everything at present 
goes like clockwork. The correspondence with the Treasury being confined 
to the raising of money and the integrity of the balances."^ However, 
he was far from satisfied with the War Department’s control of the 
Commissariat. When he became aware of scandals in awarding Commissariat 
contracts,, he wrote to Petrie, Chief Clerk of the Commissariat department, 
to point out that the prevalence of such practices could lead to a general 
decline in trustworthiness.^ Although the discipline of the Commissariat
1 "Memorandum on the Civil Administration of the British Army by Sir 
C.E. Trevelyan, written in May 1855; with remarks upon it by Sir 
Edward Coffin, written in February I856", n.p. (War Office Library).
2 Trevelyan to Lewis, 19 October 1855, T.L.B., XXXV, p.278.
3 T.L.B., XXXVII, p.5.
4 Trevelyan to Petrie, 2 August 1857, T.L.B., XXXVII, p.259*
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was no longer his concern, Trevelyan was determined to retain his sense
of moral involvement.
Trevelyan’s overall criticisms of the Commissariat’s inadequate
and incomplete organization and of its imperfect integration with the
army were borne out by the number of times that the department was
investigated in the years following its absorption into the War
Department* Trevelyan himself served on a departmental committee in
December 1858, when he suggested that Commissariat officers should be
recruited from among young men who possessed the entiy qualifications
for Sandhurst and who also had an aptitude for book-keeping.^ Of
course, he was unable to establish whether any men with such appropriate
and convenient qualifications really existed. Trevelyan was confidently
assuming that the Commissariat would be able to offer attractive middle-
class careers, and that this incentive would ensure a supply of
suitably qualified persons. The committee’s report and the resulting
Royal Warrant of October 1858 disregarded this problematical proposal.
The Royal Warrant laid down that Commissariat officers were to be
recruited from among subalterns of two years standing. Furthermore,
integration of the Commissariat was confirmed by making Commissariat
ranks correspond M t h  military ranks. The reorganized department was to
be exclusively supervisory, with all its subordinate staff seconded from
2the non-commissioned ranks of the army. In as far as this integration 
with the army at last removed the perennial grievance of the lack of a 
home tour of duty, it was a step that Trevelyan welcomed. However the 
new system as a whole was quite the reverse of Trevelyan’s more novel 
and ambitious scheme for the creation of a professional, civilian 
intendance.
1 Trevelyan’s evidence of 30 June 1858, P.P., 1859, p.199*
2 Ibid., pp. I9O-I9I*
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2 Purchase of Military Commissions
Trevelyan's initial concern for the quality of Commissariat personnel 
only developed at a late stage into a concern to improve the officer 
corps as a whole. His first opportunity to expound his views at length 
was provided hy the Royal Commission of 1857 on the Purchase and Sale 
of Commissions. From this time onwards, the abolition of purchase became 
one of Trevelyan's consuming interests. It filled the watershed between 
the frustration of his plans for Treasury reorganization and his eventual 
return to India. His interest continued after he had left official life, 
and he remained an ardent pamphleteer against purchase until its eventual 
abolition.
Although strictly military matters, as opposed to a m y  accounts, 
were on the periphery of Trevelyan's work, he never doubted that his 
thirty years* experience in India and at the Treasury was in itself 
sufficient qualification for giving evidence to the Royal Commission. His 
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1857 reflected both his experience of managing 
the Commissariat and his theories for improving admission to the Civil 
Service. Although there were obvious differences between civil and military 
service Trevelyan confidently expected that the same range of moral, 
social and educational advantages would be derived from the abolition 
of purchase, as from open competitive, examinations in the Civil Service.
Trevelyan began his evidence by observing that the purchase system 
undermined the basis of any satisfactory relationship between the state 
and its servants; it destroyed the essential contractual relationship 
by preventing the payment of a realistic salary in return for the 
performance of a public service. Instead the purchase system was 
virtually equivalent to the purchase of an annuity (the officer's pay 
being the income), with the right of resale if the officer survived the
1 For a full description of the system see N.H. Moses, "Edward Cardwell's 
Abolition of the Purchase System, l868-l8y4" (London thesis, 1969),pp.28-58.
- 505 -
hazards of war and of tropical postings. Quite apart ffom its effect
on military efficiency, Trevelyan deplored the system because it
was contrary to sound principles of insurance in sacrificing capital
for a precarious income. Such an arrangement automatically favoured
the rich and excluded the man of limited means who was seeking a
professional career.^ Another major defect of purchase was that it
prevented a rational system of retirement because officers could
reasonably regard half-pay as a legitimate return on the purchase price
2
that they had already paid. Purchase - like superannuation deductions 
in the Civil Service - created a moral light that conflicted with 
efficiency. In addition, the effect of purchase on an officer's family 
was equally objectionable, for if the officer had the misfortune to 
die or to be killed, the purchase price was lost. Only the royal bounty 
could alleviate distress in these circumstances.^ Trevelyan maintained 
that if officers did not have the burden of debt that often resulted 
from their having to buy each step of promotion, they would be able to 
insure their lives. Trevelyan emphasized what he felt was tantamount 
to the immorality of the existing system* "Arrangements could hardly 
be devised or better calculated to overthrow the habits of economy which 
the great motive of providing for wife and children generally forms."
He did not, in discussing this aspect of purchase, take into account 
the special hazards of military life. Instead, he was eager to use 
the same argument that he had used earlier to counter demands for a
1 P.P., 1857 sess. 2, XVIII, pp. 305-506. Only an elaborate and
artificial system of allowances brou^t officers' pay up to a 
realistic level.
2 Ibid.. pp. 511-515.
5 When Trevelyan's cousin. Colonel Trevelyan, died at Varna £9,000 
was lost in this way. (ibid., p.318.) In February I856, Trevelyan 
appealed to Lord Hardinge for some kind of compensation for th^ 
family as a whole. As a result, a free ensigncy was granted to the 
eldest son of the colonel's eldest brother (Trevelyan to Hardinge,
7 February I856, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.298).
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1
dependants* fund for Civil Servants. When pensions had in fact
been paid to th^ dependants of those who had been killed or who had
died of wounds in the Crimea, Trevelyan had insisted that they should
be awarded strictly according to the established rule, i.e. only those
whose relative had been killed outright or vdio had died within six
2
months of being wounded were entitled to a full-rate pension.
Another parallel with the situation in the Civil Service was the 
lack of incentive that resulted from an excessively secure position; 
a commission was in effect the purchase of a life interest that nothing 
short of a court-martial could extinguish. Although Trevelyan felt that 
many Civil Servants possessed too great a security, the direct equivalent 
in the Civil Service had been the sale of reversions - a practice that 
had ended in the eighteenth century. Trevelyan was, therefore, only 
seeking to see introduced into the army the more modem, contractual 
approach to making appointments.
When Trevelyan came to suggest an alternative to the purchase system, 
he drew directly on his experience of the Indian army. The Indian army 
was much more professional in that the officers mostly depended on their 
pay rather than on private incomes. Mobility in making promotions 
was achieved by a species of self help, whereby officers contributed 
towards unofficial retirement bounties for their seniors. Althou^ 
this was not an ideal arrangement - indeed superficially it suspiciously 
resembled purchase - Trevelyan maintained that it did not conflict with 
promotion by merit, since it was possible for the commander in chief 
to be acquainted with the facts of each case* "We require no reports; 
we know every inch of a man's character."^ Trevelyan was convinced that
1 See p. 230 supra.
2 Trevelyan to Sidney Herbert, 18 January 1855» T.L.B., XXXV, p.64,
3 P.P., 1857 sess. 2, XVIII, pp. 3O6-307.
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the English arny could benefit from the same degree of moral scrutiny,
but achieved by the systematic use of reports of the kind he employed
on a small scale in his management of the Commissariat#
While in the reform of the Civil Service Trevelyan had sought
to sharpen distinctions between levels of work, in the army he was more
anxious to make the service more homogersous by encouraging promotion
from the ranks# He believed that if more men were commissioned in this
way, ccmamissions would serve as "prizes^ and as such would exercise "a
stimulating and elevating moral influence". In addition to pointing
out that an analogous system existed in the French army, he was anxious
to find English examples of competitive professionalism as in the merchant
service, the railways, civil engineering and industry. Furthermore in
favouring more promotion of tried and experienced men from the ranks,
Trevelyan admitted that there was an element of speculation in selecting
young men by competitive literary examination - a point that he had been
less keen to admit in connection with the Civil Service.^ Trevelyan's
ambition was, of course, to make the army "more aristocratic in the
best and truest sense, because education and professional qualification,
and the zealous discharge of duty, would be the only conditions of
success in it; and the military service would be opened to our respectable
and energetic middle class, who have at present neither lot nor part in
it." Trevelyan's definition of middle class was a rather specialized
one, in that he was thinking principally that the sons of yeoman farmers
might be attracted by a career in a revitalized army* For the industrial
and commercial middle classes he particularly favoured a connection with
"executive establishments, acting under the central corps of administrative
officers proposed to be formed on the principle of the "Intendance" of the
2
continental armies ..."
1 Ibid.. pp. 524-327. 
g Ibid.. p. 329.
- 308 -
Although Trevelyan had demonstrated some of ibe administrative 
and "moral" shortcomings of the purchase system and had outlined a few 
advantages that could result from his own proposals, he was extremely 
careful not to criticize the officer corps as a whole* He may have 
leamt caution from the disastrous effects of his unguarded remarks 
in 1855 on the Civil Service, hut more positively his restraint was 
the result of his admiraion of the aristocratic nature of the existing 
system - a quality which professionalization could only strengthen, since 
Trevelyan was convinced that the upper classes were hound to be successful 
in an educationally competitive system. Moreover Trevelyan expected 
extensive social and political benefits to arise from his proposals;
"New and closer relations would be established with the upper, middle 
and lower orders; our army would become even less of a military caste 
than at present and it would be more completely incorporated with English 
society than ever,"^
As well as pronouncing as a social theorist, Trevelyan prided himself 
on his practical alternatives to the purchase system. His proposals ranged 
comprehensively over the whole of an officer's career from first appoint­
ment to retirement. On the question of appointments, he was by this 
time convinced of the merits of limited competitive examinations - 
examinations of the kind that the Civil Service Commission was beginning 
to organize on a small scale for a few departments. Two years' experience 
of examinations of this kind had convinced him of their effectiveness. 
Consequently, he proposed that three candidates should be nominated by 
the Commander in Chief for each vacancy; and that the examinations could 
appropriately be based on the education received in the sixth forms of 
public schools. The successful candidiates would receive professional
1 Ibid., pp. 354-335.
2 On 25 July, Trevelyan presented a memorandum to show how patronage in 
the Irish Constabulary worked; half the nominations were in the hands 
of the government; a sixth were granted to sons of officers. The 
examination of nominees was conducted by the Civil Service Commission 
(Itld.. p.527%
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training in a military college for two probationary years, during which 
time their moral qualities and suitability for command would be assessed. 
Trevelyan was insistant that no part of this education should be paid 
for by the state, since the class that could afford public school 
education could also afford the modest fees of a military college. He 
did not attempt - as he had originally done in connection with his plans 
for Civil Service appointments - to offer special privileges to officers' 
sons. He disapproved of the existing arrangements which allowed reduced 
fees at Sandhurst for the sons of serving officers, for he felt that the 
latter should be encouraged to be provident. Any survival of special 
privileges would help to preserve the close-knit professionalism of the 
kind that was antithetical to the notion of an open profession.^
The system of promotion recommended by Trevelyan was a rather 
obvious blend of the principles of seniority and merit. Promotion to the 
rank of captain was to be by seniority and the passing of a fixed-test 
examination in the duties of a company commander. Trevelyan felt that 
this new system could be introduced gradually and in a modified form.
(in this connection he even likened the army to the Treasuiy as it had 
been twenty-five years before and to the changes that had been brou^t 
about then - a reference to the reorganization of 1854*) Promotion to 
higher ranks was to be made on the basis of frequent and regular 
inspections by general officers. Trevelyan assumed that it would be 
quite simple for such inspections to be conducted globally on an annual 
or fifteen-month cycle, and for the results to be recorded and collated 
at headquarters. Inevitably, he cited his experience of the Commissariat
1 Ibid., pp. 535-536. In a letter to Gladstone on 15 April, Trevelyan 
restated his arguments against military privilege, while stressing 
the need to defend entiy examinations for the Engineers and the 
Artillery against the vested interests in patronage as exemplified 
by the Commander-in-Chief (T.L.B., XXXVII, p.218).
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to show that the merits of officers could at least be effectively assessed 
on a small scale* He never appeared to question whether the same methods 
would be equally appropriate on a far larger scale. Possible objections 
to the fairness of such a scheme of selection were countered by the 
example of the Civil Service Commission - its work being made to appear 
as an instance of an improved national morality that would not tolerate 
favouritism.^
Trevelyan's proposals implied a major change in making retirements. 
These proposals would put an end to a number of unprofessional practices 
of which Trevelyan strongly disapproved. For example, once the personal 
rights that were associated with purchase were eliminated, it would no 
longer be possible for officers to transfer to and from half-pay and to 
exchange commissions merely to avoid foreign postings; half-pay would 
remain only for those who were obliged to retire through ill-health* 
Mobility in the profession could be actively encouraged by the adoption 
of the French system of enforcing retirement, in which the age of 
retirement depended upon the rank attained - the higher the rank, the 
higher the compulsory age. This common-sense formula, which ensured a 
fair degree of athletic competence in regimental ranks, was later to be 
adopted when purchase was eventually abolished; but in 1857» it was the 
cost of implementing this part of Trevelyan's scheme that provided one 
of the many arguments for rejecting his scheme in its entirety*
The report of the Royal Commission doubted whether Trevelyan's 
suggestions would prove effective. Apart from the impracticability of 
large-scale inspection, -there were too many purely theoretical elements
1 Ibid., pp. 357-440.
2 Ibid., p. 341.
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in Trevelyan's schemes*^ Yet Lord Panmure, the Secretary for War, took
them sufficiently seriously to appoint a special committee in October
21857 to examine them in detail# Trevelyan was extremely glad to 
be given an opportunity to clarify his views and to remove misunderstandings * ^ 
However despite this additional opportunity, the committee, headed by 
Benjamin Hawes, failed to see any merits in Trevelyan's proposals. Their 
main objection was on grounds of cost, for Trevelyan had estimated that 
the cost of retiring full-pay officers would be £210,622, whereas the 
committee put it at £512,271.^ Additional arguments on these lines were 
formulated by Col. A. Tulloch, who produced a hostile memorandum in
5
April 1858. One of Trevelyan's last official acts as Assistant Secretary 
was an attempt to refute Tulloch *s arguments in a monumental memorandum, 
dated 1 February 1859 and running to twenty-one folio pages. Trevelyan 
was particularly offended by the double attack that had been launched 
on his scheme. He remained convinced that the end of purchase would 
contribute to the process of improving national morality. As a last 
piece of evidence, Trevelyan produced a memorandum written by William Farr, 
Assistant Registrar General, which set the cost of retirements at an 
intermediate figure of ^^80,000»^ This was merely to set the record 
strai^t, for by this time there was no likelihood of anything being 
done. A little later the situation was summed up in a pamphlet by Edward 
Barrington de Fonblangue, a Commissariat officer, who felt that althou^ 
purchase was justifiably doomed, Trevelyan's alternative proposals were 
premature and insufficiently worked out. In particular, he dismissed
1 Ibid., pp. 29-35.
2 P.P., 1857-58» XXXVII, p. 410.
3 Trevelyan to Hawes, 18 July 1857* T.L.B., XXXVII, p.Si.
4 P.P., 1857-58, XXXVII, pp. 410-417.
5 Ibid., pp. 425-440.
6 P.P., 1859, XV, pp. 15-40.
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Trevelyan's optimism about the beneficial effects of & system of selective
entiy based on educational merit as entirely unjustified.^
These efforts came to nothing and the Purchase Question was shelved.
In the early sixties Trevelyan was closely involved in Indian affairs,
and only after his retirement did he return to the subject with a series
2
of three pamphlets. In The Purchase System (I867) he repeated much of 
his earlier evidence to the Royal Commission, >diile elaborating his views 
of the social and educational benefits of commissioning more men from the 
ranks. While arguiaents in favour of retaining purchase had weakened with 
the realization that new military techniques required systematic prof­
essional training, as instanced by the French and Prussian armies, 
Trevelyan's incidental advantages provided defenders of the old order, 
like the writer in The Quarterly in 1868, with a good opportunity to 
deflect attention away from the real issue.^ When he attempted to extend 
awareness of the issue through the columns of the recently started Saint 
Paul's (edited by Anthony Trollope) he was even more speculative; he 
deplored what he described as the "feudal" structure of the British army 
and suggested that a reserve system on the Prussian model would broaden 
its social basis.^ This matched his earlier enthusiasm for French 
military institutions, but failed to appreciate the innate differences 
between a volunteer and conscription army.
1 E.B. de Fonblangue. Money or Merit (1857), PP* IO-I4, 41-44.
2 The Purchase System in the British Army (I867, 2nd. ed. 1869),
The British Army in 1868 (I868). A Standing or Popular Army (I869).
The last pamphlet was priced at one penny in order to obtain wide 
circulation.
3 Æeneral Robert Comelis Napier^/, "Purchase in the Army", The Quarterly
Review, CXXIV (April 1868), pp. 525-537*
4 C.E. Trevelyan, "Army Reform", Saint Paul's. 17 (I869), PP* 176-184*
In an earlier issue in the same year, an article by a "Private Dragoon" 
referred to Trevelyan's ideas and pointed out that the barrack room was 
essentially democratic and thus the antithesis of national attitudes.
He cited a speech by G.O. Trevelyan \diich referred to the army being 
composed of the two extremes of "froth and dregs" (ibid., pp.95-101)*
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When Cardwell with Gladstone's support and encouragement 
remodelled the army and abolished purchase in I87O and I87I, nothing 
approaching Trevelyan's ambitions was realized. Although the quality 
of recruits to the ranks was improved through improved conditions of 
service, the officer corps remained for the most decidedly "aristocratic", 
commissions did not become realistic career objectives and promotion 
prospects were not improved. Here, as in other fields, Trevelyan's 
extravagant enthusiasm for vague social and educational objectives did 
little to further the attainment of more immediate and practicable ones. 
Yet it was later recognized by those who succeeded in abolishing purchase 
that it was Trevelyan who had formulated the arguments that eventually 
prevailed.^
Conclusion
Trevelyan's enthusiasm for army reform was unforunately for him 
not matched by significant and immediate success. In particular, his 
loss of the management of the Commissariat was not compensated by the 
adoption of the scheme he put forward for a civilian intendance on French 
lines. While the reorganization of the department in 1858 enhanced its 
status, it did so by integrating the Commissariat more closely with the 
army. With the wider issue of the abolition of purchase, Trevelyan's 
views were as premature as were his views on the abolition of patronage 
in the Civil Service. Both reforms were unrealizable in the confused 
political conditions of the fifties and sixties; both had to await 
Gladstone's first ministry in order to be ruthlessly and rapidly 
implemented.
1 Lord Northbrook admitted to Cardwell that "most of our arguments
come out of his ^Trevelyan's/ arsenal", 8 March 1872, Cardwell Papers, 
P.R.O., 30/48/21, f. 10, quoted in Moses, op. cit., p.16.
- 514 -
Chapter X
CONTINUED CONCERN FOR INDIA
Trevelyan's immediate involvement in the problems of English 
administration did not prevent him from retaining his deep concern 
for Indian affairs. It was characteristic of him to remark in lament­
ing the destruction of Delhi during the Mutiny that India was his 
first and last love.^ He always prided himself on being an
authority on Indian affairs, and he welcomed the opportunity to
2
give evidence before Select Committees in I84O and 1855 as a means 
of defending the interests of India. Yet although immensely proud
of his Indian background, Trevelyan never believed that English
administration could learn much from India - rather the reverse.
By the end of his period at the Treasury, Trevelyan was advocating 
the adoption of English financial methods in India.
1 Advice on Indian Affairs, 1855-58
Trevelyan made the most comprehensive statement of his views 
on Indian affairs in 1855* when he was equally preoccupied with the 
investigation of English government departments. Bearing this in 
mind the quality and scope of his evidence before the Select Committee 
on Indian Territories (May and July) and before the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Government of Indian Territories (June) are
1 Trevelyan to Col. Burns, 16 November 1857* T.L.B., XXXVTI, p. 120*
2 Select Committee on East India Produce. Trevelyan was particularly 
concerned to reveal the unfairness that penalized the production
of sugar in India (P.P., I84O, Till, pp. 95-111). A review of 
this Report pointed out that Indian commerce did not exercise 
the same powerful influence as the West Indian sugar interest, 
and therefore stressed the value of Trevelyan's evidence (R.D. 
Mangles ascribed, "Wrongs and Claims on Indian Commerce", The 
Edinburgh Review, LXXII January I84I, pp. 540-383).
- 315 -
all the more remarkable# Trevelyan looked upon himself as someone who
could bring forward the suggestions of others in one consolidated point
of view; he was a self-appointed authority on*6orrect" opinions, equally
happy at marshalling administrative, educational or financial idea# There
was some justification in this attitude in that Indian affairs were little
understood and aroused slight interest in Parliament, where often only
thirty M.P.s bothered to debate them#^
One persuasive concern was to keep Indian affairs independent of
English political considerations; Trevelyan felt that it was particularly
important to protect Indian revenues from English politicians. The only
way to guard against this traditional "Whig" fear was to preserve the
double system of government by the East India Company and by the Board
of Control# Like Macaulay, Trevelyan was convinced that Indian
government needed to be largely autonomous; that India needed to be
governed in India. Yet he realized that to retain the essentials of
the existing system the Company's administration in India would have
to be made less vulnerable to radical attack.
One proposal that Trevelyan supported in this connection was
the introduction of open competition into the East India Company's Civil
Service. This has already been discussed in relation to reforms in the
2
home Civil Service. The continuance, or rather development, of 
English recruitment to the Indian Civil Service coloured Trevelyan's 
approach to the appointment of native Indians to the Civil Service. 
Although he approved in theory of their being given a full range of 
career opportunities, in practice he suggested that their advancement 
should be bounded by "an impalpable elastic line" in order to protect
1 Evidence of 26 May 1853* P.P.* 1852-53, XX7III, p.123.
2 See supra pp. 172-176.
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the interests of English-hom Civil Servants# Repeating what he had 
said twenty years earlier on Indian education, he suggested that the 
revenue departments and judiciary could provide adequate scope for Indian 
ambition* He also envisaged the establishment of English-language 
universities as a means of preparing men for public service#^ This 
was the Indian paradigm of the educational stimulus of open competition*
By contrast, Trevelyan viewed, the English in India in a quasi­
political role, in that they would be of greatest value in detecting 
abuses and in exporting to India some of the improved moral climate that 
he detected in English public life. He even saw merits in limited 
English colonial settlement, asserting that "One stout Englishman is as
good for routing out and exposing abuses in a Judges' or Collectors *
2Court as several thousand Natives*"
In his evidence on financial matters Trevelyan stressed the 
extent to which he believed India could leam from England. He pointed 
out that inefficiency was endemic in India; indeed, that his idol,
Bentinck, had even been temporarily confused into believing that Indian 
revenues were insufficient* According to Trevelyan, solvency was 
possible through the avoidance of expensive wars and by putting the 
supreme government in India more fully in charge of its own finances.
He had faith in the feasibility of grafting the "very perfect and beautiful 
system" of estimate and appropriation onto Indian financial machinery. 
Although India lacked a system of ministerial responsibility and 
parliamentary government, Trevelyan felt that the existing machineiy 
could be made to serve; the governments of the presidencies would
1 Evidence of June 1855, 1852-53, XXXII, p. 159*
2 Ibid*, p.182.
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prepare estimates, these waild he examined by the legislative council 
before being embodied in an Appropriation Act. As a result retrenchment 
rather than taxability could become the watchword of Indian finance.
Of course retrenchment would clearly need to be demonstrated as a way 
of reducing taxation, not just of increasing net revenue. Indeed Indians 
would need to be educated to appreciate the new principle, but once 
the public realized that the government was only demanding "the exact 
degree of sacrifice" that was necessary for the proper administration 
of "üie country, they would accept taxation as a civic duty rather than 
as a burden, much in the same way as United States citizens did. Since 
stable government in England and America was intimately linked with the 
notion of responsible taxation, Trevelyan believed that the same 
principle was the key to ensuring a firm basis for continued English 
rule in India. He also suggested a means of achieving retrenchment 
of expenditure by devolution of many routine administrative functions 
that overburdened the supreme government.^ These twin themes of 
retrenchment and local devolution were to dominate Trevelyan's subsequent 
return to India.
One aspect of Trevelyan's earlier experience in India was 
reinforced and confirmed by his activities at the Treasury. This was 
his use of Press articles as a means of giving currency to what he 
believed were correct views on governmental matters. In his evidence 
to the Select Committee on Indian Territories he described how his 
"Indophilus" letters on internal customs duties and related fiscal matters 
had informed European opinion in India of the governmentb plans and 
had helped to mould opinion. He also made the further points, that in
1 Evidence of 7 July. The answer to the main question rune to twelve 
printed pages, and in it Trevelyan gave a comprehensive picture of 
his views and experience. P.P., 1852-55» XXÏIII, Q.8066, pp. 488- 
500.
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India the Press provided one of the few effective checks on the 
arbitrary action of officials, and that it was invaluable in explaining 
the intentions of the government to the native population. He went 
on to dismiss fears that open discussion could undermine British control 
provided that Civil Servants were free to write to the Press; "The 
whole information of the Government, and the knowledge of the business 
of the Government, resides with them; and they happen to be very apt 
with their pens. It is the character of the Anglo-Indian community 
that they are unpractised in speaking, but are very ready with their 
pen, which makes writing in the newspapers peculiarly suitable to them."^ 
A little earlier another witness, J.C. Marshman, editor of the missionary 
newspaper, Friend of India, had commented on the "Indophilus" letters 
observing that although Bentinck had approved of them in 1855, the 
official attitude had now changed and Civil Servants would no longer be 
permitted to communicate government information to the Press.^ Signif­
icantly for his resumed career in India, Trevelyan preserved the Whig- 
Benthamite tradition of uninhibited use of publicity which he had 
inherited from his first period of service.
2 Governor of Madras, 1859-60
Between 1855 and 1858 Trevelyan continued to offer advice to 
ministers and politicians.^ At the time of the Mutiny he gained greater 
public prominence by readopting his old pseudonym, "Indophilus", for 
a series of letters to The Times. He deplored both the violence of the 
mutineers and the crudely vindictive reaction of English public opinion.
1 Evidence of 28 June, P.P., 1852-55, XXXII, pp.212-214.
2 Evidence of 12 March 1855, P.P., 1852-55, XXVIII, pp.60-6l.
5 Trevelyan to H.B. Seymour, Secretary to the Board of Control, 
22 April I856, T.L.B., XXXVI, p.141; Lord Edward Fitzmaurice, 
The Life of Lord Granville (I905), I, p.269.
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After calling for firm and just re-establishment of British rule, 
he went on to discuss practical means of achieving this, such as the 
development of railways and the improvement of the police force.^ This 
conspicuous and informed interest in Indian affairs may have contributed 
to his being offered the governorship of Madras in January 1859*
The governorship was the kind of appointment usually reserved for 
politicians, and the offering by Lord Stanley, President of the Board of 
Control, was a quid pro quo for appointing a politician to Trevelyan’s 
place at the Treasury. The Economist criticized the appointment on the 
grounds that Trevelyan had left the Indian service twenty years earlier
2and returned over the heads of his Indian Civil Service contemporaries. 
Since Civil SerVants were not normally given governorships the objection 
was scarcely a valid one, and it may have arisen from the editor, James 
Wilson’s pique at Trevelyan’s obtaining such a valuable and influential 
post. (During Palmerston’s administration Wilson had served as Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury and had clashed with Trevelyan on a number of 
occasions.) Certainly with its salary of £12,800 and its power to 
mould Indian policies, the governorship was attractive to Trevelyan, 
who had become increasingly frustrated by his lack of real power at the 
Treasury. Yet for personal reasons Trevelyan did not find it easy to 
accept for it meant leaving his family in England: his son, George 
was at Harrow and his wife felt obliged to remain in order to care for 
the ailing Macaulay. He asked for time to think the matter over and on 
10 January decided to accept the offer, remarking: "In coming to this
3
determination I make a great personal sacrifice but my duty is plain."
1 The Times, 24 September 1857, p. 8 col. e; 25 September 1857, P* 4 col. c. 
These and subsequent letters were later published as The Letters of 
Indophilus to "The Times" (1857)*
2 R.H.W. Blake, Disraeli (1966), p.591; "The Hew Treasury Appointments - Mr, 
Disraeli’s Shifting Scenes", The Economist, 15 January 1859, PP* 57-59*
3 Trevelyan to Stanley, 6 and 10 January 1859, T.L.B., XXX.VIII, p.61.
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His sense of duty was immediately transmuted into the energy with 
which he began to prepare himself for his new post. On 22 January he 
wrote to the retiring governor of Madras to ask for information about 
the merits of his subordinates and for a note on the characters and 
qualities of civil and military officers in the presidency.^ At the 
same time he wrote to Canning, the Governor General, expressing the 
hope that he would prove to be a helpful and obedient governor. On 
his journey to India he devoted himself to the study of blue books on 
Indian affairs.^
A Administrative Reforms
As soon as Trevelyan arrived in Madras on 28 April he embarked 
upon a series of reforms of varying magnitude. On 2 April he started 
by simplifying the paperwork of the Presidency - an obvious reform that 
he had recommended in his evidence to Select Committees. After consulting 
members of the Presidency, he issued a minute abolishing quarterly 
general letters, replacing them by separate letters on important subjects, 
annual administrative reports and printed monthly returns. During the 
remainder of his governorship Trevelyan’s activities ranged from 
standardization of the spelling of native words to the amalgamation of 
the Queen’s and the Company's courts. His energy was as boundless as his 
efforts were far-ranging; unfortunately the more intractable problems 
of Indian finance do not allow him to be judged by this record alone.^
1 Ibid., p. 63.
2 Ibid., p. 63.
3 Trevelyan continued to keep semi-official letter books for the
period from January 1859 to April I865 (six volumes). Their scope
is discussed in M. McRae, "Sir Charles Trevelyan’s Indian Letters, 
1859-65", E.H.R., LXXVII (1962), pp. 706-712.
4 J.D. Bourdillon, Brief Statement of the Principal Measures of Sir 
Charles Trevelyan’s Administration at Madras (Madras, I860), n.p. 
Other reforms included the establishment of a civil police force, 
the reorganization of public works (the low-ranking officers to be 
selected by competitive examination), the imposition of an irrigation 
water rate, the improvement of public parks and reductions in 
military expenditure.
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B Fiscal Problems
The real issue in Indian affairs was the method to be adopted 
to meet the deficit caused by the Mitinyj the first tentative steps 
towards remedying this by imposing increased taxation were being taken 
by the time Trevelyan arrived in India.^ From the outset the new 
governor vigorously opposed these measures by the first of a prolific 
series of minutes. He countered pressure for increased taxation with 
the stock free-trade argument that reduced taxation would encourage 
consumption and thereby indirectly increase revenue. Furthermore he 
stressed the dangers of centralization in the application to Madras 
of fiscal measures that were only appropriate to Bengal. His main 
remedy for the deficit lay in making major reductions in expenditure.
Despite Trevelyan’s claim that he had the support of his own 
presidency government in resisting taxation, the central government 
insisted in July 1859 that an increased salt tax should be levied in 
Madras. This was followed in September by a more far-reaching and 
novel proposal: a Bill for licensing trades and professions. In its 
operation the measure was to include the incomes of many small merchants 
and traders, and Trevelyan was convinced that the introduction of such 
a prevalent tax would inevitably lead to the creation of a large class 
of corrupt officials, and to the encouragement of dishonesty throu^ 
people making false returns: "The experience I have had of the want of 
principle in making returns to the Income Tax even in Christian England, 
makes me exceedingly dread the introduction of such an element of
1 The correspondence and minutes relating to financial measures in 
India and leading up to Trevelyan’s eventual recall from Madras were 
printed as a Commons return (sessional paper 559, continued in 481 
of I860, P.P., I860, XLIX).
2 Ibid.. pp. 250-251, ÎO8-JI3.
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immorality and extortion into a heathen country."^ This emotional
protest went unheeded*
When in June 1859 sn abortive attempt to pass a Parliamentaiy reform
measure resulted in the fall of the Derby administration and the return
of Palmerston, there was no marked change in Indian policy. However
Trevelyan had the advantage of being already acquainted with Sir Charles
Wood, the new Secretary for India, and set about persuading him that more
power should be given to the governors of presidencies to enable them
2
to raise local taxes. This move towards devolution was cut short by 
Trevelyan’s open defiance of the supreme government - a conflict that 
was exacerbated by the fact that the newly appointed Indian Finance 
Minister was Trevelyan's former rival at the Treasury, James Wilson.
C The "Madras Mutiny", March - May I860
Trevelyan had frequently suggested that India needed a good 
financier, and it was ironic that when it was decided to establish 
the post of Indian Finance Minister the choice should have fallen upon 
James Wilson, the founder of The Economist and a former Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, where he had strongly opposed Trevelyan’s 
reorganization plans. Despite some suspicion on Wilson’s part, relations 
were initially cordial and Trevelyan was encouraged to embark on the 
reform of the Commissariat, Audit and Pay Departments. Yet it proved 
difficult to discourage him from continuing his ominous criticisms of
5
fiscal policy#
Wilson, like Trevelyan, disapproved of the Licensing Bill, but
1 Ibid., pp. 298-302.
2 Wood to Trevelyan, 10 February I860, Wood Papers, quoted in E.J.
Moore, Sir Charles Wood’s Indian Policy 1853-66 (Manchester, 1966), 
p. 58.
5 Wilson to Wood, 11 July 1859; Wilson to Trevelyan, 9 December 1859, 
quoted in E.I. Barrington, The Servant of All (1927), II, PP« 170-178, 
208-209.
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a brief study of the gravity of the Indian financial situation led him
to propose a solution that was totally different from Trevelyan’s* He
finally elaborated his remedy for the annual deficit of £10 million in
his budget presented on 18 February I860. He planned to clear this
deficit with three new taxes. Firstly, he modified the proposed licensing
system by prescribing three rates of tax; one percent on artisa.ns and
small manufacturers (small farmers were to be totally excluded from its
scope); four percent on shopkeepers; and ten percent on wholesale traders
and men in the professions. Secondly he instituted an income tax for
five years at two levels; on incomes over 200 rupees per year at two
percent and on those over 500 rupees at four percent - one percent of
the latter to be devoted to local purposes. Wilson felt that in this
way the rich landowners would be made to contribute a fair proportion
and he was insistent that there should be no privileges and exceptions*
The third tax was one on home-grown tobacco, to be imposed at a rate
equivalent to the import duty*^
Trevelyan’s reaction was predictable. He had been sent a copy
of Wilson's speech and ten days later, on 20 March, he drafted a minute
announcing his refusal to collect income tax in the Madras presidency*
For Trevelyan the issue had become a moral one; "This crisis is more
pregnant with portentous results of good and evil than any which has
occurred within the memory of the present generation." Trevelyan doubted
whether, in attempting to impose income tax, the government had leamt
anything from the Mutiny* He observed that Wilson’s speech had been
masterly in a Gladstonian way but quite inappropriate, since -tile Indian
2
people lacked any kind of representation. As soon as he saw the minute
1 P.P., 1860, XLIX, pp. 318-338,
2 Ibid,, p. 354,
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Wilson sensed that Trevelyan might make some rash public gesture
of defiance in order to make his opposition more effective• On 5 April
Trevelyan was in fact warned by telegram against taking any action
that might make the supreme government’s task more difficult, but
despite this he decided on his own responsibility to have published in
the Press his own defiant minute, together with those written by members
of his government who were also opposed to increased taxation.^ It is
certain that Trevelyan had not fully calculated the consequences of his
defiance, and that this failure was in part due to the absence of his
2
wife’s moderating influence. Trevelyan had also failed to realize that 
the speeding up of communication by the introduction of the telegraph 
had made it less easy to defy the Suprane Government or the authorities 
in England with impunity. Reaction was swift. The other members of 
the presidency who had been unwittingly involved through the publication 
of their minutes dissociated themselves from Trevelyan.^ The Supreme 
Government, although momentarily taken by surprise, was determined to 
reassert its authority, and Canning had no hesitation in asking Wood 
that Trevelyan should be recalled.^ Wood, although he personally 
regretted the necessity, had no hesitation in agreeing, and Trevelyan
5
was recalled on 10 May. Trevelyan had in fact totally miscalculated 
the situation in not realizing that his own removal from office was 
essential if Wilson’s credibility as finance minister were to be 
preserved. Indeed Trevelyan remained entirely unrepentant in the
1 Ibid.. p. 372,
2 Macaulay’s Journal, 5 June 1859* "As Hannah justly says, Trevelyan
has all his life been saying and doing rash things, and yet has
always got out of his scrapes." Quoted in G.M. Trevelyan, Sir 
G,0, Trevelyan, A Memoir (1932), p,51*
3 Ibid., p. 374,
4 M. Maclagan, Clemency Canning (1962), p, 261.
5 P,P,, I860, XLIX, pp. 376-377.
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time that remained to him as governor due to the slowness of
communioations between India and England. In a minute of 1 May he
even ventured to discuss what he felt were the constitutional issues
involved in the dispute over income tax*
In complaining of the opposition of this Government ^Madras/, Mr.
Wilson entirely mistakes the relations of the local and central
governments in matters of legislation. In respect to the passing
of a particular measure, we owe to the Government of India, not
support, but sound and faithful advice. The Legislative Council
of India is a free deliberative assembly. Its constitution and
powers have been carefully arranged on that principle. It stands
in the place of the local legislature which this Presidency
formerly had; the difference being that instead of taking a
direct part in legislation, as this government formerly did, we
act through a representative. The Executive Council has silenced
that representative, and it has therefore become necessary for
us to speak on our own behalf. The answer ought to be as public
as Mr* Wilson’s speech. The pretension that any one should
monopolise free speaking and discussion, has never before been
heard of in the British empire in the memory of the present 
1
generation.
Trevelyan’s new ifele as constitutional watchdog was a logical development
2
of his claim to defend the interests of India. Canning took a less
1 Ibid#, p* 426. Wood originally intended to abolish the Legislative 
Council and to devolve its local legislative and fiscal functions 
to presidency councils; Trevelyan’s action discouraged this 
possibility end led to attempts to remodel the Council as a supreme 
legislative and taxing body (Moore, op. cit. p. 59)»
2 Trevelyan’s view of himself was shared by at least one reviewer who 
numbered him among an illustrious series of governors who had fallen 
from favour, including Bentinck and Ellenborou^. ^.M. Ludlow/, 
"Sir Charles Trevelyan and Mr. Wilson", Macmillan’s Magrazine, II,
(i860), pp. 164-168.
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charitable view of Trevelyan’s attitude in a letter to Granville*
"And yet I don’t think that dishonesty or trickiness are features of
his character. I believe Vanity is at the bottom of his doings. Ee
had conceived such an overweening estimate of his own power, judgement
and capacity for rule, that he considers every way of bringing about
his own views to be allowable."^
Wilson did not conceal his pleasure at Trevelyan’s recall. He
observed to his son-in-law, Walter Bagehot, that the embarrassment caused
by Trevelyan’s indiscretion was well worth the opportunity to get rid
of him. He attributed Trevelyan’s main failing to his passion for having
his own pronouncements published under his own signature* "that unhappy
personal characteristic to all public proceedings which Trevelyan
could not resist; the passion of seeing /sic/ C.E. Trevelyan to documents
2
has been his ruin." With Trevelyan disposed of, Wilson was able to 
continue the construction of a new financial system -a task that was 
prematurely cut short by his death in the following August.
3 Finance Minister, 1862-65
Trevelyan’s indignation at his recall was tempered by the knowledge 
that his less controversial activities had not passed unappreciated. Sir 
Char lés Wood had gone beyond the usual forms of official politeness in 
thanking him for the reforms he had accomplished while at the same time 
dismissing him.^ Furthermore Trevelyan’s opposition to income tax had 
made him a popular hero in Madras, and before his departure he was 
presented with a series of laudatory addresses from the European and 
native sections of the communiiy.^ Partly encouraged by this favourable
1 Canning to Granville, 12 June I860, quoted in Maclagan, p. 262.
2 Wilson to Bagehot, 4 July I860, quoted in Barrington, II, p. 252. 
Trevelyan had been guilty of an earlier indiscretion in leaking to
the Madras Athenaeum (30 April I860) a minute proposing the amalgamation 
of the Supreme and Sudder courts (Maclagan, loc. cit.).
3 P.P., 1860, XLIX, pp. 376-377.
4 Addresses presented ta..Sir Charles Trevelyan ... (Madras, I860).
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climate of opinion, Trevelyan wrote an apologia in which he justified 
his defiance of the central government on the grounds that it was 
pursuing a hazardous policy in increasing taxation*^
Trevelyan’s eventual vindication, however, was less due to his 
own efforts than to the failure of Wilson's successor, Samuel Laing 
(a former Financial Secretary to the Treasury), to co-operate with Sir 
Charles Wood# The latter was anxious that all of Wilson's policies should 
be continued, but Laing resisted Wood’s pressure to bring the licence
duty into force. Furthermore, Wood was dissatisfied with the way in which
\Laing had approached the problem of establishing a paper currency. He
was also incensed at Laing’s attempts to court popularity both in India 
2
and England. Hot surprisingly, therefore. Wood was far from soriy when
Laing was obliged to resign through ill-health in the summer of 1862.
Wood was more than ever anxious to achieve his policy of stabilizing
Indian finances, and he now sought a thorou^ly reliable man: "a gentle-
%
man who will not play tricks".^ Trevelyan, who had for some time been 
pestering for another appointment, was his rather surprising choice.^
Hot surprisingly the appointment was bitterly attacked in The 
Economist by Bagehot, incensed at the slight done to his father-in-law’s 
memory. He made a telling attack on Trevelyan’s propensity for meddling 
and for usurping the powers of his superiors. On fiscal matters Bagehot 
urged that income tax should be retained in preference to the introduction 
of protective duties.^ Wood saw fit to send him a personal reply with 
the assurance that Trevelyan had learned his lesson and that Wilson’s
1 Statement by Sir Charles Trevelyan on the Circimstances connected 
with his recall from the Government of Madras (i860), nn. 5-6.
2 Moore, on. cit.. pp. 230-231.
3 Wood to Ellice, 26 July 1862, quoted in ibid., p. 231.
4 Trevelyan to Wood, 4 May 1861, cited in ibid., loc. cit.
5 The Economist:. 8 Hovember 1862, pp. 1233-1234*
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income tax would be allowed to run for its five year term.^ Yet it
must be admitted that Wood himself lacked confidence in income tax -
an attitude that was in part due to his difficulties in renewing English
income tax in I848 and I85I - and that Trevelyan was in fact morally
and emotionally committed to its complete abolition. To an increasing
extent, Trevelyan became the victim of his own naive financial confidence.
On the way to Calcutta he was feted at Madras by illuminations and greeted
by addresses which vindicated his own earlier defiance of the central
government in terms of over optimistic forecasts of falling public
2
expenditure and rising private income. Almost predictably Trevelyan
made a token attack on income tax in his first budget, vÆien he reduced
the maximum rate from four to three percent. Although Wood disapproved,
he did not attempt to force an issue with Trevelyan. Rather than attempt
to preserve income tax in its existing form. Wood was concerned to revive
the idea of a licence duty and to plan for the continuance of income tax
on a local basis. Fortified by his deep-seated aversion of any extension
of fiscal bureaucracy, Trevelyan did nothing to implement Wood’s policy.
On the contrary, when income tax was due to expire, he persuaded the
Supreme Council not to renew it. In his budget of April I865, Trevelyan
was obliged to make good the resulting deficit by means of export duties
and the floating of a loan of £1.2 million. Both measures were an
admission that Trevelyan’s fiscal policy had failed, and Wood rejected
both of them. This disastrous budget was Trevelyan's last major work
as Finance Minister, as he was obliged to retire for health reasons
3
shortly afterwards.
Trevelyan’s failure to put Indian finances on a permanently sound
1 Wood to Bagehot, 28 Hovember 1862, quoted in Barrington, op. cit. 
II, pp. 258-259.
2 The Trevelyan Meeting (Madras, I860), n.p.
5 Moore, op» cit.» pp. 245-248.
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footing was an indication of his own limitations when confronted with 
the enormous problems of reinvigorating Indian government and society 
in the years following the Mutiny. The failure would have been excusable 
if it had been accompanied by an appropriate sense of humility in the 
face of the delicate task of balancing solvency with the preservation of 
public goodwill. Instead Trevelyan's simplistic overconfidence that he 
inherited from his earlier service in India in the 1820s, appeared totally 
unrealistic in the sixties. Trevelyan felt that it was sufficient to.reduce 
the cost of the army and to avoid wars of annexation. While interested in 
the development of railways and the expansion of education, he did not 
accept that they could only be adequately financed by heavy taxation. He 
never felt the need to revise this position. In his last pronouncement on 
the subject before the Select Committee on East India Finance in 1873» he 
spoke exclusively of the need to keep down expenditure and of his efforts 
in applying to India the Treasury's rules about the preparation of estimates.^
Conclusion
India partly provided the clear field for Trevelyan's energies that 
he so desperately needed and had so long awaited. Yet this freedom quickly 
revealed the limitations of Trevelyan's imagination and his ability as a 
negotiator. While at Madras he was able to engage in a series of successful 
minor reforms, he ran into great difficulties in the more complex field 
of fiscal reform. His earlier experience of the corruption of Indian tax 
collectors made him suspicious of any attempts to create new tax machinery. 
This ingrained attitude, combined with his enthusiasm for reduction of 
expenditure, forced him into direct conflict with the Suprane Government 
over income tax. Yet he not only survived the humiliation of his recall, 
but enjoyed the vindication of his later appointment as Finance Minister.
He eventually got his own way over ending income tax because Sir Charles 
Wood shared his mistrust. What constituted for Trevelyan his final "victory"
I Trevelyan's evidence of 25 February 1873» P.P., 1873» XII, p. 89.
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in public service was for India the failure to obtain a taxation 
system to meet the cost of railways, education and public works.
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Chapter XI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RETROSPECT
Trevelyan's position in the history of nineteenth-century British 
administration can best be evaluated in the interaction between his Indian 
career and the political and administrative situation that he encountered 
on taking up his post at the Treasury. This interaction gives him a 
unique position in the development of the Civil Service and also explains 
many of the frustrations and limitations of his career.
Trevelyan obtained in India a totally different perception of official 
duties from those of his contemporaries in English government departments.
Like most East India Company Civil Servants he assumed an independent 
attitude that stemmed from the necessity of working without immediate reference 
to a political superior, and from the awareness of being one of a small 
minority of administrators working amid an alien population of 1^0 millions. 
Trevelyan gave early proof of his preparedness to take independent action - 
independent even of official superiors - in his handling of the Colebrooke 
scandal. This episode might be regarded as an exceptional exercise in youth­
ful zeal, if the same degree of enthusiasm in pursuing "right" objectives, 
regardless of the means employed, had not also characterized Trevelyan's 
subsequent activities. Furthermore, the same attitude was shared at the 
highest level, where Bentinck, and later Macaulay, as member of the Supreme 
Council, effectively defied the Board of Control and the Directors in 
abolishing internal customs duties and anglicizing Indian education by means 
of a series of faits accomplis. These well-intentioned, but conspiratorial, 
triumphs were sustained by confident optimism, which was in turn based on a 
combination of evangelical fervour, radical impatience with outdated methods 
and institutions, and a Whig sense of mission to rule. Furthermore, the
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frequency with which Trevelyan found himself on the winning side in Indian 
affairs made him arrogant and unwilling to see the need for compromise.
This background was inappropriate to the post of Assistant Secretary 
to the Treasury, where it was essential to work within the confines of 
routine with only occasional excursions into consideration of policy 
and executive action. Inevitably Trevelyan was disappointed and frustrated 
by his inability to change the situation. For example, in the remodelling 
of the Treasury in l848 and I856 Trevelyan's wish to create an "intellectual" 
administrative élite was largely ignored by his political superiors in the 
interests of maintaining harmony within the office. As to financial control 
by the Treasury, Trevelyan's influence was inversely proportional to the 
political status of the department concerned. While the estimates of the 
War Office and the Foreign Office remained immune from serious scrutiny, it 
was open to Trevelyan to harrass a politically vulnerable department like the 
General Board of Health.
Given this limited scope it is not surprising that Trevelyan relished 
the exceptional opportunities offered by Irish Famine relief and later 
by the investigation of government departments. His two-year control of 
Irish operations was due both to his position as executive head of the 
Commissariat - the department that provided most of the key personnel and 
over which Trevelyan exercised close personal control - and to the good 
working relationship that he established with a fellow Whig, Sir Charles 
Wood. As in India, he was able to mould policy and to supervise its detailed 
implementation. Being in full agreement with Wood on a policy of minimum 
government involvement, Trevelyan was given a free hand. By contrast with 
this exceptional activity, the investigation of departments was a traditional 
Treasury function. It was one that gave Trevelyan the satisfaction of
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collecting evidence, making judgments and writing reports - all tasks 
in which he had excelled in India. Gladstone gave this added significance 
by asking Trevelyan to draw general conclusions and to make recommendations 
for improving the quality of Civil Servants. Originally Trevelyan's 
emphasis had been on the division of labour between "intellectual" and 
"mechanical" labour through separate recruitment for each category - a 
distinction which appeared to make sense in the Treasury and which, he 
suggested, could be applied to all departments. First appointments were 
a secondary consideration and were to be made under more carefully 
controlled political patronage. Gladstone completely changed the emphasis 
by urging open competition for all first appointments. Trevelyan adopted 
this novel concept as his own, but in the process of doing so he made Civil 
Service reform more doctrinaire and less politically palatable. Sadly for 
Trevelyan, Gladstone's bold gesture was in advance of political opinion, 
and it merely served to raise false hopes of an administrative, social 
and educational millenium in the minds of Trevelyan and his educationist 
supporters.
In matters of general public concern Trevelyan had already in India 
made use of the Press to make preliminary soundings on reactions to 
government policy. His Indophilus letters on internal customs and Indian 
education had been given Bentinck's blessing, and in the absence of an 
Indian legislature such letters provided a forum for discussion, even if 
a limited and partisan one. Trevelyan never accepted that this technique 
was inappropriate in England. Apart from occasional pseudonymous letters 
which brought him into conflict with his political superiors, his main use 
of Press publicity was to encourage Civil Service reform. Believing that 
the country was on the threshold of a significant moral and educational 
change, he felt that the Northcote-Trevelyan proposals should reach a wide
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public. With its large circulation The Times was an ideal medium, and 
the leak of the proposals and the ensuing correspondence doubtless aroused 
public interest. Yet of greater significance was the way in which the 
tone of the report's criticisms estranged many Civil Servants and prompted 
resistance from the Whig members of the Aberdeen coalition. Gladstone was 
clearly embarrassed by Trevelyan's conduct of this episode, and more might 
have been achieved in the short-term if polemical publicity had been avoided.
Trevelyan's use of the Press also indicated his inability to appreciate 
political realities, particularly the subtle balance of interests within the 
Aberdeen coalition. The period between l846 and I868 has been described as 
a period of indecision, and in this context the failure to establish open 
competition is not surprising.^ Both open competition and the abolition 
of the purchase of military commissions - another reform to which Trevelyan 
attached great social and administrative importance - were achieved by 
Gladstone when he eventually found himself in control of a strong Liberal 
administration.
The personal notoriety that Trevelyan acquired in connection with 
Civil Service reform is analogous to the reputations gained by reformers 
in other fields, like Chadwick and Kay Shuttleworth. Like them Trevelyan 
had no wish to be," in Stephen's phrase, "a statesman in disguise". 
Paradoxically however, the stronger government that later made Gladstone's 
reforms possible, also made it less possible for a Civil Servant to acquire 
quasi-political prominence. Trevelyan's unique position in the evolution 
of the Civil Service was partly a product of the instability, which in turn 
prevented the realization of reforms that appeared both opportune and 
tantalizingly within his grasp. The subsequent development within the
1 George Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England (I962), pp. 42-45.
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Civil Service of political and anonymous professionalism ensured 
Trevelyan’s uniqueness.
In part Trevelyan's i^ecial position was due to the evolution of 
the distinction between the political and permanent servants of the Crown. 
While the main demarcation had been established in the period between I78O and 
1830, transfer between the political and permanent categories was not 
unusual, and Trevelyan's successor as Assistant Secretary was a former 
M.P. Trevelyan himself thought in terras of transition between administrative 
and political functions, suggesting that the higher level "intellectual" 
posts in the Civil Service might provide training in public business for 
prospective politicians. If this had ever been normal the evolution of 
constitutional bureaucracy as an adjunct of constitutional monarchy might 
never have occurred.
Trevelyan's economic principles constitute an important link between 
India and England. Probably inspired by his education at Haileybury, he 
was an ardent exponent of Free Trade, being particularly emphatic in his 
opposition to any form of government interference in free markets. Only 
in India did he have occasion to write reports specifically on the subject 
but his attitude is equally apparent in his semi-official letters written 
at the time of the Irish famine, when his laissez-faire views were of a 
rigour and intensity that was surprising even for the l840s. He was 
concerned that relief should be confined to those who were actually on 
the point of starvation. Furthermore he was convinced that any government 
intervention in the free market in corn would lead to irreversible economic 
ruin. Indeed starvation would almost be preferable to relief if it 
were interpreted as an expression of God's will and stirred the Irish to
1 Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (1969), p.49.
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solve their agrarian problems by emigration and improved agricultural 
methods. Trevelyan's ally in this was the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Sir Charles Wood, whose suspicion of exceptional government activity 
undermined his own confidence in his income tax proposals in the budget 
of l848. Trevelyan also shared his chief's aversion to income tax - a 
sentiment with profound consequences for his later service in India.
Trevelyan sustained his social and economic ideas after his final 
retirement through involvement in the Society for Organizing Charitable 
Relief and Repressing Mendicity (later renamed as the Charity Organization 
Society). He devoted his pamphleteering skills to the evils of indiscriminate 
charity and to the refinement of techniques for distinguishing between the 
deserving and undeserving poor.^ In effect, this was a transposition of 
his own d;hos of the morally distinguishing quality of individual effort.
This oversimple outlook pervaded Trevelyan's career. In his brother- 
in-law, Macaulay, it had been castigated as "cocksureness", and perhaps 
it could best be described as a form of secularised evangelicalism. While 
there is little evidence about the strength of Trevelyan's convictions, 
there is no doubt about his belief in the perfectability of human institutions 
and the importance of his own mission in this process. This belief served to 
convert brusqueness and insensitivity into an overbearing manner towards 
colleagues.
Lacking the tact that might have made an outsider acceptable Trevelyan 
found that he was unpopular with his colleagues in England. In the Treasury 
his overall supervisory function offered little scope for his energies.
Only in his management of the Commissariat, which was directly responsible
i G.E. Trevelyan, "Charity Electioneering", Macmillan's Magazine, XXIX 
(1874), pp. I7I-I76. See also British Library catalogue for a list of 
Trevelyan's letters, addresses and pamphlets from 187O onwards.
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to the Assistant Secretary, did he have an area of administrative autonomy.
Here he had the satisfaction of establishing strict monitorial control over
Commissariat officers serving at foreign stations. He delighted in
rewarding their merits by means of promotion or favourable posting, and in
reproving them for their shortcomings. In this Civil Service in microcosm
Trevelyan felt that he had developed techniques of personnel management
(probation records, regular promotion reviews etc.) which, he felt, could
be usefully applied to the Civil Service in general. Although his 
/
Commissariat officers were obliged to endure Trevelyan's schoolmasterlike 
manner, they appear to have appreciated his detailed interest in their 
work and his sense of fairness. Yet even here Trevelyan remained more 
concerned with economy than the development of the service - and hence the 
improvement of career opportunities.
Trevelyan's obsession with economy and retrenchment coupled with 
his intemperate manner provide the key to the final stage of his public 
career. His avowed affection for India and sustained comment on her 
affairs led him to accept the offer of the governorship of Madras in 1859- 
He particularly hoped to help in the task of reconstruction after the 
Mutiny, and he was optimistic about introducing improved English techniques 
of estimate and audit as a first step towards fiscal stability. He was 
equally concerned to achieve reductions in government, and in particular 
military, expenditure. These activities were cut short by the crisis over 
income tax. No longer in a post with so many obvious constraints and lacking 
his wife's moderating influence he came into open conflict with the supreme 
government. For Trevelyan it was particularly unfortunate that the recently 
appointed Finance Minister was James Wilson, with whom he had earlier clashed 
at the Treasury. Having learnt little about the hazards of using the Press
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as a weapon, despite the problems he had encountered in England, Trevelyan 
hoped that by printing the texts of official telegrams he would prevent 
the imposition of the tax on his presidency. Instead of being shamed 
into surrender by Trevelyan’s appeal to public opinion, the Governor 
General promptly requested Trevelyan's recall. Trevelyan remained unrep­
entant, and he eventually vindicated himself by later being appointed 
finance minister, and in allowing income tax to lapse. The price of this 
personal vindication was a large deficit for his successors, and a 
doubtful ending to his public service.
Throughout Trevelyan's career enthusiasm and promise is offset 
by rashness and failure. Coming to the Treasury after distinguished 
service in India, he found insufficient scope for his energy and talents. 
Only in specific areas of activity, such as management of the Commissariat, 
the supervision of Irish relief and the reform of the Civil Service, did 
he obtain personal satisfaction and acquire distinction. Operating at a 
time before the tradition of Civil Service anonymity had become established, 
he relished publicity and thus his name became lastingly associated with 
the Northcote-Trevelyan report and the eventual evolution of a Civil 
Service based on the twin principles of division of labour and open 
competition.
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Appendix
The 1854 C iv i l  S e r v ic e  Appointm ents " B ill"
; Source: B r i t i s h  L ib rary , Chadwick T r a c ts , CT 277 (4a).
;For Regulating the Appointment of Clerks ; 
: in. the Civil. Service.-
; ' ' B e it enacted/ & o.. v '
as follows : ; - “ • • • •. . j
1. Her Majesty and her successors may from time to time appoint three Board of Ex-
amincrs#
•.competent persons to he a Board of Examiners of candidates for appoint­
ment as Clerks in the Civil Service, and may from time to time remove ;
. ‘ ■ any such person. ■ • , • \  ■
r • • 2.- The Board of Examiners may from time to time appoint a Secretary-Their offi-
■ . ... and a Registrar and so many Assistant Examiners Clerks Messengers and 
Servants as may he approved hy the Lords of Her Majesty’s Treasury, and 
may from time to time remove any such Secretary Registrar Assistant 
/  . .Examiner Clerk Messenger or Servaht. -
II.
3. The Board of Examiners shall from time, to time-frame a scheme •Examination 
of examination and regulations'for the purpose of ascertaining the natural to compete, 
ability and rudimentary acquirements to he required as a qualification for •
, admission to compete for employment in the Civil Service. ••
They shall once at least in every year causé a description of the exist- . 
ing scheme of such examination, to he published in the London Gazette,”- . 
j . 4. They shall from time to time appoint convenient places in England : .
, Scotland and Ireland for making such examinations.
.They shall on the 1st of January and 1st of July in every year give 
: notice in the “ London Gazette’’ of the times and places at which such 
.examinations win he made during the ensuing half-year.
They shall direct one or more of the Assistant Examiners to attend at ■
. such time and place to make such examination. .
5. Every male subject of Her Majesty, who has not been dismissed from ■
: any branch of the public service, may present himself at any .such time and . ' ‘
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place for examination and shall be then and there examined according 
to the regulations of the Board.
If any person so examined shows thereby that he has the qualifications 
required to admit him to compete for employment in the Civil Service he 
may require and the Assistant Examiner shall deliver to him a certificate 
of the same. ,
6. The Board shall cause a register to be kept of the names descrip­
tions and addresses of all persons so admitted to compete.
III.
Compétitive 7. The Board of Examiners shall from time to time by inquiry of the 
Examination, g£ departments ascertain the special qualifications required
for the service of each office or department or of any particular branch or 
division thereof :
They shall from time to time frame a scheme of a series of com­
petitive examinations for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifications 
of candidates for clerkships in the civil service :
General,— • ' And the first class of such series shall be framed with a view to 
ascertain the general qualifications of candidates : and the other classes 
Special. of such seiies shall be framed with a view to ascertain the special 
. . qualifications required in clerks in particular departments or divisions of
the civil service :
And in every class of such series a number of marks shall be fixed 
for the maximum of excellence in respect of each subject of examination 
and a number of marks constituting the minimum of qualification :
They shall on the 1st of January in every year and so often as 
'the scheme of competitive examination is altered cause to be published in 
'.the “ London Gazette” a copy of such scheme.
'■ 8. They shall on the 1st of January in every year give notice in the
“ London Gazette” of the places and times appointed for such examinations : 
They shall conduct the examination of all persons who duly present 
themselves for competitive examination in some place to which the public 
may freely resort :
They may for the purpose of examination in any special class be 
assisted by any person or persons whom they may think proper.
9. Every person who has obtained a certificate of admissibility to com­
pete may present himself at any such place and time for examination ; and 
ho may require to bo examined as to his qualifications in any particular 
■ class or classes exclusively ;
And if on such examination he obtain a number of marks equal to 
that fixed as the minimum of qualification the Board of Examiners shall 
enter his name description and address on the register of candidates
Ilf
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for appointment as clerks in the civil service, with the number of marks 
obtained by him on examination and the class or classes in which they 
were so obtained ; and shall deliver to him a certificate of the same under 
their hands.
10. The Board shall keep a register of all persons who have passed the 
competitive examination distinguishing the classes in'w hich they have 
passed and the number of marks obtained in each class respectively ;
The Board shall keep a register of the address of every such person 
so long as such person remains on the list of candidates and until he has 
accepted of some probationary, or other appointment in the civil service ; 
and whenever such person gives notice to the Board of any change in his 
address they shall cause such change to be made in the register accordingly.
IV.
11. After the first competitive examination under this Act' whenever it A^ poiutl 
becomes necessary to appoint a clerk in any office or department maintained SVrksiiips in 
by funds provided by Parliament (including the civil departments of the
army and navy,) unless some person previously employed in the public ;
service be appointed as such clerk, the head of such office or department 
shall notify the same to the Board of Examiners, and shall state whether 
the qualifications required in the clerk to be appointed be general or special, 
and if they be special of what class : • .
And the Board of Examiners shall thereupon by letter directed to the ‘ •
address from time to time given by each candidate, or otherwise, offer such 
appointment to that person on the register of candidates who has obtained ■. •
the greatest number of marks in the class from which the appointment is , . 
required to be made ; and if the same be not accepted by such person within •
days, then to the person on the register who has obtained the ' , . .
next greatest number of marks ; and so on in succession : ' '
And if no person in the class for whom the appointment is required 
to be made accept the same, such appointment shall be thrown open to all ■ • 
those persons who have passed a competitive examination, and every such '
person may claim such appointment; and the Board shall cause notice ' '
thereof to be exhibited publicly in some place open to all candidates : and 
if more than one such person make such claim, that person who has received 
the greatest number of marks shall be entitled to be appointed: and if 
amongst such persons there be two or more who have obtained an equal 
number of marks, they shall be re-examined in respect of the subjects of 
examination of the class from which the appointment was first required ' 
to be made : and any one member of the Board may conduct such exami­
nation : and the person who at such examination obtains the greatest '
number of marks, shall be entitled to the appointment. • .
/
- 342 -
4
Saving of 
powers of 
iïoads of 
ofIiccs,-&c.
V .
Annual
Roi)ort.
VI.
No officer 
under this 
Act to sit in 
Parliament.
12. I f  any candidate accept of such, appointment he shall ho appointed 
on probation for one year but he may be dismissed during such year for 
incompetency or improper conduct, ,
When any person has so received an appointment, the same shall be 
entered in the Register of Candidates, and he shall be no longer deemed 
a candidate for appointment. ' .
■ 13. But in case any person having received an appointment resign the 
same, if he produce a certificate of good conduct from the head of the 
office or department to which he was so appointed, he may present himself 
again for any competitive examination, and if he pass the same shall be again 
entered on the Register of Candidates accordingly.
14. Provided always that nothing in this Act contained shall alter or 
affect the powers of any head of any office or department or other person, 
to regulate the duties; and promotions of ; clerks therein or their suspension 
or dismissal therefrom! . ^
15. The Board of Examiners shall on,-the . . . in every year
make a report in writing of their. proceedings, during the year preceding, 
•under this act : and shall include therein a list of the names descriptions 
and addresses of all persons who within the year have passed a competitive 
examination distinguishing the class or classes passed and the total numbev 
of marks obtained by each person : ■ '• • ; - •
And also a list of all persons who having passed an examination under 
this Act, have-within the year accepted any appointment under .the  
provisions of this act. .. ’ ; • : ‘ ;
16.. No  .Examiner, Assistant Examiner,' Secretary, or Registrar ap­
pointed under this Act shall be competent to be elected or to sit or serve in 
' the Commons ,House of Parliament.- n ; ' • ' • • ' -
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